EU written comments on the reports of Terrestrial and Aquatic Animal Health Standard Commission meetings of September 2009, with reference to the Chapters in the OIE Terrestrial and Aquatic Codes, which will be for discussion at their next meetings in February 2010. – Coordination of the EU position

Inhoud

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COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 18 December 2009

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OUTCOME OF PROCEEDINGS

from:

on:

Subject :

Working Party of Chief Veterinary Officers 8 December 2009

EU written comments on the reports of Terrestrial and Aquatic Animal Health Standard Commission meetings of September 2009, with reference to the Chapters in the OIE Terrestrial and Aquatic Codes, which will be for discussion at their next meetings in February 2010. – Coordination of the EU position

  • 1. 
    On the basis of the draft comments provided by the Commission, the Working Party of Chief Veterinary Officers met on 8 December 2009 to agree on a EU position.

2.

The discussion led to the following conclusions:

(a) The Presidency stated that there was an agreement on the texts under examination, as amended at the meeting and that this final version could be forwarded to the OIE1.

The final version of the EU comments is presented in the Annexes.

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(b) The Working Party adhered to the position traditionally adopted in favour of forwarding letters signed jointly by the Presidency and the Commission to communicate to the OIE the comments to be made on behalf of the Member States1.

1         The Commission representative asked that the following statement be entered in the outcome of proceedings:

"The Commission considers that the procedure followed for forwarding the EU comments to the World Organisation for Animal Health (both by the Presidency, on behalf of the Member States, and by the Commission) does not correspond to the procedures usually followed in similar cases (notably in the case of the Codex Alimentarius). The fact that the EU only has observer status with an international organisation does not prevent the Commission on its own from forwarding the EU comments.

The Commission accordingly considers that the procedure followed in the case in question cannot constitute a precedent likely to be invoked for forthcoming OIE sessions or in other similar circumstances".

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Original: English September 2009

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 7–18 September 2009

The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (the Code Commission) met at the OIE Headquarters in Paris from 7 to 18 September 2009.

The members of the Code Commission are listed in Annex I and the agenda adopted is in Annex II.

The Code Commission reviewed the documents identified in the agenda, addressing comments that Members had submitted by August 7 2009 and amended texts in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (the Terrestrial Code) where appropriate. The amendments are shown in the usual manner by double underline and strikeout and may be found in the Annexes to the report. In Annexes XI (collection and processing of laboratory rodent and rabbit embryos /ova), XVIII (Anthrax) and XX (foot and mouth disease), the amendments made at this meeting (September 2009) are shown with a coloured background to distinguish them from those made prior to the 77th OIE General Session in May 2009.

Members should note that, unless stated otherwise, texts submitted for comment may be proposed for adoption at the 78th OIE General Session. Depending on the comments received on each text, the Code Commission will identify the texts proposed for adoption in May 2010 in the report of its February 2010 meeting.

The Code Commission strongly encourages Members to participate in the development of the OIE’s international standards by submitting comments on this report. It would be very helpful if comments were submitted as specific proposed text changes, supported by a scientific rationale. Proposed deletions should be indicated in ‘strikeout’ and proposed additions with ‘double underline’. Members should not use the automatic ‘track-change’ function provided by word processing software as such changes are lost in the process of collating Members’ submissions into the Code Commission’s working documents. Comments on this report must reach OIE Headquarters by 8 January 2010 to be considered at the 8 February 2010 meeting of the Code Commission. Comments should be sent to the International Trade Department at: trade.dept@oie.int.

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A. MEETING WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

The Code Commission met with Dr Vallat and discussed a number of important issues.

Standards and guidelines of the OIE: In response to Members’ questions and to avoid confusion, it was decided that all texts in the Codes and Manuals would be considered to be ‘standards’ while texts found outside the Codes and Manuals (for example, on the OIE internet site) would be considered as ‘guidelines’ or ‘recommendations’.

Delisted diseases: the joint meeting discussed and agreed that all chapters and references to diseases no longer listed by the OIE should be removed from the Code. Relevant information on delisted diseases could be maintained in other locations (e.g. on the OIE internet site) but unless these were updated regularly they could become obsolete. However, Dr Vallat noted that references to delisted diseases could be maintained in the Manuals as Members could find this information useful and relevant. The following disease chapters were proposed for deletion (see Annex XXXIII):

Chapter 11.4.      Bovine cysticercosis

Chapter 11.10.    Dermatophilosis

Chapter 12.4.      Epizootic lymphangitis

Chapter 12.12.    Horse mange

Chapter 12.13.    Horse pox

Chapter 15.2.      Atrophic rhinitis of swine

Chapter 15.6.      Teschovirus encephalomyelitis.

On the recognition of country/zone freedom from equine diseases, Dr Vallat noted that an ad hoc group under the SCAD would be convened to address the issue of disease freedom on a disease by disease basis. He also indicated that the ad hoc Group would start with African horse sickness and could then consider glanders.

On the issue of commodity based trade, Dr Vallat emphasised that this is a priority for the OIE and encouraged the Code Commission to continue working on this issue.

Dr Vallat noted that bee diseases are of increasing concern because of the implications for food production and the environment. He noted that an ad hoc group would be convened to review the existing disease chapters to ensure that they address all relevant issues.

The Code Commission examined the Draft 5th Strategic Plan and provided comments to the Director General.

The Code Commission acknowledged comments submitted by Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, the European Union (EU), Japan, Korea (Rep. of), Kenya, Kuwait, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Uganda and the United States of America (USA). The Code Commission also considered comments provided by an industry association.

B. JOINT MEETING OF THE CODE COMMISSION AND THE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION

The Code Commission and the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (SCAD) held a joint meeting on 9 September 2009 and discussed several important points. Dr William Karesh (Chair of the OIE Wildlife Working Group) attended this meeting. A summary of these discussions appears below.

  • 1. 
    Animal health surveillance

Dr Bruckner, President of the SCAD, explained that the OIE Wildlife Working Group and the ad hoc Group on Epidemiology had been asked to provide advice on the development of an OIE policy on wildlife, including aspects relating to surveillance, treatment of wildlife in the relevant disease chapters, and trade implications of finding infection in wild populations. Dr Karesh commented that there was a need to rethink how the OIE refers to pathogens and diseases, reflecting the fact that some important pathogens readily infect multiple species. Dr Karesh also raised the possibility of developing text in the Code on epizootic haemorrhagic disease (EHD), as this

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is an important OIE listed disease of wildlife that affects cattle; it should be taken into account in the diagnosis and management of bluetongue.

  • 2. 
    Foot and mouth disease

It was confirmed that the SCAD would consider OIE Members’ comments on modifications to the four disease questionnaires and provide advice to the Code Commission. On compartmentalisation, Dr Thiermann indicated that the Code Commission did not see a need, at this time, for the SCAD to provide advice for eventual inclusion in the Code on the implementation of compartmentalisation for foot and mouth disease (FMD) nor for other specific diseases. On beef casings, Dr Bruckner stated that the SCAD had received advice from experts that confirmed that the procedures used to render small ruminant and porcine casings safe are also effective for beef casings. In reply to the question of the Philippines for advice on the required coverage of an animal population with FMD vaccine, Dr Bruckner stated that it would be difficult to provide definitive advice to cover all situations but that, as already stated in the Terrestrial Code (Article 8.5.44.), as a general rule, at least 80% of the population targeted for vaccination should be vaccinated in order to consider that coverage was adequate.

  • 3. 
    Swine vesicular disease

Dr Bruckner indicated that the SCAD would seek advice from an ad hoc group and the OIE Wildlife Working Group to review the comments of OIE Members on this chapter and provide advice to the Code Commission. Dr Kahn confirmed that the International Trade Department would then align the format of the revised swine vesicular disease chapter with the chapter on classical swine fever as adopted at the 77th OIE General Session in May 2009.

  • 4. 
    Avian influenza and Newcastle disease

Dr Thiermann indicated that the Code Commission had modified the recommendations on inactivation in these chapters in response to Member comments. Because some of the scientific references lead to different recommendations on time/temperature for inactivation, the SCAD would be asked to provide further advice.

  • 5. 
    Classical swine fever

Dr Bruckner indicated that an expert would be asked to review the articles dealing with surveillance for classical swine fever with an approach similar to that taken to avian influenza and Newcastle disease. This would be referred to the ad hoc Group on Epidemiology.

  • 6. 
    Other issues:

Anthrax: the Code Commission incorporated comments from an expert and from the SCAD and made appropriate modifications to Chapter 8.1. The Code Commission also requested additional advice from OIE Delegates regarding practical measures used under field conditions to inactivate B. anthracis spores in dung, manure and bedding.

Bluetongue: SCAD will continue to seek advice from experts on the points raised by Members on maternal transmission and the use of vaccines and would share with the Code Commission in due course.

Brucellosis: an ad hoc group will be convened to provide advice to the OIE, basing its approach on the approach taken to bovine tuberculosis.

African horse sickness: the comment provided by Kenya during the 77th OIE General Session regarding the use of vaccine for African horse sickness was forwarded to the OIE Biological Standards Commission (BSC) for advice.

Equine influenza and equine viral arteritis: the International Trade Department had forwarded Member comments to four experts for review and their advice would be taken into account by the Code Commission.

Bee diseases: the Code Commission noted that the SCAD would convene an ad hoc group to review bee diseases and related concerns.

Rabies: Dr Knopf advised that an expert had been requested to review the current Terrestrial Code chapter and Member comments on rabies and an ad hoc group would be convened to draft a new/revised chapter on rabies.

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C. EXAMINATION OF MEMBER COMMENTS AND WORK OF RELEVANT EXPERT GROUPS

European Union (EU) Comments

The EU welcomes the work of the OIE TAHSC. Its comments have been incorporated in the Annexes for consideration by the Code Commission in its next meeting of February 2010.

Item 1. Glossary

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU, Japan, Kuwait, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland and the USA.

Inter alia, the Code Commission modified the definition of quarantine station in order to clarify that the presence of disease or infection in animals in a quarantine station does not affect the health status of the country or zone. The Code Commission deleted from the Glossary the definitions of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘variability’ as the definition of these terms is readily found in dictionaries of epidemiology.

The revised Glossary is provided at Annex III for Member comments.

Communication

In response to Member comments the Code Commission agreed to associate the proposed definitions related to communication with the outline of the draft chapter on communication developed by the ad hoc Group. The Code Commission invited Members to provide comments on the outline and definitions and undertook to forward these comments to the ad hoc Group to be taken into account in the further development of the chapter.

The outline and definitions are provided in Annex III for Member comments.

Item 2. Animal health surveillance (Chapter 1.4.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments of Australia, the EU and Kuwait, as well as advice of the SCAD and the ad hoc Group on Epidemiology, and made appropriate modifications to several articles, including Article 1.4.3. point 2 (e) ‘case definition’. The Code Commission will propose the inclusion of a definition for ‘wildlife’ once it receives advice from the OIE Wildlife Working Group.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex IV for Member comments. Item 3. Surveillance of arthropod vectors of animal disease (Chapter 1.5.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Australia and the EU.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex V for Member comments.

Item 4. Status for OIE listed diseases (Chapter 1. 6.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Argentina and New Zealand and made an appropriate modification to Article 1.6.1. Any changes to the disease status questionnaires in response to Member comments would be provided by the SCAD in due course.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex VI for Member comments.

Item 5. Import risk analysis (Chapter 2.1. and report of the ad hoc Group)

The Code Commission reviewed a comment from the USA and made a text modification.

The Code Commission noted the report of the OIE ad hoc Group on Import Risk Analysis for Animals and Animal Products (Annex XLI).

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The revised Chapter is provided at Annex VII for Member comments. Item 6. Evaluation of Veterinary Services (Chapters 3.1. and 3.2.)

  • a) 
    Draft revisions to Chapters 3.1. and 3.2.

The Code Commission reviewed amendments to Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. that had been proposed by the International Trade Department. The Code Commission supported the text amendments, which should help to highlight the importance of veterinary legislation as a key element of veterinary infrastructure and good governance.

The revised Chapters are provided at Annex VIII for Member comments.

  • b) 
    Guidelines on Veterinary Legislation (OIE website)

The Code Commission noted and encouraged Members to review the “Guidelines on Veterinary Legislation”, which may be found on the OIE website at: http://www.oie.int/eng/oie/organisation/A_Guidelines_Vet%20Leg.pdf.

Dr Kahn informed the Code Commission that the first OIE Global Conference on Veterinary Legislation will be held in Djerba (Tunisia) on 6–8 December 2010. The announcement is available at:

http://www.oie.int/Eng/A_LEG_VET2010/ENG_first%20announcement.pdf

  • c) 
    PVS Feedback session (9-10 December 2009) and meeting of the ad hoc Group on the Evaluation of Veterinary Services (11 December 2009)

Dr Kahn informed the Code Commission that the OIE was preparing a further revision of the OIE Tool for the Evaluation of Performance of Veterinary Services (OIE PVS Tool) and that the 11 December meeting of the ad hoc Group on the Evaluation of Veterinary Services would be preceded by a two-day seminar on expert experience in the evaluation of Veterinary Services.

Item 7. Design and implementation of systems for animal identification and traceability (Chapter 4.2.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Australia. The Code Commission noted that the concept of animal ownership may be very different in developing and developed countries and that the application of Chapter 4.2. needed to be considered in this light. The Code Commission made relevant amendments to the text.

The revised Chapter at Annex IX is provided for Member comments.

Item 8. Zoning and compartmentalisation

The Code Commission discussed the important concept of compartmentalisation and its incorporation in the Terrestrial Code as appropriate. This concept is valuable for disease control as well as for facilitating trade and can contribute to improving food security. The role of the Veterinary Authority in approving the compartment is of critical importance in both cases. Partnership with the private sector is however essential to ensure the correct application of the measures. The biosecurity plan documents the measures and the role of both the Veterinary Authority and the private sector in establishing and maintaining the compartment. If the compartment is being established for the purposes of trade, there must be a negotiation between the veterinary authority of the exporting and the importing country to recognise the correct application of measures. In all cases, the recommendations of the OIE should be followed. However, the OIE will not officially recognise free compartments. At this time the OIE does not propose to provide specific detailed recommendations in the Terrestrial Code on the provisions for implementing disease free compartments. However, practical guidance will be provided outside the Terrestrial Code via documents published on the OIE internet site.

  • a) 
    Zoning and compartmentalisation (Chapter 4.3.)

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The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU and advice of the SCAD and the ad hoc Group on Epidemiology. The Code Commission noted that the SCAD had referred the description of measures and functional aspects of the protection zone to the ad hoc Group on FMD.

The Code Commission modified the text as appropriate, including the addition of appropriate references to wildlife in Article 4.3.2. and of principles for defining a protection zone to Article 4.3.3. The EU recommendations for controls to provide for auditing of animal movements (Article 4.3.3., former point 5) were not accepted as the Code Commission considered that the important issue was the capacity to audit the history of the animals rather than tracing individual movements. However, the Code Commission reiterated the importance of animal identification and traceability for applying the concept of compartmentalisation.

  • b) 
    Application of compartmentalisation (Chapter 4.4.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU and advice of the SCAD and amended Article 4.4.7.

The Code Commission noted that these two chapters could usefully be amalgamated to eliminate the duplication of texts and asked the International Trade Department to undertake this work once the content on compartmentalisation and on protection zones had been finalised.

The revised Chapters 4.3. and 4.4. are provided at Annex X for Member comments.

Item 9.

Semen and embryo chapters (Chapters 4.5. – 4.8. (inclusive) and Chapter 4.10.)

Professor Michel Thibier, Chair of the IETS HASSAC Committee, joined the Code Commission for this agenda item. The Code Commission discussed whether it would be useful to develop a new chapter on the collection and processing of equine semen. In the absence of requests from OIE Members, the Code Commission did not propose to undertake this work in the near future.

  • a) 
    Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen (Chapter 4.5.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments of the EU, extensive comments made by Australia, and the comments made by the USA at the 77th OIE General Session.

In accordance with Australia’s comments and the advice of Prof. Thibier, the Code Commission renumbered Chapter 4.5. as Chapter 4.6. and made several amendments to the text, including modification of the terms ‘quarantine’, ‘quarantine station’ and ‘pre-quarantine’, the word ‘quarantine’ being replaced by ‘isolation’ throughout the chapter.

The Code Commission considered the recommendations made by the USA at the 77th OIE General Session regarding testing for Campylobacter fetus subsp. venerealis and for Trichomonas fetus but, in the absence of a structured scientific rationale for the specific number of tests proposed, was not able to make the requested modifications.

The Code Commission decided not to accept the Australian proposal to modify several articles with respect to bluetongue because they were not consistent with the recommendations in Chapter 8.3. (Bluetongue).

As a matter of OIE policy, all references to border disease and Teschovirus encephalomyelitis were deleted from the chapter as these diseases are no longer listed by the OIE.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XI for Member comments.

  • b) 
    General hygiene in semen collection and processing centres (Chapter 4.6.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments of Australia.

In accordance with Australia’s comments and the advice of Prof. Thibier, the Code Commission renumbered Chapter 4.6. as Chapter 4.5. The Code Commission did not accept the proposal to change

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the title of this chapter, as the title is appropriate to the contents of the chapter. The Code Commission made appropriate modifications to the text in Articles 4.6.1. and 4.6.2.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XI for Member comments.

  • c) 
    Collection and processing of in vivo derived embryos from livestock and horses (Chapter 4.7.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments of the EU, Kuwait and South Africa.

Modifications were made to Articles 4.7.2. and 4.7.4.

In reply to a question from the EU, the Code Commission was advised by Prof. Thibier that the requirement in Article 4.7.5. for washing of no more than 10 embryos in a batch is the recommendation of the IETS Manual because all the studies demonstrating the safety of washed embryos have been conducted on batches of 10 embryos or less.

The Code Commission referred to the IETS the recommendation of South Africa regarding the listing of Mycobacterium paratuberculosis (in sheep) under category 3 in Article 4.7.14. Prof. Thibier confirmed that the IETS would consider this at its next meeting in January 2010.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XI for Member comments.

  • d) 
    Collection and processing of in vitro produced embryos/oocytes from livestock and horses (Chapter 4.8.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments of the EU, Kuwait and Sudan (the 77th OIE General Session).

In response to the EU comment on Articles 4.8.3., 4.8.4. and 4.8.5., the Code Commission advised that the risks associated with in vitro produced (and micro manipulated) embryos and oocytes are different to the risks associated with in vivo produced embryos and oocytes because of the loss of integrity of the zona pellucida and there is less scientific evidence for the in vitro products, hence the different recommendations.

The Code Commission accepted comments of the EU and of Kuwait and modified Article 4.8.2. and Article 4.8.4. accordingly.

The Code Commission did not accept the recommendation of Sudan to add congenital diseases to Chapter 4.8., as these diseases are outside the scope of the Terrestrial Code.

The Code Commission discussed the comments of the EU on the wording in this chapter ‘subject to veterinary restrictions for listed diseases’. The difficulty of determining which diseases on the OIE list should be considered as transmissible via in vitro produced embryos/oocytes, as distinct from in vivo produced embryos (that are the subject of specific IETS recommendations) makes it difficult to quickly resolve this issue. As an interim measure, the Code Commission decided to qualify the reference to listed diseases by adding the words ‘of concern (under study)’ and to ask the IETS to provide a proposed listing of the diseases that the OIE should take into account.

The Code Commission also asked the IETS to revise the articles on in vivo derived embryos in Chapter 8.3. (Bluetongue), Chapter 11.5. (Campylobacteriosis), Chapter 11.16. (Trichomonosis) and Chapter 14.9. (Scrapie).

The Code Commission modified the text of Article 4.8.5. to clarify that the testing described in this article is considered as supplemental to the procedures outlined elsewhere in the chapter.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XI for Member comments.

  • e) 
    Collection and processing of laboratory rodent and rabbit embryos/ova (Chapter 4.10.) The Code Commission reviewed comments of the EU and Kuwait.

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The Code Commission accepted the recommendation of Kuwait on Article 4.10.2. and that of the EU on Article 4.10.5. and made appropriate modifications.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XI for Member comments.

Item 10. Health certification (Chapters 5.1., 5.2. and 5.10.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU and comments from Canada, Norway and the USA forwarded by the Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission (Aquatic Animals Commission) in March 2009.

Harmonization of the two Codes is an important objective. However, the Code Commission noted that the Member comments to the Aquatic Animals Commission had not been submitted to the Terrestrial Code Commission. To facilitate the process of review and harmonization, the Commission encouraged Members to ensure that the comments submitted to the two Commissions are consistent.

In response to a comment from the EU, the Code Commission modified the text to exclude conditions for diseases that are not transmitted by the commodity concerned. The Commission also agreed that only one responsible veterinarian should sign the health certificate to avoid confusion in the importing country. The Code Commission noted that substitutions and other changes to certificates were not acceptable and therefore decided to maintain the text in point 8 of Article 5.2.3.

The Commission did not accept the proposed modification of Chapter 5.10. (Note for guidance on veterinary certificates) because the proposed addition of ‘general principles’ is already covered in Chapters 5.1. and 5.2 and the proposed deletions are normal requirements for border control, zoning, etc. However, it asked the Aquatic Animals Commission to consider introducing modifications to the OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code (Aquatic Code) as appropriate.

The revised Chapters are provided at Annex XII for Member comments.

Item 11. The control of hazards of animal health and public health importance in animal feed (Chapter 6.3.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Australia and the EU and modified the text as appropriate, including modification of the definition of ‘feed additive’.

Due to lack of specific information, the Code Commission maintained its position not to cover feed for bees in this chapter. It did not accept the proposed Australian modification of the definition of feed ingredients based on the fact that the text in the Terrestrial Code has been substantially harmonized with the Codex Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding (CAC/RCP 54-2004). It did not accept the proposed addition of monitoring to contamination (point 12 of Article 6.3.4.) because this is covered by point 7 (Sampling and analysis) of Article 6.3.4.

The revised Chapters are provided at Annex XIII for Member comments.

Item 12. The control of hazards of animal health and public health importance in heat treated pet food (draft proposed new chapter)

The Code Commission acknowledged the submission of a draft proposed new chapter on pet food and supporting document by the Delegate of the USA.

The Code Commission considered that all animal feed, including pet food, should be covered in Chapter 6.3. and decided that after adoption of the provisions of the proposed new chapter, the text would be included in Chapter 6.3. and the footnotes deleted.

The proposed new Chapters are provided at Annex XIV for Member comments.

The supporting document is provided at Annex XLIII for information of Members on the international pet food industry, its practices, and the work in progress.

Item 13. Salmonellosis

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  • a) 
    Report on the Codex Working Group meeting (Brazil 7–12 September 2009)

In 2007, the Codex Alimentarius Commission agreed that the development of guidelines for the control of Salmonella and Campylobacter in poultry was a priority. Later that year, at its 39th session, the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH) agreed on the approach to be taken in the development of draft Guidelines for control of Campylobacter and Salmonella spp. in chicken meat. The 40th session of the CCFH requested the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide the necessary scientific advice to ensure that the Guidelines were underpinned with the most robust scientific data. In response the FAO and WHO convened an expert meeting on 4–8 May 2009, in Rome, which the OIE attended.

The Physical Working Group met in Brazil on 7-11 September 2009 to further develop the proposed draft Guidelines for control of Campylobacter and Salmonella in chicken meat. The Working Group reviewed the draft Guidelines taking into account the FAO/WHO Expert meeting report and CAC Member comments.

The Guidelines incorporate a ‘production-to-consumption’ approach and identify all steps in the food chain where control measures could potentially be applied. The Guidelines are divided into three parts, the first on Good Hygiene Practices (GHPs), the second on hazard based controls and the third on risk based control measures. They include references to relevant OIE standards as the primary source of recommendations regarding the primary production phase and it is noted that the Codex Guidelines are supplementary to relevant OIE standards with regard to control measures during primary production. In addition, the Codex Working Group agreed to use OIE definitions where they exist. The proposed Guidelines include OIE definitions for competitive exclusion, epidemiological unit, establishment and flock. The OIE will continue to participate actively in the drafting and revision of the Guidelines according to the CAC procedures.

  • b) 
    Biosecurity procedures in poultry production (revised Chapter 6.4.)

The Code Commission reviewed the report of the ad hoc Group on Salmonellosis (Annex XLII), including the revised Chapter 6.4. The Code Commission endorsed the work of the ad hoc Group, which had addressed Member comments and had reduced the amount of detail that was previously in this chapter. The resulting text addresses generically hygiene and biosecurity practices. If additional details on frequency and timing of measures are needed by Members, these could be developed and presented as guidelines outside the Terrestrial Code. Noting that the OIE had received one round of comments from Members on this text, the Code Commission decided to propose the revised chapter for adoption in May 2010.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XV for Member comments.

  • c) 
    Prevention, detection and control of Salmonella in poultry (Chapter 6.5.)

The Code Commission received comments from the EU and South Africa.

The Code Commission reviewed the work of the ad hoc Group on Salmonellosis, including the revision of Chapter 6.5. The ad hoc Group had addressed Member comments and had also incorporated into Chapter 6.5. the three Articles from Chapter 6.6. (Salmonella Enteritidis and Salmonella Typhimurium in Poultry) thereby deleting Chapter 6.6.

Bearing in mind that the terminology ‘free from at least S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium’ was not clear and that concept of freedom from these pathogens has not been defined in the Terrestrial Code, the Code Commission modified Article 6.5.5.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XV for Member comments.

Item 14. Introduction to the recommendations for controlling antimicrobial resistance

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU and modified the text as appropriate.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XVI for Member comments.

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Item 15. Animal welfare

EU comments

The EU welcomes the work of the OIE to improve the existing animal welfare chapters as well as to develop new texts.

In particular, as regard the Draft Chapter on the "Use of animals in research and education", the EU wishes to acknowledge the progress made with the document, especially the inclusion of a specific section addressing the care and accommodation needs of the animals. The EU equally welcomes the number of previous EU comments have been taken into account in the latest draft.

The EU welcomes the work carried out by the OIE on the Draft Chapter on "Animal Welfare and Broiler Chicken Production" and on "Animal Welfare and Beef Cattle Production Systems" and acknowledges in particular their outcome-based approach. However the EU considers that improvements and additional details are needed to bring the draft texts in line with the previously adopted animal welfare chapters. In particular, the draft chapters contain recommendations expressed in broad and imprecise terms that are not easily usable by competent authorities, veterinarians and poultry producers. As a consequence, redrafting in the form of more precise recommendations is strongly suggested.

Specific EU comments on the proposed Draft and Revised Chapters are presented within the texts.

  • a) 
    Use of animals in research and education (new draft chapter) and report of the 3rd meeting of the ad hoc Group on Laboratory Animal Welfare (including OIE discussion paper on air transport of laboratory animals)

The Code Commission considered comments provided by Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, the EU, New Zealand, Switzerland and the USA, and from an animal welfare NGO.

The Code Commission acknowledged the work of the ad hoc Group and the extensive detailed information in its report (Annex XXXVIII). Noting that the draft chapter had been sent to Members for comment once and that the ad hoc Group had substantially addressed the comments provided, the Code Commission considered that the chapter could be proposed for adoption at the 78th OIE General Session. This will be decided in light of the Code Commission’s consideration of Member comments at its February 2010 meeting. The Code Commission also noted that the list of references provided for Member information would not be included in the chapter when proposed for adoption. To facilitate the analysis of the new draft text, the Commission decided to present two versions of the text, one showing modifications in double underline and strikeout, and a second as clean text.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XVII for Member comments.

  • b) 
    Animal welfare definition (Chapter 7.1.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments provided by Japan and comments submitted in the previous 12 months by the EU, Canada and the USA and during the 77th OIE General Session. The Code Commission recalled that the definition had been adopted at the 76th OIE General Session by consensus after lengthy discussion and, given that the comments under consideration could not readily be reconciled, the Code Commission decided that no changes to the definition were warranted.

  • c) 
    Stray dog population control (Chapter 7.7.)

The Code Commission reviewed this chapter, which had been presented as an annex to the report of the 8th meeting of the OIE Animal Welfare Working Group (AWWG), and, to ensure consistency with the rest of the Terrestrial Code, deleted the word ‘guidelines’ from the title and modified the heading of the table.

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The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XVII for Member comments.

  • d) 
    Report of the 8th meeting of the OIE Animal Welfare Working Group

The Code Commission noted the report of the 8th meeting of the AWWG (Annex XXXV). In regard to the future work programme of the AWWG, the Code Commission recommended that the AWWG focus its attention in the next year on the development of new chapters on laboratory animal welfare and on the welfare of livestock in the different production systems (starting with beef cattle and broiler chickens, then proceeding to dairy cattle, laying hens and pigs). In this work, the Code Commission encouraged the AWWG to develop texts of similar brevity to those on animal welfare in broiler chicken production and beef cattle production.

The Code Commission recommended that the highest priority for the AWWG is to finish the work on these new standards. The work on wildlife and the ethics of long distance transport should be deferred pending completion of these new standards.

  • e) 
    Report of the OIE Electronic Consultation Group on Poultry Welfare

The Code Commission reviewed the recommendations of the Electronic Consultation Group (Annex XXXIX), which had proposed several amendments to Chapters 7.3., 7.4., 7.5. and 7.6. to address the specific requirements for transporting, killing and slaughtering poultry. The Code Commission acknowledged the thorough work of this group and made a number of modifications to the draft text received from the AWWG. However, the Code Commission expressed its concern that the excessive amount of detail was inappropriate in a standard of this kind. Such detail would be better published as guidelines i.e. outside the Terrestrial Code.

The revised Chapters are provided at Annex XVII for Member comments.

  • f) 
    Report of the first meeting of the ad hoc Group on Animal Welfare and Broiler Chicken Production Systems

The Code Commission reviewed the report of the ad hoc Group (Annex XXXVI) and made several modifications to the text of the draft new chapter for clarification and to improve consistency with other Terrestrial Code chapters.

The Code Commission noted that the recommendations were limited to broilers in commercial production systems and do not cover broilers in informal production systems (such as backyard and village flocks). This does not mean to say that welfare is unimportant in backyard production systems. Rather, it reflects the difficulties that Veterinary Services face in making interventions in non commercial flocks. No definition has been proposed for backyard flocks but the Code Commission noted that this term has been used for several years (e.g. in the FAO Recommendations on the Prevention, Control and Eradication of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Asia, published in September 2004).

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XVII for Member comments.

  • g) 
    Report of the first meeting of the ad hoc Group on Animal Welfare and Beef Cattle Production Systems

The Code Commission reviewed the report of the ad hoc Group (Annex XXXVII).

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XVII for Member comments.

The Code Commission commends the brevity of the texts on animal welfare in broiler chicken production and beef cattle production and recommends that these should be models for future concise animal welfare standards.

Item 16. Other horizontal chapters

  • a) 
    Animal health measures applicable before and at departure (Chapter 5.4.)

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  • b) 
    Border posts and quarantine stations in the importing country (Chapter 5.6.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Kuwait and South Africa, as well as advice from the SCAD, and modified the definition of quarantine station in the Glossary. The change proposed by Kuwait in Chapter 5.4. had already been adopted at the 77th OIE General Session. Since the definition of quarantine station was modified, no modifications were required in Chapter 5.6.

Item 17. Anthrax (Chapter 8.1.)

The Code Commission reviewed the comments of Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland, the advice of an expert and comments provided by the SCAD.

On Article 8.1.1. (General Provisions), the Code Commission accepted a recommendation from New Zealand to clarify that the objectives of the recommendations in the chapter encompass animal health, human health and protection of the environment. After discussion with Prof. Thibier the Code Commission also modified the text to clarify that semen and in vivo derived cattle embryos collected and handled in accordance with relevant Terrestrial Code chapters are considered to be safe commodities.

Complementing this modification, the Code Commission included in the General Provisions a reference to the application of the recommendations in this chapter for international trade in commodities other than those considered to be safe.

On New Zealand’s recommendation, the Code Commission modified Article 8.1.6. to reflect that Veterinary Services should not be expected to certify the absence of clinical anthrax in sheep at the time of shearing as there is already certification to this effect for the flock of origin. Moreover, the existing text in points 2 and 3 of Article 8.1.6. is adequate for risk management.

On New Zealand’s recommendation, the Code Commission deleted point 3 (c) in Article 8.1.8. and presented the scientific rationale for point 3 (a) i.e. boiling for 60 minutes, as follows: “Table 1 in Spotts Whitney et al (2003) cites four different studies which demonstrated the destruction of Bacillus anthracis spores through boiling or other moist heat at 100°C for 5, 10 or 17 minutes.”

In response to a question from Japan, the Code Commission concluded that the recommendations in Article 8.1.9. are well supported by a published reference [Spotts Whitney et al (2003)] and the specifications are less prescriptive and more generally applicable than those specified in the WHO Guidelines.

The Code Commission modified points 1 – 4 (inclusive) of Article 8.1.11. in accordance with a comment from Japan. The Code Commission noted the question raised by Canada on the inactivation of spores in manure, dung and bedding. Given that there is no practical option currently available for the inactivation of anthrax spores in these materials, the Code Commission did not modify Article 8.1.12. and instead requested advice from Delegates as to practical alternatives for the treatment of manure, dung and bedding.

In response to a request from Japan for the background and rationale of the amendments proposed to Articles 8.1.14. and 8.1.15., the Code Commission responded that while the procedures cited are difficult to perform and may not always be totally effective, the recommendations are taken from the best currently available scientific references.

The revised chapter is provided at Annex XVIII for Member comments. References were left in the text for information of Members but these will be removed when the text is proposed for adoption.

Item 18. Bluetongue (Chapter 8.3.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments of Australia, the EU and South Africa, as well as advice provided by the SCAD and the International Embryo Transfer Society (IETS).

The Code Commission did not accept the EU recommendation on Article 8.3.1., because even if vaccination is performed and could be considered as a measure able to interrupt the transmission of bluetongue virus, the effectiveness of vaccination cannot be assured in the absence of surveillance. The Code Commission did not accept the EU recommendation to add ‘in vitro produced embryos and oocytes’ as neither the IETS nor the SCAD supported this recommendation. Insufficient scientific studies have been

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conducted to support the safety of such embryos and there is a small amount of evidence that they may be less safe than in vivo derived embryos.

The Code Commission accepted Australia’s recommendation to modify the text of point 2 in Article 8.3.3., but did not accept recommendation to modify point 1 of Article 8.3.3., noting that the critical issue of proximity to an infected country is appropriately addressed.

On the issue of changes to the status of a BTV free country/zone due to the importation of bluetongue seropositive animals (Article 8.3.3.), the Code Commission accepted an EU recommendation (supported by the SCAD) to modify text in point 3 (b) of Article 8.3.3. as it considered that this clarified the relevant provisions.

The Code Commission accepted the EU recommendations (supported by SCAD) to modify points 4 and 5 of Article 8.3.8. to make them consistent with the rest of the chapter.

The recommendation of South Africa on Articles 8.3.11. and 8.3.14. were not supported by SCAD and no changes were made to these texts.

The revised chapter is provided at Annex XIX for Member comments.

Item 19. Foot and mouth disease (Chapter 8.5.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Argentina, Chinese Taipei, the EU, Japan, Korea (Rep. of), Kuwait, New Zealand and the USA as well as the Philippines and Uganda (the 77th OIE General Session). The Code Commission also received advice from the SCAD.

Noting that camelids are not ruminants, the Code Commission did not accept an EU recommendation to modify the text of Article 8.5.1.

In response to a recommendation from Argentina, the Code Commission modified the text in point 3 (c) of Article 8.5.2. and added new text at point 3 in Articles 8.5.3. and at point 4 in Article 8.5.4. and 8.5.5. to strengthen the provisions for protection zones.

The Code Commission agreed with Argentina on the need to modify the Spanish language version of Article 8.5.4. and the International Trade Department agreed to undertake this revision.

The Code Commission discussed the EU comment on Article 8.5.9. and made appropriate modifications to the text for clarification.

The Code Commission accepted a comment from Chinese Taipei on Article 8.5.10. related to the transport of live animals through infected areas and modified the text accordingly but did not accept Chinese Taipei’s recommendation on Article 8.5.20., as this modification had not been supported by the SCAD.

In response to the request of Uganda that Article 8.5.39. be extended to include bovine casings, and noting that the SCAD had received advice from an expert confirming that the procedures used to render small ruminant and porcine casings safe are also effective for beef casings, the Code Commission made an appropriate amendment.

In reply to the question of the Philippines for advice on the required coverage of an animal population with FMD vaccine, the SCAD indicated that it would be difficult to provide definitive advice to cover all situations but that, as a general rule, at least 80% of the population targeted for vaccination should be vaccinated in order to consider that vaccine coverage was adequate (as currently stated in Article 8.5.44.).

In response to a comment of Chinese Taipei on Article 8.5.46. point 2(a), the Code Commission sought advice from the BSC and modified the text accordingly to clarify that the NSP is a population test, not a test for individual animals, and that a positive result should be interpreted in terms of the number of positive animals, not the titre of antibody in the individual animal. On Article 8.5.46. point 2(b) and 2(d) the Code Commission modified the text for clarification as recommended by Chinese Taipei.

Compartmentalisation for FMD

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The Code Commission discussed the comments submitted by the EU, Japan, Korea (Rep. of), New Zealand and the USA regarding compartmentalisation for FMD. Several Members expressed opposition to the application of compartmentalisation to FMD. However, the Code Commission considered that there was still value in continuing to develop this work. The objective of a Member in implementing compartmentalisation may be to aid disease management and control. Notwithstanding the need for bilateral consultations to satisfy trading partners that the compartment is biosecure, the concept could also be of value in facilitating trade.

Dr Vallat has made it clear that the OIE does not intend currently to grant official recognition for FMD (or other disease) free compartments. However, subject to technical feasibility, the Code Commission considered that Members may wish to establish FMD free compartments for the purpose of supporting improvements in animal health status and for facilitating trade.

Noting that the SCAD had supported the concept that a compartment could be established either in an FMD free (with or without vaccination) or in an FMD infected zone, the Code Commission modified Article 8.5.5.bis by deleting ‘where vaccination is practised’ from the chapeau of this article.

The Code Commission noted that the FMD/FMDV surveillance requirements for a compartment are effectively the same as those for a zone. Accordingly, the Code Commission added text to the effect that surveillance in accordance with Chapters 4.3. and 4.4. should be implemented in the country or zone (as appropriate) in which the compartment is located.

Noting that an expert and the ad hoc Group on Epidemiology had developed a checklist for the implementation of a compartment for avian influenza and Newcastle disease (see http://www.oie.int/eng/info_ev/Other%20Files/En_final_Compartmentalisation_AI_ND_10_05_2007.pdf ), the Code Commission considered that it was not necessary at this time to include specific recommendations in the Terrestrial Code on the implementation of compartments for FMD but requested that the SCAD consider the development of a checklist for FMD similar to that provided for AI/ND.

The Code Commission also recommended that the checklist for AI/ND be updated, taking into account comments submitted by the EU.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XX for Member comments.

Item 20. Paratuberculosis (Chapter 8.10.)

The Code Commission noted a comment submitted by the EU.

In response to previous requests of Members, the Code Commission discussed with the SCAD the possibility of preparing a support document for guidance of Members. However, in view of the lack of adequate diagnostic tests for paratuberculosis, the Code Commission and the SCAD agreed that this work could not be undertaken in advance of further scientific development.

Noting that the content of Chapter 8.10. had been removed from the Terrestrial Code, the Code Commission decided that it could do no further work on paratuberculosis pending the future development of a supporting document.

Item 21. Rabies (Chapter 8.11.)

The Code Commission reviewed the comments from the EU and referred them to the ad hoc Group on Rabies, which will meet in January 2010 to consider replacing the current Chapter 8.10. The Code Commission undertook that, if possible, it would study the recommendations of the ad hoc Group and the SCAD at its February 2010 meeting.

Item 22. West Nile fever (Chapter 8.16.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU and the USA.

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The Code Commission accepted the deletion of chicken and turkey chicks under 12 days of age from the list of susceptible species and reorganised the recommendation on importation as appropriate. In making these modifications, the Code Commission took careful note of the following scientific evidence.

“There are only very limited and artificially controlled laboratory studies demonstrating infectivity, but there is absolutely no evidence that this occurs and poses any risk under field conditions. Chickens and turkeys, regardless of age, are a resistant species and as such, artificially laboratory-induced infection should not be used as a basis for imposing trade restrictions. Recommending restrictions on a species (chicks under 12 days old) that have shown not to play any epidemiological role in the transmission of the disease agent is not warranted.

Studies conducted by Swayne et al. (Avian Dis. 2000 Oct-Dec; 44(4) 932-7) showed that while turkeys do develop a viraemia, the level of virus is very low – less than what is needed to effectively infect mosquitoes. The data for that study showed that turkeys are not a significant amplifying host for infecting mosquitoes. Similarly, a study conducted by Senne et al. (Avian Dis. 2000 Jul-Sep; 44(3) 642-9) showed a lack of significant viraemia needed to infect mosquitoes. Another study by Buckley et al. (Virology Journal 2006, Sep; 3:71) failed to isolate either virus or viral RNA from the sera of infected chicks. Furthermore, there is no field evidence which shows that clinical disease develops in chickens or turkeys. Thus, although poultry of any age can become infected with WNV, they do not develop clinical disease, they cannot infect other birds or animals, and they do not act as a reservoir for the virus.”

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XXI for Member comments.

Item 23. Diseases of bees (Chapters 9.1. – 9.6. (inclusive))

Noting that an ad hoc Group on Bee Diseases would be convened in January 2009 under the SCAD and the BSC, the Code Commission forwarded Member comments to the experts for review.

  • a) 
    Chapters 9.1., 9.2. and 9.3.

The Code Commission noted comments from the EU.

The Code Commission modified the text in point 3 of Articles 9.1.2. by adding the words ‘honey for human consumption’.

  • b) 
    Small hive beetle infestation (Chapter 9.4.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Australia and the EU.

The Code Commission modified the text in point 2 of Article 9.4.2. by adding the words ‘honey for human consumption’.

  • c) 
    Chapters 9.5. and 9.6.

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU.

The Code Commission modified the text in point 2 of Articles 9.5.2. and 9.6.2. by adding the words ‘honey for human consumption’.

The revised Chapters are provided at Annex XXII for Member comments.

Item 24. Avian influenza (Chapter 10.4.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments of Australia, the EU and the USA, and SCAD advice.

The Code Commission replaced the word ‘container’ by ‘packaging material’ in all articles relating to eggs (Articles 10.4.10, 11, 12, 13 and 14) as containers are defined in the Terrestrial Code and the definition is not appropriate to egg packaging material.

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The Code Commission discussed the comments of the EU and New Zealand on Article 10.4.6. regarding the testing of shipments of live birds other than poultry. The Code Commission considered that the final details of the sampling programme need to be agreed between trading partners and cannot be specified in the Terrestrial Code. However, in order to provide guidance to Members, the Code Commission modified Article 10.4.6. in line with advice from SCAD.

The Code Commission considered but did not accept the EU suggestion to change Articles 10.4.15. and 10.4.21. because these articles are consistent with the articles describing the procedures for the inactivation of AI viruses.

After considering the comments of the USA, the Code Commission decided to merge Articles 10.4.19. and 10.4.20. as the two articles deal with essentially the same risks and recommend the same approaches to risk management. The essential point is freedom of the country, zone or compartment from HPNAI – which applies equally when the country, zone or compartment is free from NAI.

The Code Commission noted recommendations of the USA on Articles 10.4.22. and 10.4.25. and added a reference to poultry meat meal in both articles and a third processing alternative at point 2 (c) of Article 10.4.25.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XXIII for Member comments.

Item 25. Newcastle disease (Chapter 10.13.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Australia, the EU and the USA.

The Code Commission replaced the word ‘container’ by ‘packaging material’ in all articles relating to eggs (Articles 10.13.8., 9. and 10.) as containers are defined in the Terrestrial Code and the definition is not appropriate to egg packaging material.

The Code Commission considered that the approach to management of risks of avian influenza in poultry meat meal should be applied to the management of risks associated with Newcastle disease virus and accordingly modified Article 10.13.16. and Article 10.13.19. by adding poultry meat meal to the scope of these articles, and added a third alternative to the processing parameters in Article 10.13.19.

The Code Commission noted the wide variation in the conclusions of studies on the inactivation of Newcastle disease viruses. However, based on the explanation provided by a Member and an expert, the Code Commission decided to remove ‘under study’ in Articles 10.13.20. and 10.13.21. and accepted the inclusion of poultry meat meal in Article 10.13.19. (feather meal and poultry meat meal).

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XXIV for Member comments.

Item 26. Bovine brucellosis (Chapter 8.10.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU.

The Code Commission noted that an OIE ad hoc Group on Brucellosis will hold a meeting in November under SCAD to review the chapter and forwarded the submitted comments for consideration of experts.

Item 27. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 11.6.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Australia and the EU and comments submitted by an industry association.

In response to the EU comment, the Code Commission modified Articles 11.6.3. and 11.6.4. to clarify that providing the importation of cattle is done in accordance with Articles 11.6.7., 8. and 9., such importation would not change the status of the importing country.

In response to the comments from an industry association, Dr Thiermann recalled the decision of OIE Delegates at the 77th OIE General Session. The Code Commission decided that the articles on gelatine should not be changed.

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In response to the EU comment on Article 11.6.14. and the request for the OIE to provide the scientific justification for considering only the distal ileum as specified risk material, the Code Commission noted that no new scientific information has come to light that would warrant changing the decisions based on the supporting document and reported in the Code Commission report of October 2006. The Commission welcomed the submission of relevant new scientific information.

In response to the comment of Australia on Article 11.6.15., Dr Thiermann clarified that the reason for the difference is that Article 11.6.14. applies to raw commodities whereas Article 11.6.15. refers to the production of gelatin, a very rigorous process that has been demonstrated in peer reviewed scientific studies to produce a safe commodity.

In response to the EU comment on Article 11.6.17., the Code Commission noted that the current text makes reference to Article 11.6.15., and thus limits the manufacturing of di-calcium phosphate (DCP) to vertebral columns from cattle under 30 months of age that have passed ante and post mortem inspection. Skulls are excluded. This recommendation is consistent with the current scientific knowledge on BSE and the safety of DCP produced in this manner has been verified by peer reviewed scientific study.

The Code Commission discussed the EU request to modify Article 11.6.20. but made no changes as it considered that the text was sufficiently clear.

In response to EU comments, the Code Commission added text on the assessment of the birth cohort of a case (Article 11.6.23.), to clarify the correct implementation of provisions on the feed ban.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XXV for Member comments.

Item 28. Tuberculosis of bovines and farmed cervidae

  • a) 
    Bovine tuberculosis (Chapter 11.7.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Canada (the 77th OIE General Session), the EU and South Africa.

The Code Commission accepted the EU proposal to modify the text of Article 11.7.2. for clarification of the meaning. However, the Code Commission did not accept the comment from South Africa regarding the inadequacy of abattoir monitoring for countries that have been free of bovine tuberculosis for at least five years. The Code Commission is not aware of any scientific evidence supporting this proposition. Moreover, the Code Commission is aware of this method being used with success by at least one OIE Member that has eradicated bovine tuberculosis.

The Code Commission accepted a proposal from the EU to modify Article 11.7.3. to clarify that all cattle in the compartment should be included in the certification.

In response to the comment of the Canadian Delegate regarding the consistency of the texts dealing with free compartments and free herds, the Code Commission confirmed that the requirements for a free compartment were intentionally stricter than those for free herds.

  • b) 
    Bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae (Chapter 11.8.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU and accepted a recommendation to make Chapter 11.8 consistent with Chapter 11.7.

The revised Chapters are provided at Annex XXVI for Member comments.

Item 29. Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (Chapter 11.9.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU and Kuwait.

The Code Commission discussed an EU comment calling for a definition of domestic cattle. However, rather than addressing this point in Chapter 11.9., the Commission noted that the OIE would have a broader discussion on the definition of the role of wildlife in the epidemiology of several diseases, including the

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implications for country status and trade. The EU comment should be considered in the context of this broader discussion.

In response to the comment of Kuwait, the Code Commission noted that the OIE ad hoc Group on Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia had recommended the removal of semen and embryos from the list of safe commodities and that bovine pleuropneumonia was not currently on any IETS list because insufficient scientific studies have been conducted for the IETS to evaluate the safety of embryos. Therefore, the Code Commission did not accept Kuwait’s recommendation.

The revised Chapters are provided at Annex XXVII for Member comments.

Item 30. Enzootic bovine leukosis (Chapter 11.11.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from New Zealand.

The Code Commission proposed new text with the conditions for a free compartment, following a structure similar to that adopted in the chapter on bovine tuberculosis. The Code Commission also added text specifying which animals are considered to be susceptible to enzootic bovine leukosis, i.e. domestic cattle (Bos indicus and Bos taurus) and replaced the word ‘animal’ with ‘cattle’ as appropriate throughout the chapter.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XXVIII for Member comments.

Item 31. Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis/infectious pustular vulvovaginitis (Chapter 11.13.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Australia and agreed with the proposal to make reference to testing according to the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals in Article 11.13.7.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XXIX for Member comments.

Item 32. Equine diseases (Chapters 12.1., 12.7. and 12.10.)

The Code Commission discussed with Dr Vallat the request of the People’s Republic of China (at the 77th OIE General Session) for the OIE to consider establishing procedures for the official recognition of Member freedom from certain equine diseases. This matter will be considered by an ad hoc Group established under the SCAD. The Code Commission agreed to follow developments on this issue in collaboration with SCAD.

  • a) 
    African horse sickness (Chapter 12.1.)

The Code Commission referred to the BSC a comment from Kenya regarding the use of vaccine for African horse sickness.

  • b) 
    Equine influenza (Chapter 12.7.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from Australia, and the advice of an expert, and modified the text of Article 12.7.6. as appropriate.

  • c) 
    Equine viral arteritis (Chapter 12.10.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments from the EU, Kuwait and South Africa, and advice of three experts.

The Code Commission did not accept the recommendation of Kuwait on point 3 of Article 12.10.2., because the period described in this point could vary depending on the timing of the first test (‘not earlier than 7 days after commencing isolation’).

Based on Member comments and expert consultation, several changes were made.

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The revised Chapters 12.7. and 12.10. are provided at Annex XXX for Member comments.

Item 33. Scrapie (Chapter 14.9.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments of Canada, the EU and New Zealand, as well as comments made by the USA at the 77th OIE General Session.

In response to the EU comment, the Code Commission modified Article 14.9.1. (General Provisions) to express more clearly the OIE’s position that scrapie does not present a risk to human health. In response to the comment of Canada on the safety of semen, the Code Commission included semen in Article 14.9.1. as a safe commodity. The justification for this decision was provided as follows:

Evidence from epidemiological studies and experimental matings of scrapie-affected rams suggests that scrapie is unlikely to be transmitted by semen (Wrathall 2000, Wang et al. 2001, Wrathall et al. 2008). Palmer (1959) failed to transmit scrapie by subcutaneous injection into lambs of semen from a clinically affected ram. The lambs were, however, only observed for 30 months post-inoculation and this observation period would now be considered less than ideal.

Bioassays in mice have failed to detect scrapie infectivity in testis, seminal vesicles and semen of affected rams (Hourrigan et al. 1979, Hourrigan 1990, Hadlow 1991, Hourrigan and Klingsporn 1996). Hourrigan reported the failure to detect infectivity in semen samples from 21 cases of scrapie (Hourrigan 1990). The study by Hadlow et al. (1980) showed that the distribution of scrapie infectivity in goats is essentially the same as in naturally-infected sheep.

Gatti and colleagues were unable to detect PrPsc in seminal plasma of rams with scrapie, suggesting that infectivity was absent (Gatti et al. 2002). The conclusions of this study have recently been confirmed by an experiment in which semen from infected rams was inoculated into scrapie-susceptible transgenic mice expressing the VRQ allele of the sheep prion gene (Sarradin et al. 2008).

The transgenic mouse model used by Sarradin and colleagues (2008) has been shown to be capable of detecting very low levels of infectivity. The study reported by Sarradin and others (2008) demonstrated that scrapie was not transmitted by semen at any time during the incubation period of scrapie in four rams, even from one of the highly susceptible VRQ/VRQ genotype during the clinical stages of the disease.

In reply to the EU question on the justification for the seven-year period stated in Article 14.9.3., the Code Commission pointed out that this recommendation came from the ad hoc Group on Scrapie and had been based on twice the average time period for the scrapie agent to be transmitted from one generation of sheep to the next.

The Code Commission did not agree with the Canadian request to permit the introduction of rams and bucks from establishments other than free establishments, although it had been permitted in the 2008 edition of the Terrestrial Code. There may be a small risk that rams and bucks, if infected with scrapie, could transmit scrapie via saliva and faeces.

Noting the supportive advice of SCAD on the topic of historical freedom, the Code Commission did not accept the EU proposal to adopt numerical testing targets to establish freedom because to prove the absence of a disease of this nature would require testing of a very large number of animals. The concept of historical freedom has been accepted by the OIE and is appropriate in the case of scrapie. However, the Code Commission modified Article 14.9.15. to strengthen the provisions for the formal programme of targeted surveillance. The Code Commission also deleted from Articles 14.9.14. and 14.9.15. references to demonstrating the presence of susceptible genotypes in the population of sheep in the country because, since the chapter was drafted, there had been significant advances in knowledge on the genetics of scrapie susceptibility and it is highly unlikely that any country would have a small ruminant population without susceptible genotypes.

The EU comment on point 2 a) and b) of Article 14.9.3. was not accepted as the requirement for scrapie to be notifiable is already covered in Article 14.9.3. (point 1).

The Code Commission did not accept the recommendation of the USA (the 77th OIE General Session) to target surveillance for scrapie to all cull sheep rather than to sheep with chronic wasting conditions.

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However, the text in point 2 (b) of Article 14.9.3. was modified to provide that mature sheep found dead on farm should be tested when the numbers of mature culled sheep and goats over 18 months of age were insufficient in the practical situation. In addition, the words ‘under study’ were removed from this point.

In regard to compartments, the Code Commission considered that there is likely to be commercial interest in this approach and the provisions of Article 14.9.4. should be as clear as possible. With this objective, the Code Commission modified the chapeau and several points in this article.

The Code Commission noted the support of SCAD for the EU comment on Article 14.9.6. and agreed to delete the option for placing imported animals in a quarantine station, given that the OIE is unable to provide specific recommendations on the testing and associated parameters.

The Code Commission did not agree to combine Articles 14.9.11. and 14.9.12. as recommended by SCAD; however, it modified the text of Article 14.9.12. to indicate that listed products should not be traded internationally, consistent with the EU comment.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XXXI for Member comments.

Item 34. Classical swine fever (Chapter 15.3.)

The Code Commission reviewed comments received from Australia and South Africa, comments made by the Delegate of the USA at the 77th OIE General Session, and advice of the SCAD.

The Code Commission noted that South Africa’s comment on Article 15.3.2. had already been addressed. As stated at the 77th OIE General Session, the criterion in point 7 of Article 15.3.2. applies to the determination of status and the text does not need to be repeated in other articles.

The Code Commission accepted the comment of the USA on Article 15.3.3. and made an appropriate modification to the text. The comments of Australia on Article 15.3.22. (procedures for the inactivation of CSF virus in trophies) were referred to the SCAD for advice on the scientific issues raised.

The SCAD confirmed that the articles dealing with surveillance for classical swine fever would be reviewed to ensure consistency with the articles on disease surveillance in Chapter 10.4. (Avian Influenza) and Chapter 10.13. (Newcastle Disease) by the ad hoc Group on Epidemiology.

The revised Chapter is provided at Annex XXXII for Member comments.

Item 35. Swine vesicular disease (Chapter 15.5.)

The Code Commission received extensive comments from the EU, Korea (Rep. of), New Zealand and Thailand.

The Code Commission acknowledged Members’ requests for advice on surveillance and inactivation procedures for swine vesicular disease virus in swine products, similar to the approach taken in Chapter 15.3. (Classical Swine Fever). The Code Commission is awaiting advice from the SCAD, which will convene an ad hoc Group to provide advice on these points. Once the content of the chapter has been agreed, the International Trade Department will align the format of the chapter with that of Chapter 15.3. In the interim, the Code Commission made no changes to Chapter 15.5.

Item 36. Teschovirus encephalomyelitis (Chapter 15.6.)

The Code Commission received comments from the EU.

With agreement of the Director General and the SCAD and noting that this disease is no longer listed by the OIE, the Code Commission proposed to delete the chapter and all references to this disease in the Terrestrial Code.

The deleted Chapters is provided at Annex XXXIII for Member comments.

C. OTHER ISSUES

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Item 37. Private standards for sanitary measures and animal welfare

Dr Sarah Kahn briefed the Code Commission on the current OIE work programme on private standards. The OIE has sent a questionnaire to Members and the replies to the questionnaire will be reviewed by the ad hoc Group on Private Standards, which will hold a meeting on 9-10 November 2009.

Dr Kahn indicated that Dr Vallat had attended the General Assembly of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and had made a presentation on, inter alia, private standards. A recording of Dr Vallat’s presentation may be found on the CAC website at:

http://www.codexaudio.net/CAC_32/OriginalVersion/Index_en.html (see file at Thursday Part 1, Dr Vallat starts speaking at 7 minutes into the recording).

The ad hoc Group has been asked to propose an OIE strategy to help Members to avoid trade problems arising from private standards on sanitary measures and on animal welfare.

The Code Commission noted this update and agreed that it would consider the report of the ad hoc Group at the Commission’s February 2010 meeting.

The report of the ad hoc Group is provided at Annex XL or information of Members.

Item 38. Trade in animal products (‘commodities’)

Dr Keith Hamilton (OIE Scientific and Technical Department) briefed the Code Commission on the literature review that has been prepared for the ad hoc Group on Trade in Animal Products (“Commodities”), which will hold its next meeting on 15 October 2009.

In the context of its work on safe commodities and to be consistent with the modification of several chapters to highlight the safe commodities, the Code Commission proposed modifications to the chapters on Rift Valley fever and Aujeszky’s disease.

The Code Commission noted the update provided by Dr Hamilton and undertook to continue working on this issue as a matter of priority at its February 2010 meeting.

The revised Chapters are provided at Annex XXXIV for Member comments.

Item 39. Wildlife disease reporting – update on developments with WAHIS

The Code Commission received comments from South Africa.

Dr Francesco Berlingieri briefed the Code Commission on the development of WAHIS – Wild, which is a supplement to the existing OIE programme for reporting animal diseases. The Code Commission discussed the implications of this redevelopment and agreed that the topic of wildlife diseases and implications for trade should remain as an important issue on the future work programme of the OIE and of the Code Commission.

Item 40. Future work programme of the Code Commission

The Code Commission updated its work programme for 2009–2010, which may be found at Annex XLIV.

Item 41. Other issues

The next meeting of the Code Commission is scheduled for 8–12 February 2010. The deadline for comments to be considered by the Code Commission at this meeting is 8 January 2010.

.../Annexes

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Annex I

MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 7–18 September 2009

List of participants

MEMBERS OF THE CODE COMMISSION

Dr A. Thiermann

(President)

US Mission to the OECD

19, rue de Franqueville

75016 Paris

FRANCE

Tel.: 33-(0)1 44 15 18 69

E-mail: a.thiermann@oie.int

Dr E. Bonbon

(Vice-President)

Commission européenne

DG SANCO-D1

Rue Froissart 101

1040 Bruxelles

Belgique

Tel: 32-2-2985845

Fax: 32-2-2953144

E-mail:

etienne.bonbon@ec.europa.eu

Dr J. Caetano

(Secretary General)

Director of Animal Programme

Secretaria de Defesa Agropecuaria

Ministerio da Agricultura, Pecuaria e

Abastecimento

Espl. dos Ministerios

Bloco D Anexo B4 -ANDAR

70.043-900 Brasilia DF

BRAZIL

Tel.: (55-61) 321.823.14/321.823.15

E-mail jcaetano@agricultura.gov.br

Dr S.K. Hargreaves

Principal Director of Livestock

and Veterinary Services

Ministry of Agriculture

PO Box CY66

Causeway Harare

ZIMBABWE

Tel.: (263-4) 791.355/722.358

Fax: (263-4) 791.516

E-mail: skhargreaves@zol.co.zw

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Prof. A.M. Hassan                               Prof. S.C. MacDiarmid

Veterinary Expert                                  Principal International Adviser

Federal Ministry of Animal Resources Risk Analysis, International Coordination and AdAdjunct Pr

and Fisheries                                        Adjunct Professor in Veterinary Biosecurity

Khartoum                                              (Massey University)

SUDAN                                                 Biosecurity New Zealand

Tel.: (249) 912.163.979                        P.O. Box 2526

Fax: (249) 834.75 996                          Wellington

E-mail: ahmedhassan32@hotmail.comNEW ZEALAND

hescobusiness@yahoo.com                Tel.: (64-4) 894.0420

Fax: (64-4) 894.0731

E-mail:

Stuart.MacDiarmid@maf.govt.nz

Prof. Michel Thibier

Professeur Michel THIBIER

Conseil Général de de l'Agriculture de l'Alimentation et des Espaces

Ruraux

Ministère de l'Alimentation, de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche

251 rue de Vaugirard

75732 Paris Cedex 15

FRANCE

Tel: +33 (0)1 49 55 84 33

Fax :+33 (0)1 49 55 81 69

michel.thibier@agriculture.gouv.fr

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Annex I (contd)

OIE HEADQUARTERS

Dr B. Vallat

Director General

12, rue de Prony

75017 Paris

FRANCE

Tel.: 33 (0)1 44 15 18 88

Fax: 33 (0)1 42 67 09 87

E-mail: oie@oie.int

Dr W. Pelgrim

Chargé de mission

OIE

Tel.: 33 (0)1 44 15 18 68

E-mail: w.pelwrim@oie.int

Dr Sarah Kahn

Head

International Trade Department

OIE

Tel.: 33 (0)1 44.15.18.80

E-mail: s.kahn@oie.int

Dr L. Stuardo

Chargé de mission

International Trade Department

OIE

Tel.: 33 (0)1 44 15 18 72

E-mail: l.stuardo@oie.int

Dr Y. Atagi

Deputy Head

International Trade Department

OIE

Tel.: 33 (0)1 44.15.18.92

E-mail: y.atagi@oie.int

Dr Gillian Mylrea

Chargée de mission

International Trade Department

OIE

Tel.: 33 (0)1 44.15.18.67

E-mail: g.mylrea@oie.int

Annex II

MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 7–18 September 2009

Adopted agenda

1.

Welcome - Director General

A. MEETING WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

B. JOINT MEETING OF THE CODE COMMISSION AND THE SCIENTIFIC

COMMISSION

  • 1. 
    Interface of wildlife and livestock how to incorporate the relevant wildlife aspects

into disease-specific chapters

2.

Joint discussion on specific chapters

  • a) 
    Animal health surveillance

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  • b) 
    Foot and mouth disease
  • c) 
    Swine vesicular disease
  • d) 
    Avian influenza and Newcastle disease
  • e) 
    Classical swine fever
  • f) 
    Other issues

C. EXAMINATION OF MEMBER COMMENTS AND WORK OF RELEVANT EXPERT

GROUPS

  • 1. 
    Update on reports of other commissions and other relevant activities of the OIE -President of the Commission
  • 2. 
    Code revision Item 1   Glossary

Item 2   Animal health surveillance (Chapter 1.4.)

Item 3   Surveillance of arthropod vectors of animal disease (Chapter 1.5.)

Item 4   Status for OIE listed diseases (Chapter 1.6.)

Item 5   Import risk analysis (Chapter 2.1. and report of the ad hoc Group)

Item 6   Evaluation of veterinary services (Chapters 3.1. and 3.2.)

  • a) 
    Draft revisions to Chapter 3.1. and 3.2.
  • b) 
    Guidelines on veterinary legislation
  • c) 
    PVS Feed back session in December 2009

Item 7 Design and implementation of animal systems to achieve animal traceability (Chapter 4.2.)

Item 8 Zoning and compartmentalisation

  • a) 
    Zoning and compartmentalisation (Chapter 4.3.)

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  • b) 
    Application of compartmentalisation (Chapter 4.4.)

Item 9 Semen and embryo chapters (Chapters 4.5.- 8., 10.)

Item 10 General obligations related to certification (Chapter 5.1.)

Item 11 Control of hazards of animal health and public health importance in animal feed (Chapter 6.3.)

Item 12 Control of hazards of animal health and public health importance in heat treated pet food (new draft Chapter)

Item 13 Salmonellosis

  • a) 
    Report on the Codex Working Group meeting (Brazil 7-12 September 2009)
  • b) 
    Biosecurity procedures in poultry production (revised Chapter 6.4.)
  • c) 
    Prevention, detection and control of Salmonella in poultry (Chapter 6.5.) and Salmonella enteritidis and Salmonella typhimurium in poultry (Chapter 6.6.).

Item 14 Introduction to the recommendations for controlling antimicrobial resistance (Chapter 6.7.)

Item 15 Animal welfare

  • a) 
    Use of animals in research and education (new draft chapter) and report of the third meeting of the OIE ad hoc Group on Laboratory Animal Welfare (including OIE discussion paper on air transport of laboratory animals).
  • b) 
    Animal welfare definition (Chapter 7.1.)
  • c) 
    Stray dog population control (Chapter 7.7.)
  • d) 
    Report of the eighth meeting of the OIE Animal Welfare Working Group
  • e) 
    Report of the OIE Electronic Consultation Group on Poultry Welfare
  • f) 
    Report of the first meeting of the OIE ad hoc Group on Animal Welfare and Broiler Chicken Production Systems

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  • g) 
    Report of the first meeting of the OIE ad hoc Group on Animal Welfare and Beef Cattle Production Systems.

Item 16 Other horizontal chapters

  • a) 
    Animal health measures applicable before and at departure (Chapter 5.4.)
  • b) 
    Border posts and quarantine stations in the importing country (Chapter 5.6.) Item 17 Anthrax (Chapter 8.1.)

Item 18 Bluetongue (Chapter 8.3.)

Item 19 Foot and mouth disease (Chapter 8.5.)

Item 20 Paratuberculosis (Chapter 8.9.)

Item 21 Rabies (Chapter 8.10.)

Item 22 West Nile fever (Chapter 8.16.)

Item 23 Diseases of bees (Chapters 9.1. -6.)

Item 24 Avian influenza (Chapter 10.4.)

Item 25 Newcastle disease (Chapter 10.13.)

Item 26 Bovine brucellosis (Chapter 11.3.)

Item 27 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 11.6.)

Item 28 Bovine tuberculosis (Chapter 11.7.) and Bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae (Chapter 11.8.)

Item 29 Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (Chapter 11.9.)

Item 30 Enzootic bovine leukosis (Chapter 11.11.)

Item 31 Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis/ infectious pustular vulvovaginitis (Chapter 11.13.)

Item 32 Equine diseases

  • a) 
    African horse sickness (Chapter 12.1. inactivated vaccine from GS77)
  • b) 
    Equine influenza (Chapter 12.7.)

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  • c) 
    Equine viral arteritis (Chapter 12.10.)

Item 33 Scrapie (Chapter 14.9., semen/embryo issue with IETS, historical freedom)

Item 34 Classical swine fever (Chapter 15.3.)

Item 35 Swine vesicular disease (Chapter 15.5.)

Item 36 Teschovirus encephalomyelitis (Chapter 15.6.)

C. Other issues

Item 37 Private standards for sanitary measures and animal welfare – update.

Item 38 Trade in Animal Products (“commodities”) – status report.

Item 39 Wildlife disease reporting: update on developments with WAHIS

Item 40 Future work programme of the Code Commission

Item 41 Other issues

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Annex III GLOSSARY

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed changes but has a comment in relation to Quarantine station.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code :

Central Bure auHeadquarte rs

means the Permanent Secretariat of the World Organisation for Animal Health which headquarters are located at:

12, rue de Prony, 75017 Paris, FRANCE Telephone: 33-(0)1 44 15 18 88 Fax: 33-(0)1 42 67 09 87 Electronic mail: oie@ oie.int WWW: http://www.oie.int

E arly detection syste m

means a system for the timely detection and identification of an incursion or emergence of diseases /infections in a country, zone or compartment . An early detection system should be under the control of the V eterinary Services and should include the following characteristics:

  • a. 
    representative coverage of target animal populations by field services;
  • b. 
    ability to undertake effective disease investigation and reporting;
  • c. 
    access to laboratories capable of diagnosing and differentiating relevant diseases ;
  • d. 
    a training programme for veterinarians , veterinary para-professionals , livestock owners/keepers and others involved in handling animals for detecting and reporting unusual animal health incidents;
  • e. 
    the legal obligation of private veterinarians to report to the V eterinary A uthority ;
  • f. 
    a national chain command.

Qu aran tin e station

means a premises an establishment under the control of the V eterinary A uthority where animals are maintained in isolation with no direct or indirect contact with other animals , to prevent ensure that there is no the transmission of specified pathogen(s) outside the establishment while the animals are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing and treatment. The presence of disease or infection in animals in the quarantine station does not affect the animal health status of the country or zone .

EU comment

The word "outside" in the third line should be changed to "into or out of".

In addition, the proposed new sentence added to the definition is not really part of the definition and relates to imports and therefore implies that this definition of quarantine station is only for imports. As there are other reasons such as export or diagnosis of disease or vaccine virus challenge this could be included in the relevant Chapter 5.6. concerning imports.

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Moreover, this assumption is only valid if the prescriptions of the definition are fulfilled (isolation), thus it should be stated too.

Finally, does this definition also have a consequence on quarantine as part of Artificial Insemination centres?

Uncertainty

means the lack of precise knowledge of the input values which is due to measurement error or to lack of knowledge of the steps required, and the pathways from hazard to risk , when building the scenario being assessed.

V ariab ility

means a real-world complexity in which the value of an input is not the same for each case due to natural diversity in a given population.

text deleted

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Annex III (contd) PROPOSED CHAPTER ON COMMUNICATION

EU Comments

The EU has several comments on this proposed chapter, inserted below.

The adoption of this chapter, which is merely at the first draft stage, will need a full cycle of comments, thus not being possible before May 2011.

General considerations

Introduction

There is a need to institutionalize communication as a discipline within Veterinary Services in order for them to achieve effective internal and external communication. Communication underpins everything that Veterinary Services do including prevention, surveillance, animal welfare, disease response, public health and food safety. The integration/combination of veterinary and communication expertise is essential for effective communication.

Principles

  • • 
    Communication is a continuous process
  • • 
    Veterinary Services should be mandated and have the authority to communicate
  • • 
    Veterinary Services are responsible to plan, implement, monitor, evaluate and revise communication

EU Comments

The VS communicate on animal health and welfare and/or veterinary public health issues. This should be indicated in the two sentences above, by adding the words "on matters on which they have authority".

Moreover, it should be the Veterinary Authority that is responsible for communication. Veterinary Authority should replace Veterinary Services.

  • • 
    Importance of joint technical veterinary expertise and professional communication skills when intending to disseminate scientific information
  • • 
    Suitable criteria for communication

▫     Transparency

▫     Consistency

▫     Timeliness

▫     Balance

▫     Accuracy

▫     Honesty

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  • Targeted Definitions

Communication

means the discipline of informing, influencing, and motivating individual, institutional and public audiences, preferably on the basis of interactive exchanges, about any issue falling under the mandate of the OIE and the competence of the Veterinary Services.

EU Comments

The word "influencing" is not relevant as the Communication in the intended scope of this chapter is a technical tool to get actions done.

The words "provoking action/reaction from" should be used instead.

Crisis

means a time of great danger, difficulty or uncertainty when problems related to any issue falling under the mandate of the OIE and the competence of the V eterinary Services require immediate action.

EU Comments

This definition is very difficult to understand. A crisis is not a "time" but rather a "situation"; moreover, introducing the notion of "danger" in the definition of crisis makes it very subjective.

Proposed wording:

"means a local, regional or global situation where issues that fall under the mandate of the OIE and the competence of the Veterinary Services are at stake and where economy or public health may be greatly affected, depending of the actions engaged."

Crisis Communic ation

means the process of providing information of potentially incomplete nature within time constraints that allows an individual, affected and/or interested parties, an entire community or the general public to make best possible decisions and be informed of and/or accept policy decisions and rationale behind policy decisions during a crisis.

EU Comments

This definition is very difficult to understand. It should be more simple and straightforward, and use the fact that communication has a definition already.

Proposed wording:

"means a type of communication destined to provide, within the constraints of a crisis, the most accurate and targeted information to an individual, affected and/or interested parties, an entire community or the general public, in order to get the best reactions in view of the managing of the crisis."

Outb re ak c ommunic ation

means the process of communicating in the event of an outbreak . Outbreak communication includes notification .

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Required elements

  • • 
    Proper organizational structure within VS

▫ VS should be mandated and have the authority to communicate

▫ Dedicated communication unit

▫ Official contact points

▫ Clearly defined chain of command (governance)

  • • 
    Human resources

▫ Qualified personnel

▫ Training

▫ Adequate number (back-up)

▫ Job descriptions

  • • 
    Financial and material resources ▫ Budget

▫ Equipment

▪ Office equipment

▪ Technical equipment

▪ Access to the Internet ▫ Suitable premise/accommodation

  • • 
    Documentation for demonstration (evidence to demonstrate capabilities) ▫ Policies on communication

▫ Work plans

▫ Communication products

  • • 
    Quality assessment and evaluation ▫ Monitoring system in place
  • • 
    Consequences For the society

▫ Increased knowledge and awareness ▫ Acceptance of policy decisions

▫ Consequential change of perception, attitude and/or behaviour For VS ▫ Raising the profile/awareness/knowledge

Improve trust/credibility

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Annex IV

CH AP TE R 1.4. ANIMAL HEALTH SURVEILLANCE

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed changes.

Article 1.4.1. Introduction and objectives

  • 1. 
    In general, surveillance is aimed at demonstrating the absence of disease or infection , determining the occurrence or distribution of disease or infection , while also detecting as early as possible exotic or emerging diseases . The type of surveillance applied depends on the desired outputs needed to support decision-making. The following recommendations may be applied to all diseases , their agents and all susceptible species (including wildlife) as listed in the Terrestrial Code , and are designed to assist with the development of surveillance methodologies. Except where a specific surveillance method for a certain disease or infection is already described in the Terrestrial Code , the recommendations in this chapter may be used to further refine the general approaches described for a specific disease or infection . Where detailed disease /infection -specific information is not available, suitable approaches should be based on the recommendations in this chapter.
  • 2. 
    Animal health surveillance is an essential tool to detect disease or infection , to monitor disease trends, to facilitate the control of disease or infection , to support claims for freedom from disease or infection , to provide data for use in risk analysis , for animal and/or public health purposes, and to substantiate the rationale for sanitary measures. Both domestic and wild animals are susceptible to certain disease /infection . However, in the presence of appropriate biosecurity measures, disease /infection in wild animals does not imply mean that the same disease /infection is necessarily present in domestic a nimals in the same country or z one . Surveilla nce data underpin the quality of disease status reports and should satisfy information requirements of risk analysis for international trade and for national decision-making. Wildlife may be included because they can serve as reservoirs and as indicators of human and domestic animal and wildlife disease . Wildlife disease /infection surveillance presents specific challenges that may differ significantly from surveillance in livestock.
  • 3. 
    Prerequisites to enable an OIE Member to provide information for the evaluation of its animal health status are:
  • a. 
    that the Member complies with the provisions of Chapter 3.1. of the Terrestrial Code ;
  • b. 
    that, where possible, surveillance data be complemented by other sources of information (e.g. scientific publications, research data, documented field observations and other non-survey data);
  • c. 
    that transparency in the planning and execution of surveillance activities and the analysis and availability of data and information, be maintained at all times, in accordance with Chapter 1.1. of the Terrestrial Code .
  • 4. 
    The objectives of this chapter are to:
  • a. 
    provide guidance to the type of outputs that a surveillance system should generate;
  • b. 
    provide recommendations to assess the quality of disease /infection surveillance systems.

Article 1.4.2.

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Definitions

The following definitions apply for the purposes of this chapter:

Bias: means a tendency of an estimate to deviate in one direction from a true value.

Case definition: means a set of criteria used to classify an animal as a case .

Confidence: in the context of demonstrating freedom from infection , confidence is the probability that the type of surveillance applied would detect the presence of infection if the population were infected. The confidence depends on, among other parameters, the assumed level of infection in an infected population. The term refers to confidence in the ability of the surveillance applied to detect disease /infection , and is equivalent to the sensitivity of the surveillance system.

Probability sampling: means a sampling strategy in which every unit has a known non-zero probability of inclusion in the sample.

Sample: means the group of elements (sampling units) drawn from a population, on which tests are performed or parameters measured to provide surveillance information.

Sampling units: means the unit that is sampled, either in a random survey or in non-random surveillance . This may be an individual animal or a group of animals (e.g. an epidemiological unit ). Together, they comprise the sampling frame.

Sensitivity: means the proportion of truly positive units that are correctly identified as positive by a test.

Specificity: means the proportion of truly negative units that are correctly identified as negative by a test.

Study population: means the population from which surveillance data are derived. This may be the same as the target population or a subset of it.

Surveillance system: means a method of surveillance that may involve one or more component activities that generates information on the health, disease or zoonosis status of animal populations.

Survey: means an investigation in which information is systematically collected, usually carried out on a sample of a defined population group, within a defined time period.

Target population: means the population about which conclusions are to be inferred.

Test: means a procedure used to classify a unit as either positive, negative or suspect with respect to a disease or an i nf ecti on .

Test system: means a combination of multiple tests and rules of interpretation which are used for the same purpose as a test.

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Article 1.4.3. Principles of surveillance

  • 1. 
    Types of surveillance
  • a. 
    Surveillance may be based on many different data sources and can be classified in a number of ways, including:
  • i. 
    the means by which data are collected (active versus passive surveillance );
  • ii. 
    the disease focus (pathogen-specific versus general surveillance ); and
  • iii. 
    the way in which units for observation are selected (structured surveys versus non-random data sources).
  • b. 
    In this chapter, surveillance activities are classified as being based on: EITHER i. structured population-based surveys, such as:
  • systematic sampling at slaughter ;
  • random surveys;
  • surveys for infection in clinically normal animals , including wildlife; OR ii. structured non-random surveillance activities, such as:
  • disease reporting or notifications;
  • control programmes/health schemes;
  • targeted testing/screening;
  • ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections;
  • laboratory investigation records;
  • biological specimen banks;
  • sentinel units;
  • field observations;
  • farm production records;
  • wildlife disease data.

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  • c. 
    In addition, surveillance data should be supported by related information, such as:
  • i. 
    data on the epidemiology of the disease /infection , including environmental, host population distribution, and climatic information;
  • ii. 
    data on animal movements, including transhumance, as well as natural wildlife migrations;
  • iii. 
    trading patterns for animals and animal products;
  • iv. 
    national animal health regulations, including information on compliance with them and their effectiveness;
  • v. 
    history of imports of potentially infected material; and
  • vi. 
    biosecurity measures in place;
  • vii. 
    the risk likelihood and consequence of disease /infection introduction.
  • d. 
    The sources of evidence should be fully described. In the case of a structured survey, this should include a description of the sampling strategy used for the selection of units for testing. For structured non-random data sources, a full description of the system is required including the source(s) of the data, when the data were collected, and a consideration of any biases that may be inherent in the system.
  • 2. 
    Critical elements

In assessing the quality of a surveillance system, the following critical elements need to be addressed over and above quality of V eterinary Services (Chapter 3.1.).

  • a. 
    Populations

Ideally, surveillance should be carried out in such a way as to take into account all animal species susceptible to the infection in a country, zone or compartment . The surveillance activity may cover all individuals in the population or part of them. When surveillance is conducted only on a subpopulation , care should be taken regarding the inferences made from the results.

Definitions of appropriate populations should be based on the specific recommendations of the disease chapters of the Terrestrial Code .

  • b. 
    Time frame (or temporal values of surveillance data)

Surveillance should be carried out at a frequency that reflects the biology of the infection and the risk s of its introduction.

  • c. 
    Epidemiological unit

The relevant epidemiological unit (s) for the surveillance system should be defined to ensure that it is representative of the population appropriate to meet the objectives of surveillance. Therefore, it should be chosen taking into account factors such as carriers, reservoirs, vectors , immune status, genetic resistance and age, sex, and other host criteria.

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  • d. 
    Clustering

Infection in a country, zone or compartment usually clusters rather than being uniformly or randomly distributed through a population. Clustering may occur at a number of different levels (e.g. a cluster of infected animals within a herd , a cluster of pens in a building, or a cluster of farms in a compartment ). Clustering should be taken into account in the design of surveillance activities and the statistical analysis of surveillance data, at least at what is judged to be the most significant level of clustering for the particular animal population and infection .

  • e. 
    Case definition

A clear case definition should be defined developed for each disease /infection under surveillance , using clear criteria and, where they exist, the standards in the T errestrial Code . For wildlife disease /infection surveillance , it is essential to correctly identify and report host animal taxonomy (including genus and species).

EU comment

Replace the word "defined" by "specified".

  • f. 
    Analytical methodologies

Surveillance data should be analysed using appropriate methodologies, and at the appropriate organisational levels to facilitate effective decision making, whether it be planning interventions or demonstrating status.

Methodologies for the analysis of surveillance data should be flexible to deal with the complexity of real life situations. No single method is applicable in all cases. Different methodologies may be needed to accommodate the relevant host species, pathogens, varying production and surveilla nce systems, and types and amounts of data and information available.

The methodology used should be based on the best information available. It should also be in accordance with this chapter, fully documented and supported by reference to the scientific literature and other sources, including expert opinion. Sophisticated mathematical or statistical analyses should only be carried out when justified by the proper amount and quality of field data.

Consistency in the application of different methodologies should be encouraged and transparency is essential in order to ensure fairness and rationality, consistency in decision making and ease of understanding. The uncertainties, assumptions made, and the effect of these on the final conclusions should be documented.

  • g. 
    Testing

Surveillance involves the detection of disease or infection by the use of appropriate case definitions based on the results of one or more tests for evidence of infection or immune status. In this context, a test may range from detailed laboratory examinations to field observations and the analysis of production records. The performance of a test at the population level (including field observations) may be described in terms of its sensitivity and specificity and predictive values. Imperfect sensitivity and/or specificity will have an impact on the conclusions from surveillance . Therefore, these parameters should be taken into account in the design of surveillance systems and analysis of surveilla nce data.

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The values of sensitivity and specificity for the tests used should be specified for each species in which they may be used, and the method used to determine or estimate these values should be documented. Alternatively, where values for sensitivity and/or specificity for a particular test are specified in the Terrestrial Manual , these values may be used as a guide.

Samples from a number of animals or units may be pooled and subjected to a testing protocol. The results should be interpreted using sensitivity and specificity values that have been determined or estimated for that particular pool size and testing procedure.

  • h. 
    Quality assurance

Surveillance systems should incorporate the principles of quality assurance and be subjected to periodic auditing to ensure that all components of the system function and provide verifiable documentation of procedures and basic checks to detect significant deviations of procedures from those documented in the design.

  • i. 
    Validation

Results from animal health surveillance systems are subject to one or more potential biases. When assessing the results, care should be taken to identify potential biases that can inadvertently lead to an over-estimate or an under-estimate of the parameters of interest.

  • j. 
    Data collection and management

The success of a surveillance system is dependent on a reliable process for data collection and management. The process may be based on paper records or computerised. Even where data are collected for non-survey purposes (e.g. during disease control interventions, inspections for movement control or during disease eradication schemes), the consistency and quality of data collection and event reporting in a format that facilitates analysis, is critical. Factors influencing the quality of collected data include:

  • the distribution of, and communication between, those involved in generating and transferring data from the field to a centralised location; this requires effective collaboration among all stakeholders, such as government ministries, non-governmental organisations, and others, particularly for data involving wildlife;
  • the ability of the data processing system to detect missing, inconsistent or inaccurate data, and to address these problems;
  • maintenance of disaggregated data rather than the compilation of summary data;
  • minimisation of transcription errors during data processing and communication.

Article 1.4.4.

Structured population-based surveys

In addition to the principles for surveillance discussed above, the following recommendations should be used when planning, implementing and analysing surveys.

  • 1. 
    Types of surveys

Surveys may be conducted on the entire target population (i.e. a census) or on a sample. A sample may be selected in either of the t wo following ways:

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  • a. 
    non-probability based sampling methods, such as: i. convenience;
  • ii. 
    expert choice; iii. quota;
  • b. 
    probability based sampling methods, such as: i. simple random selection;
  • ii. 
    cluster sampling;
  • iii. 
    stratified sampling;
  • iv. 
    systematic sampling.

Periodic or repeated surveys conducted in order to document disease freedom should be done using probability based sampling methods so that data from the study population can be extrapolated to the target population in a statistically valid manner.

The sources of information should be fully described and should include a detailed description of the sampling strategy used for the selection of units for testing. Also, consideration should be made of any biases that may be inherent in the survey design.

  • 2. 
    Survey design

The population of epidemiological units should first be clearly defined; hereafter sampling units appropriate for each stage, depending on the design of the survey, should be defined.

The design of the survey will depend on the size and, structure and degree of understanding of the population being studied, the epidemiology of the infection and the resources available.

Data on wild animal population size often do not exist and should be determined before a survey can be designed. The expertise of wildlife biologists may be sought in the gathering and interpretation of such population data. Historical population data should be updated since these may not reflect current populations.

  • 3. 
    Sampling

The objective of sampling from a population is to select a subset of units that is representative of the population of interest with respect to the objective of the study. Sampling should provide the best likelihood that the sample will be representative of the population, within the practical constraints imposed by different environments and production systems.

Specimens from wildlife for surveillance may be available from sources such as hunters and trappers, road-kills, wild animal meat markets, sanitary inspection of hunted animals , morbidity-mortality observations by the general public, wildlife rehabilitation centres, wildlife biologists and wildlife agency field personnel, farmers, and other landholders, naturalists and conservationists. Wildlife data such as census data, trends over time, and reproductive success can be used in a manner similar to farm production records for epidemiological purposes.

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  • 4. 
    Sampling methods

When selecting epidemiological units from within a population, probability sampling (e.g. simple random selection) should be used. When this is not possible, sampling should provide the best practical chance of generating a sample that is representative of the target population.

In any case, the sampling method used at all stages should be fully documented.

  • 5. 
    Sample size

In general, surveys are conducted either to demonstrate the presence or absence of a factor (e.g. infection ) or to estimate a parameter (e.g. the prevalence of infection ). The method used to calculate sample size for surveys depends on the purpose of the survey, the expected prevalence, the level of confidence desired of the survey results and the performance of the tests used.

Article 1.4.5. Structured non-random surveillance

Surveillance systems routinely use structured non-random data, either alone or in combination with surveys.

  • 1. 
    Common non-random surveillance sources

A wide variety of non-random surveillance sources may be available. These vary in their primary purpose and the type of surveillance information they are able to provide. Some surveillance systems are primarily established as early detection systems, but may also provide valuable information to demonstrate freedom from infection . Other systems provide cross-sectional information suitable for prevalence estimation, either once or repeatedly, while yet others provide continuous information, suitable for the estimate of incidence data (e.g. disease reporting systems, sentinel sites, testing schemes).

  • a. 
    Disease reporting or notification systems

Data derived from disease reporting systems can be used in combination with other data sources to substantiate claims of animal health status, to generate data for risk analysis , or for early detection. Effective laboratory support is an important component of any reporting system. Reporting systems relying on laboratory confirmation of suspect clinical cases should use tests that have a high specificity. Reports should be released by the laboratory in a timely manner, with the amount of time from disease detection to report generation minimized (to hours in the case of introduction of a foreign animal disease).

Whenever the responsibility for disease notification falls outside the scope of the V eterinary A uthority , for example in some countries for diseases in wildlife, effective communication and data sharing should be established with the relevant authorities to ensure comprehensive and timely disease reporting.

  • b. 
    Control programmes / health schemes

Animal disease control programmes or health schemes, while focusing on the control or eradication of specific diseases , should be planned and structured in such a manner as to generate data that are scientifically verifiable and contribute to structured surveillance .

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  • c. 
    Targeted testing / screening

This may involve testing targeted to selected sections of the population (subpopulations), in which disease is more likely to be introduced or found. Examples include testing culled and dead animals , swill fed animals , those exhibiting clinical signs, animals located in a defined geographic area and specific age or commodity group.

  • d. 
    Ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections

Inspections of animals at slaughterhouses may provide valuable surveillance data. The sensitivity and specificity of slaughterhouse inspection for detecting the presence of specified diseases under the inspection system in place should be pre-determined. The accuracy of the inspection system will be influenced by:

  • i. 
    the training, experience and number of the inspection staff;
  • ii. 
    the involvement of the Competent A uthorities in the supervision of ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections;
  • iii. 
    the quality of construction of the slaughterhouse , speed of the slaughter chain, lighting quality, etc.; and
  • iv. 
    staff morale and motivation for efficient performance.

Slaughterhouse inspections are likely to provide good coverage for particular age groups and geographical areas only. Slaughterhouse surveillance data are subject to biases in relation to target populations (e.g. only animals of a particular class and age are likely to be slaughtered for human consumption in significant numbers). Such biases need to be recognised when analysing surveillance data.

For traceback and analysis of spatial and herd -level coverage, there should be, if possible, an effective identification system that relates animals in the slaughterhouse to their locality of origin.

  • e. 
    Laboratory investigation records

Analysis of laboratory investigation records may provide useful surveillance information. The coverage of the system will be increased if analysis is able to incorporate records from national, accredited, university and private sector laboratories. Valid analysis of data from different laboratories depends on the existence of standardised diagnostic procedures and standardised methods for interpretation and data recording. As with abattoir inspections, there needs to be a mechanism to relate specimens to the farm of origin.

  • f. 
    Biological specimen banks

Specimen banks consist of stored specimens, gathered either through representative sampling or opportunistic collection or both. Specimen banks may contribute to retrospective studies, including providing support for claims of historical freedom from infection , and may allow certain studies to be conducted more quickly and at lower cost than alternative approaches.

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  • g. 
    Sentinel units

Sentinel units/sites involve the identification and regular testing of one or more of animals of known health/immune status in a specified geographical location to detect the occurrence of disease /infection (usually serologically). They are particularly useful for surveillance of for diseases /infections with a strong spatial component, such as vector -borne diseases /infections . Sentinel units provide the opportunity to target surveillance depending on the likelihood of infection (related to vector habitats and host population distribution), cost and other practical constraints. Sentinel units may provide evidence of freedom from infection , or provide data on prevalence and incidence as well as the distribution of disease /infection .

  • h. 
    Field observations

Clinical observations of animals in the field are an important source of surveillance data. The sensitivity and specificity of field observations may be relatively low, but these can be more easily determined and controlled if a clear standardised case definition is applied. E ducation of potential field observers in application of the case definition and reporting is an important component. Ideally, both the number of positive observations and the total number of observations should be recorded.

  • i. 
    Farm production records

Systematic analysis of farm production records may be used as an indicator of the presence or absence of disease /infection at the herd or flock level. In general, the sensitivity of this approach may be quite high (depending on the disease ), but the specificity is often quite low.

  • j. 
    Wildlife data

Specimens from wild animals for disease /infection surveilla nce may be available from sources such as hunters and trappers, road-kills, wild animal meat markets, sanitary inspection of hunted animals , morbidity and mortality observations by the general public, wildlife rehabilitation centres, wildlife biologists and wildlife agency field personnel, farmers and other landholders, naturalists and conservationists. Wildlife data such as census data, trends over time, and reproductive success can be used in a manner similar to farm production records for epidemiological purposes.

  • 2. 
    Critical elements for structured non-random surveillance

There are a number of critical factors which should be taken into account when using structured non-random surveillance data such as coverage of the population, duplication of data, and sensitivity and specificity of tests that may give rise to difficulties in the interpretation of data. Surveillance data from non-random sources can, however, be a cost-efficient method of early detection, and may increase the level of confidence or detect a lower level of prevalence compared to random sampling surveys.

  • 3. 
    Analytical methodologies

Different scientifically valid methodologies may be used for the analysis of non-random surveillance data. Where no data are available, estimates based on expert opinions, gathered and combined using a formal, documented and scientifically valid methodology may be used.

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  • 4. 
    Combination of multiple sources of data

The methodology used to combine the evidence from multiple data sources should be scientifically valid, and fully documented including references to published material.

Surveillance information gathered from the same country, zone or compartment at different times may provide cumulative evidence of animal health status. Such evidence gathered over time may be combined to provide an overall level of confidence. For instance, repeated annual surveys may be analysed to provide a cumulative level of confidence. However, a single larger survey, or the combination of data collected during the same time period from multiple random or non-random sources, may be able to achieve the same level of confidence in just one year a shorter period of time.

Analysis of surveillance information gathered intermittently or continuously over time should, where possible, incorporate the time of collection of the information to take the decreased value of older information into account. The sensitivity, specificity and completeness of data from each source should also be taken into account for the final overall confidence level estimation.

Article 1.4.6.

Surveillance to demonstrate freedom from disease/ infection

  • 1. 
    Requirements to declare a country, zone or compartment free from disease/infection without pathogen specific surveillance

This Article provides general principles for declaring a country, zone or compartment free from disease /infection in relation to the time of last occurrence and in particular for the recognition of historical freedom.

The provisions of this Article are based on the principles described in Article 1.4.3. of this chapter and the following premises:

  • in the absence of disease and vaccination, the animal population would become susceptible over a period of time;
  • the disease agents to which these provisions apply are likely to produce identifiable clinical signs in susceptible animals ;
  • competent and effective V eterinary Services will be able to investigate, diagnose and report disease, if present;
  • disease /infection can affect both wild and domestic animals ;
  • the absence of disease /infection over a long period of time in a susceptible population can be substantiated by effective disease investigation and reporting by a Member.
  • a. 
    Historically free

Unless otherwise specified in the relevant disease chapter, a country, zone or compartment may be recognised free from infection without formally applying a pathogen-specific surveilla nce programme when:

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  • i. 
    there has never been occurrence of disease , or
  • ii. 
    eradication has been achieved or the disease /infection has ceased to occur for at least 25 years, provided that for at least the past 10 years:
  • iii. 
    it has been a notifiable disease ;
  • iv. 
    an early detection system has been in place for all relevant species;
  • v. 
    measures to prevent disease /infection introduction have been in place; no vaccination against the disease has been carried out unless otherwise provided in the Terrestrial Code ;
  • vi. 
    infection is not known to be established in wildlife within the country or zone intended to be declared free. A country or zone cannot apply for historical freedom if there is any evidence of infection in wildlife.
  • b. 
    Last occurrence within the previous 25 years

Countries, zones or compartments that have achieved eradication (or in which the disease /infection has ceased to occur) within the previous 25 years, should follow the pathogen-specific surveillance requirements in the Terrestrial Code if they exist. In the absence of specific requirements for surveillance in the Terrestrial Code , countries should follow the general recommendations on surveillance to demonstrate animal health status outlined in this chapter provided that for at least the past 10 years:

  • i. 
    it has been a notifiable disease ;
  • ii. 
    an early detection system has been in place;
  • iii. 
    measures to prevent disease /infection introduction have been in place;
  • iv. 
    no vaccination against the disease has been carried out unless otherwise provided in the Terrestrial Code ;
  • v. 
    infection is not known to be established in wildlife within the country or zone intended to be declared free. A country or zone cannot apply for freedom if there is any evidence of infection in wildlife.
  • 2. 
    Recommendations for the discontinuation of pathogen-specific screening after recognition of freedom from infection

A country, zone or compartment that has been recognised as free from infection following the provisions of the Terrestrial Code may discontinue pathogen-specific screening while maintaining the infection-free status provided that:

  • a. 
    it is a notifiable disease ;
  • b. 
    an early detection system is in place;
  • c. 
    measures to prevent disease /infection introduction are in place;

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  • d. 
    vaccination against the disease is not applied;
  • e. 
    infection is known not to be established in wildlife. It can be difficult to collect sufficient epidemiological data to prove absence of disease /infection in wild animal populations. In such circumstances, a range of supporting evidence should be used to make this assessment.
  • 3. 
    Self declaration of disease/infection

Members may make a self declaration that a country, zone or compartment is free from a listed disease , based on the implementation of the provisions of the Terrestrial Code and the Terrestrial Manual - see relevant provisions in Chapter 1.5. The V eterinary A uthority may wish to transmit this information to the OIE Central Bureau , which may publish the information.

  • 4. 
    International recognition of disease/infection free status

For diseases for which procedures exist whereby the OIE can officially recognise the existence of a disease /infection free country, zone or compartment , a Member wishing to apply for recognition of this status shall, via its Permanent Delegate, send to the OIE all the relevant documentation relating to the country, zone or compartment concerned. Such documentation should be presented according to the recommendations prescribed by the OIE for the appropriate animal diseases .

  • 5. 
    Demonstration of freedom from infection

A surveillance system to demonstrate freedom from infection should meet the following requirements in addition to the general requirements for surveillance outlined in Article 1.4.3. of this chapter.

Freedom from infection implies the absence of the pathogenic agent in the country, zone or compartment . Scientific methods cannot provide absolute certainty of the absence of infection . Demonstrating freedom from infection involves providing sufficient evidence to demonstrate (to a level of confidence acceptable to Members) that infection with a specified pathogen is not present in a population. In practice, it is not possible to prove (i.e., be 100% confident) that a population is free from infection (unless every member of the population is examined simultaneously with a perfect test with both sensitivity and specificity equal to 100%). Instead, the aim is to provide adequate evidence (to an acceptable level of confidence), that infection , if present, is present in less than a specified proportion of the population.

However, finding evidence of infection at any level in the target population automatically invalidates any freedom from infection claim unless otherwise stated in the relevant disease chapter. The implications of disease /infection in wildlife for the status of domestic animals in the same country or zone should be assessed in each situation, as indicated in the relevant chapter on each disease in the Terrestrial Code .

Evidence from targeted, random or non-random data sources, as stated before, may increase the level of confidence or be able to detect a lower level of prevalence with the same level of confidence compared to structured surveys.

Article 1.4.7.

Surveillance for distribution and occurrence of infection

Surveillance to determine distribution and occurrence of infection or of other relevant health related events is widely used to assess progress in the control or eradication of selected diseases and pathogens and as an aid to decision making. It has, however, relevance for the international movement of animals and products when movement occurs among infected countries.

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In contrast to surveillance to demonstrate freedom from infection , surveillance used to assess progress in control or eradication of selected diseases and pathogens is usually designed to collect data about a number of variables of animal health relevance, for example:

  • 1. 
    prevalence or incidence of infection ;
  • 2. 
    morbidity and mortality rates;
  • 3. 
    frequency of disease /infection risk factors and their quantification;
  • 4. 
    frequency distribution of herd sizes or the sizes of other epidemiological units ;
  • 5. 
    frequency distribution of antibody titres;
  • 6. 
    proportion of immunised animals after a vaccination campaign;
  • 7. 
    frequency distribution of the number of days elapsing between suspicion of infection and laboratory confirmation of the diagnosis and/or to the adoption of control measures;
  • 8. 
    farm production records;
  • 9. 
    role of wildlife in maintenance or transmission of the infection .

text deleted

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Annex V

CH AP TE R 1.5.

SURVEILLANCE OF ARTHROPOD VECTORS OF ANIMAL DISEASES

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed changes.

Article 1.5.1. Introduction

V ector -borne diseases are of increasing importance economically and to human and animal health.

Environmental (including climate change), sociological and economical changes may affect the distribution and impact of these diseases .

Improved understanding of the distribution and population dynamics of the vectors is a key element for assessing and managing the risk s associated with vector -borne animal and zoonotic disea ses .

The Terrestrial Code contains recommendations for the surveillance of several vector -borne diseases and general recommendations for animal health surveillance .

The need has arisen to complement these general recommendations on surveillance with additional advice on the surveillance of vectors themselves. This chapter only addresses surveilla nce for arthropod vectors .

For the purpose of trade, it must be noted that there is no conclusive relationship between the presence of a vector(s) and the disease status of a country/zone , and also that the apparent absence of a vector(s) does not by itself confirm vector -free status.

A decision tree for vector surveillance is presented in Figure 1.

Article 1.5.2.

Objectives

The objective of these recommendations is to provide methods for:

  • 1. 
    gathering up-to-date information on the spatial and temporal distribution and abundance of vectors of the arthropod-borne OIE-listed diseases and emerging diseases ;
  • 2. 
    monitoring changes in the spatial and temporal distribution and abundance of these vectors ;
  • 3. 
    collecting relevant data to inform risk assessment (including vector competency) and risk management of these vector -borne di sea ses ;
  • 4. 
    detecting the presence of specific vectors or confirming their absence;
  • 5. 
    understanding pathways of entry for vectors and vector -borne pathogenic agents.

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Figure 1 Decision Tree for Vector Surveillance

Climate change predictions may guide risk assessment and surveillance planning

Article 1.5.3. Sampling methodology

  • 1. 
    Sampling plan
  • a. 
    The objective of the surveillance programme should be determined and stated before planning begins.
  • b. 
    All available historical data on the vector or the disease for the country or zone should be collated and assessed.
  • c. 
    The sampling plan should consider the following: i. the biology and ecology of the vector(s) ,
  • ii. 
    the presence, distribution and abundance of the vectors ’ host animal population(s),
  • iii. 
    the environmental, climatic, ecological and topographic conditions of relevance to vector ecology,
  • iv. 
    the need for a risk assessment to indicate the areas at highest risk of introduction of a vector that is unlikely to be present.
  • d. 
    Sampling should be aimed at:

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  • i. 
    establishing vector presence or confirming vector absence in the country or zone ,
  • ii. 
    describing the distribution of the vector(s) within the country or zone ,
  • iii. 
    providing additional information on vector density and spatial/temporal variability (both over the short- and the long-term),
  • iv. 
    early detection of vectors or vector -borne pathogenic agents in areas with risk s of entry and establishment.
  • e. 
    The sampling plan should be designed to provide appropriate estimates of the indicators listed above. Consideration should be given to the following:

The recommended general approach to sampling is via a three-stage hierarchy:

  • i. 
    Stratification based on ecological criteria (where possible), and risk assessment for vector introduction,
  • ii. 
    subdivision of strata into spatial sampling units, and
  • iii. 
    establishment of actual sampling sites within selected spatial sampling units.

If adequate entomological, epidemiological and historical data and/or expert opinion exists, the sampling plan may be refined or targeted by defining strata which are as homogenous homogeneous as possible with respect to the following known or suspected risk -factors, as appropriate for the country or zone :

  • i. 
    domestic or wild populations of host animals preferred by the vector ,
  • ii. 
    vector habitat suitability,
  • iii. 
    climatic patterns (including seasonal),
  • iv. 
    areas endemically and/or epidemically affected by the disease(s) of concern,
  • v. 
    areas of known vector occurrences,
  • vi. 
    fringe zone(s) around areas of known vector occurrences or other high risk s areas for vector introduction, such as ports,
  • vii. 
    areas in which the disease(s) or vector(s) of concern have not been reported currently or historically,
  • viii. 
    each stratum (or the whole country or zone , if not stratified) should be divided into spatial sampling units according to standard methodologies such as a grid system,
  • ix. 
    the number and size of the spatial sampling units should be defined to provide appropriate estimates of the indicators listed above,

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  • x. 
    the number and location of actual sampling sites within each spatial sampling unit also should be defined to provide appropriate estimates of the indicators listed above,
  • xi. 
    different levels of sampling intensity (spatial sampling unit size, number of units sampled, number of sites sampled within units, and sampling frequency) may be applied to different strata into which the country or zone has been divided. For example, more intensive sampling might be carried out in strata where vector presence seems most likely, based on biological or statistical criteria.
  • 2. 
    Sampling methods

Many sampling methods have been developed for the capture of vector arthropods, and these differ according to the disease /vector system under consideration.

  • a. 
    The collection methods used should be adapted as required to ensure reasonable confidence of collecting the vector(s) of concern.
  • b. 
    Collection methods should obtain the various developmental stages (such as eggs, larvae, nymphs, adults) and adult age categories, as appropriate to the species in question, required to estimate population survival rates and population dynamics in relation to disease transmission.
  • c. 
    Different collection methods may be required to obtain samples from a single vector species, depending on the life stage or place of capture (such as from the environment or from the host animals). The collection method must be appropriate to the species and life stage of interest.

The collection methods should preserve the vector(s) in a manner suitable for their morphological identification or identification with molecular techniques. Where the purpose of sampling is to detect or isolate a pathogenic agent(s), specific protocols should be followed to ensure the samples are suitable for these assays.

  • 3. 
    Data management, analysis and interpretation

Data management and analytical methodologies should be done in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

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Annex VI

CH AP TE R 1.6.

STATUS FOR OIE LISTED DISEASES: PROCEDURES FOR SELF DECLARATION AND FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION BY THE OIE

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed changes.

Article 1.6.1.

General principles

Members may wish to make a self declaration as to the freedom of a country, zone or compartment from an OIE listed disease . The Member may inform the OIE of its claimed status and the OIE may publish the claim. Publication does not imply endorsement of the claim. The OIE does not recognise publish self declaration for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), foot and mouth disease (FMD), rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP).

Members may request official recognition by the OIE as to:

  • 1. 
    the risk status of a country or zone with regard to BSE;
  • 2. 
    the freedom of a country or zone from FMD, with or without vaccination;
  • 3. 
    the freedom of a country from rinderpest;
  • 4. 
    the freedom of a country or zone from CBPP.

The OIE does not grant official recognition for other diseases .

In these cases, Members should present documentation setting out the compliance of the V eterinary Services of the applicant country or zone with the provisions of Chapters 1.1., 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code and with the provisions of the relevant disease chapters in the Terrestrial Code and the Terrestrial Manual .

When requesting official recognition of disease status, the Member should submit to the OIE Scientific and Technical Department a dossier providing the information requested (as appropriate) in Articles 1.6.2. (for BSE), 1.6.3. (for FMD), 1.6.4. (for rinderpest) or 1.6.5. (for CBPP).

The OIE framework for the official recognition and maintenance of disease status is described in Resolution N° XXII (administrative procedures) and Resolution N° XXIII (financial obligations) adopted during the 76th General Session in May 2008.

Article 1.6.2.

Questionnaire on bovine spongiform encephalopathy

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Acceptance of this submission is based on the compliance of the V eterinary Service of the applicant country, zone or compartment with the provisions of Chapter 3.1. of the Terrestrial Code and the compliance of BSE diagnostic

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laboratories with the provisions of Chapter 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Manual . Documentary evidence should be provided to support this based on Chapter 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code .

Article 11.6.2. of the Terrestrial Code Chapter on BSE prescribes the criteria to determine the BSE risk status of a the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment . This document is the means whereby a claim for negligible risk (Article 11.6.3.) or controlled risk (Article 11.6.4.) can be made to the OIE.

The document comprises the following:

  • • 
    Section 1 – Risk assessment (see point 1 of Article 11.6.2.)
  • • 
    Section 2 – Other requirements of points 2 to 4 of Article 11.6.2. o Ongoing awareness programme o Compulsory notification and investigation o Diagnostic capability
  • • 
    Section 3 – Surveillance (Article 11.6.2. and Articles 11.6.20. to 11.6.22.)
  • • 
    Section 4 – BSE history of the country, zone or compartment (Articles 11.6.3. and 11.6.4.).

N.B. Where, during the completion of this questionnaire, the submitting V eterinary Service provides documentation regarding the legislation under which it is mandated, it should provide the content of any legal act described (in one of the three official languages of OIE), as well as the dates of official publication and implementation. Submitting countries are encouraged to follow the format and numbering used in this document.

SECTION 1: RISK ASSE SSMENT (see point 1 of Article 11.6.2.)

Introduction

The first step in determining the BSE risk status of the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment is to conduct a risk assessment (reviewed annually), based on Sections 2. and 3. and Chapter 4.3. of the Terrestrial Code , identifying all potential factors for BSE occurrence and their historic perspective.

Documentation guidelines

This section provides guidance on the data gathering and presentation of information required to support the risk release and exposure assessments in respect of:

Relea se assessment:

  • 1. 
    The potential for the release of the BSE agent through importation of meat-and-bone meal or greaves .
  • 2. 
    The potential for the release of the BSE agent through the importation of potentially infected live cattle.
  • 3. 
    The potential for the release of the BSE agent through the importation of potentially infected products of bovine origin.

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Exposure a ssessment:

  • 4. 
    The origin of bovine carcasses, by-products and slaughterhouse waste, the parameters of the rendering processes and the methods of cattle feed production.
  • 5. 
    The potential for the exposure of cattle to the BSE agent through consumption of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of bovine origin.

In each of the five areas of release and exposure assessment that follow, the contributor is guided in terms of the question, the rationale and the evidence required to support the country, zone or compartment status claim.

Release assessment

  • 1. 

    The potential for the release of the BSE agent through importation of meat-and-bone meal or greaves

Question to be answered: Has meat-and-bone meal , greaves , or feedstuffs containing either, been imported within the past 8 years? If so, where from and in what quantities?

Rationale: Knowledge of the origin of meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing either meat-and-bone meal or greaves , is necessary to assess the risk of release of BSE agent. Meat-and-bone meal and greaves originating in countries of high BSE risk pose a higher release risk than that from low risk countries. Meat-and-bone meal and greaves originating in countries of unknown BSE risk pose an unknown release risk.

This point is irrelevant if the exposure assessment outlined below in Article 11.6.27. indicates that meat-and-bone meal or greaves has not been fed, either deliberately or accidentally, in the past 8 years. Nevertheless, documentation should be provided on the control systems (including relevant legislation) in place to ensure that meat-and-bone meal or greaves has not been fed to cattle.

E vi dence req ui red :

  • a) 
    Documentation to support claims that meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing either meat-and-bone meal or greaves have not been imported, OR
  • b) 
    Documentation on annual volume, by country of origin, of meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing them imported during the past 8 years.
  • c) 
    Documentation describing the species composition of the imported meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing them.
  • d) 
    Documentation, from the V eterinary Service of the country of production, supporting why the rendering processes used to produce meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing them would have inactivated, or significantly reduced the titre of BSE agent, should it be present.
  • 2. 

    The potential for the release of the BSE agent through the importation of potentially infected live cattle

Question to be answered: Have live cattle been imported within the past 7 years?

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Rationale: The release risks are dependent on:

  • • 
    country, zone or compartment of origin and its BSE status, which will change as more data become available; this may result from the detection of clinical disease , or following active surveillance , or assessment of geographical BSE risk;
  • • 
    feeding and management of the imported cattle in the country, zone or compartment of origin;
  • • 
    use to which the commodity has been put as apart from representing risk of developing clinical disease , the slaughter , rendering and recycling in meat-and-bone meal of imported cattle represents a potential route of exposure of indigenous livestock even if meat-and-bone meal and greaves , or feedstuffs containing them, have not been imported;
  • • 
    dairy versus meat breeds, where there are differences in exposure in the country, zone or compartment of origin because feeding practices result in greater exposure of one category;
  • • 
    age at slaughter . E vi dence req ui red:
  • a) 
    Documentation including tables on the country, zone or compartment of origin of imports. This should identify the country, zone or compartment of origin of the cattle, the length of time they lived in that country, zone or compartment and of any other country in which they have resided during their lifetime.

b)   Documentation including tables describing origin and volume of imports.

  • c) 
    Documentation demonstrating that risks are periodically reviewed in light of evolving knowledge on the BSE status of the country, zone or compartment of origin.
  • 3. 

    The potential for the release of the BSE agent through the importation of potentially infected products of bovine origin

Question to be answered: What products of bovine origin have been imported within the past 7 years?

Rationale: T he release risk s are dependent on:

  • • 
    the origin of the cattle products and whether these products contain tissues known to contain BSE infectivity (Article 11.6.13.);
  • • 
    country, zone or compartment of origin and its BSE status, which will change as more data become available; this may result from the detection of clinical disease , or following active surveillance , or assessment of geographical BSE risk;
  • • 
    feeding and management of the cattle in the country, zone or compartment of origin;
  • • 
    use to which the commodity has been put as apart from representing risk of developing clinical disease , the slaughter , rendering and recycling in meat-and-bone meal of imported cattle represents a potential route of exposure of indigenous livestock even if meat-and-bone meal and greaves , or feedstuffs containing them, have not been imported;

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  • • 
    dairy versus meat breeds, where there are differences in exposure in the country, zone or compartment of origin because feeding practices result in greater exposure of one category;
  • • 
    age at slaughter . E vi dence req ui red:
  • a) 
    Documentation on the country, zone or compartment of origin of imports. This should identify the country, zone or compartment of origin of cattle from which the products were derived, the length of time they lived in that country, zone or compartment and of any other country in which they have resided during their lifetime.
  • b) 
    Documentation describing origin and volume of imports.
  • c) 
    Documentation demonstrating that risks are periodically reviewed in light of evolving knowledge on the BSE status of the country, zone or compartment of origin.

Exposure assessment

  • 4. 

    The origin of bovine carcasses, by-products and slaughterhouse waste, the parameters of the rendering processes and the methods of cattle feed production

Question to be answered: How have bovine carcasses, by-products and slaughterhouse waste been processed over the past 8 years?

Rationale: The overall risk of BSE in the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment is proportional to the level of known or potential exposure to BSE infectivity and the potential for recycling and amplification of the infectivity through livestock feeding practices. For the risk assessment to conclude that the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment is of negligible or controlled BSE risk, it must have demonstrated that appropriate measures have been taken to manage any risks identified. If potentially infected cattle or contaminated materials are rendered, there is a risk that the resulting meat-and-bone meal could retain BSE infectivity. Where meat-and-bone meal is utilized in the production of any cattle feed, the risk of cross-contamination exists.

E vi dence req ui red:

  • a) 
    Documentation describing the collection and disposal of fallen stock and materials condemned as unfit for human consumption.
  • b) 
    Documentation including tables describing the fate of imported cattle, including their age at slaughter or death .
  • c) 
    Documentation describing the definition and disposal of specified risk material, if any.
  • d) 
    Documentation describing the rendering process and parameters used to produce meat-and-bone meal and greaves .
  • e) 
    Documentation describing methods of animal feed production, including details of ingredients used, the extent of use of meat-and-bone meal in any livestock feed, and measures that prevent cross-contamination of cattle feed with ingredients used in monogastric feed.

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  • f) 
    Documentation describing the end use of imported cattle products and the disposal of waste.
  • g) 
    Documentation describing monitoring and enforcement of the above.
  • 5. 

    The potential for the exposure of cattle to the BSE agent through consumption of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of bovine origin

Question to be answered: Has meat-and-bone meal or greaves of bovine origin been fed to cattle within the past 8 years (Articles 11.6.3. and 11.6.4. in the Terrestrial Code )?

Rationale: If cattle have not been fed products of bovine origin (other than milk or blood) potentially containing meat-and-bone meal or greaves of bovine origin within the past 8 years, meat-and-bone meal and greaves can be dismissed as a risk.

In the case of countries applying for negligible risk status, it will be required to demonstrate that the ruminant feed ban has been effective for at least 8 years following the birth of the youngest case .

E vi dence req ui red:

  • a) 
    Documentation describing the use of imported meat-and-bone meal and greaves , including the feeding of any animal species.
  • b) 
    Documentation describing the use made of meat-and-bone meal and greaves produced from domestic cattle, including the feeding of any animal species.
  • c) 
    Documentation on the measures taken to control cross-contamination of cattle feedstuffs with the meat-and-bone meal and greaves including the risk of cross-contamination during production, transport, storage and feeding.
  • d) 
    Documentation, in the form of the following table, on the audit findings in rendering plants and feed mills processing ruminant material or mixed species containing ruminant material, related to the prohibition of the feeding to ruminants of meat-and-bone meal and greaves .

Year (information

should be

provided for

each of the 8

years for

effectiveness is

claimed)

Year 1

Year 2, etc.

Type of

plant

(renderer

or feed

mill)

Renderer

Feed mill

Renderer

Feed mill

Number of plants

processing ruminant material

(A)

Number of plants in

(A) inspected

(B)

Total number of

visual inspections

in (B)

Total

number of plants in (B) with

infractions

Total number of inspected plants in (B) with sampling

 
 

111 11 (C) 1

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Total

number

of plants

in (C)

with

positive

test results

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  • e) 
    Documentation, in the form of the following table, on the audit findings in rendering plants and feed mills processing non-ruminant material, related to the prohibition of the feeding of meat-and-bone meal and greaves to ruminants.
 

Year (information

should be

provided for

each of the 8

years for

effectiveness is

claimed)

Type of

plant

(renderer

or feed

mill)

Number of plants

processing ruminant material

Number of plants in

(A) inspected

Total number of

visual inspections

in (B)

Total

number of plants in (B) with

infractions

Total number of inspected plants in (B) with sampling

Total

number

of plants

in (C)

with

positive

test results

 
 

(A) (B) (C)

 

Year 1

JRenderer ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| |||

 

Feed mill

 

Year 2, etc.

Renderer ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| |

 

Feed mill

  • f) 
    Documentation, in the form of the following table, on each plant above processing ruminant material or mixed species containing ruminant material with infractions, specifying the type of infraction and the method of resolution.

Year (information should be provided for each of the 8 years for effectiveness is claimed)

Type of plant

(renderer or feed

mill)

Renderer

Year 1

Feed mill

Renderer

Year 2, etc.

Feed mill

 

Plant ID

 

ID 1

 

ID 2

 

ID 3, etc.

 

ID 1

 

ID 2

 

ID 3, etc.

 
 
 
 

Nature of infraction

Method of resolution

Follow-up results

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  • g) 
    Documentation, in the form of the following table, on each plant above processing non-ruminant material with infractions, specifying the type of infraction and the method of resolution.

Year (information should be provided for each of the 8 years for effectiveness is claimed)

 

Type of plant (renderer or feed mill)

Plant ID

Nature of infraction

Method of resolution

Follow-up results

Renderer

ID 1

   

|

 

ID 2

     
 

ID 3, etc.

     

Feed mill

ID 1

   

|

 

ID 2

     
 

ID 3, etc.

     

Renderer

     

|

Feed mill

       
  • h) 
    Documentation explaining why, in light of the findings displayed in the preceding four tables, it is considered that there has been no significant exposure of cattle to the BSE agent through consumption of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of bovine origin.
  • i) 
    Documentation of husbandry practices (multiple species farms) which could lend themselves to cross-contamination of cattle feed with meat-and-bone meal and greaves destined to other species.

SECTION 2: OTHER REQUIREMENTS (see points 2 to 4 of Article 11.6.2.)

  • 1. 

    Awareness programme (see point 2 of Article 11.6.2.)

Questi ons to be a nswered:

o Is there an awareness programme?

o What is the target audience?

o What is the curriculum and how long has it been in place?

o Is there a contingency and/or preparedness plan that deals with BSE?

Rationale:

An awareness programme is essential to ensure detection and reporting of BSE, especially in countries of low prevalence and competing differential diagnoses.

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E vi dence req ui red:

  • a) 
    Documentation indicating when the awareness programme was instituted and its continuous application and geographical coverage.
  • b) 
    Documentation on the number and occupation of persons who have participated in the awareness programme (veterinarians, producers, workers at auctions, slaughterhouses , etc.).
  • c) 
    Documentation of materials used in the awareness programme (the manual, supportive documents, or other teaching materials).
  • d) 
    Documentation on the contingency plan.
  • 2. 

    Compulsory notification and investigation (see point 3 of Article 11.6.2.)

Questi ons to be a nswered:

o What guidance is given to veterinarians, producers, workers at auctions, slaughterhouses , etc.) in terms of the criteria that would initiate the investigation of an animal as a BSE suspect? Have these criteria evolved?

o What were the date and content of the legal act making notification of BSE suspects compulsory?

o What are the measures in place to stimulate notification, such as compensation payments or penalties for not notifying a suspect?

Rationale:

The socio-economic implications associated with BSE require that there be incentives and/or obligations to notify and investigate suspect cases .

Evidence req ui red:

  • a) 
    Documentation on the date of official publication and implementation of compulsory notification. Including a brief description of incentives and penalties.
  • b) 
    Documentation on the manual of procedures for investigation of suspect animals and follow-up of positive findings.
  • 3. 

    Examination in an approved laboratory of brain or other tissues collected within the framework of the aforementioned surveillance system (see point 4 of Article 11.6.2.)

Questi ons to be a nswered:

o Are the diagnostic procedures and methods those described in Chapter 2.4.6. of the Terrestrial Manual ?

o Have these diagnostic procedures and methods been applied through the entire surveillance period?

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Rationale:

The OIE only recognizes for the purpose of this submission samples that have been tested in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual.

E vi dence req ui red:

  • a) 
    Documentation as to the approved laboratories where samples of cattle tissues from the country, zone or compartment are examined for BSE. (If this is located outside the country, information should be provided on the cooperation agreement).
  • b) 
    Documentation of the diagnostic procedures and methods used.
  • c) 
    Documentation that the diagnostic procedures and methods have been applied through the entire surveillance period.

SECTION 3: BSE SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING SYSTEM (see point 4 of Article 11.6.2.)

Questions to be a nswered:

o Does the BSE surveillance programme comply with the guidelines in Articles 11.6.20. to 11.6.22. of the T errestrial C ode ?

o What were the results of the investigations?

Rati onale:

Point 4 of Article 11.6.2. and Articles 11.6.20. to 11.6.22. prescribe the number of cattle, by subpopulation, that need to be tested in order to ensure the detection of BSE at or above a minimal threshold prevalence.

E vi dence req ui red:

  • 1. 
    Documentation that the samples collected are representative of the distribution of cattle population in the country, zone or compartment .
  • 2. 
    Documentation of the methods applied to assess the ages of animals sampled and the proportions for each method (individual identification, dentition, other methods to be specified).
  • 3. 
    Documentation of the means and procedures whereby samples were assigned to the cattle subpopulations described in Article 11.6.21., including the specific provisions applied to ensure that animals described as clinical met the conditions of point 1 of Article 11.6.21.
  • 4. 
    Documentation of the number of animals meeting the conditions in point 1 of Article 11.6.21. as compared to the numbers of clinical samples submitted in previous years in accordance to the former provisions in the T errestrial C ode , and explanation of possible differences.
  • 5. 
    Documentation, based on the following table, of all clinically suspect cases notified complying with the definition in point 1 of Article 11.6.21.

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Laboratory identification number

 

Age

Clinical signs

 
   
   

1 1

1 1

Point of detection

(farm, market channels,

slaughterhouse)

  • 6. 
    Documentation according to the following table, that the number of target points applicable to the country, zone or compartment and its BSE surveillance requirements (Type A or type B surveillance as a result of the risk assessment of section 1) are met as described in Articles 11.6.21. and 11.6.22.

SUMMARY TABLE FOR BSE SURVEILLANCE

Year: (complete a separate table for each year of surveillance)

Surveillance subpopulations

 
 

Routine slaughter

Fallen stock

Casualty slaughter

Clinical suspect

   

Samples

Points

Samples

Points

Samples

Points

Samples

Points

                 

>1 and <2 years

               
                 

>2 and <4 years

               
                 

>4 and <7 years

               
                 

>7 and <9 years

               
                 

>9 years

               
                 

Subtotals

               
                 

Total points

               
  • 7. 
    Indicate the number of adult cattle (over 24 months of age) in the country, zone or compartment .

SECTION 4: BSE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY, ZONE OR COMPARTMENT (see Articles 11.6.3. and 11.6.4.)

Questions to be a nswered:

  • • 
    Has BSE occurred in the country, zone or compartment ?
  • • 
    How has it been dealt with?

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Rati onale:

The categorization of a country, zone or compartment in either negligible or controlled risk is dependent upon, the outcome of the risk assessment described in section 1, compliance with the provisions described in section 2, the results of surveillance described in section 3, and the history of BSE in the country, zone or compartment . This section provides the opportunity to describe the BSE history in the country, zone or compartment .

E vi dence required:

  • 1. 
    Documentation of whether a case of BSE has ever been diagnosed in the country, zone or compartment . In the case of positive BSE findings:
  • 2. 
    Documentation on the origin of each BSE case in respect to the country, zone or compartment . Indicate the birth date and place of birth.
  • 3. 
    Indicate the most recent year of birth in relation to all BSE cases .
  • 4. 
    Documentation that:

o

o

o

o

the case(s) and all the progeny of female cases , born within 2 years prior to or after clinical onset of the disease , and

all cattle which, during their first year of life, were reared with the BSE cases during their first year of life, and which investigation showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during that period, or

if the results of the investigation are inconclusive, all cattle born in the same herd as, and within 12 months of the birth of, the BSE cases ,

if alive in the country, zone or compartment , are permanently identified, and their movements controlled, and, when slaughtered or at death, are completely destroyed.

Article 1.6.3.

Questionnaire on foot and mouth disease

FMD FREE COUNTRY WHERE VACCINATION IS NOT PRACTISED

Report of a Member which applies for recognition of status, under Chapter 8.5. of the Terrestrial A nimal H ealth Code (2009), as a FMD free country not practising vaccination

Please address concisely the following topics. National regulations laws and Veterinary Administration directives may be referred to and annexed as appropriate in one of the OIE official languages.

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  • 1. 
    Introduction
  • a) 
    Geographical factors. Provide a general description of the country including physical, geographical and other factors that are relevant to FMD dissemination, countries sharing common borders and other countries that although may not be adjacent share a link for the potential introduction of disease . Provide a map identifying the factors above.
  • b) 
    Livestock industry. Provide a general description of the livestock industry in the country.
  • 2. 
    Veterinary system
  • a) 
    Legislation. Provide a list and summary of all relevant veterinary legislation in relation to FMD.
  • b) 
    Veterinary Services. Provide documentation on the compliance of the V eterinary Service of the country with the provisions of Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code and 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Manual and describe how the Veterinary Services supervise and control all FMD related activities. Provide maps and tables wherever possible.
  • c) 
    Role of farmers, industry and other relevant groups in FMD surveillance and control (include a description of training and awareness programmes on FMD).
  • d) 
    Role of private veterinary profession in FMD surveillance and control.
  • 3. 
    FMD eradication
  • a) 
    History. Provide a description of the FMD history in the country, date of first detection, origin of infection , date of eradication (date of last case ), types and subtypes present.
  • b) 
    Strategy. Describe how FMD was controlled and eradicated (e.g. stamping-out, modified stamping-out, zoning), provide timeframe for eradication.
  • c) 
    Vaccines and vaccination. Was FMD vaccine ever used? If so, when was the last vaccination carried out? What species were vaccinated?
  • d) 
    Legislation, organisation and implementation of the FMD eradication campaign. Provide a description of the organizational structure at the different levels. Indicate if detailed operational guidelines exist and give a brief summary.
  • e) 
    Animal identification and movement control. Are susceptible animals identified (individually or at a group level)? Provide a description of the methods of animal identification, herd registration and traceability. How are animal movements controlled in the country? Provide evidence on the effectiveness of animal identification and movement controls. Please provide information on pastoralism, transhumance and related paths of movement.
  • 4. 
    FMD diagnosis

Provide documentary evidence that the provisions in Chapters 1.1.2., 1.1.3., and 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual are applied. In particular, the following points should be addressed:

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  • a) 
    Is FMD laboratory diagnosis carried out in the country? If so, provide a list of approved laboratories. If not, provide the name(s) of and the arrangements with the laboratory(ies) samples are sent to, the follow-up procedures and the time frame for obtaining results.
  • b) 
    Provide an overview of the FMD approved laboratories, in particular to address the following points:
  • i) 
    Procedures for the official accreditation of laboratories. Give details of internal quality management systems, e.g. Good Laboratory Practice, ISO, etc. that exist in, or planned for, the laboratory system.
  • ii) 
    Give details of participation in inter-laboratory validation tests (ring tests).
  • iii) 
    Is live virus handled?
  • iv) 
    Biosecurity measures applied.
  • v) 
    Details of the type of tests undertaken.
  • 5. 
    FMD surveillance

Provide documentary evidence that surveillance for FMD in the country complies with the provisions of Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. of the Terrestrial Code and Chapter 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual . In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Clinical suspicion. What are the criteria for raising a suspicion of FMD? What is the procedure to notify (by whom and to whom) and what penalties are involved for failure to report? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past two years, the number of suspect cases , the number of samples tested for FMDV, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis).
  • b) 
    Serological surveillance. Are serological surveys conducted? If so, provide detailed information on the survey design (confidence level, sample size, stratification). How frequently are they conducted? Are wildlife susceptible species included in serological surveys? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past t wo years, the number of samples tested for FMDV, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis). Provide details on follow-up actions taken on all suspicious and positive results. Provide criteria for selection of populations for targeted surveillance and numbers of animals examined and samples tested. Provide details on the methods applied for monitoring the performance of the surveillance system including indicators.
  • c) 
    Livestock demographics and economics. What is the susceptible animal population by species and production systems? How many herds , flock s , etc., of each susceptible species are in the country? How are they distributed (e.g. herd density, etc.)? Provide tables and maps as appropriate.
  • d) 
    Wildlife demographics. What susceptible species are present in the country? Provide estimates of population sizes and geographic distribution. What are the measures in place to prevent contact between domestic and wildlife susceptible species?
  • e) 
    Slaughterhouses and markets. Where are the major livestock marketing or collection centres? What are the patterns of livestock movement within the country? How are the animals transported and handled during these transactions?

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  • 6. 
    FMD prevention
  • a) 
    Coordination with neighbouring countries. Are there any relevant factors about the adjacent countries or zones that should be taken into account (e.g. size, distance from adjacent border to affected herds or animals )? Describe coordination, collaboration and information sharing activities with neighbouring countries.
  • b) 
    Import control procedures

From what countries or zones does the country authorize the import of susceptible animals or their products? What criteria are applied to approve such countries or zones ? What controls are applied on entry of such animals and products, and subsequent internal movement? What import conditions and test procedures are required? Are imported animals of susceptible species required to undergo a quarantine or isolation period? If so, for how long and where? Are import permits and health certificates required? What other procedures are used? Provide summary statistics of imports of susceptible animals and their products for the past t wo years, specifying country or zone of origin, species and volume.

  • i) 
    Provide a map with the number and location of ports, airports and land crossings. Is the official service responsible for import controls part of the official services, or is it an independent body? If it is an independent body, describe its management structure, staffing levels and resources, and its accountability to the central V eterinary Services . Describe the communication systems between the central authorities and the border inspection posts, and between border inspection posts.
  • ii) 
    Provide a description on the methods used for the safe disposal of waste from international traffic, who is responsible and provide a summary, for the past two years, of the quantity disposed of.
  • iii) 
    Describe the regulations, procedures, type and frequency of checks at the point of entry into the country and/or their final destination, concerning the import and follow-up of the following:

§    a ni mals ,

§    genetic material (semen and embryos),

§    animal products,

§    veterinary medicinal products (i.e. biologics).

  • iv) 
    Describe the action available under legislation, and actually taken, when an illegal import is detected. Provide information on detected illegal imports.
  • 7. 
    Control measures and contingency planning
  • a) 
    Give details of any written guidelines, including contingency plans, available to the official services for dealing with suspected or confirmed outbreak s of FMD.
  • b) 
    Is quarantine imposed on premises with suspicious cases , pending final diagnosis? What other procedures are followed regarding suspicious cases ?

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  • c) 
    In the event of an FMD outbreak :
  • i) 
    indicate the sampling and testing procedures used to identify and confirm presence of the causative agent;
  • ii) 
    describe the actions taken to control the disease situation in and around any holdings found to be infected with FMD;
  • iii) 
    indicate the control and/or eradication procedures (e.g. vaccination, stamping-out, partial slaughter /vaccination, etc.) that would be taken. Include details on antigen and vaccine banks;
  • iv) 
    describe the procedures used to confirm that an outbreak has been successfully controlled/eradicated, including any restrictions on restocking;
  • v) 
    give details of any compensation payments made available to farmers, etc. when animals are slaughtered for disease control/eradication purposes and their prescribed timetable.
  • 8. 
    Compliance with the Terrestrial Code
  • a) 
    In addition to the documentary evidence that the provisions of Article 8.5.2. are properly implemented and supervised, the Delegate of the country must submit a declaration indicating:
  • i) 
    there has been no outbreak of FMD during the past 12 months;
  • ii) 
    no evidence of FMDV infection has been found during the past 12 months;
  • iii) 
    no vaccination against FMD has been carried out during the past 12 months,
  • b) 
    and should confirm that since the cessation of vaccination no animals vaccinated against FMD have been imported.
  • 9. 
    Recovery of status

Countries applying for recovery of status should comply with the provisions of Article 8.5.8. of the Terrestrial Code and provide detailed information as specified in sections 3.a), 3.b), 3.c) and 5.b) of this questionnaire. Information in relation to other sections need only be supplied if relevant.

FMD FREE COUNTRY WHERE VACCINATION IS PRACTISED

Report of a Member which applies for recognition of status, under Chapter 8.5. of the Terrestrial A nimal H ealth Code (2009), as a FMD free country practising vaccination

Please address concisely the following topics. National regulations laws and Veterinary Administration directives may be referred to and annexed as appropriate in one of the OIE official languages.

  • 1. 
    Introduction
  • a) 
    Geographical factors. Provide a general description of the country including physical, geographical and other factors that are relevant to FMD dissemination, countries sharing common borders and other countries that although may not be adjacent share a link for the potential introduction of disease . Provide a map identifying the factors above.

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  • b) 
    Livestock industry. Provide a general description of the livestock industry in the country.
  • 2. 
    Veterinary system
  • a) 
    Legislation. Provide a list and summary of all relevant veterinary legislation in relation to FMD.
  • b) 
    Veterinary Services. Provide documentation on the compliance of the V eterinary Service of the country with the provisions of Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code and 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Manual and describe how the V eterinary Services supervise and control all FMD related activities in the country and in the zone . Provide maps and tables wherever possible.
  • c) 
    Role of farmers, industry and other relevant groups in FMD surveillance and control (include a description of training and awareness programmes on FMD).
  • d) 
    Role of private veterinary profession in FMD surveillance and control.
  • 3. 
    FMD eradication
  • a) 
    History. Provide a description of the FMD history in the country, provide date of first detection, origin of infection , date of eradication (date of last case ), types and subtypes present.
  • b) 
    Strategy. Describe how FMD was controlled and eradicated (e.g. stamping-out, modified stamping-out, zoning), provide timeframe for eradication.
  • c) 
    Vaccines and vaccination. What type of vaccine is used? What species are vaccinated? Provide evidence that the vaccine used complies with Chapter 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual . Describe the vaccination programme, including records kept, and provide evidence to show its effectiveness (e.g. vaccination coverage, serosurveillance, etc.).
  • d) 
    Legislation, organisation and implementation of the FMD eradication campaign. Provide a description of the organizational structure at the different levels. Indicate if detailed operational guidelines exist and give a brief summary.
  • e) 
    Animal identification and movement control. Are susceptible animals identified (individually or at a group level)? Provide a description of the methods of animal identification, herd registration and traceability, including vaccination data. How are animal movements controlled in the country? Provide evidence on the effectiveness of animal identification and movement controls. Please provide information on pastoralism, transhumance and the related paths of movement.
  • 4. 
    FMD diagnosis

Provide documentary evidence that the provisions in Chapters 1.1.2., 1.1.3. and 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual are applied. In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Is FMD laboratory diagnosis carried out in the country? If so, provide a list of approved laboratories. If not, provide the name(s) of and the arrangements with the laboratory(ies) samples are sent to and the follow-up procedures and the timeframe for obtaining results.
  • b) 
    Provide an overview of the FMD approved laboratories, in particular to address the following points:

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  • i) 
    Procedures for the official accreditation of laboratories. Give details of internal quality management systems, e.g. Good Laboratory Practice, ISO, etc. that exist in, or planned for, the laboratory system.
  • ii) 
    Give details of participation in inter-laboratory validation tests (ring tests).
  • iii) 
    Is live virus handled?
  • iv) 
    Biosecurity measures applied.
  • v) 
    Details of the type of tests undertaken.
  • 5. 
    FMD surveillance

Provide documentary evidence that surveillance for FMD in the country complies with the provisions of Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. of the Terrestrial Code and Chapter 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual . In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Clinical suspicion. What are the criteria for raising a suspicion of FMD? What is the procedure to notify (by whom and to whom) and what penalties are involved for failure to report? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past two years, the number of suspect cases , the number of samples tested for FMDV, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis).
  • b) 
    Surveillance. Are serological and virological surveys conducted, in particular applying the provisions of Article 8.5.44.? If so, provide detailed information on the survey design (confidence level, sample size, stratification). How frequently are they conducted? Are wildlife susceptible species included in serological surveys? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past t wo years, the number of samples tested for FMD and FMDV, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis). Provide details on follow-up actions taken on all suspicious and positive results. Provide criteria for selection of populations for targeted surveillance and numbers of animals examined and samples tested. Provide details on the methods applied for monitoring the performance of the surveillance system including indicators.
  • c) 
    Livestock demographics and economics. What is the susceptible animal population by species and production systems? How many herds , flock s , etc., of each susceptible species are in the country? How are they distributed (e.g. herd density, etc.)? Provide tables and maps as appropriate.
  • d) 
    Wildlife demographics. What susceptible species are present in the country? Provide estimates of population sizes and geographic distribution. What are the measures in place to prevent contact between domestic and wildlife susceptible species?
  • e) 
    Slaughterhouses and markets. Where are the major livestock marketing or collection centres? What are the patterns of livestock movement within the country? How are the animals transported and handled during these transactions?
  • 6. 
    FMD prevention
  • a) 
    Coordination with neighbouring countries. Are there any relevant factors about the adjacent countries or zones that should be taken into account (e.g. size, distance from adjacent border to affected herds or animals )? Describe coordination, collaboration and information sharing activities with neighbouring countries.
  • b) 
    Import control procedures

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From what countries or zones does the country authorize the import of susceptible animals or their products? What criteria are applied to approve such countries or zones ? What controls are applied on entry of such animals and products, and subsequent internal movement? What import conditions and test procedures are required? Are imported animals of susceptible species required to undergo a quarantine or isolation period? If so, for how long and where? Are import permits and health certificates required? What other procedures are used? Provide summary statistics of imports of susceptible animals and their products for the past t wo years, specifying country or zone of origin, species and volume.

  • i) 
    Provide a map with the number and location of ports, airports and land crossings. Is the official service responsible for import controls part of the official services, or is it an independent body? If it is an independent body, describe its management structure, staffing levels and resources, and its accountability to the central V eterinary Services . Describe the communication systems between the central authorities and the border inspection posts, and between border inspection posts.
  • ii) 
    Provide a description on the methods used for the safe disposal of waste from international traffic, who is responsible and provide a summary, for the past two years, of the quantity disposed of.
  • iii) 
    Describe the regulations, procedures, type and frequency of checks at the point of entry into the country and/or their final destination, concerning the import and follow-up of the following:
  • animals ,
  • genetic material (semen and embryos),
  • animal products,
  • veterinary medicinal products (i.e. biologics).
  • iv) 
    Describe the action available under legislation, and actually taken, when an illegal import is detected. Provide information on detected illegal imports.
  • 7. 
    Control measures and contingency planning
  • a) 
    Give details of any written guidelines, including contingency plans, available to the official services for dealing with suspected or confirmed outbreak s of FMD.

b)` Is quarantine imposed on premises with suspicious cases , pending final diagnosis? What other procedures are followed regarding suspicious cases ?

  • c) 
    In the event of an FMD outbreak :
  • i) 
    indicate the sampling and testing procedures used to identify and confirm presence of the causative agent;
  • ii) 
    describe the actions taken to control the disease situation in and around any holdings found to be infected with FMD;

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  • iii) 
    indicate the control and/or eradication procedures (e.g. vaccination, stamping-out, partial slaughter /vaccination, etc.) that would be taken. Include details on antigen and vaccine banks;
  • iv) 
    describe the procedures used to confirm that an outbreak has been successfully controlled/eradicated, including any restrictions on restocking;
  • v) 
    give details of any compensation payments made available to farmers, etc. when animals are slaughtered for disease control/eradication purposes and their prescribed timetable.
  • 8. 
    Compliance with the Terrestrial Code

In addition to the documentary evidence that the provisions of Article 8.5.3. are properly implemented and supervised, the Delegate of the country must submit a declaration indicating that there has been no outbreak of FMD for the past 2 years and no evidence of FMDV circulation for the past 12 months, with documented evidence that:

  • a) 
    surveillance for FMD and FMDV circulation in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. is in operation, and that regulatory measures for the prevention and control of FMD have been implemented;
  • b) 
    routine vaccination is carried out for the purpose of the prevention of FMD;
  • c) 
    the vaccine used complies with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual .
  • 9. 
    Recovery of status

Countries applying for recovery of status should comply with the provisions of Article 8.5.8. of the Terrestrial Code and provide detailed information as specified in sections 3.a), 3.b), 3.c) and 5.b) of this questionnaire. Information in relation to other sections need only be supplied if relevant.

FMD FREE ZONE WHERE VACCINATION IS NOT PRACTISED

Report of a Member which applies for recognition of status, under Chapter 8.5. of the Terrestrial A nimal H ealth Code (2009), as a FMD free zone not practising vaccination

Please address concisely the following topics. National regulations laws and Veterinary Administration directives may be referred to and annexed as appropriate in one of the OIE official languages.

  • 1. 
    Introduction
  • a) 
    Geographical factors. Provide a general description of the country and the zone including physical, geographical and other factors that are relevant to FMD dissemination, countries or zones sharing common borders and other countries or zones that although may not be adjacent share a link for the potential introduction of disease . The boundaries of the zone must be clearly defined, including a protection zone if applied. Provide a digitalised, geo-referenced map with a precise text description of the geographical boundaries of the z one .
  • b) 
    Livestock industry. Provide a general description of the livestock industry in the country and the zone .

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  • 2. 
    Veterinary system
  • a) 
    Legislation. Provide a list and summary of all relevant veterinary legislation in relation to FMD.
  • b) 
    Veterinary Services. Provide documentation on the compliance of the V eterinary Service of the country with the provisions of Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code and 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Manual and describe how the V eterinary Services supervise and control all FMD related activities in the country and in the zone . Provide maps and tables wherever possible.
  • c) 
    Role of farmers, industry and other relevant groups in FMD surveillance and control (include a description of training and awareness programmes on FMD).
  • d) 
    Role of private veterinary profession in FMD surveillance and control.
  • 3. 
    FMD eradication
  • a) 
    History. Provide a description of the FMD history in the country and zone , provide date of first detection, origin of infection , date of eradication in the zone (date of last case ), types and subtypes present.
  • b) 
    Strategy. Describe how FMD was controlled and eradicated in the zone (e.g. stamping-out, modified stamping-out), provide timeframe for eradication.
  • c) 
    Vaccines and vaccination. If vaccination is used in the rest of the country, what type of vaccine is used? What species are vaccinated? Provide evidence that the vaccine used complies with Chapter 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual . Describe the vaccination programme, including records kept, and provide evidence to show its effectiveness (e.g. vaccination coverage, serosurveillance, etc.).
  • d) 
    Legislation, organisation and implementation of the FMD eradication campaign. Provide a description of the organizational structure at the different levels. Indicate if detailed operational guidelines exist and give a brief summary.
  • e) 
    Animal identification and movement control. Are susceptible animals identified (individually or at a group level)? Provide a description of the methods of animal identification, herd registration and traceability. How are animal movements controlled in and between zones of the same or different status, in particular if the provisions of the Terrestrial Code in Article 8.5.9. are applied? Provide evidence on the effectiveness of animal identification and movement controls. Please provide information on pastoralism, transhumance and the related paths of movement.
  • 4. 
    FMD diagnosis

Provide documentary evidence that the provisions in Chapters 1.1.2., 1.1.3. and 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual are applied. In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Is FMD laboratory diagnosis carried out in the country? If so, provide a list of approved laboratories. If not, provide the name(s) of and the arrangements with the laboratory(ies) samples are sent to. Indicate the laboratory(ies) where samples originating from the zone are diagnosed, the follow-up procedures and the time frame for obtaining results.

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  • b) 
    Provide an overview of the FMD approved laboratories, in particular to address the following points:
  • a) 
    Procedures for the official accreditation of laboratories. Give details of internal quality management systems, e.g. Good Laboratory Practice, ISO, etc. that exist in, or planned for, the laboratory system.
  • b) 
    Give details of participation in inter-laboratory validation tests (ring tests).
  • c) 
    Is live virus handled?
  • d) 
    Biosecurity measures applied.
  • e) 
    Details of the type of tests undertaken.
  • 5. 
    FMD surveillance

Provide documentary evidence that surveillance for FMD in the zone complies with the provisions of Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. of the Terrestrial Code and Chapter 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual . In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Clinical suspicion. What are the criteria for raising a suspicion of FMD? What is the procedure to notify (by whom and to whom) and what penalties are involved for failure to report? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of suspect cases , the number of samples tested for FMDV, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis).
  • b) 
    Serological surveillance. Are serological surveys conducted? If so, provide detailed information on the survey design (confidence level, sample size, stratification). How frequently are they conducted? Are wildlife susceptible species included in serological surveys? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of samples tested for FMDV, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis). Provide details on follow-up actions taken on all suspicious and positive results. Provide criteria for selection of populations for targeted surveillance and numbers of animals examined and samples tested. Provide details on the methods applied for monitoring the performance of the surveillance system including indicators.
  • c) 
    Livestock demographics and economics. What is the susceptible animal population by species and production systems in the country and the zone ? How many herds , flock s , etc., of each susceptible species are in the country? How are they distributed (e.g. herd density, etc.)? Provide tables and maps as appropriate.
  • d) 
    Wildlife demographics. What susceptible species are present in the country and the zone ? Provide estimates of population sizes and geographic distribution. What are the measures in place to prevent contact between domestic and wildlife susceptible species?
  • e) 
    Slaughterhouses and markets. Where are the major livestock marketing or collection centres? What are the patterns of livestock movement within the country? How are the animals transported and handled during these transactions?

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  • 6. 
    FMD prevention
  • a) 
    Coordination with neighbouring countries. Are there any relevant factors about the adjacent countries and zones that should be taken into account (e.g. size, distance from adjacent border to affected herds or animals )? Describe coordination, collaboration and information sharing activities with neighbouring countries and z ones .

If the FMD free zone without vaccination is situated in an FMD infected country or borders an infected country or zone , describe the animal health measures implemented to effectively prevent the introduction of the agent, taking into consideration physical or geographical barriers.

  • b) 
    Import control procedures

From what countries or zones does the country authorize the import of susceptible animals or their products into a free zone ? What criteria are applied to approve such countries or zones ? What controls are applied on entry of such animals and products, and subsequent internal movement? What import conditions and test procedures are required? Are imported animals of susceptible species required to undergo a quarantine or isolation period? If so, for how long and where? Are import permits and health certificates required? What other procedures are used? Provide summary statistics of imports of susceptible animals and their products for the past 2 years, specifying country or zone of origin, species and volume.

  • i) 
    Provide a map with the number and location of ports, airports and land crossings. Is the official service responsible for import controls part of the official services, or is it an independent body? If it is an independent body, describe its management structure, staffing levels and resources, and its accountability to the central V eterinary Services . Describe the communication systems between the central authorities and the border inspection posts, and between border inspection posts.
  • ii) 
    Provide a description on the methods used for the safe disposal of waste from international traffic, who is responsible and provide a summary, for the past 2 years, of the quantity disposed of.
  • iii) 
    Describe the regulations, procedures, type and frequency of checks at the point of entry into the country and/or their final destination, concerning the import and follow-up of the following:
  • animals ,
  • genetic material (semen and embryos),
  • animal products,
  • veterinary medicinal products (i.e. biologics).
  • iv) 
    Describe the action available under legislation, and actually taken, when an illegal import is detected. Provide information on detected illegal imports.

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Annex VI (contd)

  • 7. 
    Control measures and contingency planning
  • a) 
    Give details of any written guidelines, including contingency plans, available to the official services for dealing with suspected or confirmed outbreak s of FMD.
  • b) 
    Is quarantine imposed on premises with suspicious cases , pending final diagnosis? What other procedures are followed regarding suspicious cases ?
  • c) 
    In the event of an FMD outbreak :
  • i) 
    indicate the sampling and testing procedures used to identify and confirm presence of the causative agent;
  • ii) 
    describe the actions taken to control the disease situation in and around any holdings found to be infected with FMD;
  • iii) 
    indicate the control and/or eradication procedures (e.g. vaccination, stamping-out, partial slaughter /vaccination, etc.) that would be taken. Include details on antigen and vaccine banks;
  • iv) 
    describe the procedures used to confirm that an outbreak has been successfully controlled/eradicated, including any restrictions on restocking;
  • v) 
    give details of any compensation payments made available to farmers, etc. when animals are slaughtered for disease control/eradication purposes and their prescribed timetable.
  • 8. 
    Compliance with the Terrestrial Code

In addition to the documentary evidence that the provisions of Article 8.5.4. are properly implemented and supervised, the Delegate of the country must submit a declaration indicating:

  • a) 
    there has been no outbreak of FMD during the past 12 months;
  • b) 
    no evidence of FMDV infection has been found during the past 12 months;
  • c) 
    no vaccination against FMD has been carried out during the past 12 months;
  • d) 
    no vaccinated animal has been introduced into the zone since the cessation of vaccination, except in accordance with Article 8.5.9.
  • 9. 
    Recovery of status

Countries applying for recovery of status should comply with the provisions of Article 8.5.8. of the Terrestrial Code and provide detailed information as specified in sections 3.a), 3.b), 3.c) and 5.b) of this questionnaire. Information in relation to other sections need only be supplied if relevant.

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Annex VI (contd)

FMD FREE ZONE WHERE VACCINATION IS PRACTISED

Report of a Member which applies for recognition of status, under Chapter 8.5. of the Terrestrial A nimal H ealth Code (2009), as a FMD free zone practising vaccination

Please address concisely the following topics. National regulations laws and Veterinary Administration directives may be referred to and annexed as appropriate in one of the OIE official languages.

  • 1. 
    Introduction
  • a) 
    Geographical factors. Provide a general description of the country and the zone including physical, geographical and other factors that are relevant to FMD dissemination, countries or zones sharing common borders and other countries or zones that although may not be adjacent share a link for the potential introduction of disease . The boundaries of the zone must be clearly defined, including a protection zone if applied. Provide a digitalised, geo-referenced map with a precise text description of the geographical boundaries of the z one .
  • b) 
    Livestock industry. Provide a general description of the livestock industry in the country and the zone .
  • 2. 
    Veterinary system
  • a) 
    Legislation. Provide a list and summary of all relevant veterinary legislation in relation to FMD.
  • b) 
    Veterinary Services. Provide documentation on the compliance of the V eterinary Service of the country with the provisions of Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code and 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Manual and describe how the V eterinary Services supervise and control all FMD related activities in the country and in the zone . Provide maps and tables wherever possible.
  • c) 
    Role of farmers, industry and other relevant groups in FMD surveillance and control (include a description of training and awareness programmes on FMD).
  • d) 
    Role of private veterinary profession in FMD surveillance and control.
  • 3. 
    FMD eradication
  • a) 
    History. Provide a description of the FMD history in the country and zone , provide date of first detection, origin of infection , date of eradication in the zone (date of last case ), types and subtypes present.
  • b) 
    Strategy. Describe how FMD was controlled and eradicated in the zone (e.g. stamping-out, modified stamping-out), provide timeframe for eradication.
  • c) 
    Vaccines and vaccination. What type of vaccine is used? What species are vaccinated? Provide evidence that the vaccine used complies with Chapter 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual . Describe the vaccination programme in the country and in the zone , including records kept, and provide evidence to show its effectiveness (e.g. vaccination coverage, serosurveillance, etc.).
  • d) 
    Legislation, organisation and implementation of the FMD eradication campaign. Provide a description of the organizational structure at the different levels. Indicate if detailed operational guidelines exist and give a brief summary.

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  • e) 
    Animal identification and movement control. Are susceptible animals identified (individually or at a group level)? Provide a description of the methods of animal identification, herd registration and traceability, including vaccination data. How are animal movements controlled in and between zones of the same or different status, in particular if the provisions of the Terrestrial Code in Article 8.5.9. are applied? Provide evidence on the effectiveness of animal identification and movement controls. Please provide information on pastoralism, transhumance and the related paths of movement.
  • 4. 
    FMD diagnosis

Provide documentary evidence that the provisions in Chapters 1.1.2., 1.1.3. and 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual are applied. In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Is FMD laboratory diagnosis carried out in the country? If so, provide a list of approved laboratories. If not, provide the name(s) of and the arrangements with the laboratory(ies) samples are sent to, the follow-up procedures and the time frame for obtaining results. Indicate the laboratory(ies) where samples originating from the zone are diagnosed.
  • b) 
    Provide an overview of the FMD approved laboratories, in particular to address the following points.
  • i) 
    Procedures for the official accreditation of laboratories. Give details of internal quality management systems, e.g. Good Laboratory Practice, ISO, etc. that exist in, or planned for, the laboratory system.
  • ii) 
    Give details of participation in inter-laboratory validation tests (ring tests).
  • iii) 
    Is live virus handled?
  • iv) 
    Biosecurity measures applied.
  • v) 
    Details of the type of tests undertaken.
  • 5. 
    FMD surveillance

Provide documentary evidence that surveillance for FMD in the zone complies with the provisions of Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. of the Terrestrial Code and Chapter 2.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual . In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Clinical suspicion. What are the criteria for raising a suspicion of FMD? What is the procedure to notify (by whom and to whom) and what penalties are involved for failure to report? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of suspect cases , the number of samples tested for FMDV, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis).
  • b) 
    Surveillance. Are serological and virological surveys conducted, in particular applying the provisions of Article 8.5.44.? If so, provide detailed information on the survey design (confidence level, sample size, stratification). How frequently are they conducted? Are wildlife susceptible species included in serological surveys? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of samples tested for FMD and FMDV, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis). Provide details on follow-up actions taken on all suspicious and positive results. Provide criteria for selection of populations for targeted surveillance and numbers of animals examined and samples tested. Provide details on the methods applied for monitoring the performance of the surveillance system including indicators.

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  • c) 
    Livestock demographics and economics. What is the susceptible animal population by species and production systems in the country and the zone ? How many herds , flock s , etc., of each susceptible species are in the country? How are they distributed (e.g. herd density, etc.)? Provide tables and maps as appropriate.
  • d) 
    Wildlife demographics. What susceptible species are present in the country and in the zone ? Provide estimates of population sizes and geographic distribution. What are the measures in place to prevent contact between domestic and wildlife susceptible species?
  • e) 
    Slaughterhouses and markets. Where are the major livestock marketing or collection centres? What are the patterns of livestock movement within the country? How are the animals transported and handled during these transactions?
  • 6. 
    FMD prevention
  • a) 
    Coordination with neighbouring countries. Are there any relevant factors about the adjacent countries and zones that should be taken into account (e.g. size, distance from adjacent border to affected herds or animals )? Describe coordination, collaboration and information sharing activities with neighbouring countries and z ones .

If the FMD free zone with vaccination is situated in an FMD infected country or borders an infected country or zone , describe the animal health measures implemented to effectively prevent the introduction of the agent, taking into consideration physical or geographical barriers.

  • b) 
    Import control procedures

From what countries or zones does the country authorize the import of susceptible animals or their products into a free zone ? What criteria are applied to approve such countries or zones ? What controls are applied on entry of such animals and products, and subsequent internal movement? What import conditions and test procedures are required? Are imported animals of susceptible species required to undergo a quarantine or isolation period? If so, for how long and where? Are import permits and health certificates required? What other procedures are used? Provide summary statistics of imports of susceptible animals and their products for the past 2 years, specifying the country or zone of origin, the species and the volume.

  • i) 
    Provide a map with the number and location of ports, airports and land crossings. Is the official service responsible for import controls part of the official services, or is it an independent body? If it is an independent body, describe its management structure, staffing levels and resources, and its accountability to the central V eterinary Services . Describe the communication systems between the central authorities and the border inspection posts, and between border inspection posts.
  • ii) 
    Provide a description on the methods used for the safe disposal of waste from international traffic, who is responsible and provide a summary, for the past 2 years, of the quantity disposed of.
  • iii) 
    Describe the regulations, procedures, type and frequency of checks at the point of entry into the country and/or their final destination, concerning the import and follow-up of the following:

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Annex VI (contd)

  • animals ,
  • genetic material (semen and embryos),
  • animal products,
  • veterinary medicinal products (i.e. biologics).
  • iv) 
    Describe the action available under legislation, and actually taken, when an illegal import is detected. Provide information on detected illegal imports.
  • 7. 
    Control measures and contingency planning
  • a) 
    Give details of any written guidelines, including contingency plans, available to the official services for dealing with suspected or confirmed outbreak s of FMD.
  • b) 
    Is quarantine imposed on premises with suspicious cases , pending final diagnosis? What other procedures are followed regarding suspicious cases ?
  • c) 
    In the event of an FMD outbreak :
  • i) 
    indicate the sampling and testing procedures used to identify and confirm presence of the causative agent;
  • ii) 
    describe the actions taken to control the disease situation in and around any holdings found to be infected with FMD;
  • iii) 
    indicate the control and/or eradication procedures (e.g. vaccination, stamping-out, partial slaughter /vaccination, etc.) that would be taken. Include details on antigen and vaccine banks;
  • iv) 
    describe the procedures used to confirm that an outbreak has been successfully controlled/eradicated, including any restrictions on restocking;
  • v) 
    give details of any compensation payments made available to farmers, etc. when animals are slaughtered for disease control/eradication purposes and their prescribed timetable.
  • 8. 
    Compliance with the Terrestrial Code

In addition to the documentary evidence that the provisions of Article 8.5.5. are properly implemented and supervised, the Delegate of the country must submit a declaration indicating:

  • a) 
    that there has been no outbreak of FMD for the past 2 years,
  • b) 
    no evidence of FMDV circulation for the past 12 months,
  • c) 
    surveillance for FMD and FMDV circulation in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. is in operation.
  • 9. 
    Recovery of status

Countries applying for recovery of status should comply with the provisions of Article 8.5.8. of the Terrestrial Code and provide detailed information as specified in sections 3.a), 3.b), 3.c) and 5.b) of this questionnaire. Information in relation to other sections need only be supplied if relevant.

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Annex VI (contd)

Article 1.6.4.

Questionnaire on rinderpest

RINDERPEST FREE COUNTRY

Report of a Member which applies for recognition of status, under Chapter 8.12. of the Terrestrial A nimal H ealth

Code (2009), as a rinderpest infection free country

Please address concisely the following topics. National regulations laws and Veterinary Administration directives may be referred to and annexed as appropriate in one of the OIE official languages.

  • 1. 
    Introduction
  • a) 
    Geographical factors. Provide a general description of the country including physical, geographical and other factors that are relevant to rinderpest dissemination, countries sharing common borders and other countries that although may not be adjacent share a link for the potential introduction of disease . Provide a map identifying the factors above.
  • b) 
    Livestock industry. Provide a general description of the livestock industry in the country.
  • 2. 
    Veterinary system
  • a) 
    Legislation. Provide a list and summary of all relevant veterinary legislation in relation to rinderpest.
  • b) 
    Veterinary Services. Provide documentation on the compliance of the V eterinary Service of the country with the provisions of Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code and 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Manual and describe how the V eterinary Services supervise and control all rinderpest related activities. Provide maps and tables wherever possible.
  • c) 
    Role of farmers, industry and other relevant groups in rinderpest surveillance and control (include a description of training and awareness programmes on rinderpest).
  • d) 
    Role of private veterinary profession in rinderpest surveillance and control.
  • 3. 
    Rinderpest eradication
  • a) 
    History. Provide a description of the rinderpest history in the country, date of first detection, origin of infection , date of eradication (date of last case ), lineage(s) present.
  • b) 
    Strategy. Describe how rinderpest was controlled and eradicated (e.g. stamping-out, modified stamping-out, zoning), provide timeframe for eradication.
  • c) 
    Vaccines and vaccination. Was rinderpest vaccine ever used? If so, when was the last vaccination carried out? What species were vaccinated? Has heterologous vaccine been used in cattle, buffalo or yak?

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  • d) 
    Legislation, organisation and implementation of the rinderpest eradication campaign. Provide a description of the organizational structure at the different levels. Indicate if detailed operational guidelines exist and give a brief summary.
  • e) 
    Animal identification and movement control. Are susceptible animals identified (individually or at a group level)? Provide a description of the methods of animal identification, herd registration and traceability. How are animal movements controlled in the country? Provide evidence on the effectiveness of animal identification and movement controls. Please provide information on pastoralism, transhumance and related paths of movement.
  • 4. 
    Rinderpest diagnosis

Provide evidence that a system is in place for the rapid confirmation of a suspected outbreak i.e. that the provisions in Chapters 1.1.2., 1.1.3. and 2.1.15. of the Terrestrial Manual are applied. In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Is rinderpest laboratory diagnosis carried out in the country? If so, provide a list of approved laboratories. If not, provide the name(s) of and the arrangements with the laboratory(ies) samples are sent to, the follow up procedures and the time frame for obtaining results.
  • b) 
    Provide an overview of the rinderpest approved laboratories, in particular to address the following points:
  • i) 
    Procedures for the official accreditation of laboratories. Give details of internal quality management systems, e.g. Good Laboratory Practice, ISO, etc. that exist in, or planned for, the laboratory system.
  • ii) 
    Give details of participation in inter-laboratory validation tests (ring tests).
  • iii) 
    Is live virus handled?
  • iv) 
    Biosecurity measures applied.
  • v) 
    Details of the type of tests undertaken.
  • 5. 
    Rinderpest surveillance

Provide documentary evidence that surveillance for rinderpest in the country complies with the provisions of Articles 8.12.20. to 8.12.27. of the Terrestrial Code and Chapter 2.1.15. of the Terrestrial Manual . In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Clinical suspicion. What are the criteria for raising a suspicion of rinderpest? What is the procedure to notify (by whom and to whom) and what penalties are involved for failure to report? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of suspect cases , the number of samples tested for rinderpest virus, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis). In particular, provide evidence of compliance with the provisions of Articles 8.12.20. to 8.12.27. of the Terrestrial Code .

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  • b) 
    Serological surveillance. Are serological surveys conducted? If so, provide detailed information on the survey design in accordance with Articles 8.12.20. to 8.12.27. of the Terrestrial Code 1. Are wildlife susceptible species included in serological surveys? If not, explain the rationale. Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of samples tested for rinderpest virus, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis). Provide details on follow-up actions taken on all suspicious and positive results. Provide criteria for selection of populations for targeted surveillance and numbers of animals examined and samples tested. Provide details on the methods applied for monitoring the performance of the surveillance system including indicators.
  • c) 
    Livestock demographics and economics. What is the susceptible animal population by species and production systems? How many herds , flock s , etc., of each susceptible species are in the country? How are they distributed (e.g. herd density, etc.)? Provide tables and maps as appropriate.
  • d) 
    Wildlife demographics. What susceptible species are present in the country? Provide estimates of population sizes and geographic distribution. What are the measures in place to prevent contact between domestic and wildlife susceptible species?
  • e) 
    Slaughterhouses and markets. Where are the major livestock marketing or collection centres? What are the patterns of livestock movement within the country? How are the animals transported and handled during these transactions.
  • 6. 
    Rinderpest prevention
  • a) 
    Coordination with neighbouring countries. Are there any relevant factors about the adjacent countries that should be taken into account (e.g. size, distance from adjacent border to affected herds or animals )? Describe coordination, collaboration and information sharing activities with neighbouring countries.
  • b) 
    Import control procedures

From what countries or zones does the country authorize the import of susceptible animals or their products? What criteria are applied to approve such countries or zones ? What controls are applied on entry of such animals and products, and subsequent internal movement? What import conditions and test procedures are required? Are imported animals of susceptible species required to undergo a quarantine or isolation period? If so, for how long and where? Are import permits and health certificates required? What other procedures are used? Provide summary statistics of imports of susceptible animals and their products for the past 2 years, specifying country or zone of origin, species and volume.

  • i) 
    Provide a map with the number and location of ports, airports and land crossings. Is the official service responsible for import controls part of the official services, or is it an independent body? If it is an independent body, describe its management structure, staffing levels and resources, and its accountability to the central V eterinary Services . Describe the communication systems between the central authorities and the border inspection posts, and between border inspection posts.
  • ii) 
    Describe the regulations, procedures, type and frequency of checks at the point of entry into the country and/or their final destination, concerning the import and follow-up of the following:

17701/09                                                                                             LT/hl                          87

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Annex VI (contd)

  • animals ,
  • genetic material (semen and embryos),
  • animal products,
  • veterinary medicinal products (i.e. biologics).
  • iii) 
    Describe the action available under legislation, and actually taken, when an illegal import is detected. Provide information on detected illegal imports.
  • 7. 
    Control measures and contingency planning
  • a) 
    Give details of any written guidelines, including contingency plans, available to the official services for dealing with suspected or confirmed outbreak s of rinderpest.
  • b) 
    Is quarantine imposed on premises with suspicious cases , pending final diagnosis? What other procedures are followed regarding suspicious ca ses ?
  • c) 
    In the event of a rinderpest outbreak :
  • i) 
    indicate the sampling and testing procedures used to identify and confirm presence of the causative agent;
  • ii) 
    describe the actions taken to control the disease situation in and around any holdings found to be infected with rinderpest;
  • iii) 
    indicate the control and/or eradication procedures (e.g. vaccination, stamping-out, partial slaughter /vaccination, etc.) that would be taken;
  • iv) 
    describe the procedures used to confirm that an outbreak has been successfully controlled/eradicated, including any restrictions on restocking;
  • v) 
    give details of any compensation payments made available to farmers, etc. when animals are slaughtered for disease control/eradication purposes and their prescribed timetable.
  • 8. 
    Compliance with the Terrestrial Code

The Delegate of the country must submit documentary evidence that the provisions of Article 8.12.2. or point 1 of Article 1.4.6. (historical freedom) of the Terrestrial Code have been properly implemented and supervised.

  • 9. 
    Recovery of status

Countries applying for recovery of status should comply with the provisions of Article 8.12.3. of the Terrestrial Code and provide detailed information as specified in sections 3.a), 3.b), 3.c) and 5.b) of this questionnaire. Information in relation to other sections need only be supplied if relevant.

Article 1.6.5. Questionnaire on contagious bovine pleuropneumonia

CBPP FREE COUNTRY

Report of a Member which applies for recognition of status, under Chapter 11.9. of the Terrestrial A nimal H ealth

Code (2009), as a CBPP free country

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Annex VI (contd)

Please address concisely the following topics. National regulations laws and Veterinary Administration directives may be referred to and annexed as appropriate in one of the OIE official languages.

  • 1. 
    Introduction
  • a) 
    Geographical factors. Provide a general description of the country including physical, geographical and other factors that are relevant to CBPP dissemination, countries sharing common borders and other countries that although may not be adjacent share a link for the potential introduction of disease . Provide a map identifying the factors above.
  • b) 
    Livestock industry. Provide a general description of the livestock industry in the country.
  • 2. 
    Veterinary system
  • a) 
    Legislation. Provide a list and summary of all relevant veterinary legislation in relation to CBPP.
  • b) 
    Veterinary Services. Provide documentation on the compliance of the V eterinary Service of the country with the provisions of Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code and 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Manual and describe how the V eterinary Services supervise and control all CBPP related activities. Provide maps and tables wherever possible.
  • c) 
    Role of farmers, industry and other relevant groups in CBPP surveillance and control (include a description of training and awareness programmes on CBPP).
  • d) 
    Role of private veterinary profession in CBPP surveillance and control.
  • 3. 
    CBPP eradication
  • a) 
    History. Provide a description of the CBPP history in the country, date of first detection, origin of infection , date of eradication (date of last case ).
  • b) 
    Strategy. Describe how CBPP was controlled and eradicated (e.g. stamping-out, modified stamping-out, zoning), and provide timeframe for eradication.
  • c) 
    Vaccines and vaccination. Was CBPP vaccine ever used? If so, when was the last vaccination carried out?
  • d) 
    Legislation, organisation and implementation of the CBPP eradication campaign. Provide a description of the organizational structure at the different levels. Indicate if detailed operational guidelines exist and give a brief summary.
  • e) 
    Animal identification and movement control. Are susceptible animals identified (individually or at a group level)? Provide a description of the methods of animal identification, herd registration and traceability. How are animal movements controlled in the country? Provide evidence on the effectiveness of animal identification and movement controls. Please provide information on pastoralism, transhumance and the related paths of movement.
  • 4. 
    CBPP diagnosis

Provide documentary evidence that the provisions in Chapters 1.1.2., 1.1.3. and 2.4.9. of the Terrestrial Manual are applied. In particular, the following points should be addressed:

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Annex VI (contd)

  • a) 
    Is CBPP laboratory diagnosis carried out in the country? If so, provide a list of approved laboratories. If not, provide the name(s) of and the arrangements with the laboratory(ies) samples are sent to, the follow-up procedures and the time frame for obtaining results.
  • b) 
    Provide an overview of the CBPP approved laboratories, in particular to address the following points:
  • i) 
    Procedures for the official accreditation of laboratories. Give details of internal quality management systems, e.g. Good Laboratory Practice, ISO, etc. that exist in, or planned for, the laboratory system.
  • ii) 
    Give details of participation in inter-laboratory validation tests (ring tests).
  • iii) 
    Biosecurity measures applied.
  • iv) 
    Details of the type of tests undertaken including procedures to isolate and identify M. mycoides subsp. mycoides SC as opposed to M. mycoides subsp. mycoides LC.
  • 5. 
    CBPP surveillance

Provide documentary evidence that surveillance for CBPP in the country complies with the provisions of Articles 11.9.12. to 11.9.17. of the Terrestrial Code and Chapter 2.4.9. of the Terrestrial Manual . In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Clinical surveillance. What are the criteria for raising a suspicion of CBPP? What is the procedure to notify (by whom and to whom) and what penalties are involved for failure to report? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of suspect cases , the number of samples tested for CBPP agent, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis).
  • b) 
    Slaughterhouses, slaughter slabs, abattoirs. What are the criteria for raising a suspicion of CBPP lesion? What is the procedure to notify (by whom and to whom)? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of suspect cases , the number of samples tested for CBPP agent, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis).
  • c) 
    Provide details on training programmes for personnel involved in clinical and slaughter facilities surveillance , and the approaches used to increase community involvement in CBPP surveillance programmes.
  • d) 
    For countries where a significant proportion of animals are not slaughtered in controlled abattoirs , what are the alternative surveillance measures applied to detect CBPP (e.g. active clinical surveilla nce programmes, laboratory follow-up).
  • e) 
    Livestock demographics and economics. What is the susceptible animal population by species and production systems? How many herds of each susceptible species are in the country? How are they distributed (e.g. herd density, etc.)? Provide tables and maps as appropriate.
  • f) 
    Slaughterhouses and markets. Where are the major livestock marketing or collection centres? What are the patterns of livestock movement within the country? How are the animals transported and handled during these transactions?

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Annex VI (contd)

  • g) 
    Provide a description of the means employed during the 2 years preceding this application to rule out the presence of any Mmm SC strain in the susceptible population. Provide criteria for selection of populations for targeted surveillance and numbers of animals examined and samples tested. Provide details on the methods applied for monitoring the performance of the surveillance system including indicators.
  • 6. 
    CBPP prevention
  • a) 
    Coordination with neighbouring countries. Are there any relevant factors about the adjacent countries that should be taken into account (e.g. size, distance from adjacent border to affected herds or animals )? Describe coordination, collaboration and information sharing activities with neighbouring countries.
  • b) 
    Import control procedures

From what countries or zones does the country authorize the import of susceptible animals ? What criteria are applied to approve such countries or zones ? What controls are applied on entry of such animals , and subsequent internal movement? What import conditions and test procedures are required? Are imported animals of susceptible species required to undergo a quarantine or isolation period? If so, for how long and where? Are import permits and health certificates required? What other procedures are used? Provide summary statistics of imports of susceptible animals for the past 2 years, specifying country or zone of origin, species and volume.

  • i) 
    Provide a map with the number and location of ports, airports and land crossings. Is the official service responsible for import controls part of the official services, or is it an independent body? If it is an independent body, describe its management structure, staffing levels and resources, and its accountability to the central V eterinary Services . Describe the communication systems between the central authorities and the border inspection posts, and between border inspection posts.
  • ii) 
    Describe the regulations, procedures, type and frequency of checks at the point of entry into the country and/or their final destination, concerning the import and follow-up of the following:

§ a ni mals ,

§ veterinary medicinal products (i.e. biologics).

  • iii) 
    Describe the action available under legislation, and actually taken, when an illegal import is detected. Provide information on detected illegal imports.
  • 7. 
    Control measures and contingency planning
  • a) 
    Give details of any written guidelines, including contingency plans, available to the official services for dealing with suspected or confirmed outbreak s of CBPP.
  • b) 
    Is quarantine imposed on premises with suspicious cases , pending final diagnosis? What other procedures are followed regarding suspicious cases ?
  • c) 
    In the event of a CBPP outbreak :

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Annex VI (contd)

  • i) 
    indicate the sampling and testing procedures used to identify and confirm presence of the causative agent;
  • ii) 
    describe the actions taken to control the disease situation in and around any holdings found to be infected with CBPP;
  • iii) 
    indicate the control and/or eradication procedures (e.g. vaccination, stamping-out, partial slaughter /vaccination, etc.) that would be taken;
  • iv) 
    describe the procedures used to confirm that an outbreak has been successfully controlled/eradicated, including any restrictions on restocking;
  • v) 
    give details of any compensation payments made available to farmers, etc. when animals are slaughtered for disease control/eradication purposes and their prescribed timetable.
  • 8. 
    Compliance with the Terrestrial Code

In addition to the documentary evidence that the provisions of Article 11.9.3. are properly implemented and supervised, the Delegate of the country must submit a declaration indicating:

  • a) 
    no clinical CBPP has been detected for at least 2 years;
  • b) 
    no CBPP vaccines have been used for at least 2 years in any susceptible species;
  • c) 
    the country operates both clinical surveillance and disease reporting systems for CBPP adequate to detect clinical disease if it were present;
  • d) 
    all clinical and pathological evidence suggestive of CBPP is investigated by field and laboratory methods (including serological assessment) to refute a possible diagnosis of CBPP;
  • e) 
    there are effective measures in force to prevent the re-introduction of the disease .
  • 9. 
    Recovery of status

Countries applying for recovery of status should comply with the provisions of Article 11.9.4. of the Terrestrial Code and provide detailed information as specified in sections 3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 5.b), 5.c) and 5.d) of this questionnaire. Information in relation to other sections need only be supplied if relevant.

CBPP FREE ZONE

Report of a Member which applies for recognition of status, under Chapter 11.9. of the Terrestrial A nimal H ealth

Code (2009), as a CBPP free zone

Please address concisely the following topics. National regulations laws and Veterinary Administration directives may be referred to and annexed as appropriate in one of the OIE official languages.

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Annex VI (contd)

  • 1. 
    Introduction
  • a) 
    Geographical factors. Provide a general description of the country including physical, geographical and other factors that are relevant to CBPP dissemination, countries sharing common borders and other countries that although may not be adjacent share a link for the potential introduction of disease . Provide a map identifying the factors above. The boundaries of the zone must be clearly defined. Provide a digitalised, geo-referenced map with a precise text description of the geographical boundaries of the zone .
  • b) 
    Livestock industry. Provide a general description of the livestock industry in the country.
  • 2. 
    Veterinary system
  • a) 
    Legislation. Provide a list and summary of all relevant veterinary legislation in relation to CBPP.
  • b) 
    Veterinary Services. Provide documentation on the compliance of the V eterinary Service of the country with the provisions of Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code and 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Manual and describe how the V eterinary Services supervise and control all CBPP related activities. Provide maps and tables wherever possible.
  • c) 
    Role of farmers, industry and other relevant groups in CBPP surveillance and control (include a description of training and awareness programmes on CBPP).
  • d) 
    Role of private veterinary profession in CBPP surveillance and control.
  • 3. 
    CBPP eradication
  • a) 
    History. Provide a description of the CBPP history in the zone , date of first detection, origin of infection , date of eradication (date of last case ).
  • b) 
    Strategy. Describe how CBPP was controlled and eradicated in the zone (e.g. stamping-out, modified stamping-out, zoning) and provide timeframe for eradication.
  • c) 
    Vaccines and vaccination. Was CBPP vaccine ever used? In the entire country? If vaccination was used, when was the last vaccination carried out? Where in the country?
  • d) 
    Legislation, organisation and implementation of the CBPP eradication campaign. Provide a description of the organizational structure at the different levels. Indicate if detailed operational guidelines exist and give a brief summary.
  • e) 
    Animal identification and movement control. Are susceptible animals identified (individually or at a group level)? Provide a description of the methods of animal identification, herd registration and traceability. How are animal movements controlled in the zone ? Provide evidence on the effectiveness of animal identification and movement controls. Please provide information on pastoralism, transhumance and the related paths of movement.
  • 4. 
    CBPP diagnosis

Provide documentary evidence that the provisions in Chapters 1.1.2., 1.1.3. and 2.4.9. of the Terrestrial Manual are applied. In particular, the following points should be addressed:

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Annex VI (contd)

  • a) 
    Is CBPP laboratory diagnosis carried out in the country? If so, provide a list of approved laboratories. If not, provide the name(s) of and the arrangements with the laboratory(ies) samples are sent to, the follow-up procedures and the time frame for obtaining results.
  • b) 
    Provide an overview of the CBPP approved laboratories, in particular to address the following points:
  • i) 
    Procedures for the official accreditation of laboratories. Give details of internal quality management systems, e.g. Good Laboratory Practice, ISO, etc. that exist in, or planned for, the laboratory system.
  • ii) 
    Give details of participation in inter-laboratory validation tests (ring tests).
  • iii) 
    Biosecurity measures applied.
  • iv) 
    Details of the type of tests undertaken including procedures to isolate and identify M. mycoides subsp. mycoides SC as opposed to M. mycoides subsp. mycoides LC.
  • 5. 
    CBPP surveillance

Provide documentary evidence that surveillance for CBPP in the country complies with the provisions of Articles 11.9.12. to 11.9.17. of the Terrestrial Code and Chapter 2.4.9. of the Terrestrial Manual . In particular, the following points should be addressed:

  • a) 
    Clinical surveillance. What are the criteria for raising a suspicion of CBPP? What is the procedure to notify (by whom and to whom) and what penalties are involved for failure to report? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of suspect cases , the number of samples tested for CBPP agent, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis).
  • b) 
    Slaughterhouses, slaughter slabs, abattoirs. What are the criteria for raising a suspicion of CBPP lesion? What is the procedure to notify (by whom and to whom)? Provide a summary table indicating, for the past 2 years, the number of suspect cases , the number of samples tested for CBPP agent, species, type of sample, testing method(s) and results (including differential diagnosis).
  • c) 
    Provide details on training programmes for personnel involved in clinical and slaughter facilities surveillance , and the approaches used to increase community involvement in CBPP surveillance programmes.
  • d) 
    For countries where a significant proportion of animals in the zone are not slaughtered in controlled abattoirs , what are the alternative surveillance measures applied to detect CBPP (e.g. active clinical surveillance programme, laboratory follow-up).
  • e) 
    Livestock demographics and economics. What is the susceptible animal population by species and production systems? How many herds of each susceptible species are in the zone ? How are they distributed (e.g. herd density, etc.)? Provide tables and maps as appropriate.
  • f) 
    Slaughterhouses and mark ets . Where are the major livestock marketing or collection centres? What are the patterns of livestock movement within the country and the zone ? How are the animals transported and handled during these transactions?

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Annex VI (contd)

  • g) 
    Provide a description of the means employed during the 2 years preceding this application to rule out the presence of any Mmm SC strain in the susceptible population of the zone . Provide criteria for selection of populations for targeted surveillance and numbers of animals examined and samples tested. Provide details on the methods applied for monitoring the performance of the surveillance system including indicators.
  • 6. 
    CBPP prevention
  • a) 
    Coordination with neighbouring countries and zones . Are there any relevant factors about the adjacent countries and zones that should be taken into account (e.g. size, distance from adjacent border to affected herds or animals )? Describe coordination, collaboration and information sharing activities with neighbouring countries and zones . If the CBPP free zone is situated in a CBPP infected country or borders an infected country or zone , describe the animal health measures implemented to effectively prevent the introduction of the agent, taking into consideration physical or geographical barriers.
  • b) 
    Import control procedures

From what countries or zones does the country authorize the import of susceptible animals ? What criteria are applied to approve such countries or zones ? What controls are applied on entry of such animals , and subsequent internal movement? What import conditions and test procedures are required? Are imported animals of susceptible species required to undergo a quarantine or isolation period? If so, for how long and where? Are import permits and health certificates required? What other procedures are used? Provide summary statistics of imports of susceptible animals for the past 2 years, specifying country or zone of origin, species and volume.

  • i) 
    Provide a map with the number and location of ports, airports and land crossings. Is the official service responsible for import controls part of the official services, or is it an independent body? If it is an independent body, describe its management structure, staffing levels and resources, and its accountability to the central V eterinary Services . Describe the communication systems between the central authorities and the border inspection posts, and between border inspection posts.
  • ii) 
    Describe the regulations, procedures, type and frequency of checks at the point of entry into the zone and/or their final destination, concerning the import and follow-up of the following:

§ a ni mals ,

§ veterinary medicinal products (i.e. biologics).

  • iii) 
    Describe the action available under legislation, and actually taken, when an illegal import is detected. Provide information on detected illegal imports.
  • 7. 
    Control measures and contingency planning
  • a) 
    Give details of any written guidelines, including contingency plans, available to the official services for dealing with suspected or confirmed outbreak s of CBPP.
  • b) 
    Is quarantine imposed on premises with suspicious cases , pending final diagnosis? What other procedures are followed regarding suspicious cases ?

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Annex VI (contd)

  • c) 
    In the event of a CBPP outbreak :
  • i) 
    indicate the sampling and testing procedures used to identify and confirm presence of the causative agent;
  • ii) 
    describe the actions taken to control the disease situation in and around any holdings found to be infected with CBPP;
  • iii) 
    indicate the control and/or eradication procedures (e.g. vaccination, stamping-out, partial slaughter /vaccination, etc.) that would be taken;
  • iv) 
    describe the procedures used to confirm that an outbreak has been successfully controlled/eradicated, including any restrictions on restocking;
  • v) 
    give details of any compensation payments made available to farmers, etc. when animals are slaughtered for disease control/eradication purposes.
  • 8. 
    Compliance with the Terrestrial Code

In addition to the documentary evidence that the provisions of Article 11.9.3. are properly implemented and supervised, the Delegate of the country must submit a declaration indicating that in the zone :

  • a) 
    no clinical CBPP has been detected for at least 2 years;
  • b) 
    no CBPP vaccines have been used for at least 2 years in any susceptible species;
  • c) 
    the country operates both clinical surveillance and disease reporting systems for CBPP adequate to detect clinical disease if it were present in the zone ;
  • d) 
    all clinical and pathological suggestive of CBPP is investigated by field and laboratory methods (including serological assessment) to refute a possible diagnosis of CBPP;
  • e) 
    there are effective measures in force to prevent the re-introduction of the disease .
  • 9. 
    Recovery of status

Countries applying for recovery of status should comply with the provisions of Article 11.9.4. of the Terrestrial Code and provide detailed information as specified in sections 3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 5.b), 5.c) and 5.d) of this questionnaire. Information in relation to other sections need only be supplied if relevant.

  • 1. 
    Accounts of the ages for eruption of the incisor teeth vary markedly and are clearly dependent on species, breed, nutritional status and nature of the feed. Therefore, for the purposes of serosurveillance, it should be noted that a) cattle having only one pair of erupted permanent central incisor teeth are aged between 21 and 36 months (Asian buffalos 24-48 months) and b) cattle having only two pairs of erupted permanent central incisor teeth are aged between 30 and 48 months (Asian buffalos 48-60 months).

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Annex VII

CH AP TE R 2.1

IMPORT RISK ANALYSIS

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed change.

Article 2.1.1.

Introduction

The importation of animals and animal products involves a degree of disease risk to the importing country . This risk may be represented by one or several diseases or infections .

The principal aim of import risk analysis is to provide importing countries with an objective and defensible method of assessing the disease risk s associated with the importation of animals , animal products, animal genetic material, feedstuffs, biological products and pathological material . The analysis should be transparent. This is necessary so that the exporting country is provided with clear reasons for the imposition of import conditions or refusal to import.

Transparency is also essential because data are often uncertain or incomplete and, without full documentation, the distinction between facts and the analyst's value judgements may blur.

This Chapter alludes to the role of the OIE with respect to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the so-called SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), provides definitions and describes the OIE informal procedure for dispute mediation.

Chapter 2.2. provides recommendations and principles for conducting transparent, objective and defensible risk analyses for international trade . The components of risk analysis described in that Chapter are hazard identification , risk assessment , risk management and risk communication (Figure 1).

F ig. 1. The four components of risk analysis

The risk assessment is the component of the analysis which estimates the risk s associated with a hazard . Risk assessments may be qualitative or quantitative. For many diseases , particularly for those diseases listed in this T errestrial Code where there are well developed internationally agreed standards, there is broad agreement concerning the likely risk s . In such cases it is more likely that a qualitative assessment is all that is required. Qualitative assessment does not require mathematical modelling skills to carry out and so is often the type of assessment used for routine decision making. No single method of import risk assessment has proven applicable in all situations, and different methods may be appropriate in different circumstances.

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The process of import risk analysis usually needs to take into consideration the results of an evaluation of V eterinary Services , zoning, compartmentalisation and surveillance systems in place for monitoring of animal health in the ex porting country . These are described in separate Chapters in the T errestrial Code .

Article 2.1.2. Hazard identification

The hazard identification involves identifying the pathogenic agents which could potentially produce adverse consequences associated with the importation of a commodity .

The potential hazards identified would be those appropriate to the species being imported, or from which the commodity is derived, and which may be present in the exporting country . It is then necessary to identify whether each potential hazard is already present in the importing country , and whether it is a notifiable disease or is subject to control or eradication in that country and to ensure that import measures are not more trade restrictive than those applied within the country.

H azard identification is a categorisation step, identifying biological agents dichotomously as potential hazards or not. The risk assessment may be concluded if hazard identification fails to identify potential hazards associated with the importation.

The evaluation of the V eterinary Services , surveillance and control programmes and zoning and compartmentalisation systems are important inputs for assessing the likelihood of hazards being present in the animal population of the ex porting country .

An importing country may decide to permit the importation using the appropriate sanitary standards recommended in the Terrestrial Code , thus eliminating the need for a risk assessment .

Article 2.1.3. Principles of risk assessment

  • 1. 
    Risk assessment should be flexible to deal with the complexity of real life situations. No single method is applicable in all cases. Risk assessment must be able to accommodate the variety of animal commodities , the multiple hazards that may be identified with an importation and the specificity of each disease , detection and surveillance systems, exposure scenarios and types and amounts of data and information.
  • 2. 
    Both qualitative risk assessment and quantitative risk assessment methods are valid. Although quantitative assessment is recognised as being able to provide deeper insights into a particular problem, qualitative methods may be more relevant when available data are limited.
  • 3. 
    The risk assessment should be based on the best available information that is in accord with current scientific thinking. The assessment should be well-documented and supported with references to the scientific literature and other sources, including expert opinion.
  • 4. 
    Consistency in risk assessment methods should be encouraged and transparency is essential in order to ensure fairness and rationality, consistency in decision making and ease of understanding by all the interested parties.
  • 5. 
    Risk assessments should document the uncertainties , the assumptions made, and the effect of these on the final risk estimate.
  • 6. 
    Risk increases with increasing volume of commodity imported.
  • 7. 
    The risk assessment should be amenable to updating when additional information becomes available.

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Annex VII (contd)

Article 2.1.4.

Risk assessment steps

  • 1. 
    Release assessment

Release assessment consists of describing the biological pathway(s) necessary for an importation activity to 'release' (that is, introduce) pathogenic agents into a particular environment, and estimating the probability of that complete process occurring, either qualitatively (in words) or quantitatively (as a numerical estimate). The release assessment describes the probability of the 'release' of each of the potential hazards (the pathogenic agents) under each specified set of conditions with respect to amounts and timing, and how these might change as a result of various actions, events or measures. Examples of the kind of inputs that may be required in the release assessment are:

  • a) 
    Biological factors
  • species, age and breed of animals
  • agent predilection sites
  • vaccination, testing, treatment and quarantine.
  • b) 
    Country factors
  • incidence/prevalence
  • evaluation of V eterinary Services , surveillance and control programmes and zoning and compartmentalisation systems of the ex porting country .
  • c) 
    Commodity factors
  • quantity of commodity to be imported
  • ease of contamination
  • effect of processing
  • effect of storage and transport.

If the release assessment demonstrates no significant risk , the risk assessment does not need to continue.

  • 2. 
    Exposure assessment

Exposure assessment consists of describing the biological pathway(s) necessary for exposure of animals and humans in the importing country to the hazards (in this case the pathogenic agents) released from a given risk source, and estimating the probability of the exposure(s) occurring, either qualitatively (in words) or quantitatively (as a numerical estimate).

The probability of exposure to the identified hazards is estimated for specified exposure conditions with respect to amounts, timing, frequency, duration of exposure, routes of exposure (e.g. ingestion, inhalation, or insect bite), and the number, species and other characteristics of the animal and human populations exposed. Examples of the kind of inputs that may be required in the exposure assessment are:

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  • a) 
    Biological factors
  • properties of the agent.
  • b) 
    Country factors
  • presence of potential vectors
  • human and animal demographics
  • customs and cultural practices
  • geographical and environmental characteristics.
  • c) 
    Commodity factors
  • quantity of commodity to be imported
  • intended use of the imported animals or products
  • disposal practices.

If the exposure assessment demonstrates no significant risk , the risk assessment may conclude at this step.

  • 3. 
    Consequence assessment

Consequence assessment consists of describing the relationship between specified exposures to a biological agent and the consequences of those exposures. A causal process must exist by which exposures produce adverse health or environmental consequences, which may in turn lead to socio-economic consequences. The consequence assessment describes the potential consequences of a given exposure and estimates the probability of them occurring. This estimate may be either qualitative (in words) or quantitative (a numerical estimate). Examples of consequences include:

  • a) 
    Direct consequences
  • animal infection , disease and production losses
  • public health consequences.
  • b) 
    Indirect consequences
  • surveillance and control costs
  • compensation costs
  • potential trade losses
  • adverse consequences to the environment.
  • 4. 
    Risk estimation

Risk estimation consists of integrating the results from the release assessment, exposure assessment, and consequence assessment to produce overall measures of risk s associated with the hazards identified at the outset. Thus risk estimation takes into account the whole of the risk pathway from hazard identified to unwanted outcome.

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For a quantitative assessment, the final outputs may include:

  • estimated numbers of herds , flock s , animals or people likely to experience health impacts of various degrees of severity over time;
  • probability distributions, confidence intervals, and other means for expressing the uncertainties in these estimates;
  • portrayal of the variance of all model inputs;
  • a sensitivity analysis to rank the inputs as to their contribution to the variance of the risk estimation output;
  • analysis of the dependence and correlation between model inputs.

Article 2.1.5. Principles of risk management

  • 1. 
    Risk management is the process of deciding upon and implementing measures to achieve the Member's appropriate level of protection, whilst at the same time ensuring that negative effects on trade are minimized. The objective is to manage risk appropriately to ensure that a balance is achieved between a country's desire to minimize the likelihood or frequency of disease incursions and their consequences and its desire to import commodities and fulfil its obligations under interna tiona l trade agreements.
  • 2. 
    The international standards of the OIE are the preferred choice of sanitary measures for risk management . The application of these sanitary measures should be in accordance with the intentions in the standards.

Article 2.1.6. Risk management components

  • 1. 
    Risk evaluation - the process of comparing the risk estimated in the risk assessment with the Member's appropriate level of protection.
  • 2. 
    Option evaluation - the process of identifying, evaluating the efficacy and feasibility of, and selecting measures to reduce the risk associated with an importation in order to bring it into line with the Members appropriate level of protection. The efficacy is the degree to which an option reduces the likelihood and/or magnitude of adverse health and economic consequences. Evaluating the efficacy of the options selected is an iterative process that involves their incorporation into the risk assessment and then comparing the resulting level of risk with that considered acceptable. The evaluation for feasibility normally focuses on technical, operational and economic factors affecting the implementation of the risk management options.
  • 3. 
    Implementation - the process of following through with the risk management decision and ensuring that the risk management measures are in place.
  • 4. 
    Monitoring and review - the ongoing process by which the risk management measures are continuously audited to ensure that they are achieving the results intended.

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Article 2.1.7.

Principles of risk communication

  • 1. 
    Risk communication is the process by which information and opinions regarding hazards and risk s are gathered from potentially affected and interested parties during a risk analysis , and by which the results of the risk assessment and proposed risk management measures are communicated to the decision-makers and interested parties in the importing and ex porting countries . It is a multidimensional and iterative process and should ideally begin at the start of the risk analysis process and continue throughout.
  • 2. 
    A risk communication strategy should be put in place at the start of each risk analysis .
  • 3. 
    The communication of the risk should be an open, interactive, iterative and transparent exchange of information that may continue after the decision on importation.
  • 4. 
    The principal participants in risk communication include the authorities in the exporting country and other stakeholders such as domestic and foreign industry groups, domestic livestock producers and consumer groups.
  • 5. 
    The assumptions and uncertainty in the model, model inputs and the risk estimates of the risk assessment should be communicated.
  • 6. 
    Peer review is a component of risk communication in order to obtain scientific critique and to ensure that the data, information, methods and assumptions are the best available.

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Annex VIII

CH AP TE R 3.1. VETERINARY SERVICES

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed changes.

Article 3.1.1.

The quality of the V eterinary Services depends on a set of factors, which include fundamental principles of an ethical, organisational, legislative and technical nature. The V eterinary Services shall conform to these fundamental principles, regardless of the political, economic or social situation of their country.

Compliance with these fundamental principles by the V eterinary Services of a Member is important to the establishment and maintenance of confidence in its international veterinary certificates by the V eterinary Services of other Members.

The same fundamental principles should apply in countries where the responsibility for establishing or applying certain animal health measures, or issuing some international veterinary certificates is exercised by an organisation other than the V eterinary Services , or by an authority or agency on behalf of the V eterinary Services . In all cases, the V eterinary Services retain ultimate responsibility for the application of these principles.

These fundamental principles are presented in Article 3.1.2. Other factors affecting quality are described in Volume 1 of the Terrestrial Code (notification, principles of certification, etc.).

The quality of V eterinary Services, including veterinary legislation, can be measured through an evaluation, whose general principles are described in Article 3.1.3. and in Article 3.1.4.

Recommendations on the evaluation of V eterinary Services, including legislation, are described in Chapter 3.2.

EU comment

EU suggest to add the word "veterinary" before the word "legislation" to be consistent.

A procedure for evaluating V eterinary Services by OIE experts, on a voluntary basis, is described in Article 3.1.5.

Article 3.1.2. Fundamental principles of quality

The V eterinary Services shall comply with the following principles to ensure the quality of their activities:

  • 1. 
    Professional judgement

The personnel of V eterinary Services should have the relevant qualifications, scientific expertise and experience to give them the competence to make sound professional judgements.

  • 2. 
    Independence

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Care should be taken to ensure that V eterinary Services ' personnel are free from any commercial, financial, hierarchical, political or other pressures which might affect their judgement or decisions.

  • 3. 
    Impartiality

The V eterinary Services should be impartial. In particular, all the parties affected by their activities have a right to expect their services to be delivered under reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions.

  • 4. 
    Integrity

The V eterinary Services should guarantee that the work of each of their personnel is of a consistently high level of integrity. Any fraud, corruption or falsification should be identified and corrected.

  • 5. 
    Objectivity The V eterinary Services should at all times act in an objective, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

6.    Veterinary legislation

Veterinary legislation is a fundamental element of quality as it supports good governance and provides the legal framework for all key activities of the veterinary services.

Legislation should be suitably flexible to allow for judgements of equivalence and efficient responses to changing situations. In particular, it should define and document the responsibilities and structure of the organisations in charge of the animal identification system, control of animal movements, animal disease control and reporting systems, epidemiological surveillance and communication of epidemiological information.

A similar demonstration should be made by Veterinary Services when they are in charge of veterinary public health activities.

67. General organisation

The V eterinary Services must be able to demonstrate by means of appropriate legislation, sufficient financial resources and effective organisation that they are in a position to have control of the establishment and application of animal health measures, and of international veterinary certification activities. Legislation should be suitably flexible to allow for judgements of equivalence and efficient responses to changing situations. In particular, they should define and document the responsibilities and structure of the organisations in charge of the animal identification system, control of animal movements, animal disease control and reporting systems, epidemiological surveillance and communication of epidemiological information.

A similar demonstration should be made by V eterinary Services when they are in charge of veterinary public health activities.

The V eterinary Services should have at their disposal effective systems for animal disease surveillance and for notification of disease problems wherever they occur, in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Code . Adequate coverage of animal populations should also be demonstrated. They should at all times endeavour to improve their performance in terms of animal health information systems and animal disease control.

The V eterinary Services should define and document the responsibilities and structure of the organisation (in particular the chain of command) in charge of issuing internationa l veterina ry certifica tes .

Each position within the V eterinary Services which has an impact on their quality should be described. These job descriptions should include the requirements for education, training, technical knowledge and experience.

78. Quality policy

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The V eterinary Services should define and document their policy and objectives for, and commitment to, quality, and should ensure that this policy is understood, implemented and maintained at all levels in the organisation. Where conditions allow, they may implement a quality system corresponding to their areas of activity and appropriate for the type, range and volume of work that they have to perform. The recommendations for the quality and evaluation of V eterinary Services propose a suitable reference system, which should be used if a Member choose to adopt a quality system.

89. Procedures and standards

The V eterinary Services should develop and document appropriate procedures and standards for all providers of relevant activities and associated facilities. These procedures and standards may for example relate to:

  • a. 
    programming and management of activities, including international veterinary certification activities;
  • b. 
    prevention, control and notification of disease outbreak s ;
  • c. 
    risk analysis , epidemiological surveillance and zoning;
  • d. 
    inspection and sampling techniques;
  • e. 
    diagnostic tests for animal diseases ;
  • f. 
    preparation, production, registration and control of biological products for use in the diagnosis or prevention of diseases ;
  • g. 
    border controls and import regulations;
  • h. 
    disinfection and disinfestation ;
  • i. 
    treatments intended to destroy, if appropriate, pathogens in animal products.

Inasmuch as the OIE has adopted standards on these matters, the V eterinary Services should comply with these standards when applying animal health measures and when issuing interna tional veterinary certificates .

910. Information, complaints and appeals

The V eterinary A uthority should undertake to reply to legitimate requests from V eterinary A uthorities of other Members or any other authority, in particular ensuring that any requests for information, complaints or appeals that they may present are dealt with in a timely manner.

A record should be maintained of all complaints and appeals and of the relevant action taken by the V eteri na ry S ervi ces .

1011. Documentation

The V eterinary Services should have at their disposal a reliable and up-to-date documentation system suited to their activities.

1112. Self-evaluation

The V eterinary Services should undertake periodical self-evaluation especially by documenting achievements against goals, and demonstrating the efficiency of their organisational components and resource adequacy.

A procedure for evaluating V eterinary Services by OIE experts, on a voluntary basis, is described in Article 3.1.5.

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1213. Communication

V eterinary Services should have effective internal and external systems of communication covering administrative and technical staff and parties affected by their activities.

1314. Human and financial resources

Responsible authorities should ensure that adequate resources are made available to implement effectively the above activities.

Article 3.1.3.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , every Member should recognise the right of another Member to undertake, or request it to undertake, an evaluation of its V eterinary Services where the initiating Member is an actual or a prospective importer or exporter of commodities and where the evaluation is to be a component of a risk analysis process which is to be used to determine or review sanitary measures which apply to such trade.

Any evaluation of V eterinary Services should be conducted having regard to the OIE recommendations on the evaluation of V eterinary Services presented in Chapter 3.2.

A Member has the right to expect that the evaluation of its V eterinary Services will be conducted in an objective manner. A Member undertaking evaluation should be able to justify any measure taken as a consequence of its evaluation.

Article 3.1.4.

A Member which intends to conduct an evaluation of another Member's V eterinary Services should give them notice in writing. This notice should define the purpose of the evaluation and details of the information required.

On receipt of a formal request for information to enable an evaluation of its V eterinary Services by another Member, and following bilateral agreement of the evaluation process and criteria, a Member should expeditiously provide the other country with meaningful and accurate information of the type requested.

The evaluation process should take into account the fundamental principles and other factors of quality laid down in Article 3.1.1. and in Article 3.1.2. It should also take into consideration the specific circumstances regarding quality, as described in Article 3.1.1., prevailing in the countries concerned.

The outcome of the evaluation conducted by a Member should be provided in writing as soon as possible, and in any case within 4 months of receipt of the relevant information, to the Member which has undergone the evaluation. The evaluation report should detail any findings which affect trade prospects. The Member which conducts the evaluation should clarify in detail any points of the evaluation on request.

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In the event of a dispute between two Members over the conduct or the conclusions of the evaluation of the V eterinary Services , the matter should be dealt with having regard to the procedures set out in Article 5.3.8.

Article 3.1.5. Evaluation facilitated by OIE experts under the auspices of the OIE

The OIE has established procedures for the evaluation of the V eterinary Services of a Member, upon request by the Member.

The World Assembly of OIE Delegates endorses a list of approved experts to facilitate the evaluation process.

Under these procedures, the Director General of the OIE recommends an expert(s) from that list.

The expert(s) facilitate(s) the evaluation of the V eterinary Services of the Member based on the provisions in Chapter 3.2., using the OIE Tool for the E valuation of Performance of V eterinary Services (OIE PV S Tool ).

The expert(s) produce(s) a report in consultation with the V eterinary Services of the Member.

The report is submitted to the Director General of the OIE and, with the consent of the Member, published by the OIE.

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CHAPTER 3.2.

EVALUATION OF VETERINARY SERVICES

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed changes.

Article 3.2.1. General considerations

  • 1. 
    Evaluation of V eterinary Services is an important element in the risk analysis process which countries may legitimately use in their policy formulations directly applying to animal health and sanitary controls of international trade in animals , animal-derived products, animal genetic material and animal feedstuffs.

Any evaluation should be carried out with due regard for Chapter 3.1.

  • 2. 
    In order to ensure that objectivity is maximised in the evaluation process, it is essential for some standards of discipline to be applied. The OIE has developed these recommendations which can be practically applied to the evaluation of V eterinary Services . These are relevant for evaluation of the V eterinary Services of one country by those of another country for the purposes of risk analysis in international trade . The recommendations are also applicable for evaluation by a country of its o wn V eterinary Services – the process known as self-evaluation – and for periodic re-evaluation. These recommendations should be used by OIE experts when facilitating an evaluation under the auspices of the OIE, following a request of a Member. In applying these recommendations on the evaluation, the OIE Tool for the E valuation of Performance of V eterinary Services (OIE PV S Tool ) should be used.

In carrying out a risk analysis prior to deciding the sanitary/zoosanitary conditions for the importation of a commodity , an importing country is justified in regarding its evaluation of the V eterinary Services of the ex porting country as critical.

  • 3. 
    The purpose of evaluation may be either to assist a national authority in the decision-making process regarding priorities to be given to its o wn V eterinary Services (self-evaluation) or to assist the process of risk analysis in international trade in animals and animal-derived products to which official sanitary and/or zoosanitary controls apply.
  • 4. 
    In both situations, the evaluation should demonstrate that the V eterinary Services have the capability for effective control of the sanitary and zoosanitary status of animals and animal products. Key elements to be covered in this process include resource adequacy of resources, management capability, legislative and administrative infrastructures, independence in the exercise of official functions and history of performance history, including disease reporting.
  • 5. 
    Good governance is the key to cCompetence, and integrity and are qualities on which others base their confidence in individuals or organisations. Mutual confidence between relevant official V eterinary Services of trading partner countries contributes fundamentally to stability in international trade in animals and animal-related products. In this situation, scrutiny is directed more at the ex porting country than at the importing country .

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  • 6. 
    Although quantitative data can be provided on V eterinary Services , the ultimate evaluation will be essentially qualitative. While it is appropriate to evaluate resources and infrastructure (organisational, administrative and legislative), it is also appropriate to place emphasis on the evaluation of the quality of outputs and performance of V eterinary Services . Evaluation should take into consideration any quality systems used by V eteri na ry S ervi ces .
  • 7. 
    An importing country has a right of assurance that information on sanitary/zoosanitary situations provided by the V eterinary Services of an ex porting country is objective, meaningful and correct. Furthermore, the V eterinary Services of the importing country are entitled to expect validity in the veterinary certification of export.
  • 8. 
    An ex porting country is entitled to expect that its animals and animal products will receive reasonable and valid treatment when they are subjected to import inspection in the country of destination. The country should also be able to expect that any evaluation of its standards and performance will be conducted on a non-discriminatory basis. The importing country should be prepared and able to defend any position which it takes as a consequence of the evaluation.
  • 9. 
    As the veterinary statutory body is not a part of the V eterinary Services , an evaluation of that body should be carried out to ensure that the registration/licensing of veterinarians and authorisation of veterinary para-professi onals is included.

Article 3.2.2. Scope

  • 1. 
    In the evaluation of V eterinary Services , the following items may be considered, depending on the purpose of the evaluation:

o   organisation, structure and authority of the V eterina ry Services ;

o   human resources;

o   material (including financial) resources;

o   veterinary legislation and functional capabilities and legislative support;

o   animal health and veterinary public health controls;

o   formal quality systems including quality policy;

o   performance assessment and audit programmes;

o   participation in OIE activities and compliance with OIE Members’ obligations.

  • 2. 
    To complement the evaluation of V eterinary Services , the legislative framework, organisational structure and functioning of the veterinary statutory body should also be considered.
  • 3. 
    Article 3.2.14. outlines appropriate information requirements for:

o self-evaluation by the V eterinary A uthority which perceives a need to prepare information for national or international purposes;

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o evaluation by a prospective or actual importing country of the V eterinary Services of a prospective or actual exporting count ry ;

o verification or re-verification of an evaluation in the course of a visit to the exporting country by the i mporting count ry ;

o evaluation by third parties such as OIE PVS experts or regional organisations.

Article 3.2.3. Evaluation criteria for the organisational structure of the Veterinary Services

  • 1. 
    A key element in the evaluation is the study of the organisation and structure of the official V eterinary Services . The V eterinary Services should define and set out their policy, objectives and commitment to quality systems and standards. These organisational and policy statements should be described in detail. Organisational charts and details of functional responsibilities of staff should be available for evaluation. The role and responsibility of the Chief Veterinary Officer/Veterinary Director should be clearly defined. Lines of command should also be described.
  • 2. 
    The organisational structure should also clearly set out the interface relationships of government Ministers and departmental Authorities with the Chief Veterinary Officer/Veterinary Director and the V eterinary Services . Formal relationships with statutory authorities and with industry organisations and associations should also be described. It is recognised that Services may be subject to changes in structure from time to time. Major changes should be notified to trading partners so that the effects of re-structuring may be assessed.
  • 3. 
    Organisational components of V eterinary Services which have responsibility for key functional capabilities should be identified. These capabilities include epidemiological surveillance , disease control, import controls, animal disease reporting systems, animal identification systems, traceability systems, animal movement control systems, communication of epidemiological information, training, inspection and certification. Laboratory and field systems and their organisational relationships should be described.
  • 4. 
    To reinforce the reliability and credibility of their services, the V eterinary Services may have set up quality systems that correspond with their fields of activity and to the nature and scale of activities that they carry out. Evaluation of such systems should be as objective as possible.
  • 5. 
    The V eterinary A uthority alone speaks for the country as far as official international dialogue is concerned. This is also particularly important to cases where zoning and compartmentalisation are being applied. The responsibilities of the V eterinary A uthority should be made clear in the process of evaluation of V eterinary Servi ce s .
  • 6. 
    The V eterinary A uthority is defined in the Glossary of the Terrestrial Code . As some countries have some relevant roles of the V eterinary A uthority vested in autonomous sub-national (state/provincial, municipal) government bodies, there is an important need to assess the role and function of these Services. Details of their roles, relationship (legal and administrative) to each other and to the V eterinary A uthority should be available for evaluation. Annual reports, review findings and access to other information pertinent to the animal health activities of such bodies should also be available.
  • 7. 
    Similarly, where the V eterinary A uthority has arrangements with other providers of relevant services such as universities, laboratories, information services, etc., these arrangements should also be described. For the purposes of evaluation, it is appropriate to expect that the organisational and functional standards that apply to the V eterinary A uthority should also apply to the service providers.

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Article 3.2.4.

Evaluation criteria for quality systems

  • 1. 
    The V eterinary Services should demonstrate a commitment to the quality of the processes and outputs of their services. Where services or components of services are delivered under a formal quality systems programme which is based on OIE recommended standards or, especially in the case of laboratory components of V eterinary Services other internationally recognised quality standards, the V eterinary Services undergoing evaluation should make available evidence of accreditation, details of the documented quality processes and documented outcomes of all relevant audits undertaken.
  • 2. 
    Where the V eterinary Services undergoing evaluation make large use of formal quality systems in the delivery of their services, it is appropriate that greater emphasis be placed on the outcomes of evaluation of these quality systems than on the resource and infrastructural components of the services.

Article 3.2.5.

Evaluation criteria for human resources

  • 1. 
    The V eterinary Services should demonstrate that their human resource component includes an integral core of full-time civil service employees. This core must include veterinarians . It should also include administrative officials and veterinary para-professionals . The human resources may also include part-time and private sector veterinarians and veterinary para-professionals . It is essential that all the above categories of personnel be subject to legal disciplinary provisions. Data relating to the resource base of the V eterinary Services undergoing evaluation should be available.
  • 2. 
    In addition to raw quantitative data on this resource base, the functions of the various categories of personnel in the V eterinary Services should be described in detail. This is necessary for analysis and estimation of the appropriateness of the application of qualified skills to the tasks undertaken by the V eterinary Services and may be relevant, for example, to the roles of veterinarians and veterinary para-professionals in field services. In this case, the evaluation should provide assurances that disease monitoring is being conducted by a sufficient number of qualified, experienced field veterinarians who are directly involved in farm visits; there should not be an over-reliance on veterinary para-professionals for this task.
  • 3. 
    Analysis of these data can be used to estimate the potential of the V eterinary Services to have reliable knowledge of the state of animal health in the country and to support an optimal level of animal disease control programmes. A large population of private veterinarians would not provide the V eterinary Services with an effective epizootiological information base without legislative (e.g. compulsory reporting of notifiable diseases ) and administrative (e.g. official animal health surveillance and reporting systems) mechanisms in place.
  • 4. 
    These data should be assessed in close conjunction with the other information described in this chapter. For example, a large field staff (veterinarians and veterinary para-professionals ) need fixed, mobile and budgetary resources for animal health activities in the livestock farming territory of the country. If deficiencies are evident, there would be reason to challenge the validity of epizootiological information.

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Article 3.2.6. Evaluation criteria for material resources

  • 1. 
    Financial

Actual yearly budgetary information regarding the V eterinary Services should be available and should include the details set out in the model questionnaire outlined in Article 3.2.14. Information is required on conditions of service for veterinary staff (including salaries and incentives), and should provide a comparison with the private sector and perhaps with other professionals. Information should also be available on nongovernment sources of revenue available to veterina rians in their official responsibilities.

  • 2. 
    Administrative
  • a. 
    Accommodation

The V eterinary Services should be accommodated in premises suitable for efficient performance of their functions. The component parts of the V eterinary Services should be located as closely as possible to each other at the central level, and in the regions where they are represented, in order to facilitate efficient internal communication and function.

  • b. 
    Communications

The V eterinary Services should be able to demonstrate that they have reliable access to effective communications systems, especially for animal health surveillance and control programmes. Inadequate communications systems within the field services components of these programmes or between outlying offices and headquarters, or between the V eterinary Services and other relevant administrative and professional services, signify an inherent weakness in these programmes. Adequate communications systems between laboratories and between field and laboratory components of the V eterinary Services should also be demonstrated.

Examples of types of communications which should be routinely available on an adequate country-wide basis are national postal, freight and telephone networks. Rapid courier services, facsimile and electronic data interchange systems (e.g. e-mail and Internet services) are examples of useful communication services which, if available, can supplement or replace the others. A means for rapid international communication should be available to the V eterinary A uthority , to permit reporting of changes in national disease status consistent with OIE recommendations and to allow bilateral contact on urgent matters with counterpart V eterinary A uthorities in trading-partner countries.

  • c. 
    Transport systems

The availability of sufficient reliable transport facilities is essential for the performance of many functions of V eterinary Services . This applies particularly to the field services components of animal health activities (e.g. emergency response visits). Otherwise, the V eterinary Services cannot assure counterpart services in other countries that they are in control of the animal health situation within the country.

Appropriate means of transport are also vital for the satisfactory receipt of samples to be tested at veterinary laboratories, for inspection of imports and exports, and for the performance of animals and animal product inspection in outlying production or processing establishments.

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  • 3. 
    Technical

Details available on laboratories should include resources data, programmes under way as well as those recently completed and review reports on the role or functions of the laboratory. Information as described in the model questionnaire should be used in the evaluation of laboratory services.

  • a. 
    Cold chain for laboratory samples and veterinary medicines

Adequate refrigeration and freezing systems should be available and should be used throughout the country to provide suitable low temperature protection for laboratory samples in transit or awaiting analysis, as well as veterinary medical products (e.g. vaccines) when these are required for use in animal disease control programmes. If these assurances cannot be given, it may be valid to discount many types of test results, as well as the effectiveness of certain disease control programmes and the export inspection system in the country undergoing evaluation.

  • b. 
    Diagnostic laboratories

Analysis of the laboratory service component of V eterinary Services , which would include official governmental laboratories and other laboratories accredited by the V eterinary Services for specified purposes, is an essential element of the evaluation process. The quality of the veterinary diagnostic laboratories of a country underpins the whole control and certification processes of the zoosanitary/sanitary status of exported animals and animal products, and therefore these laboratories should be subject to rigid quality assurance procedures and should use international quality assurance programmes (wherever available) for standardising test methodologies and testing proficiency. An example is the use of International Standard Sera for standardising reagents.

This emphasis is valid whether one relates it to the actual testing performed on individual export consignments or to the more broad and ongoing testing regimes which are used to determine the animal health and veterinary public health profiles of the country and to support its disease control programmes. For the purposes of evaluation, veterinary diagnostic laboratories include those which are concerned with either animal health or veterinary public health activities. The V eterinary Services must approve and designate these laboratories for such purposes and have them audited regularly.

  • c. 
    Research

The scope of animal disease and veterinary public health problems in the country concerned, the stages reached in the controls which address those problems and their relative importance can be measured to some degree by analysis of information on government priorities and programmes for research in animal health. This information should be accessible for evaluation purposes.

Article 3.2.7. Legislation and fFunctional capabilities and legislative support

  • 1. 
    Animal health and veterinary public health

The V eterinary A uthority should be able to demonstrate that it has the capacity, supported by appropriate legislation, to exercise control over all animal health matters. These controls should include, where appropriate, compulsory notification of prescribed animal diseases, inspection, movement controls through systems which provide adequate traceability, registration of facilities, quarantine of infected premises/areas, testing, treatment, destruction of infected animals or contaminated materials, controls over the use of veterinary medicines, etc. The scope of the legislative controls should include domestic animals and their reproductive material, animal products, wildlife as it relates to the transmission of diseases to humans and domestic animals , and other products subject to veterinary inspection. Arrangements should exist for cooperation with the V eterinary A uthorities of the neighbouring countries for the control of animal diseases in border areas and for establishing linkages to recognise and regulate transboundary activities. Information on the veterinary public health legislation covering the production of products of animal origin for national consumption may be also considered in the evaluation.

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  • 2. 
    Export/import inspection

The V eterinary A uthority should have appropriate legislation and adequate capabilities to prescribe the methods for control and to exercise systematic control over the import and export processes of animals and animal products in so far as this control relates to sanitary and zoosanitary matters. The evaluation should also involve the consideration of administrative instructions to ensure the enforcement of importing country requirements during the pre-export period.

In the context of production for export of foodstuffs of animal origin, the V eterinary A uthority should demonstrate that comprehensive legislative provisions are available for the oversight by the relevant authorities of the hygienic process and to support official inspection systems of these commodities which function to standards consistent with or equivalent to relevant Codex Alimentarius and OIE standards.

Control systems should be in place which permit the exporting V eterinary A uthority to approve export premises. The V eterinary Services should also be able to conduct testing and treatment as well as to exercise controls over the movement, handling and storage of exports and to make inspections at any stage of the export process. The product scope of this export legislation should include, inter alia , animals and animal products (including animal semen, ova and embryos), and animal feedstuffs.

The V eterinary A uthority should be able to demonstrate that they have adequate capabilities and legislative support for zoosanitary control of imports and transit of animals , animal products and other materials which may introduce animal diseases . This could be necessary to support claims by the V eterinary Services that the animal health status of the country is suitably stable, and that cross-contamination of exports from imports of unknown or less favourable zoosanitary status is unlikely. The same considerations should apply in respect of veterinary control of public health. The V eterinary Services should be able to demonstrate that there is no conflict of interest when certifying veterinarians are performing official duties.

Legislation should also provide the right to deny and/or withdraw official certification. Penalty provisions applying to malpractice on the part of certifying officials should be included.

The V eterinary Services should demonstrate that they are capable of providing accurate and valid certification for exports of animals and animal products, based on Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. of the Terrestrial Code . They should have appropriately organised procedures which ensure that sanitary/animal health certificates are issued by efficient and secure methods. The documentation control system should be able to correlate reliably the certification details with the relevant export consignments and with any inspections to which the consignments were subjected.

Security in the export certification process, including electronic documentation transfer, is important. A system of independent compliance review is desirable, to safeguard against fraud in certification by officials and by private individuals or corporations. The certifying veterinarian should have no conflict of interest in the commercial aspects of the animals or animal product being certified and be independent from the commercial parties.

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Article 3.2.8.

Animal health controls

  • 1. 
    Animal health status

An updated assessment of the present animal disease status of a country is an important and necessary procedure. For this undertaking, studies of the OIE publications such as World A nimal H ealth , the Bulletin and Disease I nformation must be fundamental reference points. The evaluation should consider the recent history of the compliance of the country with its obligations regarding international notification of animal diseases . In the case of an OIE Member, failure to provide the necessary animal health reports consistent with OIE requirements will detract from the overall outcome of the evaluation of the country.

An exporting country should be able to provide further, detailed elaboration of any elements of its animal disease status as reported to the OIE. This additional information will have particular importance in the case of animal diseases which are foreign to or strictly controlled in the importing country or region. The ability of the V eterinary Services to substantiate elements of their animal disease status reports with surveillance data, results of monitoring programmes and details of disease history is highly relevant to the evaluation. In the case of evaluation of the V eterinary Services of an ex porting country for international trade purposes, an importing country should be able to demonstrate the reasonableness of its request and expectations in this process.

  • 2. 
    Animal health control

Details of current animal disease control programmes should be considered in the evaluation. These programmes would include epidemiological surveillance, official government-administered or officially-endorsed, industry-administered control or eradication programmes for specific diseases or disease complexes, and animal disease emergency preparedness. Details should include enabling legislation, programme plans for epidemiological surveillance and animal disease emergency responses, quarantine arrangements for infected and exposed animals or herds , compensation provisions for animal owners affected by disease control measures, training programmes, physical and other barriers between the free country or zone and those infected, incidence and prevalence data, resource commitments, interim results and programme review reports.

  • 3. 
    National animal disease reporting systems

The presence of a functional animal disease reporting system which covers all agricultural regions of the country and all veterinary administrative control areas should be demonstrated.

An acceptable variation would be the application of this principle to specific zones of the country. In this case also, the animal disease reporting system should cover each of these zones. Other factors should come to bear on this situation, e.g. the ability to satisfy trading partners that sound animal health controls exist to prevent the introduction of disease or export products from regions of lesser veterinary control.

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Article 3.2.9. Veterinary public health controls

  • 1. 
    Food hygiene

The V eterinary A uthority should be able to demonstrate effective responsibility for the veterinary public health programmes relating to the production and processing of animal products. If the V eterinary A uthority does not exercise responsibility over these programmes, the evaluation should include a comprehensive review of the role and relationship of the organisations (national, state/provincial, and municipal) which are involved. In such a case, the evaluation should consider whether the V eterinary A uthority can provide guarantees of responsibility for an effective control of the sanitary status of animal products throughout the slaughter , processing, transport and storage periods.

  • 2. 
    Zoonoses

Within the structure of V eterinary Services , there should be appropriately qualified personnel whose responsibilities include the monitoring and control of zoonotic diseases and, where appropriate, liaison with medical authorities.

  • 3. 
    Chemical residue testing programmes

Adequacy of controls over chemical residues in exported animals , animal products and feedstuffs should be demonstrated. Statistically-based surveillance and monitoring programmes for environmental and other chemical contaminants in animals , in animal-derived foodstuffs and in animal feedstuffs should be favourably noted. These programmes should be coordinated nationwide. Correlated results should be freely available on request to existing and prospective trading partner countries. Analytical methods and result reporting should be consistent with internationally recognised standards. If official responsibility for these programmes does not rest with the V eterinary Services , there should be appropriate provision to ensure that the results of such programmes are made available to the V eterinary Services for assessment. This process should be consistent with the standards set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission or with alternative requirements set by the importing country where the latter are scientifically justified.

  • 4. 
    Veterinary medicines

It should be acknowledged that primary control over veterinary medicinal products may not rest with the V eterinary A uthority in some countries, owing to differences between governments in the division of legislative responsibilities. However, for the purpose of evaluation, the V eterinary A uthority should be able to demonstrate the existence of effective controls (including nationwide consistency of application) over the manufacture, importation, export, registration, supply, sale and use of veterinary medicines, biologicals and diagnostic reagents, whatever their origin. The control of veterinary medicines has direct relevance to the areas of animal health and public health.

In the animal health sphere, this has particular application to biological products. Inadequate controls on the registration and use of biological products leave the V eterinary Services open to challenge over the quality of animal disease control programmes and over safeguards against animal disease introduction in imported veterinary biological products.

It is valid, for evaluation purposes, to seek assurances of effective government controls over veterinary medicines in so far as these relate to the public health risks associated with residues of these chemicals in animals and animal-derived foodstuffs. This process should be consistent with the standards set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission or with alternative requirements set by the importing country where the latter are scientifically justified.

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  • 5. 
    Integration between animal health controls and veterinary public health

The existence of any organised programme which incorporates a structured system of information feedback from inspection in establishments producing products of animal origin, in particular meat or dairy products, and applies this in animal health control should be favourably noted. Such programmes should be integrated within a national disease surveillance scheme.

V eterinary Services which direct a significant element of their animal health programmes specifically towards minimising microbial and chemical contamination of animal-derived products in the human food chain should receive favourable recognition in the evaluation. There should be evident linkage between these programmes and the official control of veterinary medicines and relevant agricultural chemicals.

Article 3.2.10. Performance assessment and audit programmes

  • 1. 
    Strategic plans

The objectives and priorities of the V eterinary Services can be well evaluated if there is a published official strategic plan which is regularly updated. Understanding of functional activities is enhanced if an operational plan is maintained within the context of the strategic plan. The strategic and operational plans, if these exist, should be included in the evaluation.

V eterinary Services which use strategic and operational plans may be better able to demonstrate effective management than countries without such plans.

  • 2. 
    Performance assessment

If a strategic plan is used, it is desirable to have a process which allows the organisation to assess its own performance against its objectives. Performance indicators and the outcomes of any review to measure achievements against pre-determined performance indicators should be available for evaluation. The results should be considered in the evaluation process.

  • 3. 
    Compliance

Matters which can compromise compliance and adversely affect a favourable evaluation include instances of inaccurate or misleading official certification, evidence of fraud, corruption, or interference by higher political levels in international veterinary certification, and lack of resources and poor infrastructure.

It is desirable that the V eterinary Services contain (or have a formal linkage with) an independent internal unit/section/commission the function of which is to critically scrutinise their operations. The aim of this unit should be to ensure consistent and high integrity in the work of the individual officials in the V eterinary Services and of the corporate body itself. The existence of such a body can be important to the establishment of international confidence in the V eterinary Services .

An important feature when demonstrating the integrity of the V eterinary Services is their ability to take corrective action when miscertification, fraud or corruption has occurred.

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A supplementary or an alternative process for setting performance standards and application of monitoring and audit is the implementation of formal quality systems to some or all activities for which the V eterinary Services are responsible. Formal accreditation to international quality system standards should be utilised if recognition in the evaluation process is to be sought.

  • 4. 
    Veterinary Services administration
  • a. 
    Annual reports

Official government annual reports should be published, which provide information on the organisation and structure, budget, activities and contemporary performance of the V eterinary Services . Current and retrospective copies of such reports should be available to counterpart Services in other countries, especially trade partners.

  • b. 
    Reports of government review bodies

The reports of any periodic or ad hoc government reviews of V eterinary Services or of particular functions or roles of the V eterinary Services should be considered in the evaluation process. Details of action taken as a consequence of the review should also be accessible.

  • c. 
    Reports of special committees of enquiry or independent review bodies

Recent reports on the V eterinary Services or elements of their role or function, and details of any subsequent implementation of recommendations contained in these reports should be available. The

V eterinary Services concerned should recognise that the provision of such information need not be detrimental to the evaluation outcome; in fact, it may demonstrate evidence of an effective audit and response programme. The supplying of such information can reinforce a commitment to transparency.

  • d. 
    In-service training and development programme for staff

In order to maintain a progressive approach to meeting the needs and challenges of the changing domestic and international role of V eterinary Services , the national administration should have in place an organised programme which provides appropriate training across a range of subjects for relevant staff. This programme should include participation in scientific meetings of animal health organisations. Such a programme should be used in assessing the effectiveness of the Services.

  • e. 
    Publications

V eterinary Services can augment their reputation by demonstrating that their staff publish scientific articles in refereed veterinary journals or other publications.

  • f. 
    Formal linkages with sources of independent scientific expertise

Details of formal consultation or advisory mechanisms in place and operating between the V eterinary Services and local and international universities, scientific institutions or recognised veterinary organisations should be taken into consideration. These could serve to enhance the international recognition of the V eterinary Services .

  • g. 
    Trade performance history

In the evaluation of the V eterinary Services of a country, it is pertinent to examine the recent history of their performance and integrity in trade dealings with other countries. Sources of such historical data may include Customs Services.

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Article 3.2.11. Participation in OIE activities

Questions on a country's adherence to its obligations as a member of the OIE are relevant to an evaluation of the V eterinary Services of the country. Self-acknowledged inability or repeated failure of a Member to fulfil reporting obligations to the OIE will detract from the overall outcome of the evaluation. Such countries, as well as non-member countries, will need to provide extensive information regarding their V eterinary Services and sanitary/zoosanitary status for evaluation purposes.

Article 3.2.12. Evaluation of veterinary statutory body

  • 1. 
    Scope

In the evaluation of the veterinary statutory body , the following items may be considered, depending on the purpose of the evaluation:

  • a. 
    objectives and functions;
  • b. 
    legislative basis, autonomy and functional capacity;
  • c. 
    the composition and representation of the body's membership;
  • d. 
    accountability and transparency of decision-making;
  • e. 
    sources and management of funding;
  • f. 
    administration of training programmes and continuing professional development for veterinarians and veterinary para-professionals .
  • 2. 
    Evaluation of objectives and functions

The veterinary statutory body should define its policy and objectives, including detailed descriptions of its powers and functions such as:

  • a. 
    to regulate veterinarians and veterinary para-professionals through licensing and/or registration of such persons;
  • b. 
    to determine the minimum standards of education (initial and continuing) required for degrees, diplomas and certificates entitling the holders thereof to be registered as veterina rians and veterinary para -professionals ;
  • c. 
    to determine the standards of professional conduct of veterinarians and veterinary para-professionals and to ensure these standards are met.

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  • 3. 
    Evaluation of legislative basis, autonomy and functional capacity

The veterinary statutory body should be able to demonstrate that it has the capacity, supported by appropriate legislation, to exercise and enforce control over all veterinarians and veterinary para-professionals . These controls should include, where appropriate, compulsory licensing and registration, minimum standards of education (initial and continuing) for the recognition of degrees, diplomas and certificates, setting standards of professional conduct and exercising control and the application of disciplinary procedures.

The veterinary statutory body should be able to demonstrate autonomy from undue political and commercial interests.

Where applicable, regional agreements for the recognition of degrees, diplomas and certificates for veteri na rians and veteri na ry pa ra-professi onals should be demonstrated.

  • 4. 
    Evaluation of membership representation

Detailed descriptions should be available in respect of the membership of the veterinary statutory body and the method and duration of appointment of members. Such information includes:

  • a. 
    veterinarians designated by the V eterinary A uthority , such as the Chief Veterinary Officer;
  • b. 
    veterinarians elected by members registered by the veterina ry sta tutory body ;
  • c. 
    veterinarians designated or nominated by the veterinary association(s);
  • d. 
    representative(s) of veterinary para-professions;
  • e. 
    representative(s) of veterinary academia;
  • f. 
    representative(s) of other stakeholders from the private sector;
  • g. 
    election procedures and duration of appointment; h.   qualification requirements for members.
  • 5. 
    Evaluation of accountability and transparency of decision-making

Detailed information should be available on disciplinary procedures regarding the conducting of enquiries into professional misconduct, transparency of decision-making, publication of findings, sentences and mechanisms for appeal.

Additional information regarding the publication at regular intervals of activity reports, lists of registered or licensed persons including deletions and additions should also be taken into consideration.

  • 6. 
    Evaluation of financial sources and financial management

Information regarding income and expenditure, including fee structure(s) for the licensing/registration of persons should be available.

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  • 7. 
    Evaluation of training programmes and programmes for continuing professional development, for veterinarians and veterinary para-professionals

Descriptive summary of continuing professional development, training and education programmes should be provided, including descriptions of content, duration and participants; documented details of quality manuals and standards relating to Good Veterinary Practice should be provided.

Article 3.2.13.

  • 1. 
    The V eterinary Services of a country may undertake self-evaluation against the above criteria for such purposes as national interest, improvement of internal efficiency or export trade facilitation. The way in which the results of self-evaluation are used or distributed is a matter for the country concerned.
  • 2. 
    A prospective importing country may undertake an evaluation of the V eterinary Services of an ex porting country as part of a risk analysis process, which is necessary to determine the sanitary or zoosanitary measures which the country will use to protect human or animal life or health from disease or pest threats posed by imports. Periodic evaluation reviews are also valid following the commencement of trade.
  • 3. 
    In the case of evaluation for the purposes of international trade , the authorities of an importing country should use the principles elaborated above as the basis for the evaluation and should attempt to acquire information according to the model questionnaire outlined in Article 3.2.14. The V eterinary Services of the importing country are responsible for the analysis of details and for determining the outcome of the evaluation after taking into account all the relevant information. The relative ranking of importance ascribed, in the evaluation, to the criteria described in this chapter will necessarily vary according to case-by-case circumstances. This ranking should be established in an objective and justifiable way. Analysis of the information obtained in the course of an evaluation study must be performed in as objective a manner as possible. The validity of the information should be established and reasonableness should be employed in its application. The assessing country must be willing to defend any position taken on the basis of this type of information, if challenged by the other party.

Article 3.2.14.

This article outlines appropriate information requirements for the self-evaluation or evaluation of the V eterinary Services of a country.

  • 1. 
    Organisation and structure of Veterinary Services
  • a. 
    National Veterinary Authority

Organisational chart including numbers, positions and numbers of vacancies.

  • b. 
    Sub-national components of the Veterinary Authority

Organisational charts including numbers, positions and number of vacancies.

  • c. 
    Other providers of veterinary services

Description of any linkage with other providers of veterinary services.

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  • 2. 
    National information on human resources
  • a. 
    Veterinarians
  • i. 
    Total numbers of veterinarians registered/licensed by the V eterinary statutory body of the country.
  • ii. 
    Numbers of:

§ full time government veterinarians : national and sub-national;

§ part time government veterinarians : national and sub-national;

§ private veterinarians authorised by the V eterinary Services to perform official veterinary functions [Describe accreditation standards, responsibilities a nd/ or limitations applying to these private veterinarians. ] ;

§ other veteri na rians .

  • iii. 
    Animal health:

Numbers associated with farm livestock sector on a majority time basis in a veterinary capacity, by geographical area [Show categories and numbers to differentiate staff involved in field service, laboratory, administration, import/ ex port and other functions, as a pplicable.] :

§ full time government veterinarians : national and sub-national;

§ part time government veterinarians : national and sub-national;

§ other veteri na rians .

  • iv. 
    Veterinary public health:

Numbers employed in food inspection on a majority time basis, by commodity [Show categories and numbers to differentiate staff involved in inspection, laboratory and other functions, as a pplicable.] :

§    full time government veterinarians : national and sub-national;

§    part time government veterinarians : national and sub-national;

§    other veteri na rians .

  • v. 
    Numbers of veterinarians relative to certain national indices:

§    per total human population;

§    per farm livestock population, by geographical area;

§    per livestock farming unit, by geographical area.

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  • vi. 
    Veterinary education:

§ number of veterinary schools;

§ length of veterinary course (years);

§ international recognition of veterinary degree. vii. Veterinary professional associations.

  • b. 
    Graduate personnel (non-veterinary)

Details to be provided by category (including biologists, biometricians, economists, engineers, lawyers, other science graduates and others) on numbers within the V eterinary A uthority and available to the V eteri na ry A uthority .

  • c. 
    Veterinary para-professionals employed by the Veterinary Services i. Animal health:

§ Categories and numbers involved with farm livestock on a majority time basis:

§ by geographical area;

§ proportional to numbers of field Veterinary Officers in the V eterinary Services , by geographical area.

§ E ducation/training details.

  • ii. 
    Veterinary public health:

§ Categories and numbers involved in food inspection on a majority time basis:

§ meat inspection: export meat establishments with an export function and domestic meat establishments (no export function);

§    dairy inspection;

§   other foods.

§   Numbers in import/export inspection.

§    E ducation/training details.

  • d. 
    Support personnel

Numbers directly available to V eterinary Services per sector (administration, communication, transport).

  • e. 
    Descriptive summary of the functions of the various categories of staff mentioned above
  • f. 
    Veterinary, veterinary para-professionals , livestock owner, farmer and other relevant associations
  • g. 
    Additional information and/or comments.

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  • 3. 
    Financial management information
  • a. 
    Total budgetary allocations to the V eterinary A uthority for the current and past two fiscal years: i. for the national V eterinary A uthority ;
  • ii. 
    for each of any sub-national components of the V eterinary A uthority ; iii. for other relevant government-funded institutions.
  • b. 
    Sources of the budgetary allocations and amount: i. government budget;
  • ii. 
    sub-national authorities;
  • iii. 
    taxes and fines;
  • iv. 
    grants;
  • v. 
    private services.
  • c. 
    Proportional allocations of the amounts in a) above for operational activities and for the programme components of V eterinary Services .
  • d. 
    Total allocation proportionate of national public sector budget. [This data may be necessary for comparative assessment with other countries which should tak e into account the contex ts of the importance of the livestock sector to the national economy and of the animal health status of the country. ]
  • e. 
    Actual and proportional contribution of animal production to gross domestic product.
  • 4. 
    Administration details
  • a. 
    Accommodation

Summary of the numbers and distribution of official administrative centres of the V eterinary Services (national and sub-national) in the country.

  • b. 
    Communications

Summary of the forms of communication systems available to the V eterinary Services on a nation-wide and local area bases.

  • c. 
    Transport
  • i. 
    Itemised numbers of types of functional transport available on a full-time basis for the V eterinary Services . In addition provide details of transport means available part-time.
  • ii. 
    Details of annual funds available for maintenance and replacement of motor vehicles.

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Annex VIII (contd)

  • 5. 
    Laboratory services
  • a. 
    Diagnostic laboratories (laboratories engaged primarily in diagnosis)
  • i. 
    Descriptive summary of the organisational structure and role of the government veterinary laboratory service in particular its relevance to the field V eterinary Services .
  • ii. 
    Numbers of veterinary diagnostic laboratories operating in the country:

§ government operated laboratories;

§ private laboratories accredited by government for the purposes of supporting official or officially-endorsed animal health control or public health testing and monitoring programmes and import/export testing.

  • iii. 
    Descriptive summary of accreditation procedures and standards for private laboratories .
  • iv. 
    Human and financial resources allocated to the government veterinary laboratories , including staff numbers, graduate and post-graduate qualifications and opportunities for further training.
  • v. 
    List of diagnostic methodologies available against major diseases of farm livestock (including poultry ).
  • vi. 
    Details of collaboration with external laboratories including international reference laboratories and details on numbers of samples submitted.
  • vii. 
    Details of quality control and assessment (or validation) programmes operating within the veterinary laboratory service.
  • viii. 
    Recent published reports of the official veterinary laboratory service which should include details of specimens received and foreign animal disease investigations made.
  • ix. 
    Details of procedures for storage and retrieval of information on specimen submission and results.
  • x. 
    Reports of independent reviews of the laboratory service conducted by government or private organisations (if available).
  • xi. 
    Strategic and operational plans for the official veterinary laboratory service (if available).
  • b. 
    Research laboratories (laboratories engaged primarily in research)
  • i. 
    Numbers of veterinary research laboratories operating in the country:

§ government operated laboratories ;

§ private laboratories involved in full time research directly related to animal health and veterinary public health matters involving production animal species.

  • ii. 
    Summary of human and financial resources allocated by government to veterinary research.
  • iii. 
    Published programmes of future government sponsored veterinary research.
  • iv. 
    Annual reports of the government research laboratories .

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Annex VIII (contd)

  • 6. 
    Veterinary legislation and fFunctional capabilities and legislative support
  • a. 
    Animal health and veterinary public health
  • i. 
    Assessment of the adequacy and implementation of relevant legislation (national or sub-national) concerning the following:

§    animal and veterinary public health controls at national frontiers;

§    control of endemic animal diseases, including z oonoses ;

§    emergency powers for control of exotic disease outbreaks, including zoonoses ;

§    inspection and registration of facilities;

§ veterinary public health controls of the production, processing, storage and marketing of meat for domestic consumption;

§ veterinary public health controls of the production, processing, storage and marketing of fish, dairy products and other foods of animal origin for domestic consumption;

§ registration and use of veterinary pharmaceutical products including vaccines. ii. Assessment of ability of V eterinary Services to enforce legislation.

  • b. 
    Export/import inspection
  • i. 
    Assessment of the adequacy and implementation of relevant national legislation concerning:

§ veterinary public health controls of the production, processing, storage and transportation of meat for export;

§ veterinary public health controls of production, processing, storage and marketing of fish, dairy products and other foods of animal origin for export;

§ animal health and veterinary public health controls of the export and import of animals , animal genetic material, animal products, animal feedstuffs and other products subject to veterinary inspection;

§ animal health controls of the importation, use and bio-containment of organisms which are aetiological agents of animal diseases, and of pathological material;

§ animal health controls of importation of veterinary biological products including vaccines;

§ administrative powers available to V eterinary Services for inspection and registration of facilities for veterinary control purposes (if not included under other legislation mentioned above);

§ documentation and compliance. ii. Assessment of ability of V eterinary Services to enforce legislation.

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  • 7. 
    Animal health and veterinary public health controls
  • a. 
    Animal health
  • i. 
    Description of and sample reference data from any national animal disease reporting system controlled and operated or coordinated by the V eterinary Services .
  • ii. 
    Description of and sample reference data from other national animal disease reporting systems controlled and operated by other organisations which make data and results available to V eterinary Servi ce s .
  • iii. 
    Description and relevant data of current official control programmes including:

§ epidemiological surveillance or monitoring programmes;

§ officially approved industry administered control or eradication programmes for specific diseases . iv. Description and relevant details of animal disease emergency preparedness and response plans. v. Recent history of animal disease status:

§ animal diseases eradicated nationally or from defined sub-national zones in the last ten years;

§ animal diseases of which the prevalence has been controlled to a low level in the last ten years;

§ animal diseases introduced to the country or to previously free sub national regions in the last ten years;

§ emerging diseases in the last ten years;

§ animal diseases of which the prevalence has increased in the last ten years.

  • b. 
    Veterinary public health i. Food hygiene

§ Annual national slaughter statistics for the past three years according to official data by species of animals (bovine, ovine, porcine, caprine, poultry , farmed game, wild game, equine, other).

§ Estimate of total annual slaughterings which occur but are not recorded under official statistics.

§ Proportion of total national slaughter which occurs in registered export establishments, by category of animal .

§ Proportion of total national slaughter which occurs under veterinary control, by category of a ni ma l .

§ Numbers of commercial fresh meat establishments in the country which are registered for export by the V eterinary A uthority :

§ slaughterhouses (indicate species of animals );

§ cutting/packing plants (indicate mea t type);

§ meat processing establishments (indicate meat type);

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§ cold stores.

§ Numbers of commercial fresh meat establishments in the country approved by other importing countries which operate international assessment inspection programmes associated with approval procedures.

§ Numbers of commercial fresh meat establishments under direct public health control of the V eterinary Services (including details of category and numbers of inspection staff associated with these premises).

§ Description of the veterinary public health programme related to production and processing of animal products for human consumption (including fresh meat , poultry meat , meat products , game meat , dairy products, fish, fishery products, molluscs and crustaceans and other foods of animal origin) especially including details applying to exports of these commodities .

§ Descriptive summary of the roles and relationships of other official organisations in public health programmes for the products listed above if the V eterinary A uthority does not have responsibility for those programmes which apply to national production destined to domestic consumption and/or exports of the commodities concerned.

  • ii. 
    Zoonoses

§ Descriptive summary of the numbers and functions of staff of the V eterinary A uthority involved primarily with monitoring and control of zoonotic diseases.

§ Descriptive summary of the role and relationships of other official organisations involved in monitoring and control of zoonoses to be provided if the V eterinary A uthority does not have these responsibilities.

  • iii. 
    Chemical residue testing programmes

§ Descriptive summary of national surveillance and monitoring programmes for environmental and chemical residues and contaminants applied to animal-derived foodstuffs, animals and animal feedstuffs.

§ Role and function in these programmes of the V eterinary A uthority and other V eterinary Services to be described in summary form.

§ Descriptive summary of the analytical methodologies used and their consistency with internationally recognised standards.

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Annex VIII (contd)

  • iv. 
    Veterinary medicines

§ Descriptive summary of the administrative and technical controls involving registration, supply and use of veterinary pharmaceutical products especially including biological products. This summary should include a focus on veterinary public health considerations relating to the use of these products in food-producing a nimals .

§ Role and function in these programmes of the V eterinary A uthority and other V eterinary Services to be described in summary form.

  • 8. 
    Quality systems
  • a. 
    Accreditation

Details and evidence of any current, formal accreditation by external agencies of the V eterinary Services of any components thereof.

  • b. 
    Quality manuals

Documented details of the quality manuals and standards which describe the accredited quality systems of the V eterinary Services .

  • c. 
    Audit

Details of independent (and internal) audit reports which have been undertaken of the V eterinary Services of components thereof.

  • 9. 
    Performance assessment and audit programmes
  • a. 
    Strategic plans and review
  • i. 
    Descriptive summary and copies of strategic and operational plans of the V eterinary Services organisation.
  • ii. 
    Descriptive summary of corporate performance assessment programmes which relate to the strategic and operational plans - copies of recent review reports.
  • b. 
    Compliance

Descriptive summary of any compliance unit which monitors the work of the V eterinary Services (or elements thereof).

  • c. 
    Annual reports of the Veterinary Authority Copies of official annual reports of the national (sub-national) V eterinary A uthority .
  • d. 
    Other reports
  • i. 
    Copies of reports of official reviews into the function or role of the V eterinary Services which have been conducted within the past three years.
  • ii. 
    Descriptive summary (and copy of reports if available) of subsequent action taken on recommendations made in these reviews.

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  • e. 
    Training
  • i. 
    Descriptive summary of in-service and development programmes provided by the V eterinary Services (or their parent Ministries) for relevant staff.
  • ii. 
    Summary descriptions of training courses and duration.
  • iii. 
    Details of staff numbers (and their function) who participated in these training courses in the last three years.
  • f. 
    Publications Bibliographical list of scientific publications by staff members of V eterinary Services in the past three years.
  • g. 
    Sources of independent scientific expertise

List of local and international universities, scientific institutions and recognised veterinary organisations with which the V eterinary Services have consultation or advisory mechanisms in place.

  • 10. 
    Membership of the OIE State if country is a member of the OIE and period of membership.
  • 11. 
    Other assessment criteria

text deleted

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Annex IX

CH AP TE R 4.2.

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS TO ACHIEVE ANIMAL TRACEABILITY

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed changes but have some comments.

Article 4.2.1.

Introduction and objectives

These recommendations are based on the general principles presented in Article 4.1.1. The recommendations outline for Members the basic elements that need to be taken into account in the design and implementation of an animal identification system to achieve animal traceability . Whatever a nimal identification system the country adopts, it should comply with relevant OIE standards, including Chapters 5.10. to 5.12. for animals and animal products intended for export. Each country should design a programme in accordance with the scope and relevant performance criteria to ensure that the desired animal traceability outcomes can be achieved.

Article 4.2.2. Glossary

EU Comments

Replace the word "Glossary" by the word "Definitions". Furthermore all words defined below should not be italics as only used for the present chapter.

For the purpose of this chapter:

Desire d outcomes : describe the overall goals of a programme and are usually expressed in qualitative terms, e.g. ‘to help ensure that animals and/or animal products are safe and suitable for use’. Safety and suitability for use could be defined in terms such as animal health, food safety, trade and aspects of animal husbandry.

Pe rformanc e crite ria : are specifications for performance of a programme and are usually expressed in quantitative terms, such as ‘all animals can be traced to the establishment of birth within 48 hours of an enquiry’.

Reportin g : means advising the V eterinary A uthority and other partner organisations as appropriate in accordance with the procedures listed in the programme.

Sc ope : specifies the targeted species, population and/or production/trade sector within a defined area (country, zone ) or compartment that is the subject of the identifica tion and tracea bility programme.

T ranshumance : periodic/seasonal movements of animals between different pastures within or between countries.

Article 4.2.3. Key elements of the animal identification system

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  • 1. 
    Desired outcomes

Desired outcomes should be defined through consultation between the V eterinary A uthority and other parties, which should include (depending on scope) animal producers and food processors, private sector veterinarians, scientific research organisations and other government agencies. Desired outcomes may be defined in terms of any or all of the following:

  • a. 
    animal health (e.g. disease surveillance and notification; detection and control of disease ; vaccination programmes);
  • b. 
    public health (e.g. surveillance and control of zoonotic diseases and food safety);
  • c. 
    management of emergencies e.g. natural catastrophies or man-made events;
  • d. 
    trade (support for inspection and certification activities of V eterinary Services , as described in Chapters 5.10. to 5.12. which reproduce model international veterinary certificates);
  • e. 
    aspects of animal husbandry such as animal performance, and genetic data.
  • 2. 
    Scope

Scope should also be defined through consultation between the V eterinary A uthority and other parties, as discussed above. The scope of animal identification systems is often based on the definition of a species and sector, to take account of particular characteristics of the farming systems e.g. pigs in pork export production; poultry in a defined compartment ; cattle within a defined FMD free zone . Different systems will be appropriate according to the production systems used in countries and the nature of their industries and trade.

  • 3. 
    Performance criteria

Performance criteria are also designed in consultation with other parties, as discussed above. The performance criteria depend on the desired outcomes and scope of the programme. They are usually described in quantitative terms according to the epidemiology of the disease . For example, some countries consider it necessary to trace susceptible animals within 24-48 hours when dealing with highly contagious diseases such as FMD and avian influenza. For food safety, animal tracing to support investigation of incidents may also be urgent. For chronic animal diseases that are not zoonoses , it may be considered appropriate that animals can be traced over a longer period.

  • 4. 
    Preliminary studies

In designing animal identification systems it is useful to conduct preliminary studies, which should take into account:

  • a. 
    animal populations, species, distribution, herd management,
  • b. 
    farming and industry structures, production and location,
  • c. 
    animal health,
  • d. 
    public health,
  • e. 
    trade issues,
  • f. 
    aspects of animal husbandry,
  • g. 
    zoning and compartmentalisation,

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  • h. 
    animal movement patterns (including transhumance),
  • i. 
    information management and communication,
  • j. 
    availability of resources (human and financial),
  • k. 
    social and cultural aspects,
  • l. 
    stakeholder knowledge of the issues and expectations,
  • m. 
    gaps between current enabling legislation and what is needed long term,
  • n. 
    international experience,
  • o. 
    national experience,
  • p. 
    available technology options,
  • q. 
    existing identification system(s),
  • r. 
    expected benefits from the animal identification systems and animal traceability and to whom they accrue,
  • s. 
    issues pertaining to data ownership and access rights,
  • t. 
    reporting requirements.

Pilot projects may form part of the preliminary study to test the animal identification system and animal traceability and to gather information for the design and the implementation of the programme.

Economic analysis may consider costs, benefits, funding mechanisms and sustainability.

  • 5. 
    Design of the programme
  • a. 
    General provisions

The programme should be designed in consultation with the stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of the animal identification system and animal traceability . It should take into account the scope, performance criteria and desired outcomes as well as the results of any preliminary study.

All the specified documentation should be standardised as to format, content and context.

To protect and enhance the integrity of the system, procedures should be incorporated into the design of the programme to prevent, detect and correct errors e.g. use of algorithms to prevent duplication of identification numbers and to ensure plausibility of data.

  • b. 
    Means of animal identification

The choice of a physical animal or group identifier should consider elements such as the durability, human resources, species and age of the animals to be identified, required period of identification, cultural aspects, animal welfare , technology, compatibility and relevant standards, farming practices, production systems, animal population, climatic conditions, resistance to

The V eterinary A uthority is responsible for approving the materials and equipment chosen, to ensure that these means of animal identification comply with technical and field performance specifications, and for the supervision of their distribution. The V eterinary A uthority is also responsible for ensuring that identifiers are unique and are used in accordance with the requirements of the animal identification system .

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The V eterinary A uthority should establish procedures for a nimal identification and a nimal tracea bility including:

  • i. 
    the establishment of birth, and time period within which an animal is born on an establishment should be identified;
  • ii. 
    when animals are introduced into an establishment ;
  • iii. 
    when an animal loses its identification or the identifier becomes unusable;
  • iv. 
    arrangements and rules for the destruction and/or reuse of identifiers;
  • v. 
    penalties for the tampering and/or removal of official animal identification devices.

Where group identification without a physical identifier is adequate, documentation should be created specifying at least the number of animals in the group, the species, the date of identification, the person legally responsible for the animals and/or establishment . This documentation constitutes a unique group identifier and it should be updated to be traceable if there are any changes.

Where all animals in the group are physically identified with a group identifier, documentation should also specify the unique group identifier.

  • c. 
    Registration

Procedures need to be incorporated into the design of the programme in order to ensure that relevant events and information are registered in a timely and accurate manner.

Depending on the scope, performance criteria and desired outcomes, records as described below should specify, at least, the species, the unique animal or group identifier, the date of the event, the identifier of the establishment where the event took place, and the code for the event itself.

  • i. 
    Establishments/owners or responsible keepers

Establishments where animals are kept should be identified and registered, including at least their physical location (such as geographical coordinates or street address), the type of establishment and the species kept. The register should include the name of the person legally responsible for the animals at the establishment.

The types of establishments that may need to be registered include holdings (farms), assembly centres (e.g. agriculture shows and fairs, sporting events, transit centres, breeding centres), mark ets , abattoirs , rendering plants, dead stock collection points, transhumance areas, centres for necropsy and diagnosis, research centres, zoos, border posts , quara ntine sta tions .

In cases where the registration of establishments is not applicable e.g. some transhumance systems, the animal owner, the owner’s place of residence and the species kept should be recorded.

EU comment

The example given above should be in brackets to make it clearer that it is an example as follows

  • ii. 
    Animals

A nimal identification and species should be registered for each establishment/owner. Other relevant information about the animals at each establishment/owner may also be recorded e.g. date of birth, production category, sex, breed, animal identification of the parents.

EU Comments:

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Number of animals per species is to be added to examples.

  • iii. 
    Movements

The registration of animal movements is necessary to achieve animal traceability . When an animal is introduced into or leaves an establishment, these events constitute a movement.

Some countries classify birth, slaughter and death of the animal as movements. When establishments are not registered as part of the animal identification system , ownership and location changes constitute a movement record.

The information registered should include the date of the movement, the establishment from which the animal or group of animals was dispatched, the number of animals moved, the destination establishment, and any establishment used in transit. Movement recording may also include means of transport and the vehicle / identifier.

When establishments are not registered as part of the animal identification system , ownership and location changes constitute a movement record. Movement recording may also include means of transport and the vehicle / identifier.

Procedures should be in place to maintain animal traceability during transport and when animals arrive at and leave an establishment.

  • iv. 
    Events other than movements

The following events may also be registered:

§ birth, slaughter and death of the animal (when not classified as a movement),

§ attachment of the unique identifier to an animal ,

§ change of owner or keeper regardless of change of establishment,

§ observation of an animal on an establishment (testing, health investigation, health certification, etc.),

§ animal imported: a record of the animal identification from the ex porting country should be kept and linked with the animal identification assigned in the importing country ,

§ animal exported: a record of the animal identification from the ex porting country should be provided to the V eterinary A uthority in the importing country ,

EU comment

The "animal imported" and "animal exported" should be considered as movements and included in point iii above.

§ animal identifier lost or replaced,

§ animal missing (lost, stolen, etc.),

§ animal identifier retired (at slaughter , following loss of the identifier or death of the animal on a farm, at diagnostic laboratories , etc.).

  • d. 
    Documentation

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Documentation requirements should be clearly defined and standardised, according to the scope, performance criteria and desired outcomes and supported by the legal framework.

  • e. 
    Reporting

Depending on the scope, performance criteria and desired outcomes, relevant information (such as animal identification , movement, events, changes in numbers of livestock, esta blishments ) should be reported to the V eterinary A uthority by the person responsible for the animals .

  • f. 
    Information system

An information system should be designed according to the scope, performance criteria and desired outcomes. This may be paper based or electronic. The system should provide for the collection, compilation, storage and retrieval of information on matters relevant to registration . The following considerations are important:

§    have the potential for linkage to traceability in the other parts of the food chain;

§    minimize duplication;

§    relevant components, including databases, should be compatible;

§    confidentiality of data;

§    appropriate safeguards to prevent the loss of data, including a system for backing up the data.

The V eterinary A uthority should have access to this information system as appropriate to meet the scope, performance criteria and desired outcomes.

  • g. 
    Laboratories

The results of diagnostic tests should record the animal identifier or the group identifier and the establishment where the sample was collected.

  • h. 
    Abattoirs, rendering plants, dead stock collection points, markets and assembly centres

A battoirs , rendering plants, dead stock collection points, mark ets and assembly centres should document arrangements for the maintenance of animal identification and animal traceability in compliance with the legal framework.

These establishments are critical points for control of animal health and food safety.

A nimal identification should be recorded on documents accompanying samples collected for analysis.

The components of the animal identification system operating within abattoirs should complement and be compatible with arrangements for tracking animal products throughout the food chain. At an abattoir , animal identification should be maintained during the processing of the animal ’s carcass until the carcass is deemed fit for human consumption.

The animal identification and the establishment from which the animal was dispatched should be registered by the abattoir , rendering plant and dead stock collection points.

A battoirs , rendering plants and dead stock collection points should ensure that identifiers are collected and disposed of according to the procedures established and regulated within the legal framework. These procedures should minimize the risk of unauthorized reuse and, if appropriate, should establish arrangements and rules for the reuse of identifiers.

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Reporting of movement by abattoirs , rendering plants and dead stock collection points should occur according to the scope, performance criteria and desired outcomes and the legal framework.

  • i. 
    Penalties

Different levels and types of penalties should be defined in the programme and supported by the legal framework.

  • 6. 
    Legal framework

The V eterinary A uthority , with other relevant governmental agencies and in consultation with stakeholders, should establish a legal framework for the implementation and enforcement of animal identification system and animal traceability in the country. The structure of this framework will vary from country to country.

A nimal identification , animal traceability and animal movement should be under the responsibility of the V eteri na ry A uthority .

This legal framework should address:

  • i. 
    desired outcomes and scope;
  • ii. 
    obligations of the V eterinary A uthority and other parties;
  • iii. 
    organisational arrangements, including the choice of technologies and methods used for the animal i dentifica ti on system and a ni ma l tra ceability ;
  • iv. 
    management of animal movement;
  • v. 
    confidentiality of data;
  • vi. 
    data access / accessibility;
  • vii. 
    checking, verification, inspection and penalties;
  • viii. 
    where relevant, funding mechanisms;
  • ix. 
    where relevant, arrangements to support a pilot project.

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Annex IX (contd)

  • 7. 
    Implementation
  • a. 
    Action plan

For implementing the animal identification system , an action plan should be prepared specifying the timetable and including the milestones and performance indicators, the human and financial resources, and checking, enforcement and verification arrangements.

The following activities should be addressed in the action plan:

  • i. 
    Communication

The scope, performance criteria, desired outcomes, responsibilities, movement and registration requirements and sanctions need to be communicated to all parties.

Communication strategies need to be targeted to the audience, taking into account elements such as the level of literacy (including technology literacy) and spoken languages.

  • ii. 
    Training programmes

It is desirable to implement training programmes to assist the V eterinary Services and other parties. iii. Technical support

Technical support should be provided to address practical problems.

  • b. 
    Checking and verification

Checking activities should start at the beginning of the implementation to detect, prevent and correct errors and to provide feedback on programme design.

Verification should begin after a preliminary period as determined by the V eterinary A uthority in order to determine compliance with the legal framework and operational requirements.

  • c. 
    Auditing

Auditing should be carried out under the authority of the V eterinary A uthority to detect any problems with the animal identification system and animal tracea bility and to identify possible improvements.

  • d. 
    Review

The programme should be subject to periodic review, taking into account the results of checking, verification and auditing activities.

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Annex X

CH AP TE R 4.3. ZONING AND COMPARTMENTALISATION

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed changes, but proposes further text to improve the description of a protection zone in article 4.3.3.

Article 4.3.1. Introduction

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , ‘zoning’ and ‘regionalisation’ have the same meaning.

Establishing and maintaining a disease free-status throughout the country should be the final goal for OIE Members. However, given the difficulty of establishing and maintaining a disease free status for an entire territory, especially for diseases the entry of which is difficult to control through measures at national boundaries, there may be benefits to a Member in establishing and maintaining a subpopulation with a distinct health status within its territory. Subpopulations may be separated by natural or artificial geographical barriers or, in certain situations, by the application of appropriate management practices.

Zoning and compartmentalisation are procedures implemented by a Member under the provisions of this Chapter with a view to defining subpopulations of distinct health status within its territory for the purpose of disease control and/or international trade . While zoning applies to an animal subpopulation defined primarily on a geographical basis (using natural, artificial or legal boundaries), compartmentalisation applies to an animal subpopulation defined primarily by management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity. In practice, spatial considerations and good management including biosecurity plans play important roles in the application of both concepts.

A particular application of the concept of zoning is the establishment of a containment zone . In the event of limited outbreak s of a specified disease within an otherwise free country or zone , a single containment zone , which includes all cases , can be established for the purpose of minimizing the impact on the entire country or zone .

This Chapter is to assist OIE Members wishing to establish and maintain different subpopulations within their territory using the principles of compartmentalisation and zoning. These principles should be applied in accordance with the measures recommended in the relevant disease Chapter(s). This Chapter also outlines a process through which trading partners may recognise such subpopulations . This process is best implemented by trading partners through establishing parameters and gaining agreement on the necessary measures prior to disease outbreaks .

Before trade in animals or their products may occur, an importing country needs to be satisfied that its animal health status will be appropriately protected. In most cases, the import regulations developed will rely in part on judgements made about the effectiveness of sanitary procedures undertaken by the ex porting country , both at its borders and within its territory.

As well as contributing to the safety of international trade , zoning and compartmentalisation may assist disease control or eradication within a Member's territory. Zoning may encourage the more efficient use of resources within certain parts of a country and compartmentalisation may allow the functional separation of a subpopulation from other domestic or wild animals through biosecurity measures, which a zone (through geographical separation) would not achieve. Following a disease outbreak , the use of compartmentalisation may allow a Member

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to take advantage of epidemiological links among subpopulations or common practices relating to biosecurity, despite diverse geographical locations, to facilitate disease control and/or the continuation of trade.

Zoning and compartmentalisation cannot be applied to all diseases but separate requirements will be developed for each disease for which the application of zoning or compartmentalisation is considered appropriate.

To regain free status following a disease outbreak in a zone or compartment , Members should follow the recommendations in the relevant disease Chapter in the Terrestrial Code .

Article 4.3.2.

General considerations

The V eterinary Services of an exporting country which is establishing a zone or compartment within its territory for international trade purposes should clearly define the subpopulation in accordance with the recommendations in the relevant Chapters in the Terrestrial Code , including those on surveillance , and the identification and traceability of live animals . The V eterinary Services of an exporting country should be able to explain to the V eterinary Services of an importing country the basis for claiming a distinct animal health status for the given zone or compartment under consideration.

The procedures used to establish and maintain the distinct animal health status of a zone or compartment should be appropriate to the particular circumstances, and will depend on the epidemiology of the disease , in particular, the presence and importance of susceptible wildlife species, environmental factors and applicable appropriate biosecurity measures.

The authority, organisation and infrastructure of the V eterinary Services , including laboratories , must be clearly documented in accordance with the Chapter on the evaluation of V eterinary Services of the Terrestrial Code , to provide confidence in the integrity of the zone or compartment . The final authority of the zone or compartment , for the purposes of domestic and international trade , lies with the V eterinary A uthority .

In the context of maintaining the health status of a population , references to ‘import’, ‘importation’ and ‘imported animals/products’ found in the Terrestrial Code apply both to importation into a country and to the movement of animals and their products into zones and compartments . Such movements should be the subject of appropriate measures to preserve the animal health status of the z one /compartment .

The ex porting country should be able to demonstrate, through detailed documentation provided to the importing country , that it has implemented the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code for establishing and maintaining such a zone or compartment .

An importing country should recognise the existence of this zone or compartment when the appropriate measures recommended in the Terrestrial Code are applied and the V eterinary A uthority of the ex porting country certifies that this is the case.

The exporting country should conduct an assessment of the resources needed and available to establish and maintain a zone or compartment for international trade purposes. These include the human and financial resources, and the technical capability of the V eterinary Services (and of the relevant industry, in the case of a compartment ) including di sea se surveillance and diagnosis.

Biosecurity and surveillance are essential components of zoning and compartmentalisation, and the arrangements should be developed through cooperation of industry and V eterina ry Services .

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Annex X (contd)

Industry’s responsibilities include the application of biosecurity measures, documenting and recording movements of animals and personnel, quality assurance schemes, monitoring the efficacy of the measures, documenting corrective actions, conducting surveillance , rapid reporting and maintenance of records in a readily accessible form.

The V eterinary Services should provide movement certification, and carry out documented periodic inspections of facilities, biosecurity measures, records and surveillance procedures. V eterinary Services should conduct or audit surveillance , reporting and laboratory diagnostic examinations.

Article 4.3.3.

Principles for defining a zone or compartment, including protection and containment zones

In conjunction with the above considerations, the following principles should apply when Members define a zone or a compa rtment .

  • 1. 
    The extent of a zone and its geographical limits should be established by the V eterinary A uthority on the basis of natural, artificial and/or legal boundaries, and made public through official channels.

2.     A protection zone may be established to preserve the health status of animals in a free country or zone , from adjacent countries or zones of different animal health status. Measures should be implemented based on the epidemiology of the disease under consideration to prevent introduction of the pathogenic agent. These measures should include intensified movement control and surveillance and may also include vaccination, special identification, raised awareness or other measures.

EU Comments

In the first line the word "in" should be replaced by "of" to avoid any misunderstanding.

In order to give a better description of the protection zone, the EU proposes to replace the last sentence by the following paragraph:

"These measures should include intensified movement control and surveillance and may include but are not limited to the following:

animal identification and traceability,

vaccination of all or at risk susceptible animals,

testing and/or vaccination of animals moved,

specific procedures for sample handling, sending and testing

enhanced cleansing – disinfection procedures for transport means, and possible compulsory routes,

specific surveillance of susceptible wildlife species,

awareness campaigns to the public or targeted at breeders, traders, hunters, veterinarians,

The application of these measures can be in the entire free zone or in a defined area within and/or outside the free zone .

23. In the event of limited outbreak s in a country or zone previously free of a disease , a containment zone may be established for the purposes of trade. Establishment of a containment zone should be based on a rapid response including:

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  • a. 
    appropriate standstill of movement of animals and commodities upon notification of suspicion of the specified disease and the demonstration that the outbreak s are contained within this zone through epidemiological investigation (trace-back, trace-forward) after confirmation of infection . The primary outbreak and likely source of the outbreak should be identified and all cases shown to be epidemiologically linked.
  • b. 
    A stamping-out policy or another effective control strategy aimed at eradicating the disease should be applied and the susceptible animal population within the containment zones should be clearly identifiable as belonging to the containment zone . Increased passive and targeted surveillance in accordance with Chapter 1.4. in the rest of the country or zone should be carried out and has not detected any evidence of infection .
  • c. 
    Measures consistent with the disease specific chapter should be in place to prevent spread of the infection from the containment zone to the rest of the country or zone , including ongoing surveillance in the containment zone .
  • d. 
    For the effective establishment of a containment zone , it is necessary to demonstrate that there have been no new cases in the containment zone within a minimum of two incubation periods from the last detected case .
  • e. 
    The free status of the areas outside the containment zone would be suspended pending the establishment of the containment zone . The free status of these areas could be reinstated, once the containment zone is clearly established, irrespective of the provisions of the disease specific chapter.
  • f. 
    The containment zone should be managed in such a way that it can be demonstrated that commodities for international trade can be shown to have originated outside the containment zone .
  • g. 
    The recovery of the free status of the containment zone should follow the provisions of the disease specific chapter.

34. The factors defining a compartment should be established by the V eterinary A uthority on the basis of relevant criteria such as management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity, and made public through official channels.

45. A nimals and herds belonging to such subpopulations need to be recognisable as such through a clear epidemiological separation from other animals and all things presenting a disease risk . For a zone or compartment , the V eterinary A uthority should document in detail the measures taken to ensure the identification of the subpopulation and the establishment and maintenance of its health status through a biosecurity plan . The measures used to establish and maintain the distinct animal health status of a zone or compartment should be appropriate to the particular circumstances, and will depend on the epidemiology of the disease , environmental factors, the health status of animals in adjacent areas, applicable biosecurity measures (including movement controls, use of natural and artificial boundaries, the spatial separation of animals , and commercial management and husbandry practices), and surveilla nce .

56. Relevant animals within the zone or compartment should be identified in such a way that their history can be audited. Depending on the system of production, identification may be done at the herd , flock lot or individual animal level. Relevant animal movements into and out of the zone or compartment should be well documented, controlled and supervised. The existence of a valid animal identification system is a prerequisite to assess the integrity of the zone or compartment .

67. For a compartment , the biosecurity plan should describe the partnership between the relevant industry and the V eterinary A uthority , and their respective responsibilities. It should also describe the routine operating procedures to provide clear evidence that the surveillance conducted, the live a nimal identifica tion and traceability system, and the management practices are adequate to meet the definition of the compartment . In addition to information on animal movement controls, the plan should include herd or flock production records, feed sources, surveillance results, birth and death records, visitor logbook, morbidity and mortality history, medications, vaccinations, documentation of training of relevant personnel and any other criteria necessary for evaluation of risk mitigation. The information required may vary according to the species and disease(s)

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under consideration. The biosecurity plan should also describe how the measures will be audited to ensure that the risk s are regularly re-assessed and the measures adjusted accordingly.

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Annex X (contd)

CH AP TE R 4.4. APPLICATION OF COMPARTMENTALISATION

EU Comments

The EU can support the proposed change, and is ready to participate in any discussion in relation with the agenda on future work on compartmentalisation, and notably the prioritisation of disease for which it should be implemented and the sharing of experience of Members in this regard.

Article 4.4.1.

Introduction and objectives

The recommendations in this Chapter provide a structured framework for the application and recognition of compartments within countries or zones , based on the provisions of Chapter 4.3. with the objective to facilitate trade in animals and products of animal origin and as a tool for disease management.

Establishing and maintaining a disease free-status throughout the country should be the final goal for OIE Members. However, establishing and maintaining a disease -free status for an entire country may be difficult, especially in the case of diseases that can easily cross international boundaries. For many diseases , OIE Members have traditionally applied the concept of zoning to establish and maintain an animal subpopulation with a different animal health status within national boundaries.

The essential difference between zoning and compartmentalisation is that the recognition of zones is based on geographical boundaries whereas the recognition of compartments is based of management practices and biosecurity. However, spatial considerations and good management practices play a role in the application of both concepts.

Compartmentalisation is not a new concept for V eterinary Services ; in fact, it has been applied for a long time in many disease control programmes that are based on the concept of disease -free herds /flock s .

The fundamental requirement for compartmentalisation is the implementation and documentation of management and biosecurity measures to create a functional separation of subpopulations .

For example, an animal production operation in an infected country or zone might have biosecurity measures and management practices that result in negligible risk from diseases or agents. The concept of a compartment extends the application of a ‘risk boundary’ beyond that of a geographical interface and considers all epidemiological factors that can help to create an effective disease -specific separation between subpopulations .

In disease -free countries or zones , compartments preferably should be defined prior to the occurrence of a disease outbreak . In the event of an outbreak or in infected countries or zones , compartmentalisation may be used to facilitate trade.

For the purpose of international trade , compartments must be under the responsibility of the V eterinary A uthority in the country. For the purposes of this Chapter, compliance by the Members with Chapters 1.1. and 3.1. is an essential prerequisite.

Article 4.4.2.

Principles for defining a compartment

A compartment may be established with respect of a specific disease or diseases . A compartment must be clearly defined, indicating the location of all its components including establishments , as well as related functional units (such as

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feed mills, slaughterhouses , rendering plants, etc.), their interrelationships and their contribution to an epidemiological separation between the animals in a compartment and subpopulations with a different health status. The definition of compartment may revolve around disease specific epidemiological factors, animal production systems, biosecurity practices infrastructural factors and surveilla nce .

Article 4.4.3.

Separation of a compartment from potential sources of infection

The management of a compartment must provide to the V eterinary A uthority documented evidence on the following:

  • 1. 
    Physical or spatial factors that affect the status of biosecurity in a compartment

While a compartment is primarily based on management and biosecurity measures, a review of geographical factors is needed to ensure that the functional boundary provides adequate separation of a compartment from adjacent animal populations with a different health status. The following factors should be taken into consideration in conjunction with biosecurity measures and, in some instances, may alter the degree of confidence achieved by general biosecurity and surveillance measures:

  • a. 
    disease status in adjacent areas and in areas epidemiologically linked to the compartment ;
  • b. 
    location, disease status and biosecurity of the nearest epidemiological units or other epidemiologically relevant premises. Consideration should be given to the distance and physical separation from:
  • i. 
    flock s or herds with a different health status in close proximity to the compartment , including wildlife and their migratory routes;
  • ii. 
    slaughterhouses , rendering plants or feed mills;
  • iii. 
    mark ets , fairs, agricultural shows, sporting events, zoos, circuses and other points of animal concentration.
  • 2. 
    Infrastructural factors

Structural aspects of the establishments within a compartment contribute to the effectiveness of its biosecurity. Consideration should be given to:

  • a. 
    fencing or other effective means of physical separation;
  • b. 
    facilities for people entry including access control, changing area and showers;

c.     vehicle access including washing and disinfection procedures;

d.    unloading and loading facilities;

  • e. 
    isolation facilities for introduced animals ;
  • f. 
    facilities for the introduction of material and equipment;
  • g. 
    infrastructure to store feed and veterinary products; h.   disposal of carcasses, manure and waste;
  • i. 
    water supply;

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  • j. 
    measures to prevent exposure to living mechanical or biological vectors such as insects, rodents and wild birds;
  • k. 
    air supply;
  • l. 
    feed supply/source.

More detailed recommendations for certain establishments can be found in Sections 4 and 6 of the Terrestrial Code .

  • 3. 
    Biosecurity plan

The integrity of the compartment relies on effective biosecurity. The management of the compartment should develop, implement and monitor a comprehensive biosecurity plan .

The biosecurity plan should describe in detail:

  • a. 
    potential pathways for introduction and spread into the compartment of the agents for which the compartment was defined, including animal movements, rodents, fauna, aerosols, arthropods, vehicles , people, biological products, equipment, fomites, feed, waterways, drainage or other means. Consideration should also be given to the survivability of the agent in the environment;
  • b. 
    the critical control points for each pathway;
  • c. 
    measures to mitigate exposure for each critical control point;
  • d. 
    standard operating procedures including:
  • i. 
    implementation, maintenance, monitoring of the measures, ii. application of corrective actions, iii. verification of the process, iv. record keeping;
  • e. 
    contingency plan in the event of a change in the level of exposure;
  • f. 
    reporting procedures to the V eterinary A uthority ;
  • g. 
    the programme for educating and training workers to ensure that all persons involved are knowledgeable and informed on biosecurity principles and practices;
  • h. 
    the surveillance programme in place.

In any case, sufficient evidence should be submitted to assess the efficacy of the biosecurity plan in accordance with the level of risk for each identified pathway. This evidence should be structured in line with the principles of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP). The biosecurity risk of all operations of the compartment should be regularly re-assessed and documented at least on a yearly basis. Based on the outcome of the assessment, concrete and documented mitigation steps should be taken to reduce the likelihood of introduction of the disease agent into the compartment .

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Annex X (contd)

  • 4. 
    Traceability system

A prerequisite for assessing the integrity of a compartment is the existence of a valid traceability system. All animals within a compartment should be individually identified and registered in such a way that their history and movements can be documented and audited. In cases where individual identification may not be feasible, such as broilers and day-old chicks, the V eterinary A uthority should provide sufficient assurance of traceability .

All animal movements into and out of the compartment should be recorded at the compartment level, and when needed, based on a risk assessment , certified by the V eterinary A uthority . Movements within the compartment need not be certified but should be recorded at the compartment level.

Article 4.4.4.

Documentation

Documentation must provide clear evidence that the biosecurity, surveillance , tra ceability and management practices defined for a compartment are effectively and consistently applied. In addition to animal movement information, the necessary documentation should include herd or flock production records, feed sources, laboratory tests, birth and death records, the visitor logbook, morbidity history, medication and vaccination records, biosecurity plans , training documentation and any other criteria necessary for the evaluation of disease exclusion.

The historical status of a compartment for the disease(s) for which it was defined should be documented and demonstrate compliance with the requirements for freedom in the relevant Terrestrial Code Chapter.

In addition, a compartment seeking recognition should submit to the V eterinary A uthority a baseline animal health report indicating the presence or absence of OIE listed diseases . This report should be regularly updated to reflect the current animal health situation of the compartment .

Vaccination records including the type of vaccine and frequency of administration must be available to enable interpretation of surveillance data.

The time period for which all records should be kept may vary according to the species and disease(s) for which the compa rtment was defined.

All relevant information must be recorded in a transparent manner and be easily accessible so as to be auditable by the V eterinary A uthority .

Article 4.4.5.

Surveillance for the agent or disease

The surveillance system should comply with Chapter 1.4. on Surveillance and the specific recommendations for surveillance for the disease(s) for which the compartment was defined, if available.

If there is an increased risk of exposure to the agent for which the compartment has been defined, the detection level of the internal and external surveillance should be reviewed and, where necessary, raised. At the same time, biosecurity measures in place should be reassessed and increased if necessary.

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Annex X (contd)

  • 1. 
    Internal surveillance

Surveillance should involve the collection and analysis of disease /infection data so that the V eterina ry A uthority can certify that the animal subpopulation contained in all the establishments comply with the defined status of that compartment . A surveillance system that is able to ensure early detection in the event that the agent enters a subpopulation is essential. Depending on the disease(s) for which the compartment was defined, different surveillance strategies may be applied to achieve the desired confidence in disease freedom.

  • 2. 
    External surveillance

The biosecurity measures applied in a compartment must be appropriate to the level of exposure of the compartment . External surveillance will help identify a significant change in the level of exposure for the identified pathways for disease introduction into the compartment .

An appropriate combination of active and passive surveillance is necessary to achieve the goals described above. Based on the recommendations of Chapter 1.4., targeted surveillance based on an assessment of risk factors may be the most efficient surveillance approach. Targeted surveillance should in particular include epidemiological units in close proximity to the compartment or those that have a potential epidemiological link with it.

Article 4.4.6.

Diagnostic capabilities and procedures

Officially-designated laboratory facilities complying with the OIE standards for quality assurance, as defined in Chapter 1.1.3. of the Terrestrial Manual , should be available for sample testing. All laboratory tests and procedures should comply with the recommendations of the laboratory for the specific disease . Each laboratory that conducts testing should have systematic procedures in place for rapid reporting of disease results to the V eterinary A uthority . Where appropriate, results should be confirmed by an OIE Reference Laboratory.

Article 4.4.7. Emergency response and notification

Early detection, diagnosis and notification of disease are critical to minimize the consequences of outbreak s .

In the event of suspicion of occurrence of the disease for which the compartment was defined, export certification the free status of the compartment should be immediately suspended. If confirmed, the status of the compartment should be immediately revoked and importing countries should be notified following the provisions of Chapter 1.1.

In case of an occurrence of any infectious disease not present according to the baseline animal health report of the compartment referred to in Article 4.4.4., the management of the compartment should notify the V eterinary A uthority , and initiate a review to determine whether there has been a breach in the biosecurity measures. If a significant breach in biosecurity, even in the absence of outbreak , is detected, export certification as a free compartment should be suspended. Disease free status of the compartment may only be reinstated after the compartment has adopted the necessary measures to re-establish the original biosecurity level and the V eterinary A uthority re-approves the status of the compartment .

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Annex X (contd)

In the event of a compartment being at risk from a change, in the surrounding area, in the disease situation for which the compartment was defined, the V eterinary A uthority should re-evaluate without delay the status of the compartment and consider any additional biosecurity measures needed to ensure that the integrity of the compartment is maintained.

Article 4.4.8.

Supervision and control of a compartment

The authority, organisation, and infrastructure of the V eterinary Services , including laboratories , must be clearly documented in accordance with the Chapter on the Evaluation of V eterinary Services of the Terrestrial Code , to provide confidence in the integrity of the compartment .

The V eterinary A uthority has the final authority in granting, suspending and revoking the status of a compartment . The V eterinary A uthority should continuously supervise compliance with all the requirements critical to the maintenance of the compartment status described in this Chapter and ensure that all the information is readily accessible to the importing countries . Any significant change should be notified to the importing country .

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Annex XI

CH AP TE R 4.5 6.

COLLECTION AND PROCESSING OF BOVINE, SMALL RUMINANT AND PORCINE SEMEN

EU comments

The EU thanks the TAHSC for this clarification and simplification work. However, it would be appreciated that comments inserted below are taken into account, especially that on Border disease testing in article 4.5.3.

Article 4.56.1. General considerations

The purposes of official sanitary control of semen production are to:

  • 1. 
    maintain the health of animals on an artificial insemination centre at a level which permits the international distribution of semen with a negligible risk of infecting other animals or humans with pathogens transmissible by semen;
  • 2. 
    ensure that semen is hygienically collected, processed and stored.

A rtificial insemination centres should comply with recommendations in Chapter 4.65. Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 4.56.2. Conditions applicable to testing of bulls and teaser animals

Bulls and teaser animals should enter an artificial insemination centre only if they fulfil the following requirements.

  • 1. 
    Pre-quarantine Prior to entering pre-entry isolation facility

The animals should comply with the following requirements prior to entry into isolation at the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility where the country of origin is not free.

  • a. 
    Bovine brucellosis The animals should comply with point 3 or 4 of Article 11.3.5.
  • b. 
    Bovine tuberculosis The animals should comply with point 3 or 4 of Article 11.7.5.
  • c. 
    Bovine viral diarrhoea-mucosal disease (BVD-MD) The animals should be subjected to the following tests:
  • i. 
    a virus isolation test or a test for virus antigen, with negative results; and ii. a serological test to determine the serological status of every animal .
  • d. 
    Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis-infectious pustular vulvovaginitis

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If the artificial insemination centre is to be considered as infectious bovine rhinotracheitis-infectious pustular vulvovaginitis free (IBR/IPV), the animals should either:

  • i. 
    come from an IBR/IPV free herd as defined in Article 11.13.3.; or
  • ii. 
    be subjected, with negative results, to a serological test for IBR/IPV on a blood sample.
  • e. 
    Bluetongue

The animals should comply with Articles 8.3.6., 8.3.7. or 8.3.8., depending on the bluetongue status of the country of origin of the animals .

  • 2. 
    Testing in the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility prior to entering the semen collection facilities

Prior to entering the semen collection facilities of the artificial insemination centre , bulls and teaser animals should be kept in a quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility for at least 28 days. The animals should be subjected to diagnostic tests tested as described below a minimum of 21 days after entering the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility, except for Campyloba cter fetus subsp. venerealis and T ritrichomonas foetus , for which testing may commence after 7 days in quarantine pre-entry isolation. All the results should be negative except in the case of BVD-MD antibody serological testing (see point 2b)i) below).

  • a. 
    Bovine brucellosis The animals should be subjected to a serological test with negative results.
  • b. 
    BVD-MD
  • i. 
    All animals should be tested for viraemia as described in point 1c) above.

Only when all the animals in quarantine pre-entry isolation test negative for viraemia, may the animals enter the semen collection facilities upon completion of the 28-day quarantine pre-entry isolation period.

  • ii. 
    After 21 days in quarantine pre-entry isolation, all animals should be subjected to a serological test to determine the presence or absence of BVD-MD antibodies.
  • iii. 
    Only if no sero-conversion occurs in the animals which tested seronegative before entry into the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility, may any animal (seronegative or seropositive) be allowed entry into the semen collection facilities.
  • iv. 
    If sero-conversion occurs, all the animals that remain seronegative should be kept in quarantine pre-entry isolation over a prolonged time until there is no more seroconversion in the group for a period of 3 weeks. Serologically positive animals may be allowed entry into the semen collection facilities.
  • c. 
    Campylobacter fetus subsp. venerealis

i. A nimals less than 6 months old or kept since that age only in a single sex group prior to quarantine pre-entry isolation should be tested once on a preputial specimen, with a negative result.

ii. A nimals aged 6 months or older that could have had contact with females prior to quarantine pre-entry isolation should be tested three times at weekly intervals on a preputial specimen, with a negative result in each case.

  • d. 
    Tritrichomonas foetus

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i. A nimals less than 6 months old or kept since that age only in a single sex group prior to quarantine pre-entry isolation, should be tested once on a preputial specimen, with a negative result.

ii. A nimals aged 6 months or older that could have had contact with females prior to quarantine pre-entry isolation should be tested three times at weekly intervals on a preputial specimen, with a negative result in each case.

  • e. 
    IBR-IPV

If the artificial insemination centre is to be considered as IBR/IPV free, the animals should be subjected, with negative results, to a diagnostic test for IBR/IPV on a blood sample. If any animal tests positive, the animal should be removed immediately from the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility and the other animals of the same group should remain in quarantine pre-entry isolation and be retested, with negative results, not less than 21 days after removal of the positive animal .

  • f. 
    Bluetongue

The animals should comply with the provisions referred to in Articles 8.3.69., 8.3.710. or 8.3. 811., depending on the bluetongue status of the country or zone where the semen collection centre is located of origin of the animals .

3. Testing for BVD-MD

to the

semen from each serologically positive bull

to the

each animal should be subjected to

dispatch of semen from BVD-MD serologically positive

or

sitive result, the bull should be removed from the centre and all of

test for

a semen sample from In the event of a

destroyed.

4

frozen semen for IBR/IPV i

not

IBR/IPV free

Each aliquot of frozen semen should be tested as per Article 11.13.7.

53. Testing programme for bulls and teasers resident in the semen collection facilities

All bulls and teasers resident in the semen collection facilities should be tested at least annually for the following diseases , with negative results, where the country or zone where the semen collection centre is located of origin is not free:

EU comment

Not only the location of the centre is important, but also and even more for some diseases like tuberculosis and brucellosis, that of the herd of origin of the animals. Moreover, consistency imposes the use of the word "facilities" instead of "centre".

Thus the following wording should be used "where the country or zone where the semen collection facilities or herds of origin of the animals are located are not free".

  • a. 
    Bovine brucellosis
  • b. 
    Bovine tuberculosis
  • c. 
    BVD-MD

A nimals negative to previous serological tests should be retested to confirm absence of antibodies.

Should an animal become serologically positive, every ejaculate of that animal collected since the last negative test should be either discarded or tested for virus with negative results.

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  • d. 
    Campylobacter fetus subsp. venerealis
  • i. 
    A preputial specimen should be cultured.
  • ii. 
    Only bulls on semen production or having contact with bulls on semen production need to be tested. Bulls returning to collection after a lay off of more than 6 months should be tested not more than 30 days prior to resuming production.

EU comment

The Manual accepts the culture and the IF, so the word "cultured" should be replaced by "tested".

  • e. 
    Bluetongue

The animals should comply with the provisions referred to in Articles 8.3.6., 8.3.7. or 8.3.811., depending on the bluetongue status of the country of origin of the animals .

  • f. 
    Tritrichomonas foetus
  • i. 
    A preputial specimen should be cultured.
  • ii. 
    Only bulls on semen production or having contact with bulls on semen production need to be tested. Bulls returning to collection after a lay off of more than 6 months should be tested not more than 30 days prior to resuming production.
  • g. 
    IBR-IPV

If the artificial insemination centre is to be considered as IBR/IPV free, the animals should comply with the provisions in point 2)c) of Article 11.13.3.

4.    Testing for BVD-MD prior to the initial dispatch of semen from each serologically positive bull

Prior to the initial dispatch of semen from BVD-MD serologically positive bulls, a semen sample from each animal should be subjected to a virus isolation or virus antigen test for BVD-MD. In the event of a positive result, the bull should be removed from the centre and all of its semen destroyed.

5.    Testing of frozen semen for IBR/IPV in artificial insemination centres not considered as IBR/IPV free Each aliquot of frozen semen should be tested as per Article 11.13.7.

Article 4.56.3.

Conditions applicable to testing of rams/ bucks and teaser animals

Rams/bucks and teaser animals should only enter an artificial insemination centre if they fulfil the following requirements.

  • 1. 
    Pre-quarantine Prior to entering pre-entry isolation facility

The animals should comply with the following requirements prior to entry into isolation at the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility.

  • a. 
    Caprine and ovine brucellosis The animals should comply with Article 14.1.6.
  • b. 
    Ovine epididymitis The animals should comply with Article 14.7.3.

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  • c. 
    Contagious agalactia The animals should comply with points 1 and 2 of Article 14.3.1.
  • d. 
    Peste des petits ruminants The animals should comply with points 1, 2, and 4 or 5 of Article 14.8.7.
  • e. 
    Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia The animals should comply with Article 14.4.5. or Article 14.4.7., depending on the CCPP status of the country of origin of the animals .
  • f. 
    Paratuberculosis The animals should be free from clinical signs for the past 2 years.

g.    Scrapie

If the animal s do not originate from a scrapie free country or zone as defined in Article 14.9.3., the animals should comply with Article

hg. Maedi-visna The animals should comply with Article 14.6.2.

ih. Caprine arthritis/encephalitis In the case of goats, the animals should comply with Article 14.2.2.

ji. Bluetongue

The animals should comply with Articles 8.3.6., 8.3.7. or 8.3.8., depending on the bluetongue status of the country of origin of the animals .

kj. Tuberculosis In the case of goats, the animals should be subject to a single or comparative tuberculin test, with negative results.

l. Border disease

The animal s should be subject to a viral agent isolation test with negative results.

EU comment

The EU sees no justification in the deletion of this point l. It is of paramount importance to know if the animal is a potential Border disease carrier prior to entering the collection centre. This point l should not be deleted.

  • 2. 
    Testing in the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility station prior to entering the semen collection facilities

Prior to entering the semen collection facilities of the artificial insemination centre , rams/bucks and teasers should be kept in a quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility for at least 28 days. The animals should be subjected to diagnostic tests tested as described below a minimum of 21 days after entering the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility, with negative results.

  • a. 
    Caprine and ovine brucellosis The animals should be subject to testing as described in point 1c) of Article 14.1.8.
  • b. 
    Ovine epididymitis The animals and semen should be subject to testing as described in points 1d) and 2 of Article 14.7.4.
  • c. 
    Maedi-visna and caprine arthritis/encephalitis The animals and semen should be subjected to a serological test for antibodies on animals and semen.

EU comment

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The EU proposes to change the wording above to read " diagnostic test on animals and semen" because it is impossible to test antibodies in the semen; however the EU queries the need for testing semen.

  • d. 
    Bluetongue

The animals should comply with the provisions referred to in Articles 8.3.69., 8.3.710. or 8.3.811., depending on the bluetongue status of the country or zone where the semen collection centre is located of origin of the animals .

  • 3. 
    Testing programme for rams/bucks and teasers resident in the semen collection facilities

All rams/bucks and teasers resident in the semen collection facilities should be tested at least annually for the following diseases , with negative results, where the country or zone where the semen collection centre is located of origin is not free:

EU comment

Not only the location of the centre is important, but also and even more for some diseases like tuberculosis and brucellosis, that of the herd of origin of the animals. Moreover, consistency imposes the use of the word "facilities" instead of "centre".

Thus the following wording should be used "where the country or zone where the semen collection facilities or herds of origin of the animals are located are not free".

  • a. 
    caprine and ovine brucellosis;
  • b. 
    ovine epididymitis;
  • c. 
    Maedi-visna and caprine arthritis/encephalitis;
  • d. 
    tuberculosis (for goats only);
  • e. 
    bluetongue

The animals should comply with the provisions referred to in Article 8.3.11.

Article 4.56.4. Conditions applicable to testing of boars

Boars should only enter an artificial insemination centre if they fulfil the following requirements.

  • 1. 
    Pre-quarantine Prior to entering pre-entry isolation facility

The animals should be clinically healthy, physiologically normal and comply with the following requirements within 30 days prior to entry into isolation at the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility.

  • a. 
    Porcine brucellosis The animals should comply with Article 15.4.3.
  • b. 
    Foot and mouth disease The animals should comply with Articles 8.5.10., 8.5.11. or 8.5.12.
  • c. 
    Aujeszky’s disease The animals should comply with Article 8.2.8. or Article 8.2.9.

d.    Teschovirus encephalomyelitis

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The animals should comply with Article 15.6.4. or Artic

ed. Transmissible gastroenteritis The animals should comply with Article 15.7.2.

fe. Swine vesicular disease The animals should comply with Article 15.5.5. or Article 15.5.7.

gf. African swine fever The animals should comply with Article 15.1.5. or Article 15.1.6.

hg. Classical swine fever The animals should comply with Articles 15.3.5. or 15.3.6.

ih. Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome The animals should be subject to the test complying with the standards in the Terrestrial Manual .

  • 2. 
    Testing in the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility prior to entering the semen collection facilities

Prior to entering the semen collection facilities of the artificial insemination centre , boars should be kept in a quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility for at least 28 days. The animals should be subjected to diagnostic tests as described below a minimum of 21 days after entering the quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility, with negative results.

  • a. 
    Porcine brucellosis The animals should comply with Article 15.4.5.
  • b. 
    Foot and mouth disease The animals should comply with Articles 8.5.13., 8.5.14., 8.5.15. or 8.5.16.
  • c. 
    Aujeszky’s disease The animals should comply with Articles 8.2.12., 8.2.13. or 8.2.14.

d.    Teschovirus encephalomyelitis The animals should comply with Article 15.6.8. or Article 15.6.9.

ed. Transmissible gastroenteritis The animals should comply with Article 15.7.4.

fe. Swine vesicular disease The animals should comply with Article 15.5.9. or Article 15.5.10.

gf. African swine fever The animals should comply with Article 15.1.8. or Article 15.1.9.

hg. Classical swine fever The animals should comply with Articles 15.3.8. or 15.3.9.

ih. Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome The animals should be subject to the test complying with the standards in the Terrestrial Manual .

  • 3. 
    Testing programme for boars resident in the semen collection facilities

All boars resident in the semen collection facilities should be tested at least annually for the following diseases , with negative results, where the compartment /zone or country is not free:

EU comment

The use in this point of the notion of compartment is confusing, as it is not the case in the previous points for bulls and rams/bucks. Until discussions have taken place on whether a semen collection centre might be considered as a compartment and the consequences in terms of routine testing, this word should be deleted.

Moreover, the last part of the sentence above should be consistent with points 1 and 2, and thus should read:

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"where the country or zone where the semen collection facilities or herds of origin of the animals are located are not free".

  • a. 
    Porcine brucellosis The animals should comply with Article 15.4.5.
  • b. 
    Foot and mouth disease The animals should comply with Articles 8.5.13., 8.5.14., 8.5.15. or 8.5.16.
  • c. 
    Aujeszky’s disease The animals should comply with Articles 8.2.12., 8.2.13. or 8.2.14. regarding testing every four months.

d.    Teschovirus encephalomyelitis

The animal s should comply with Article 15.6.8. or Article 15.6.9.

ed. Transmissible gastroenteritis The animals should comply with Article 15.7.4.

fe. Swine vesicular disease The animals should comply with Article 15.5.9. or Article 15.5.10.

gf. African swine fever The animals should comply with Article 15.1.8. or Article 15.1.9. Routine test to be applied at least every six months.

hg. Classical swine fever The animals should comply with Articles 15.3.8. or 15.3.9.

ih. Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome The animals should be subject to the test complying with the standards in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 4.56.5.

General considerations for hygienic collection and handling of semen

Observation of the recommendations described in the Articles below will very significantly reduce the likelihood of the semen being contaminated with common bacteria which are potentially pathogenic.

Article 4.56.6. Conditions applicable to the collection of semen

  • 1. 
    The floor of the mounting area should be easy to clean and to disinfect. A dusty floor should be avoided.
  • 2. 
    The hindquarters of the teaser, whether a dummy or a live teaser animal, should be kept clean. A dummy should be cleaned completely after each period of collection. A teaser animal should have its hindquarters cleaned carefully before each collecting session. The dummy or hindquarters of the teaser animal should be sanitized after the collection of each ejaculate. Disposable plastic covers may be used.
  • 3. 
    The hand of the person collecting the semen should not come into contact with the animal ’s penis. Disposable gloves should be worn by the collector and changed for each collection.
  • 4. 
    The artificial vagina should be cleaned completely after each collection where relevant. It should be dismantled, its various parts washed, rinsed and dried, and kept protected from dust. The inside of the body of the device and the cone should be disinfected before re-assembly using approved disinfection techniques such as those involving the use of alcohol, ethylene oxide or steam. Once re-assembled, it should be kept in a cupboard which is regularly cleaned and disinfected.
  • 5. 
    The lubricant used should be clean. The rod used to spread the lubricant should be clean and should not be exposed to dust between successive collections.

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  • 6. 
    The artificial vagina should not be shaken after ejaculation, otherwise lubricant and debris may pass down the cone to join the contents of the collecting tube.
  • 7. 
    When successive ejaculates are being collected, a new artificial vagina should be used for each mounting. The vagina should also be changed when the animal has inserted its penis without ejaculating.
  • 8. 
    The collecting tubes should be sterile, and either disposable or sterilised by autoclaving or heating in an oven at 180°C for at least 30 minutes. They should be kept sealed to prevent exposure to the environment while awaiting use.
  • 9. 
    After semen collection, the tube should be left attached to the cone and within its sleeve until it has been removed from the collection room for transfer to the laboratory.

Article 4.56.7.

Conditions applicable to the handling of semen and preparation of semen samples in the laboratory

  • 1. 
    Diluents
  • a. 
    All receptacles used should have been sterilised.
  • b. 
    Buffer solutions employed in diluents prepared on the premises should be sterilized by filtration (0.22 µm) or by autoclaving (121°C for 30 minutes) or be prepared using sterile water before adding egg yolk (if applicable) or equivalent additive and antibiotics.
  • c. 
    If the constituents of a diluent are supplied in commercially available powder form, the water used must have been distilled or demineralised, sterilized (121°C for 30 minutes or equivalent), stored correctly and allowed to cool before use.
  • d. 
    Whenever milk, egg yolk or any other animal protein is used in preparing the semen diluent, the product must be free of pathogens or sterilised; milk heat-treated at 92°C for 3-5 minutes, eggs from SPF flocks when available. When egg yolk is used, it should be separated from eggs using aseptic techniques. Alternatively, commercial egg yolk prepared for human consumption or egg yolk treated by, for example, pasteurisation or irradiation to reduce bacterial contamination, may be used. Other additives must also be sterilized before use.
  • e. 
    Diluent should not be stored for more than 72 hours at +5°C before use. A longer storage period is permissible for storage at -20°C. Storage vessels should be stoppered.
  • f. 
    A mixture of antibiotics should be included with a bactericidal activity at least equivalent to that of the following mixtures in each ml of frozen semen: gentamicin (250 µg), tylosin (50 µg), lincomycin-spectinomycin (150/300 µg); penicillin (500 IU), streptomycin (500 µg), lincomycin-spectinomycin (150/300 µg); or amikacin (75µg), divekacin (25µg).

The names of the antibiotics added and their concentration should be stated in the international veterinary certificate .

  • 2. 
    Procedure for dilution and packing
  • a. 
    The tube containing freshly collected semen should be sealed as soon as possible after collection, and kept sealed until processed.
  • b. 
    After dilution and during refrigeration, the semen should also be kept in a stoppered container.
  • c. 
    During the course of filling receptacles for dispatch (such as insemination straws), the receptacles and other disposable items should be used immediately after being unpacked. Materials for repeated use should be disinfected with alcohol, ethylene oxide, steam or other approved disinfection techniques.
  • d. 
    If sealing powder is used, care should be taken to avoid its being contaminated.

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  • 3. 
    Conditions applicable to the storage of semen

Semen for export should be stored separately from other genetic material not meeting these recommendations requirements of this chapter in with fresh liquid nitrogen in sterilised/sanitised flasks before being exported.

Semen straws should be sealed and code marked in line with the international standards of the International Committee for Animal Recording (ICAR)1.

Prior to export, semen straws or pellets should clearly and permanently be identified and placed into new liquid nitrogen in a new or sterilised flask or container under the supervision of an Official V eterinarian . The contents of the container or flask should be verified by the Official V eterinarian prior to sealing with an official numbered seal before export and accompanied by an international veterinary certificate listing the contents and the number of the official seal.

  • 4. 
    Sperm sorting

Equipment used for sex-sorting sperm should be clean and disinfected between animals according to the manufacturer’s recommendations of the licenser of the system.

Where seminal plasma, or components thereof, is added to sorted semen prior to cryopreservation and storage, it should be derived from animals of same or better health status.

  • 1. 
    The ICAR international standards on straws are contained in Recording Guidelines - Appendices to the international agreement of recording practices.

The text of this document is available at the following web site: www.icar.org

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Annex XI (contd)

CH AP TE R 4.6 5.

GENERAL HYGIENE IN SEMEN COLLECTION AND PROCESSING CENTRES

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes but has a comment.

Article 4.65.1.

General considerations

Observation of the recommendations described in the articles below will very significantly reduce the likelihood of the semen being contaminated with common micro-organisms some of bacteria which are potentially pathogenic.

Article 4.65.2.

Conditions applicable to artificial insemination centres

  • 1. 
    The artificial insemination centre is comprised of:
  • a. 
    animal accommodation areas (including one isolation facility for sick animals ) and a semen collection room, these two premises hereon designated as semen collection facilities; accommodation areas should be species specific where relevant;
  • b. 
    a semen laboratory and semen storage areas;
  • c. 
    administration offices.

d.     A quarantine station pre-entry isolation facility which may also be attached to either situated on the same premises as a), b) and c) above but isolated from the aforementioned, or be established at a different site to the centre, provided that it is on a different location from that of those two first parts.

EU comments

The EU proposes to delete the word "which" to ensure that it is not compulsory because it is not used for horses.

  • 2. 
    The centre should be officially approved by the V eterinary A uthority .
  • 3. 
    The centre should be under the supervision and control of the V eterinary Services which will be responsible for regular audits, at an interval of no more than 6 months, of protocols, procedures and prescribed records on the health and welfare of the animals in the centre and on the hygienic production, storage and dispatch of semen.
  • 4. 
    The centre should be under the direct supervision and control of an Official V eterinarian .

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  • 5. 
    Only swine animals associated with semen production should be permitted to enter the centre. Other species of livestock may exceptionally be resident on the centre, provided that they are kept physically apart from the swine these animal s .
  • 6. 
    Swine Donors and teasers on the centre should be adequately isolated from farm livestock on adjacent land or buildings for instance by natural or artificial means.
  • 7. 
    The entry of visitors should be strictly controlled. Personnel at a centre should be technically competent and observe high standards of personal hygiene to preclude the introduction of pathogenic organisms. Protective clothing and footwear for use only on the centre should be provided.
  • 8. 
    Individual semen containers and storage rooms should be capable of being disinfected.

Article 4.65.3.

Conditions applicable to semen collection facilities

  • 1. 
    The semen collection facilities should include separate and distinct areas for accommodating resident animals , for semen collection, for feed storage, for manure storage, and for the isolation of animals suspected of being infected.
  • 2. 
    Only animals associated with semen production should be permitted to enter the semen collection facilities. Other species of animals may be resident at the centre, if necessary for the movement or handling of the donors and teasers or for security, but contact with the donors and teasers should be minimised. All animals resident at the semen collection facilities must meet the minimum health requirements for donors.
  • 3. 
    The donors and teasers should be adequately isolated to prevent the transmission of diseases from farm livestock and other animals . Measures should be in place to prevent the entry of wild animals susceptible to ruminant and swine diseases transmissible via semen.
  • 4. 
    Personnel at the centre should be technically competent and observe high standards of personal hygiene to preclude the introduction of pathogenic organisms. Special protective clothing and footwear for use only at the semen collection facilities should be provided and worn at all times inside.
  • 5. 
    Visitors to the semen collection facilities should be kept to a minimum, and visits should be subject to formal authorisation and control. Equipment for use with the livestock should be dedicated to the semen collection facilities or disinfected prior to entry. All equipment and tools brought on to the premises must be examined and treated if necessary to ensure that they cannot introduce disease .
  • 6. 
    V ehicles used for transport of animals to and from the semen collection facilities should not be allowed to enter the facilities.
  • 7. 
    The semen collection area should be cleaned daily after collection. The animals ’ accommodation and semen collection areas should be cleaned and disinfected at least once a year.
  • 8. 
    Fodder introduction and manure removal should be done in a manner which poses no significant animal health risk.

Article 4.65.4. Conditions applicable to semen laboratories

  • 1. 
    The semen laboratory should be physically separated from the semen collection facilities, and include separate areas for artificial vagina cleaning and preparation, semen evaluation and processing, semen prestorage and storage. Entry to the laboratory should be prohibited to unauthorised personnel.
  • 2. 
    The laboratory personnel should be technically competent and observe high standards of personal hygiene to preclude the introduction of pathogenic organisms during semen evaluation, processing and storage.

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  • 3. 
    Visitors to the laboratory should be kept to a minimum, and visits should be subject to formal authorisation and control.
  • 4. 
    The laboratory should be constructed with materials that permit effective cleaning and disinfection .
  • 5. 
    The laboratory should be regularly cleaned. Work surfaces for semen evaluation and processing should be cleaned and disinfected at the end of each workday.
  • 6. 
    The laboratory should be treated against rodents and insects on a regular basis as needed to control these pests.
  • 7. 
    The storage rooms and individual semen containers should be easy to clean and disinfect.
  • 8. 
    Only semen collected from donors having a health status equivalent to or better than the donors at the semen collection facilities should be processed in the laboratory.

Article 4.65.5.

Conditions applicable to the management of bulls, rams, bucks and boars

The objective is to keep the animals in a satisfactory state of cleanliness, particularly of the lower thorax and abdomen.

  • 1. 
    Whether on pasture or housed, the animal should be kept under hygienic conditions. If housed, the litter must be kept clean and renewed as often as necessary.
  • 2. 
    The coat of the animal should be kept clean.
  • 3. 
    For bulls, the length of the tuft of hairs at the preputial orifice, which is invariably soiled, should be cut to about 2 cm. The hair should not be removed altogether, because of its protective role. If cut too short, irritation of the preputial mucosa may result because these hairs aid the drainage of urine.
  • 4. 
    The animal should be brushed regularly, and where necessary on the day before semen collection, paying special attention to the underside of the abdomen.
  • 5. 
    In the event of obvious soiling, there should be careful cleaning, with soap or a detergent, of the preputial orifice and the adjoining areas, followed by thorough rinsing and drying.
  • 6. 
    When the animal is brought into the collection area, the technician must make sure that it is clean, and that it is not carrying any excessive litter or particles of feed on its body or its hooves, for such materials are always heavily contaminated.

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Annex XI (contd)

CH AP TE R 4.7.

COLLECTION AND PROCESSING OF

IN VIVO DERIVED EMBRYOS FROM

LIVESTOCK AND HORSES

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes.

Article 4.7.1. Aims of control

The purpose of official sanitary control of in vivo derived embryos intended for movement internationally is to ensure that specific pathogenic organisms, which could be associated with embryos, are controlled and transmission of infection to recipient animals and progeny is avoided.

Article 4.7.2.

Conditions applicable to the embryo collection team

The embryo collection team is a group of competent technicians, including at least one veterinarian , to perform the collection, processing and storage of embryos. The following conditions should apply:

1. The team should be approved by the Competent A uthority .

12. The team should be supervised by a team veterinarian .

23. The team veterinarian is responsible for all team operations which include verification of donor health status, sanitary handling and surgery of donors and disinfection and hygienic procedures.

34. The team veterinarian should be specifically approved for this purpose.

45. Team personnel should be adequately trained in the techniques and principles of disease control. High standards of hygiene should be practiced to preclude the introduction of infection .

56. The collection team should have adequate facilities and equipment for:

  • a. 
    collecting embryos;
  • b. 
    processing and treatment of embryos at a permanent site or mobile laboratory;
  • c. 
    storing embryos.

These facilities need not necessarily be at the same location.

67. The embryo collection team should keep a record of its activities, which should be maintained for inspection by the V eterinary A uthority for a period of at least 2 years after the embryos have been exported.

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78. The embryo collection team should be subjected to regular inspection at least once a year by an Official V eterinarian to ensure compliance with procedures for the sanitary collection, processing and storage of embryos.

Article 4.7.3.

Conditions applicable to processing laboratories

A processing laboratory used by the embryo collection team may be mobile or permanent. It is a facility in which embryos are recovered from collection media, examined and subjected to any required treatments such as washing and being examined and prepared for freezing and storage.

A permanent laboratory may be part of a specifically designed collection and processing unit, or a suitably adapted part of an existing building. It may be on the premises where the donor animals are kept. In either case, the laboratory should be physically separated from animals. Both mobile and permanent laboratories should have a clear separation between dirty areas (animal handling) and the clean processing area.

Additionally:

  • 1. 
    The processing laboratory should be under the direct supervision of the team veterinarian and be regularly inspected by an Official V eterinarian .
  • 2. 
    While embryos for export are being handled prior to their storage in ampoules, vials or straws, no embryos of a lesser health status should be processed.
  • 3. 
    The processing laboratory should be protected against rodents and insects.
  • 4. 
    The processing laboratory should be constructed with materials which permit its effective cleansing and disinfection . This should be done frequently, and always before and after each occasion on which embryos for export are processed.

Article 4.7.4. Conditions applicable to the introduction of donor animals

  • 1. 
    Donor animals
  • a. 
    The V eterinary A uthority should have knowledge of, and authority over, the herd /flock from which the donor animals have been sourced.
  • b. 
    The donor animals should not be situated in a herd /flock subject to veterinary restrictions for OIE listed disease or pathogens for relevant species (see Chapter 1.2. of the Terrestrial Code ), other than those that are in IETS Category 1 for the species of embryos being collected (see Article 4.7.14., and footnote1).
  • c. 
    At the time of collection, the donor animals should be clinically inspected by the team veterinarian , or by a veterinarian responsible to the team veterinarian and certified to be free of clinical signs of diseases .
  • 2. 
    Semen donors
  • a. 
    Semen used to inseminate donor animals artificially should have been produced and processed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4.56.

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  • b. 
    When the donor of the semen used to inseminate donor females for embryo production is dead, and when the health status of the semen donor concerning a particular infectious disease or diseases of concern was not known at the time of semen collection, additional tests may be required of the inseminated donor female after embryo collection to verify that these infectious diseases were not transmitted. An alternative may be to test subject an aliquot of semen from the same collection date to testing.
  • c. 
    Where natural service or fresh semen is used, donor sires should meet the health conditions set out in Chapter 4. 56. as appropriate to the species.

Article 4.7.5.

Risk management

With regard to disease transmission, transfer of in vivo derived embryos is a very low risk method for moving animal genetic material. Irrespective of animal species, there are three phases in the embryo transfer process that determine the final level of risk:

  • 1. 
    The first phase, which is applicable to diseases not included in Category 1 of the IETS categorisation1 (Article 4.7.14.), comprises the risk potential for embryo contamination and depends on:
  • a. 
    the disease situation in the ex porting country and/or zone ;
  • b. 
    the health status of the herds /flock s and the donors from which the embryos are collected;
  • c. 
    the pathogenic characteristics of the specified disease agents that are of concern to the V eterinary A uthority of the i mporting country .
  • 2. 
    The second phase covers risk mitigation by use of internationally accepted procedures for processing of embryos which are set out in the IETS Manual2. These include the following:
  • a. 
    The embryos must be washed at least ten times with at least 100-fold dilutions between each wash, and a fresh pipette must be used for transferring the embryos through each wash.
  • b. 
    Only embryos from the same donor should be washed together, and no more than ten embryos should be washed at any one time.
  • c. 
    Sometimes, for example when inactivation or removal of certain viruses (e.g. bovine herpesvirus-1, and Aujeszky's disease virus) is required, the standard washing procedure should be modified to include additional washes with the enzyme trypsin, as described in the IETS Manual2.
  • d. 
    The zona pellucida of each embryo, after washing, must be examined over its entire surface area at not less than 50X magnification to ensure that it is intact and free of adherent material.

[NOTE: A ll shipments of embryos must be accompanied by a statement signed by the team veterinarian certifying that these embryo processi ng procedures ha ve b een compl eted. ]

  • 3. 
    The third phase, which is applicable to diseases not included in Category 1 of the IETS categorisation (Article 4.7.14.) and which are of concern to the V eterinary A uthority of the importing country , encompasses the risk reductions resulting from:

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  • a. 
    post-collection surveillance of the donors and donor herd /flock based on the recognized incubation periods of the diseases of concern to determine retrospectively the health status of donors whilst the embryos are stored (in species where effective storage by cryopreservation is possible) in the ex porting country ;
  • b. 
    testing of embryo-collection (flushing) fluids and non-viable embryos, or other samples such as blood, in a laboratory for presence of specified disease agents.

Article 4.7.6. Conditions applicable to the collection and storage of embryos

  • 1. 
    Media

Any biological product of animal origin used in the media and solutions for collection, processing, washing or storage of embryos should be free of pathogenic micro-organisms. Media and solutions used in the collection and storage of embryos should be sterilized by approved methods according to the IETS Manual2 and handled in such a manner as to ensure that sterility is maintained. Antibiotics should be added to collection, processing, washing and storage media as recommended in the IETS Manual2.

  • 2. 
    Equipment
  • a. 
    All equipment used to collect, handle, wash, freeze and store embryos should ideally be new or at least sterilized prior to use as recommended in the IETS Manual2.
  • b. 
    Used equipment should not be transferred between countries for re-use by the embryo collection team.

Article 4.7.7.

Optional tests and treatments

  • 1. 
    The testing of samples can be requested by an importing country to confirm the absence of pathogenic organisms that may be transmitted via in vivo derived embryos, or to help assess whether the degree of quality control of the collection team (with regard to adherence to procedures as described in the IETS Manual2) is at an acceptable level. Samples may include:
  • a. 
    Non-viable embryos/oocytes

Where the viable, zona pellucida intact embryos from a donor are intended for export, all non-fertilized oocytes and degenerated or zona pellucida compromised embryos collected from that donor should be washed according to the IETS Manual2 and pooled for testing if requested by the importing country . Non-viable embryos/oocytes from the donor should be processed and stored together.

  • b. 
    Embryo collection (flushing) fluids

The collection fluid should be placed in a sterile, closed container and, if there is a large amount, it should be allowed to stand undisturbed for one hour. The supernatant fluid should then be removed and the bottom 10-20 ml, along with accumulated debris, decanted into a sterile bottle. If a filter is used in the collection of embryos/oocytes then any debris that is retained on the filter must be rinsed off into the retained fluid.

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  • c. 
    Washing fluids

The last four washes of the embryos/oocytes should be pooled (IETS Manual2).

  • d. 
    Samples

The samples referred to above should be stored at 4°C and tested within 24 hours. If this is not possible, then samples should be stored frozen at -70°C or lower.

  • 2. 
    When treatment of the viable embryos is modified to include additional washings with the enzyme trypsin (see paragraph 2c) in Article 4.7.5.), the procedure should be carried out according to the IETS Manual2. Enzyme treatment is necessary only when pathogens for which the IETS recommends this additional treatment (such as with trypsin) may be present. It should be noted that such treatment is not necessarily always beneficial and it should not be regarded as a general disinfectant. It may also have adverse effects on embryo viability, for instance in the case of equine embryos where the embryonic capsule could be damaged by the enzyme.

Article 4.7.8. Conditions applicable to the storage and transport of embryos

  • 1. 
    The embryos for export should be stored in sealed sterile ampoules, vials or straws under strict hygienic conditions at a storage place approved by the V eterinary A uthority of the ex porting country where there is no risk of contamination of the embryos.
  • 2. 
    Only embryos from the same individual donor should be stored together in the same ampoule, vial or straw.
  • 3. 
    The embryos should if possible, depending on the species, be frozen, stored with fresh liquid nitrogen in cleaned and sterilized tanks or containers under strict hygienic conditions at the approved storage place.
  • 4. 
    Ampoules, vials or straws should be sealed at the time of freezing (or prior to export where cryopreservation is not possible), and they should be clearly identified by labels according to the standardised system recommended in the IETS Manual2.
  • 5. 
    Liquid nitrogen containers should be sealed under the supervision of the Official V eterinarian prior to shipment from the ex porting country .
  • 6. 
    Embryos must not be exported until the appropriate veterinary certificates are completed.

Article 4.7.9.

Procedure for micromanipulation

When micromanipulation of the embryos is to be carried out, this should be done after completion of the treatments described in point 2 of Article 4.7.5. and conducted in accordance with Chapter 4.9.

Article 4.7.10.

Specific conditions applicable to porcine embryos

The herd of origin should be free of clinical signs of swine vesicular disease, brucellosis and pathogenic enterovirus encephalomyelitis.

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The development of effective cryopreservation methods for the storage of zona pellucida-intact porcine embryos is still at a very early stage.

Article 4.7.11.

Specific conditions/ comments applicable to equine embryos

The recommendations apply principally to embryos from animals continuously resident in national equine populations and therefore may be found unsuitable for those from equines routinely involved in events or competitions at the international level. For instance, in appropriate circumstances horses travelling with an international veterinary certificate (e.g. competition horses) may be exempt where mutually agreed upon on a bilateral basis between the respective V eterinary A uthorities .

Article 4.7.12.

Specific conditions/ comments applicable to camelid embryos

South American camelid embryos recovered from the uterine cavity by the conventional non-surgical flushing technique at 6.5 to 7 days post-ovulation are almost invariably at the hatched blastocyst stage, and thus the zona pellucida has already been shed. Since the embryos do not enter the uterus and cannot be recovered before 6.5 to 7 days, it would be unrealistic to stipulate for these species that only zona pellucida-intact embryos can be used in international trade . It must be noted that in 2008 the development of cryopreservation methods for storage of camelid embryos is still at a very early stage, and also that pathogen interaction studies with camelid embryos have not yet been carried out.

Article 4.7.13.

Specific conditions/ comments applicable to cervid embryos

The recommendations apply principally to embryos derived from animals continuously resident in national domestic or ranched cervid populations and therefore may be found to be unsuitable for those from cervids in feral or other circumstances related to biodiversity or germplasm conservation efforts.

Article 4.7.14.

Recommendations regarding the risk of disease transmission via in vivo derived embryos

The IETS has categorised1 the following diseases and pathogenic agents into four categories, which applies only to in vivo derived embryos.

  • 1. 
    Category 1
  • a. 
    Category 1 diseases or pathogenic agents are those for which sufficient evidence has accrued to show that the risk of transmission is negligible provided that the embryos are properly handled between collection and transfer according to the IETS Manual2.
  • b. 
    The following diseases or pathogenic agents are in category 1:

§ Aujeszky's disease (pseudorabies) (swine): trypsin treatment required

§ Bluetongue (cattle)

§ Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (cattle)

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§ Brucella abortus (cattle)

§ Enzootic bovine leukosis

§ Foot and mouth disease (cattle)

§ Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis: trypsin treatment required.

  • 2. 
    Category 2
  • a. 
    Category 2 diseases are those for which substantial evidence has accrued to show that the risk of transmission is negligible provided that the embryos are properly handled between collection and transfer according to the IETS Manual2, but for which additional transfers are required to verify existing data. pathogenic agents are in category 2:

§ Bluetongue (sheep)

§ Caprine arthritis/encephalitis

§ Classical swine fever (hog cholera)

§ Scrapie (sheep).

  • 3. 
    Category 3
  • a. 
    Category 3 diseases or pathogenic agents are those for which preliminary evidence indicates that the risk of transmission is negligible provided that the embryos are properly handled between collection and transfer according to the IETS Manual2, but for which additional in vitro and in vivo experimental data are required to substantiate the preliminary findings.
  • b. 
    The following diseases or pathogenic agents are in category 3: § Bovine immunodeficiency virus

§    Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (goats)

§    Bovine viral diarrhea virus (cattle)

§    Campylobacter f etus (sheep)

§    Foot and mouth disease (swine, sheep and goats)

§    Haemophilus somnus (cattle)

§    Maedi-visna (sheep)

§    Mycobacteri um pa ratub erculosis (cattle)

§    N eospora ca ni num (cattle)

§    Ovine pulmonary adenomatosis

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§ Porcine reproductive and respiratory disease syndrome (PRRS) § Rinderpest (cattle) § Swine vesicular disease. 4. Category 4

  • a. 
    Category 4 diseases or pathogenic agents are those for which studies have been done, or are in progress, that indicate:
  • i. 
    that no conclusions are yet possible with regard to the level of transmission risk; or
  • ii. 
    the risk of transmission via embryo transfer might not be negligible even if the embryos are properly handled according to the IETS Manual2 between collection and transfer.
  • b. 
    The following diseases or pathogenic agents are in category 4: § African swine fever

§    Akabane (cattle)

§    Bovine anaplasmosis

§    Bluetongue (goats)

§    Border disease (sheep)

§    Bovine herpesvirus-4

§    Chlamydia psittaci (cattle, sheep)

§    Contagious equine metritis

§    Enterovirus (cattle, swine)

§    Equine rhinopneumonitis

§    E scherichia coli 09:K99 (cattle)

§    L eptospira borgpetersenii serovar hardjobovis (cattle)

§    L eptospira sp. (swine)

§    Mycobacteri um bovi s (cattle)

§    Mycoplasma spp. (swine)

§    Ovine epididymitis (Brucella ovis )

§    Parainfluenza-3 virus (cattle)

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§    Parvovirus (swine)

§    Porcine circovirus (type 2) (pigs)

§    Scrapie (goats)

§    T ri chomona s foetus (cattle)

§    Ureaplasma/ Mycoplasma spp. (cattle, goats)

§    Vesicular stomatitis (cattle, swine).

text deleted

  • 1. 
    Based on available research and field information, the Research Subcommittee of the Health and Safety Advisory Committee (HASAC) of the International Embryo Transfer Society (IETS) has categorised some diseases based on their relative risk of dissemination by properly processed and handled in vivo derived embryos. This Chapter that contains the complete list of IETS categorised diseases is shown in Article 4.7.14.
  • 2. 
    Manual of the International Embryo Transfer Society.

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Annex XI (contd)

CH AP TE R 4.8

COLLECTION AND PROCESSING OF IN VITRO PRODUCED EMBRYOS / OOCYTES FROM

LIVESTOCK AND HORSES

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes but would like its comments to be taken into account.

Article 4.8.1.

Aims of control

Production of embryos in vitro involves the collection of oocytes from the ovaries of donors, in vitro maturation and fertilization of the oocytes, then in vitro culture to the morula/blastocyst stage at which they are ready for transfer into recipients. The purpose of official sanitary control of in vitro produced embryos intended for movement internationally is to ensure that specific pathogenic organisms, which could be associated with such embryos, are controlled and transmission of infection to recipient animals and progeny is avoided. The conditions outlined in this chapter are also applicable where the movement of in vitro maturing (IVM) oocytes is intended.

Article 4.8.2.

Conditions applicable to the embryo production team

The embryo production team is a group of competent technicians, including at least one veterinarian , to perform the collection and processing of ovaries/oocytes and the production and storage of in vitro produced embryos. The following conditions should apply:

1. The team should be approved by the Competent A uthority.

12. The team should be supervised by a team veterinarian .

23. The team veterinarian is responsible for all team operations which include the hygienic collection of ovaries and oocytes and all other procedures involved in the production of embryos intended for international movement.

34. The team veterinarian should be specifically approved for this purpose.

45. Team personnel should be adequately trained in the techniques and principles of disease control. High standards of hygiene should be practised to preclude the introduction of infection .

56. The production team should have adequate facilities and equipment for:

  • a. 
    collecting ovaries and/or oocytes;
  • b. 
    processing of oocytes and production of embryos at a permanent site or mobile laboratory;
  • c. 
    storing oocytes and/or embryos. These facilities need not necessarily be at the same location.

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67. The embryo production team should keep a record of its activities, which should be maintained for inspection by the V eterinary A uthority for a period of at least 2 years after the embryos have been exported.

78. The embryo production team should be subjected to regular inspection at least once a year by an Official V eterinarian to ensure compliance with procedures for the sanitary collection and processing of oocytes and the production and storage of embryos.

Article 4.8.3.

Conditions applicable to the processing laboratories

A processing laboratory used by the embryo production team may be mobile or permanent. It may be contiguous with the oocyte recovery area or at a separate location. It is a facility in which oocytes which have been recovered from ovaries are then matured and fertilised, and where the resulting embryos are further cultured in vitro .

Embryos may also be subjected to any required treatments such as washing and storage and quarantine in this laboratory.

Additionally:

  • 1. 
    The laboratory should be under the direct supervision of the team veterinarian and regularly inspected by an Official V eteri na rian .
  • 2. 
    While embryos for export are being produced prior to their storage in ampoules, vials or straws, no oocyte/embryo of a lesser health status should be recovered or processed in the same laboratory.
  • 3. 
    The laboratory should be protected against rodents and insects.
  • 4. 
    The processing laboratory should be constructed with materials which permit its effective cleansing and disinfection . This should be done frequently and always before and after each occasion when embryos for export are processed.

Article 4.8.4.

Conditions applicable to donor animals

Oocytes for the in vitro production of embryos are obtained from donors basically in t wo different ways: individual collection or batch collection. The recommended conditions for these differ.

Individual collection usually involves the aspiration of oocytes from the ovaries of individual live animals on the farm where the animal resides, or at the laboratory. Occasionally oocytes may also be recovered from individual live donors by aspiration from surgically excised ovaries. When oocytes are recovered from individual live animals , the conditions for these donors should resemble those set out in Article 4.7.4.

In these cases the cleaning and sterilisation of equipment (e.g. ultrasound guided probes) is especially important and must be carried out between each donor in accordance with the recommendations in the Manual of the International Embryo Transfer Society (IETS)1.

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Batch collection involves the removal of ovaries from batches of donors slaughtered at a slaughterhouse/abattoir (hereafter ‘abattoir ’); these ovaries are then transported to the processing laboratory where the oocytes are recovered from the ovarian follicles by aspiration. Batch collection has the disadvantage that it is usually impractical to relate the ovaries which are transported to the laboratory to the donors which were slaughtered at the abattoir . Nevertheless, it is critical to ensure that only healthy tissues are obtained and that they are removed from the donors and transported to the laboratory in a hygienic manner.

Additionally:

  • 1. 
    The V eterinary A uthority should have knowledge of, and authority over, the herd(s) /flock (s) from which the donor animals have been sourced.
  • 2. 
    The donor animals should not originate from herds / flock s which that are subject to veterinary restrictions for listed diseases of concern (under study), and neither should the removal of any tissue or aspiration of oocytes take place in an infected zone , or one that is subject to veterinary restrictions for listed diseases of concern (under study)

EU comment

The EU urges the OIE to establish which diseases are of concern.

  • 3. 
    In the case of oocyte recovery from live donors, post-collection surveillance of the donors and donor herd(s) /flock (s) should be conducted based on the recognized incubation periods of the diseases of concern to determine retrospectively the health status of donors.
  • 4. 
    In the case of oocyte recovery from batches of ovaries collected from an abattoir , the abattoir should be officially approved and under the supervision of a veterinarian whose responsibility is to ensure that ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections of potential donor animals are carried out, and to certify them to be free of clinical or pathological signs of infectious diseases (under study).
  • 5. 
    Donor animals slaughtered at an abattoir should not have been designated for compulsory slaughter for a notifiable disease and should not be slaughtered at the same time as donors from which ovaries and other tissues will be removed.
  • 6. 
    Batches of ovaries and other tissues collected from an abattoir should not be transported to the processing laboratory before confirmation has been obtained that ante- and post-mortem inspection of donors has been satisfactorily completed.
  • 7. 
    Equipment for the removal and transport of ovaries and other tissues should be cleaned and sterilised before use and exclusively used for these purposes.
  • 8. 
    Records of the identities and origins of all donors should be maintained for inspection by the V eterinary A uthority for a period of at least 2 years after the embryos have been exported. While this may be difficult to achieve in the case of batch collection, it is to be expected that the identities of the herds /flock s from which the donors originated will be maintained.

Article 4.8.5.

Optional tests and treatments

The main A supplementary approach for ensuring that in vitro produced embryos do not transmit disease is by testing various materials to confirm the absence of pathogenic organisms which that are of concern to the i mporting count ry .

EU comment

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In order to prevent any unjustified barrier to trade, the EU urges the OIE to establish which diseases may be of concern in the frame of in vitro embryo transfer.

Tests may also be used to assess whether quality control procedures being applied in the processing laboratory are of an acceptable standard.

Tests may be carried out on the following materials:

  • a. 
    non-viable oocytes/embryos from any stage of the in vitro production line from batches intended for export;
  • b. 
    samples of in vitro maturation medium taken prior to mixing the oocytes with semen for the fertilisation process;
  • c. 
    samples of embryo culture medium taken immediately prior to embryo storage.

These samples should be stored at 4°C and tested within 24 hours. If this is not possible, then the samples should be stored frozen at -70°C or lower.

Additionally:

  • 1. 
    Semen used to fertilise oocytes in vitro should meet the health requirements and standards set out in Chapter 4. 56. as appropriate to the species.

When the donor of the semen used to fertilise the oocytes is no longer living dead, and when the health status of the semen donor concerning a particular infectious disease or diseases of concern was not known at the time of semen collection, additional tests on the spare embryos may be required to verify that these infectious diseases were not transmitted. An alternative may be to test an aliquot of semen from the same collection date.

  • 2. 
    Any biological product of animal origin, including co-culture cells and media constituents, used in oocyte recovery, maturation, fertilisation, culture, washing and storage should be free of living pathogens. Media should be sterilised prior to use by approved methods according to the IETS Manual1 and handled in such a manner as to ensure that sterility is maintained. Antibiotics should be added to all fluids and media as recommended in the IETS Manual1.
  • 3. 
    All equipment used to recover, handle, culture, wash, freeze and store oocytes/embryos should be new or cleaned and sterilised prior to use as recommended in the IETS Manual1.

Article 4.8.6.

Risk management

With regard to disease transmission, transfer of in vitro produced embryos is a low risk method for moving animal genetic material although the risk is not quite as low as for in vivo derived embryos. It should be noted that categorisation of diseases /disease agents by the IETS, as described for in vivo derived embryos in Article 4.7.14., does not apply in the case of in vitro produced embryos. Irrespective of the animal species, there are three phases in the embryo production and transfer process that determine the final level of risk. These are as follows:

  • 1. 
    the first phase comprises the risk potential for ovary/oocyte/embryo contamination and depends on:
  • a. 
    the disease situation in the ex porting country and/or zone ;
  • b. 
    the health status of the herds /flock s and the donors from which the ovaries/oocytes/ embryos are collected;
  • c. 
    the pathogenic characteristics of the specified disease agents (under study) that are of concern to the V eterinary A uthority of the importing country ;

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EU comment

In order to prevent any unjustified barrier to trade, the EU urges the OIE to establish which diseases may be of concern in the frame of in vitro embryo transfer.

  • 2. 
    the second phase covers risk mitigation by the use of internationally accepted procedures for the processing of embryos which are set out in the IETS Manual11. These include the following:
  • a. 
    after the in vitro culture period is finished the embryos should be washed at least ten times with at least 100-fold dilutions between each wash, and a fresh pipette should be used for transferring the embryos through each wash;
  • b. 
    only embryos from the same donor (in the case of individual collection) or from the same batch (in the case of batch collection) should be washed together, and no more than ten embryos should be washed at any one time;
  • c. 
    sometimes, for example when inactivation or removal of certain viruses (e.g. bovine herpesvirus-1, or Aujeszky’s disease virus) is required, the standard washing procedure should be modified to include additional washes with the enzyme trypsin, as described in the IETS Manual1;
  • d. 
    the zona pellucida of each embryo, after washing, should be examined over its entire surface area at not less than 50X magnification to ensure that it is intact and free of adherent material;
  • 3. 
    the third phase, which is applicable to diseases (under study) which are of concern to the V eterinary A uthority of the importing country , encompasses the risk reductions resulting from:

EU comment

In order to prevent any unjustified barrier to trade, the EU urges the OIE to establish which diseases may be of concern in the frame of in vitro embryo transfer.

  • a. 
    post-collection surveillance of the donors and donor herds /flock s based on the recognised incubation periods of the diseases of concern to determine retrospectively the health status of the donors whilst the embryos are stored (in species where effective storage by cryopreservation is possible) in the exporting country . Post-collection surveillance of donors is not, of course, possible in the case of batch collection from an abattoir , although surveillance of the herds /flock s of origin may be possible;
  • b. 
    testing of oocytes/embryos, co-culture cells, media and other samples (e.g. blood) (as referred to in Article 4.8.4.) in a laboratory for presence of disease agents.

Article 4.8.7. Conditions applicable to the storage and transport of embryos

  • 1. 
    Only embryos from the same individual donor or from the same batch collection should be stored together in the same ampoule, vial or straw.
  • 2. 
    The embryos should if possible, depending on the species, be frozen in fresh liquid nitrogen or other cryoprotectant and then stored in fresh cryoprotectant in cleaned and sterilised tanks or containers under strict hygienic conditions at a storage place.
  • 3. 
    Ampoules, vials or straws must be sealed at the time of freezing and should be labelled according to the IETS Manual1.
  • 4. 
    Liquid nitrogen containers should be sealed prior to shipment from the ex porting country .

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  • 5. 
    Embryos must not be exported until the appropriate veterinary certificates are completed.

Article 4.8.8.

Procedure for micromanipulation

When micromanipulation of the embryos is to be carried out, this should be done after completion of the treatments described in point 2 of Article 4.8.6. and conducted in accordance with Chapter 4.9.

text deleted

  • 1. 
    Manual of the International Embryo Transfer Society.

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Annex XI (contd)

CH AP TE R 4.10

COLLECTION AND PROCESSING OF LABORATORY RODENT AND RABBIT EMBRYOS / OVA

EU comments

The EU can accept the proposed changes but would propose that an "institute veterinarian" should not necessarily be required in all cases. Therefore, the EU suggests that, where appropriate, a suitably qualified expert designated by the CA could be introduced as well; however for trade the animal health certification should be carried out by an official veterinarian.

Article 4.10.1.

Conditions applicable to the maintenance of laboratory animal colonies

Maintenance of laboratory animal colonies of specific genotypes requires intensive breeding management within specialised premises. They may be kept in a gnotobiotic environment, in either a 'germfree' system or a 'barrier' room (usually with defined flora), in a conventional colony, or under undefined conditions. In both the germfree and barrier systems, the animals are raised in a controlled environment according to protocols that attempt to sources of microbiological contamination. The primary difference is that the

animals have been inoculated with known (defined) microbes1 using a cocktail of non-pathogenic flora, whereas germfree animals are kept free from both pathogenic and non-pathogenic microbes.

A second category is where laboratory animals are kept in closed, conventional colonies within which known pathogens may exist. Here, less rigid colony management protocols are used to control potential sources of contamination, but implementation of simple aseptic precautions (e.g. autoclaving of feed and bedding) should allow animals to be maintained in a microbiologically defined system. Finally, laboratory animals may live in environments with undefined microbiological conditions (e.g. non-restricted colonies, free-ranging animals).

Disease testing and donor animal/embryo handling requirements can therefore be considered as being of three distinct types, depending on the type of colony being dealt with, i.e. defined floral, conventional and undefined. The health status of all colonies should be confirmed quarterly by bacteriological, virological, parasitological, serological and immunohistochemical tests on pre-designated sentinel animals or other representative animals of the colony (e.g. older breeding males which have sired multiple litters).

Microbial status of laboratory animal colonies

Colonies of the various species and genotypes of laboratory animals are usually kept within specialised premises and their microbial status depends largely on the system whereby the colony was formed and is maintained. In this Chapter the microbial status of colonies is considered to be of three main types: ‘defined’, ‘conventional’ and ‘undefined’. Colonies of defined status are those where, at least initially, the animals are totally free of pathogenic and non-pathogenic micro-organisms (i.e. gnotobiotic), although sometimes a cocktail of known, non-pathogenic micro-organisms has been given subsequently. In either case defined colonies are kept in highly controlled environments in barrier maintained rooms, with strict protocols in place to exclude all potential sources of unwanted microbiological contamination. Colonies of conventional status are those where the animals are kept in closed colonies but where known (‘specific’) pathogens as well as non-pathogenic micro-organisms may exist. While management protocols for conventional colonies may be less rigid than those for defined colonies, they are designed to control potential sources of microbial contamination. Simple aseptic precautions (e.g. the autoclaving of food and bedding) are taken to ensure that the animals do not become infected with any

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unwanted microflora. Finally, laboratory animals may be kept in microbiologically undefined colonies which are unrestricted and may include free ranging animals. Details of these different types of colony can be found in the FELASA Report1.

The health status of defined and conventional colonies should be confirmed at least quarterly by bacteriological, virological, parasitological, serological and other tests on pre-designated sentinel animals or other representative members of the colony. Older breeding males which have sired multiple litters are often selected for this purpose.

The purpose of official sanitary control of laboratory rodent and rabbit embryos intended for movement internationally is to ensure that specific pathogenic micro-organisms, which could be associated with such embryos, are controlled and transmission of infection to recipient animals, progeny and colonies, is avoided. Requirements for the management of donors and processing of embryos vary depending on the microbial status of the colony, i.e. whether it is defined (including gnotobiotic), conventional, or undefined.

Article 4.10.2.

Conditions applicable to the embryo production collection team/ laboratory

The embryo collection team is a group of competent technicians including at least one experienced professional to perform the collection, processing and storage of embryos/oocytes.

The following conditions should apply:

  • 1. 
    The embryo production team must should be composed of competent technicians supervised by an experienced embryologist team professional holding a graduate academic degree (e.g. M.S., Ph.D., D.V.M.).

2.    The team professional is responsible for all team operations which include verification of colony and donor health status, sanitary handling and surgery of donors, disinfection and hygienic procedures. The team professional should be responsible to the institute veterinarian.

3.    The institute veterinarian should be certified or accredited in laboratory animal care and should be specifically approved for the purpose of embryo collection for export. It is the responsibility of the institute veterinarian to ensure that required health profiling procedures appropriate for the colony status are implemented. He/she is responsible for certifying that the embryo handling procedures and laboratory facilities conform to the requirements laid down in this Chapter.

24. Team personnel should be adequately trained in the techniques and principles of disease control and in the use of aseptic techniques in embryo handling. Laboratory sanitary procedures must conform with requirements in the IETS Manual2The zoonotic potential of specific pathogens affecting the various laboratory animal species should be identified and understood so as to avoid contamination of colonies via human vectors, and vice versa.

35. The embryo production team must should use all necessary precautions to protect the animals, animal facilities, laboratory and equipment against microbiological contamination. In particular, the zoonotic potential of specific pathogens should be identified and understood by staff members to avoid contamination of colonies via human vectors, or vice versa High standards of hygiene should be practiced to preclude the introduction of infection to the donor animals, colonies, facilities, and equipment. Restrictions should be established to prevent free access of personnel into the embryo collection and handling laboratory facilities especially after their exposure such personnel have been exposed to other animal facilities.

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Annex XI (contd)

6. The team should have adequate facilities and equipment for:

a)  collecting embryos;

b)  processing and treatment of embryos at a permanent site or mobile laboratory;

c)  storing embryos.

4. Proper records must should be maintained for inspection by the chief embryologist (i.e. supervisor).

Until standardised record sheets are developed for laboratory animals, it is the responsibility of each laboratory to maintain complete animal and embryo records (i.e. embryo collection, cryopreservation data). Information of the type shown in standard IETS record sheets2for livestock species should be incorporated, where applicable, and data such as embryo quality grading system, morphological stage at cryopreservation and genotypic identification of the donors should be clearly given in the records.

57. It is the responsibility of the chief embryologist (i.e. laboratory supervisor) institute veterinarian to ensure that the complete animal and embryos are properly stored in sterile, sealed containers (e.g. ampules or straws) records, including records of collection, processing and storage of embryos are maintained. In addition, the containers must be correctly identified using a standard format which includes embryo species/genotype, cryopreservation date, number and stage of embryos, container number and indication of any specialised procedure (e.g. in vitro fertilisation, micromanipulation) or condition (e.g. germfree, microbiologically defined) Record sheets of the type shown in the IETS Manual2 for livestock species should be used where applicable, and data such as genotypic identification of the donors, embryo quality grading, morphological stage and should be given. If appropriate the embryo collection team should keep a record of its activities which should be maintained for inspection by the V eterinary A uthority for at least 2 years after the embryos have been exported.

8. The embryo collection team, if involved in the export of embryos, should be subject to regular inspectio preferably annually, by an Official V eterinarian to ensure compliance with procedures for the sanita collection, processing and storage of embryos.

Article 4.10.2bis.

Conditions applicable to the processing laboratory

A processing laboratory used by the embryo collection team is a facility in which embryos are recovered from donors (or from their excised reproductive tracts), and from the collection media. Here also the embryos are

required treatments such as washing, cryopreservation for stora

pending results of any diagnostic procedures. The processing laboratory may be part of a specifically designed collection and processing unit, or a suitably adapted part of an existing building. It may be on the premises where the donor animals are kept but in this case should be physically separated from animals.

Additionally:

1.     The processing laboratory should be under the supervision of the institute veterinarian and be inspected by an Official V eterinarian.

2.     While embryos for export are being handled prior to their storage in ampoules, vials or straws, no embryos of lesser health status should be processed.

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Annex XI (contd)

3. The processing laboratory should be constructed with materials which permit its effective cleansing and disinfection . This should be done frequently, and always before and after each occasion on which embryos for export are processed.

Article 4.10.2tris.

Risk management

With regard to disease transmission, transfer of in vivo derived embryos is a very low risk method for moving the genetic material of laboratory animals. Irrespective of animal species, there are three phases in the embryo transfer process that determine the final level of risk :

1. The first phase comprises the risk potential for embryo contamination and depends on:

a)     the disease situation in the ex porting country and/or zone ;

b)     the microbial status of the colony (i.e. defined, conventional or undefined) and the donors from which the embryos are collected;

c)     the pathogenic characteristics of the specified disease agents that are of concern to the V eterinary A uthorit y of the importing coun

2. The second phase covers risk mitigation by use of internationally accepted procedures for processing of embryos which are set out in the IETS Manual2. These include the following:

a)     Depending on microbial status of the colony, the embryos should be washed up to ten times with at least 100-fold dilutions between each wash, with a fresh pipette being used for transferring the embryos through each wash.

b)     Only embryos from the same donor should be washed together, and no more than ten embryos should be washed at any one time.

c)     Sometimes, for example when removal of certain viruses (e.g. herpesviruses) is required, the standard washing procedure should be modified to include additional washes with the enzyme trypsin, as described in the IETS Manual2.

d)     The zona pellucida of each embryo, after washing, should be examined over its entire surface area at not less than 50X magnification to ensure that it is intact and (apart from the mucin layer in the case of rabbit embryos) free of adherent material.

3. The third phase, which is applicable to diseases of concern to the V eterinary A uthority of the importing cou encompasses risk mitigation resulting from:

a)     post-collection surveillance of the microbial status of the donor colony based on the recognized incubation periods of the diseases of concern to determine retrospectively the health status of the colony whilst the embryos are stored (in species where effective storage by cryopreservation is possible) in the ex portin g co untry ;

b)     post-mortem testing of the donor(s) or other samples such as blood, embryo-collection (flushing) fluids and non-viable embryos, in a laboratory for presence of specified diseas e agents .

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Annex XI (contd)

Article 4.10.3. Conditions applicable to the embryo team/ institute veterinarian

  • 1. 
    The veterinarian , certified in laboratory animal care or laboratory animal accredited, must ensure that the required colony health profiling procedures are implemented, and the results are reviewed and properly recorded before shipment of embryos. He/she is also responsible for confirming that proper animal management/sanitation conditions have been maintained It is the responsibility of the institute veterinarian to ensure that required health testing procedures are implemented to demonstrate microbial status of the colony (i.e. defined, conventional or undefined). Colony microbial status should be reviewed by the institute veterinarian before shipment of the embryos.
  • 2. 
    The veterinarian is responsible for certifying that the embryo handling procedures and laboratory conditions were maintained in accordance with the IETS Manual2 Articles 4.10.2. and 4.10.2bis.
  • 3. 
    The veterinarian must supervise all quarantine practices to protect against unwanted contamination and spread of disease , and to ensure that valid results are generated is responsible for the risk management procedures outlined in Article 4.10.2tris.
  • 4. 
    The veterinarian must should authorise all embryo shipments, ensuring that the correct embryo collection records and veterinary certification documents and embryo collection records are have been completed and are included in the shipments.

Article 4.10.4.

Test programmes for donor animals

Sentinel animals in each donor colony should be subjected to routine monthly microbial screening. Testing for specific pathogens is species dependent and will undoubtedly also be influenced by geographic location. Recommendations regarding specific microbial agents to be tested for in mice, rats, cotton rats, hamsters, guinea pigs, gerbils and rabbits have been published elsewhere3.

Article 4.10.5.

Conditions applicable to the embryo/ animal handling donors from animal colonies of different microbial status

It should be noted that the conditions applicable to donor animals vary according to the microbial status of the colony from which they originate, i.e. defined, conventional or undefined.

Sentinel animals in each donor colony of defined and conventional status should be subjected to routine microbial screening, preferably monthly, but at least quarterly. Testing for specific pathogens depends on the animal species and may be influenced by geographical location. Recommendations regarding specific microbial agents to be tested for in different laboratory animal species have been published elsewhere.

  • 1. 
    Defined microbial conditions
  • a) 
    Germfree and mMicrobiologically defined colonies (Article 4.10.1.), barrier maintained animals represent the cleanest sources of gametes, and the embryos recovered from these animals can be regarded as pathogen free.

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  • b) 
    Since the animals themselves male and female donors are pathogen free or possess defined flora (usually based on random, monthly testing of sentinel animals), dissection of the female reproductive tract and embryo isolation collection procedures can should be performed under aseptic laboratory conditions, and do not require the use of using a biological safety cabinet if appropriate.
  • c) 
    Strict aseptic procedures should nevertheless be followed and, while embryo washing is not essential to safeguard against any possible air-borne contamination in the laboratory, it is recommended that embryos undergo at least a 3-step washing procedure. In each wash, embryos should be gently agitated in the medium, and the wash volume must constitute at least a one hundred-fold dilution of the volume in which the embryos are transferred Embryo washed as described in point 2 of Article 4.10.2tris is not necessary but it is recommended that embryos are washed 2 or 3 times. In each wash, embryos should be gently agitated in the medium.

d)   Microbial testing of flush or washing media is not required.

ed) Cryopreserved embryos should be designated, in the appropriate records, The embryos should be recorded as coming from a germfree or microbiologically defined, barrier maintained colony, thus indicating that additional safeguards special risk management procedures (Article 4.10.2tris.) for pathogen removal are not necessary. Isolation and health status monitoring of The need to quarantine the embryo recipients should be considered but the need to quarantine them is a decision is a matter for the importing laboratory institute.

  • 2. 
    Conventional conditions
  • a) 
    Animals maintained under these conditions generally represent closed colonies whose Colonies of conventional microbial status are usually closed and their health status is routinely profiled monitored (Article 4.10.1.). They The animals may have been exposed to various pathogens, resulting in infection the isolation of infectious agents, with positive antibody titres or even active clinical disease, . However, prior to embryo collection there should be familiarity with but the pathogen(s) of particular concern in each individual the colony should be well known.
  • b) 
    Reproductive tracts (uteri, oviducts and/or ovaries) should be removed at a separate site and then taken into the embryo processing laboratory. These procedures should be performed by separate different technicians or, at the very minimum, their protective clothing should be changed between locations. If the animals are to should be handled in the laboratory, the tracts should be dissected out within a biological safety cabinet. This will help protect against the possible shedding of pathogens into the laboratory itself.
  • c) 
    Once the reproductive tracts have been removed, embryo recovery should be performed under aseptic conditions. Embryos must be inspected (>100x) for the presence of cracks in the zona pellucida and only zona-intact embryos should be kept. They must then be washed using the standard 10-step procedure, described Depending on which, if any, pathogens are known to occur in the colony, embryos should be processed according to the risk management procedures, including washing, as described in Article 4.10.2tris, and in the IETS Manual2. This recommendation could be waived in the future if

research evidence from embryo-pathogen interaction studies warranted it.

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  • d) 
    Embryos derived from animals that have positive antibody titres or other evidence of specific pathogens should only be transferred into a new colony via a quarantine system, using microbiologically defined recipient females. As an additional safeguard, Quarantine may also be appropriate if there is any uncertainty about the donor or disease status of the embryos, quarantining of recipients should be applied the microbial status of the donor colony or the donors. In certain situations where the embryos might could have been exposed to bacterial infection (e.g. mycoplasma), they should be cultured in a medium containing an appropriate antibiotic for 24 h pre-freezing, or post-thawing and prior to transfer before cryopreservation, or in the interval between thawing and transfer into recipients.
  • e) 
    If the embryos were not handled in the recommended manner, this must be indicated on the shipment records, and mandatory quarantining of the recipient dam and offspring should be imposed by the recipient institution until their health status is confirmed. The recipient dam should then be tested post-weaning for pathogens, and introduction of the progeny into the colony should only take place if test results are satisfactory If the recipient institution does decide to quarantine the recipient dam and offspring until their health status is confirmed, the recipients should be tested post-weaning for pathogens of concern, and introduction of offspring into the colony should only take place if the test results are satisfactory.
  • 3. 
    Undefined microbial conditions
  • a) 
    These animals are derived from either the wild Embryos from free ranging animals or from colonies of unknown health status and embryos from them require maximum precautions the full range of risk management procedures that are described in Article 4.10.2tris and in the IETS Manual2. The health status of breeder males and donor females should be determined The procedures resemble those used for embryos of livestock as recommended in Chapter 4.7. and Chapter 4.8. of this Terrestrial Code . Ideally, the breeder males and donor females should be separated from other animals and tested 15 days before and on the day of breeding (for males) or at embryo collection (for females). Alternatively, the animals could be incorporated into a conventional colony, where, over time, a health history can be documented to reduce the strict monitoring and embryo handling requirements.
  • b) 
    A bBiological safety cabinet should be used for all animal, tissue and embryo handling donors and reproductive tissues, and for processing embryos.
  • c) 
    Post-mortem testing of the donor females for diseases or pathogens of concern to the importing countr y may be appropriate after the embryos/oocytes have been collected. Alternatively if embryos are collected surgically aAn aliquot of flush fluid from each donor, or a pooled sample, should be tested for the presence of specific pathogens of concern to the importing country and laboratory.
  • d) 
    Embryos must be washed at least 10 times in accordance with the protocols in the IETS Manual2 (i.e. the 10-step wash, possibly including trypsin treatment in the case of certain herpesviruses) and an aliquot of media from the last four (pooled) washes should be tested for pathogens trypsin treatment should be used if presence of certain pathogenic herpesviruses is of concern.
  • e) 
    Cryopreserved embryos must be stored in the exporting laboratory until such time as the necessary disease screening of colonies, tissues and or fluids is completed and the certification supporting documents for certification completed and signed by the institute veterinarian .

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f) On arrival in the importing country the All embryos from these animals must should be transferred into a colony via recipients in a quarantine system, as discussed above. Recipients should be tested at intervals appropriate to recognized incubation period s of the diseases of concern. In addition to testing the recipients dam after transfer, all the offspring should be tested at 12 weeks of age and/or individuals from successive generations should be tested before their introduction into breeding colonies outside the quarantine facility.

Article 4.10.5.bis.

Conditions applicable to the storage and transport of embryos

1.     Embryos for export should be frozen in fresh liquid nitrogen and then stored in fresh liquid nitrogen in cleaned and disinfected tanks or containers.

2.     The embryos should be stored in sealed sterile ampoules, vials or straws under strict hygienic conditions at a storage place approved by the V eterinary A uthority of the exporting country. Only embryos from the same donor should be stored together in the same ampoule, vial or straw.

3.     Ampoules, vials or straws should be sealed at the time of freezing (or prior to export where cryopreservation is not possible) and they should be clearly identified according to or similar to the system recommended in the IETS Manual2. Identification should include details of the species/genotype of the donors, microbial status (e.g. defined, conventional or undefined), collection/cryopreservation date, number and developmental stage of the embryos, container number and details of any specialized procedure such as in vitro fertilization, micromanipulation.

4.     Liquid nitrogen storage containers should be sealed under the supervision of the Official V eterinarian prior to shipment from the ex porting country .

5.     Embryos should not be exported until the appropriate veterinary certificates are completed.

Article 4.10.6.

Special experimental circumstances Procedures for in vitro fertilization and micromanipulation

If embryos are to be cryopreserved following specialised produced by in vitro fertilization of oocytes, it is advised that the washed sperm should be used so as to minimize the risk of possible pathogen exposure. If embryos are to undergo micromanipulation procedures that involve penetration of the zona pellucida, they must undergo the required washing steps (depending on colony status) before treatment. In the case of in vitro fertilisation, to minimise possible pathogen exposure, it is also advised that only washed sperm should be used. Embryos should be washed again before cryopreservation any required risk management steps (including washing) should be carried out first, as described in Chapter 4.9.

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1     Recommendations for the health monitoring of mouse, rat, hamster, guineapig and rabbit breeding colonies.- Report of the Federation of European Laboratory Animal Science Associations (FELASA), Working Group on Animal Health accepted by the FELASA Board of Management, November 1992.

2     Manual of the International Embryo Transfer Society (1998).

3     Schiewe M.C., Hollifield V.M., Kasbohm L.A. & Schmidt P.M. (1995) - Embryo importation and cryobanking strategies for laboratory animals and wildlife species. T heriogenolog y , 43, 97-104.

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Annex XII

CH AP TE R 5.1. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO CERTIFICATION

EU comments

The EU strongly supports the proposed changes.

Article 5.1.1.

Safety of international trade in animals and animal products depends on a combination of factors which should be taken into account to ensure unimpeded trade, without incurring unacceptable risk s to human and animal health.

Because of differences between countries in their animal health situations, various options are offered by the Terrestrial Code . The animal health situation in the exporting country , in the transit country or countries and in the importing country should be considered before determining the requirements for trade. To maximise harmonisation of the sanitary aspects of international trade , V eterinary A uthorities of OIE Members should base their import requirements on the OIE standards.

These requirements should be included in the model certificates approved by the OIE which are included from Chapters 5.10. to 5.12. of the Terrestrial Code .

Certification requirements should be exact and concise, and should clearly convey the wishes of the importing country . For this purpose, prior consultation between V eterina ry A uthorities of importing and ex porting countries may be necessary. It enables the setting out of the exact requirements so that the signing veterinarian can, if necessary, be given a note of guidance explaining the understanding between the V eterinary A uthorities involved.

The certification requirements should not include conditions for diseases that are not transmitted by the commodit y concerned. There should only be one signing veterinarian for one certificate.

When officials of a V eterinary A uthority wish to visit another country for matters of professional interest to the V eterinary A uthority of the other country, the latter should be informed.

Article 5.1.2. Responsibilities of the importing country

  • 1. 
    The import requirements included in the international veterinary certificate should assure that commodities introduced into the importing country comply with the OIE standards. I mporting countries should restrict their requirements to those necessary to achieve the national appropriate level of protection. If these are stricter than the OIE standards, they should be based on an import risk analysis .
  • 2. 
    The international veterinary certificate should not include requirements for the exclusion of pathogens or animal diseases which are present in the importing country and are not subject to any official control programme . The measures imposed on imports to manage the risk s posed by a specific pathogen or disease should not require a higher level of protection than that provided by measures applied as part of the official control programme operating within the importing country .
  • 3. 
    The international veterinary certificate should not include measures against pathogens or diseases which are not OIE listed, unless the importing country has demonstrated through import risk analysis , carried out in accordance with Section 2., that the pathogen or disease poses a significant risk to the importing country .
  • 4. 
    The transmission by the V eterinary A uthority of certificates or the communication of import requirements to

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persons other than the V eterinary A uthority of another country, necessitates that copies of these documents are also sent to the V eterinary A uthority . This important procedure avoids delays and difficulties which may arise between traders and V eterinary A uthorities when the authenticity of the certificates or permits is not established.

This information is the responsibility of V eterinary A uthorities . However, it can be issued by private sector veterinarians at the place of origin of the commodities when this practice is the subject of appropriate approval and authentication by the V eterinary A uthority .

  • 5. 
    Situations may arise which result in changes to the consignee, identification of the means of transportation, or border post after a certificate is issued. Because these do not change the animal or public health status of the consignment, they should not prevent the acceptance of the certificate.

Article 5.1.3. Responsibilities of the exporting country

  • 1. 
    An ex porting country should, on request, supply the following to importing countries :
  • a. 
    information on the animal health situation and national animal health information systems to determine whether that country is free or has zones or compartments free from listed diseases , including the regulations and procedures in force to maintain its free status;
  • b. 
    regular and prompt information on the occurrence of notifiable diseases ;
  • c. 
    details of the country's ability to apply measures to control and prevent the relevant listed diseases ;
  • d. 
    information on the structure of the V eterinary Services and the authority which they exercise according to Chapters 3.1. and 3.2.;
  • e. 
    technical information, particularly on biological tests and vaccines applied in all or part of the national territory.
  • 2. 
    V eterinary A uthorities of ex porting countries should:
  • a. 
    have official procedures for authorisation of certifying veterinarians, defining their functions and duties as well as conditions of oversight and accountability, covering including possible suspension and termination of the appointment authorisation;
  • b. 
    ensure that the relevant instructions and training are provided to certifying veterinarians;
  • c. 
    monitor the activities of the certifying veterinarians to verify their integrity and impartiality.
  • 3. 
    The V eterinary A uthority of the exporting country is ultimately accountable for veterinary certification used in i nternationa l tra de .

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Annex XII (contd)

Article 5.1.4. Responsibilities in case of an incident related to importation

  • 1. 
    International trade involves a continuing ethical responsibility. Therefore, if within the recognised incubation periods of the various diseases subsequent to an export taking place, the V eterinary A uthority becomes aware of the appearance or reappearance of a disease which has been specifically included in the international veterinary certificate , there is an obligation for this A uthority to notify the importing country , so that the imported commodities may be inspected or tested and appropriate action be taken to limit the spread of the disease should it have been inadvertently introduced.
  • 2. 
    Equally, iIf a disease condition appears in imported commodities within a time period after importation consistent with the recognised incubation period of the disease , the V eterinary A uthority of the ex porting country should be informed so as to enable an investigation to be made, since this may be the first available information on the occurrence of the disease in a previously free herd . The V eterinary A uthority of the importing country should be informed of the result of the investigation since the source of infection may not be in the exporting count ry .
  • 3. 
    In case of suspicion, on reasonable grounds, that an official certificate may be fraudulent, the V eterinary A uthority of the importing country and ex porting country should conduct an investigation. Consideration should also be given to notifying any third country(ies) that may have been implicated. All associated consignments should be kept under official control, pending the outcome of the investigation. The V eterinary A uthorities of all countries involved should fully cooperate with the investigation. If the certificate is found to be fraudulent, every effort should be made to identify those responsible so that appropriate action can be taken according to the relevant legislation.

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Annex XII (contd)

CH AP TE R 5.2. CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES

EU comments

The EU strongly supports the proposed changes.

Article 5.2.1.

Protection of the professional integrity of the certifying veterinarian

Certification should be based on the highest possible ethical standards, the most important of which is that the professional integrity of the certifying veterinarian must be respected and safeguarded according to Chapters 3.1. and 3.2.

It is essential not to include in the any requirements additional specific matters which cannot only those specific statements that can be accurately and honestly signed by a veterinarian . For example, these requirements should not include certification of an area as being free from diseases that are not non-notifiable, diseases or the occurrence of which the signing veterinarian is not necessarily informed about. Equally, It is unacceptable to ask for certification for events which will take place after the document is signed is unacceptable when these events are not under the direct control and supervision of the signing veterinarian.

Certification of freedom from diseases based on purely clinical freedom and herd history is of limited value. This is also true of diseases for which there is no specific diagnostic test, or the value of the test as a diagnostic aid is limited.

The note of guidance referred to in Article 5.1.1. is not only to inform the signing veterinarian but also to safeguard professional integrity.

Article 5.2.2. Certifying veterinarians

Certifying veterinarians should:

  • 1. 
    be authorised by the V eterinary A uthority of the ex porting country to sign international veterina ry certificates ;
  • 2. 
    only certify matters that are within their own knowledge at the time of signing the certificate, or that have been separately attested by another competent party authorised by the V eterinary A uthorit y ;
  • 3. 
    sign only at the appropriate time certificates that have been completed fully and correctly; where a certificate is signed on the basis of supporting documentation, the certifying veterinarian should have verified or be in possession of that documentation before signing;
  • 4. 
    have no conflict of interest in the commercial aspects of the animals or animal products being certified and be independent from the commercial parties.

Article 5.2.3. Preparation of international veterinary certificates

Certificates should be drawn up in accordance with the following principles:

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  • 1. 
    Certificates should be designed so as to minimize the potential for fraud including use of a unique identification number, or other appropriate means to ensure security. Paper certificates should bear the signature of the certifying veterinarian and the official identifier (stamp) of the issuing V eterinary A uthority . Each page of a multiple page certificate should bear the unique certificate number and a number indicating the number of the page out of the total number of pages. Electronic certification procedures should include equivalent safeguards.
  • 2. 
    Certificates They should be written in using terms that are as simple, unambiguous and as easy to understand as possible, without losing their legal meaning.
  • 3. 
    If so required, certificates they should be written in the language of the importing country . In such circumstances, they should also be written in a language understood by the certifying veterinarian.
  • 4. 
    Certificates They should require appropriate identification of animals and animal products except where this is impractical (e.g. day-old birds ).
  • 5. 
    Certificates They should not require a veterinarian to certify matters that are outside his/her knowledge or which he/she cannot ascertain and verify.
  • 6. 
    Where appropriate, when presented to the certifying veterinarian, certificates they should be accompanied, when presented to the certifying veterinarian, by notes of guidance indicating the extent of enquiries, tests or examinations expected to be carried out before the certificate is signed.
  • 7. 
    Their text of a certificate should not be amended except by deletions which must be signed and stamped by the certifying veterinarian.
  • 8. 
    The signature and stamp must be in a colour different from that of the printing of the certificate. The stamp may be embossed instead of being a different colour.
  • 9. 
    Replacement certificates may be issued by a V eterinary A uthority to replace certificates that have been, for example, lost, damaged, contain errors, or where the original information is no longer correct. These replacements should be provided by the issuing authority and be clearly marked to indicate that they are replacing the original certificate. A replacement certificate should reference the number and the issue date of the certificate that it supersedes. The superseded certificate should be cancelled and where possible, returned to the issuing authority.
  • 10. 
    Only original certificates are acceptable.

Article 5.2.4.

E lectronic certification

  • 1. 
    Certification may be provided by electronic documentation sent directly from the V eterinary A uthority of the ex porting country to the V eterinary A uthority of the importing country . Such systems also normally provide an interface with the commercial organisation marketing the commodity for provision of information to the certifying authority. The certifying veterinarian must have access to all information such as laboratory results and animal identification data.

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Annex XII (contd)

  • 2. 
    Electronic certificates may be in a different format but should carry the same information as conventional paper certificates.
  • 3. 
    The V eterinary A uthority must have in place systems for the security of electronic certificates against access by unauthorised persons or organisations.
  • 4. 
    The certifying veterinarian must be officially responsible for the secure use of his/her electronic signature.

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Annex XIII

CH AP TE R 6.3.

THE CONTROL OF HAZARDS OF

ANIMAL HEALTH AND

PUBLIC HEALTH IMPORTANCE IN ANIMAL FEED

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes, but there is an editorial remark in article 6.3.3 and two comments in article 6.3.4.

Article 6.3.1.

Introduction

Animal feed is a critical component of the food-chain that has a direct impact on animal health and welfare and also on food safety and public health.

Historically, the OIE primarily addressed animal feed as an important pathway for the entry and spread of contagious epidemic diseases , such as foot and mouth disease, swine vesicular disease and avian influenza. In recent years, the role of feed as a vector for disease agents, including zoonotic organisms, was a focus of standards development in regards to bovine spongiform encephalopathy. Animal feed and feed ingredients are widely traded internationally and trade disruptions have the potential to impact economies in both developed and developing countries. Since 2002 the OIE has expanded its zoonotic disease mandate to encompass animal production food safety, working in collaboration with the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and other international organisations. In 2006 the International Committee resolved that the OIE should develop guidance on foodborne zoonoses and animal feeding, complementing relevant CAC texts.

Article 6.3.2.

Objective and scope

The objective of this chapter is to provide guidance on animal feeding in relation to animal health and to complement the guidance provided by the Codex Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding (CAC/RCP 54-2004) which deals primarily with food safety, and related other Codex texts covering animal feeding, e.g. Code of Practice for Source Directed Measures to Reduce Contamination of Food with Chemicals (CAC/RCP 49-2001).

This chapter aims at ensuring the control of animal and public health hazards through adherence to recommended practices during the production (procurement, handling, storage, processing and distribution) and use of both commercial and on-farm produced animal feed and feed ingredients for terrestrial animals.

This chapter applies to the production and use of all products destined for animal feed and feed ingredients at all levels whether produced commercially or on farm. It also includes grazing or free-range feeding, forage crop production and water for drinking. Swill feeding is a particular aspect of on-farm practice that is specifically addressed because of its recognised role in disease transmission.

This chapter deals with feed for terrestrial animals (except bees).

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Annex XIII (contd)

Article 6.3.3.

Definitions

Feed: means any material (single or multiple), whether processed, semi-processed or raw, which is intended to be fed directly to terrestrial animals (except bees).

Feed additive : means any intentionally added ingredient not normally consumed as feed by itself, whether or not it has nutritional value or other effect on the animal, which affects the characteristics of feed, health of the animal or the characteristics of products of the animal of the animal products. Microorganisms, enzymes, pH regulators, trace elements, vitamins and other products fall within the scope of this definition depending on the purpose of use and method of administration. This excludes veterinary drugs.

EU comment

Editorial remark: in the above definition, the end of second and beginning of third line should read: "which affects the characteristics of feed or of the animal products".

Feed ing re dient: means a component part or constituent of any combination or mixture making up a feed, whether or not it has a nutritional value in the animal’s diet, including feed additives. Ingredients are of plant (including aquatic plants) or terrestrial or aquatic animal origin, or other organic or inorganic substances.

Contam in ation: means the presence of a material or product in a feed or feed ingredient potentially harmful for animal or public health or restricted under current regulations.

Article 6.3.4. General principles

  • 1. 
    Roles and responsibilities

The Competent A uthority has the legal power to set and enforce regulatory animal feeding requirements, and has final responsibility for verifying that these requirements are met. The Competent A uthority may establish regulatory requirements for relevant parties to provide it with information and assistance. Refer to Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code .

Those involved in the production and use of animal feed and feed ingredients have the responsibility to ensure that these products meet regulatory requirements. Appropriate contingency plans should be in place to enable tracing and recall of non-compliant products. All personnel involved in the manufacture, storage and handling of feed and feed ingredients should be adequately trained and aware of their role and responsibility in preventing the introduction or spread of hazards. Manufacturing equipment, storage and transport facilities should be adequate and maintained in good working order and in a sanitary condition.

Those providing specialist services to producers and to the feed industry (e.g. private veterinarians , nutritionists and laboratories) may be required to meet specific regulatory requirements pertaining to the services they provide (e.g. disease reporting, quality standards, transparency).

  • 2. 
    Regulatory safety standards

All feed and feed ingredients should meet regulatory safety standards. In defining limits and tolerances for hazards, scientific evidence, including the sensitivity of analytical methods and on the characterisation of risks, should be taken into account.

  • 3. 
    Risk analysis (risk assessment, risk management and risk communication)

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Internationally accepted principles and practices on risk analysis (Section 2 of the Terrestrial Code and relevant Codex texts) should be used in developing and applying the regulatory framework.

Application of a generic framework should provide a systematic and consistent process for managing all biosecurity risks, while recognising the different risk assessment methodologies used in animal and public health.

  • 4. 
    Good practices

Where national guidelines exist, good agricultural practices and good manufacturing practices (including good hygienic practices) should be followed. Countries without such guidelines are encouraged to develop them.

EU comment

The EU proposes to change the wording of the last sentence as follows: "Countries without such guidelines are encouraged to develop them or take already existing and available guidelines on board."

Where appropriate, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles should be followed to control hazards that may occur in the manufacture, distribution and feeding of feed and feed additives and feed ingredients.

  • 5. 
    Geographic and environmental considerations

Epidemiological links between potential sources of hazards for animal health or food safety should be considered when assessing water sources, land or facilities for suitability for the production of animal feed and feed ingredients. Animal health considerations include factors such as disease status, location of quarantined premises and existence of zones /compartments of specified health status. Food safety considerations include factors such as industrial operations that generate pollutants and waste treatment plants.

  • 6. 
    Zoning and compartmentalisation

Feed is an important component of biosecurity and needs to be considered when defining a compartment or zone in accordance with Chapter 4.3. of the Terrestrial Code .

  • 7. 
    Sampling and analysis

Sampling and analysis should be based on scientifically recognised principles and procedures.

  • 8. 
    Labelling

Labelling should be informative, unambiguous, legible and conspicuously placed on the package if sold in package form and on the waybill and other sales documents if sold in bulk, un-packaged form, and should comply with regulatory requirements and Section 4.2.10 Labelling of Codex Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding (CAC/RCP 54-2004), including listing of ingredients and instructions on the handling, storing and use.

  • 9. 
    Design and management of inspection programmes

In meeting animal and public health objectives prescribed in national legislation or required by importing countries , Competent A uthorities contribute through the inspection or through the auditing of animal and public health activities conducted by other agencies or the private sector.

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Feed and feed ingredients business operators and other relevant parts of industry should practice self-regulation to secure compliance with required standards for procurement, handling, storage, processing, distribution and use. Operators have the primary responsibility for implementing systems for process control. The Competent A uthority should verify that process control systems and safety standards achieve all regulatory requirements.

EU comment

The EU proposes to change the wording of the middle sentence for better clarity as follows: "These operators have the full responsibility for implementing systems for quality control."

  • 10. 
    Assurance and certification

Feed business operators are responsible for demonstrating the safety of the establishments under their control. Competent A uthorities are responsible for providing assurances domestically and to trading partners that regulatory safety standards have been met. For international trade in animal product-based feeds, V eterinary Services are required to provide interna tiona l veterinary certifica tes .

  • 11. 
    Hazards associated with animal feed
  • a) 
    Biological hazards

Biological hazards that may occur in feed and feed ingredients include agents such as bacteria, viruses, prions, fungi and parasites.

  • b) 
    Chemical hazards

Chemical hazards that may occur in feed and feed ingredients include naturally occurring chemicals (such as mycotoxins and gossypol), industrial and environmental contaminants (such as dioxins and PCBs), residues of veterinary drugs and pesticides and also radionuclides.

  • c) 
    Physical hazards

Physical hazards that may occur in feed and feed ingredients include foreign objects (such as pieces of glass, metal, plastic or wood).

  • 12. 
    Contamination

It is important to avoid necessary that the prevention of contamination during the manufacture, storage, distribution (including transport) and the use of feed and feed ingredients and relevant provisions should be included in current regulations and standards. Scientific evidence, including the sensitivity of analytical methods and on the characterisation of risks, should be drawn upon in developing this framework.

EU comment

The EU suggests that a new sentence is added: "Special care should be taken in order to prevent the primary introduction of hazards and contamination of feed through the feed ingredients".

Procedures, such as flushing, sequencing and physical clean-out, should be used to avoid reduce the likelihood of contamination between batches of feed or feed ingredients.

  • 13. 
    Antimicrobial resistance

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Concerning the use of antimicrobials in animal feed refer to Chapters 6.7. to 6.11. of the Terrestrial Code .

  • 14. 
    Management of information

The Competent A uthority should establish clear requirements for the provision of information by the private sector as this relates to regulatory requirements.

Records should be maintained in a readily accessible form regarding the production, distribution and use of feed and feed ingredients. These records are required to facilitate the prompt trace-back of feed and feed ingredients to the immediate previous source, and trace-forward to the next subsequent recipients, to address identified animal health or public health concerns (see Section 4.3. of CAC/RCP 54-2004).

A nimal identification and animal traceability are tools for addressing animal health (including zoonoses ), and food safety risks arising from animal feed (see Chapters 4.1. and 4.2. of the Terrestrial Code ).

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Annex XIV

CONTROL OF HAZARDS OF ANIMAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPORTANCE IN HEAT TREATED PET FOOD

EU comments

The EU would like the OIE to concentrate on the animal health aspects in particular in Article 1 rather than the food safety aspects which relate mainly to misuse of the pet food. Therefore the EU asks the OIE to clarify in that sense the introduction (which could be deleted), and the objective and scope of this Chapter which could read:

"Objective and scope

The objective of this chapter is to complement Chapter 6.3 and to provide guidance on pet food in relation to animal health, zoonoses and food safety. The chapter aims at ensuring the control of animal and public health hazards through adherence to recommended practices during the production (procurement, handling, storage, processing and distribution) and use of pet food, including pet treats and pet chews."

More discussion on this Chapter is required.

Article 1

Introduction

Pet food is often overlooked as a component of the animal feed and human food supply-chain that has a direct impact on animal health and welfare and also on food safety and public health. The importance stems not only from the potential to affect pets and their owners, but also from the potential to affect food producing animals through the use of pet food as a protein source in compounded feeds.

Article 2

Objective and scope

The objective of this chapter is to complement Chapter 6.3. and to provide guidance on pet food in relation to animal health, zoonoses and food safety. The chapter aims at ensuring the control of animal and public health hazards through adherence to recommended practices during the production (procurement, handling, storage, processing and distribution) and use of pet food, including pet treats and pet chews.

For the purpose of this chapter, “pets” are limited to dogs or cats.

Article 3

Definitions

Dry pet food – means pet food with a moisture content less than 20 percent, called “kibble” or “crunchy”.

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Pet chews – means any commercial product prepared and distributed for consumption by dogs or cats made of animal skin, hide, hooves, ears, animal bones, ligaments, snouts, or pizzles3.

Pet food – means any commercial feed, including snacks and treats, prepared and distributed for consumption by dogs or cats.

Soft-moist pet food – means pet food with a moisture content of 20 percent or more and less than 65 percent.

Wet pet food – means low acid (pH greater than 4.6) pet food in hermetically sealed containers with a moisture content greater than 65 percent.

Article 4

General principles

  • 1. 
    Roles and responsibilities

The Competent A uthority and those involved in the production of pet food should follow the recommendations in point 1 of Article 6.3.4.

  • 2. 
    Risk assessment and risk management

Risk assessment and risk management should follow the recommendations in point 3 of Article 6.3.4. Those involved in the production of pet food should take into account scientific evidence, including the sensitivity of analytical methods and the characterisation of risk s , when defining limits and tolerances for hazards.

The ingredients in the finished product should have undergone one or more of the time and temperature treatments listed in Table 1.

  • 3. 
    Good Manufacturing Practices

Where national guidelines exist, good manufacturing practices (including good hygienic practices) should be followed. Countries without such guidelines are encouraged to develop them.

Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs) and/or Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point4 (HACCP) principles, where appropriate, should be followed to control hazards that may occur in the manufacture and distribution of pet food.

  • 4. 
    Sampling and analysis Sampling and analytical protocols should follow the recommendations in point 7 of Article 6.3.4.
  • 5. 
    Labelling Labelling should follow the recommendations in point 8 of Article 6.3.4.
  • 6. 
    Design and management of inspection programmes Inspection programme should follow the recommendations in point 9 of Article 6.3.4.
  • 7. 
    Assurance and certification

3 This definition is taken from 2009 Official Publication of the Association of American Feed Control Officials Incorporated. Oxford, Indiana, USA. Pages 322-323.

4 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point, as defined in the Annex to the Recommended International Code of Practice - General Principles of Food Hygiene (CAC/RCP 1-1969).

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In addition to point 10 of Article 6.3.4., assurances for pet food products of animal origin may be provided through facility approvals.

  • 8. 
    Hazards which should be considered in the manufacture of pet food
  • a) 
    Biological hazards are described in point 11 a) of Article 6.3.4.
  • b) 
    Chemical hazards are described in point 11 b) of Article 6.3.4.
  • c) 
    Physical hazards are described in point 11 c) of Article 6.3.4.
  • 9. 
    Antimicrobials

Concerning the use of antimicrobials in pet food refer to Chapters 6.8. to 6.12. of the Terrestrial Code .

  • 10. 
    Management of information Described in point 14 of Article 6.3.4.

Article 5

Groups of pet food

Pet food groups are described by the percentage of moisture in the finished product. Wet pet food is described as containing greater than 65% moisture in the finished product. Dry pet food contains less than 20% moisture in the finished product; while soft-moist products will contain between 20% and 65% moisture.5

Article 6

Time and temperature treatments

Table 1 lists the minimum treatment/temperatures applied in the processing of ingredients of animal origin used in pet foods to ensure the inactivation of biological hazards.

Table 1. Minimum time and temperature treatments for processing of pet foods containing ingredients of a nimal origin

Group

A Wet

B- Soft Moist

Product subgroup

  • 1) 
    Low-acid pet food in hermetically sealed containers
  • 2) 
    Refrigerated pet food in non-hermetically sealed containers
  • 1) 
    Extruded-expanded
  • 2) 
    Extruded-non-expanded
  • 3) 
    Non-extruded
 
 

Minimum time and

temperature treatments

1)

F0= 3

 

Fc= 3

2)

(under study)

1)

(under study)

2)

(under study)

3)

(under study)

5 These descriptions are taken from 2009 Official Publication of the Association of American Feed Control Officials Incorporated. Oxford, Indiana, USA. Pages 132-134.

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C- Dry

 

1)

Extruded-expanded

1)

(under study)

2)

Extruded non-expanded

2)

(under study)

3)

Non-extruded

3)

(under study)

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Annex XV

CH AP TE R 6.4.

BIOSECURITY PROCEDURES IN POULTRY PRODUCTION

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes, but have one editorial remark in article 6.4.3.

Article 6.4.1. Introduction

This chapter provides recommended biosecurity procedures in poultry production.

Infectious disease agents of poultry are a threat to poultry health and, at times, human health and have significant social and economic implications. In poultry production, especially under intensive conditions, prevention is the most viable and economically feasible approach to the control of infectious disease agents.

Biosecurity procedures should be implemented with the objective of preventing the introduction and dissemination of infectious disease agents in the poultry production chain. The adoption of Good Agricultural Practices and the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system will help to achieve these objectives.

Article 6.4.2.

Purpose and scope

This chapter deals with biosecurity procedures in poultry production. It should be read in conjunction with the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygiene Practice for Meat (CAC/RCP 58-2005) and Code of Hygienic Practice for Eggs and Egg Products (CAC/RCP 15-1976 Revision 2007).

This chapter provides general recommendations for infectious disease agents of poultry . Recommendations on specific diseases may be found in relevant disease chapters in the Terrestrial Code .

This chapter identifies several relevant biosecurity measures. The choice of measures to be implemented will vary according to national conditions, including poultry disease status, the risk of introduction and dissemination of infectious disease agents and the cost effectiveness of control measures.

Article 6.4.3.

Definitions (for this Chapter only)

Breede rs : means poultry destined for the production of fertile eggs for incubation for the purpose of producing da y-old birds .

Cu ling : means the depopulation of a flock before the end of its normal production period.

Live bird markets : means markets where live birds from various sources are sold for slaughter or further rearing.

EU comment

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As these definitions are for this chapter only, they should not be in italics.

Article 6.4.4. Recommendations on the location and construction of poultry establishments

  • 1. 
    All establishments (poultry farms and hatcheries)
  • a) 
    A suitably isolated geographical location is recommended, taking into account the direction of the prevailing winds, location of other poultry establishments and the distance from roads used to transport poultry .
  • b) 
    Poultry establishments should be located and constructed to provide adequate drainage away from the site.
  • c) 
    Poultry houses and hatcheries should be designed and constructed (preferably of smooth impervious materials) so that cleaning and disinfection can be carried out effectively. Ideally, the area immediately surrounding the poultry houses should be paved with concrete or other impervious material to facilitate cleaning and di si nf ecti on .
  • d) 
    The establishment should be surrounded by a security fence to prevent the entry of unwanted animals and people.
  • e) 
    A sign indicating restricted entry should be posted at the entrance to the farm.
  • 2. 
    Additional measures for poultry farms
  • a) 
    E stablishments should be designed for use with single species and single purpose. Whenever possible, the ‘all-in all-out’ single age group principle should be used. If this is not feasible and several flock s are maintained on one establishment , each flock should be managed as a separate epidemiological unit .
  • b) 
    Poultry houses, and buildings used to store feed or eggs, should be constructed and maintained to prevent the entry of wild birds, rodents and insects.
  • c) 
    Where feasible the floors of poultry houses should be constructed using concrete or other impervious materials and designed so that cleaning and disinfection can be carried out effectively.
  • d) 
    Where feasible, feed should be delivered into the farm from outside the security fence.
  • 3. 
    Additional measures for hatcheries
  • a) 
    The design of the hatchery should take account of work flow and air circulation needs, with ‘one way flow’ movement of eggs and day-old birds and one way air flow in the same direction.
  • b) 
    The hatchery buildings should include physical separation of areas used for the following: i) personnel changing, showering and sanitary facilities;
  • ii) 
    receipt, storage and transfer of eggs;
  • iii) 
    incubation;
  • iv) 
    hatching;
  • v) 
    sorting, sexing and placing of day-old birds in boxes;
  • vi) 
    storage of egg boxes and chick boxes, egg flats, box pads, chemicals and other items;

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  • vii) 
    washing equipment;
  • viii) 
    waste disposal;
  • ix) 
    dining facilities for personnel;
  • x) 
    office space.

Article 6.4.5.

Recommendations applicable to the operation of poultry establishments

  • 1. 
    All establishments (poultry farms and hatcheries)
  • a) 
    There should be good communication between all those involved in the poultry production chain from breeding to production and consumption to ensure that steps are taken to minimise dissemination of infectious disease agents. Personnel should have access to basic training in biosecurity relevant to poultry production and food safety.
  • b) 
    Traceability at all levels of the poultry production chain should be possible.
  • c) 
    Records of production should be maintained. On farm, this includes treatment, vaccination, flock history, mortality and disease surveillance data. This should be maintained on an individual flock basis. In hatcheries, relevant records include fertility, hatchability, vaccination and treatment. Records should be readily available for inspection.
  • d) 
    A veterinarian should be responsible for monitoring poultry health on the establishment .
  • e) 
    Access to the establishment should be controlled to ensure only authorised persons and vehicles enter the site.
  • f) 
    E stablishments should be free from unwanted vegetation and debris.
  • g) 
    Procedures for the prevention of entry of wild birds, and the control of vermin such as rodents and arthropods should be implemented on a routine basis.
  • h) 
    All personnel and visitors entering an establishment should follow a biosecurity procedure. The preferred procedure is for visitors and personnel to shower and change into clean clothes and footwear provided by the establishment . Where this is not practical, clean outer garments (coveralls or overalls, hats and footwear) should be provided.

Before entering and after leaving a poultry house, personnel and visitors should wash their hands with soap and water and use a properly maintained disinfectant footbath. The disinfectant solution in the footbath should be changed on a regular basis to ensure its efficacy, according to the manufacturer’s instructions.

  • i) 
    Personnel and visitors should not have had recent contact with other poultry , poultry waste, or poultry processing plant(s). This time period should be based on the level of risk of transmission of infectious disease agents. This will depend on the poultry production purpose, biosecurity procedures and disease status (e.g. the time between visiting a breeder flock and then a broiler flock would be less than the time between visiting a broiler flock and then a breeder flock ).

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Annex XV (contd)

  • j) 
    Delivery vehicles should be cleaned, and disinfected before loading each consignment of hatching eggs , day-old birds or poultry .
  • 2. 
    Additional measures for all poultry farms
  • a) 
    Animals, other than poultry of the appropriate (resident) species and age, should not be permitted access to poultry houses. No animals should have access to other buildings (e.g. those used to store feed or eggs).
  • b) 
    The water supply to poultry houses should be potable according to the World Health Organization or to the relevant national standard, and microbiological quality should be monitored if there is any reason to suspect contamination. The water delivery system should be disinfected between flock s when the poultry house is empty.
  • c) 
    Birds used to stock a poultry house should preferably be obtained from breeder flock s and hatcheries that are free from vertically transmitted infectious disease agents.
  • d) 
    Heat treated feeds with the addition of bacteriostatic or bactericidal treatments is recommended (e.g. organic acids). Where heat treatment is not possible, the use of bacteriostatic or bactericidal treatments is recommended.

Feed should be stored in a manner to prevent access by wild birds and rodents. Spilled feed should be cleaned up immediately to remove attractants for wild birds and rodents.

  • e) 
    The litter in the poultry house should be kept dry and in good condition.
  • f) 
    Dead birds should be removed from poultry houses as quickly as possible or at least daily. These should be disposed of in a safe and effective manner.
  • g) 
    Personnel involved in the catching of birds should be adequately trained in bird handling and basic biosecurity procedures.
  • h) 
    Poultry should be transported in well ventilated containers and should not be over crowded. Exposure to extreme temperatures should be avoided.
  • i) 
    Containers should be cleaned and disinfected between each use.
  • j) 
    When a poultry house is depopulated, it is recommended that all faeces and litter be removed from the house and disposed of in a manner approved by the V eterinary Services .

If litter is not removed and replaced between flock s then the litter should be treated in a manner to inactivate infectious disease agents, to prevent the dissemination of infectious disease agents from one flock to the next.

After removal of faeces and litter, cleaning and disinfection of the building and equipment should be done in accordance with Chapter 4.13.

All litter removed from a poultry house should be disposed of in a safe manner to prevent the dissemination of infectious agents.

  • k) 
    For poultry flock s that are allowed to range outdoors, attractants to wild birds should be minimised e.g. feeders should be kept inside the poultry house. Poultry should not be allowed access to sources of contamination (e.g. household waste, other farm animals, stagnant water and litter storage areas). The nesting area should be inside the poultry house.

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  • l) 
    To avoid the development of antimicrobial resistance, antimicrobials should be used according to relevant directions of the V eterinary Services and manufacturer’s instructions and in accordance with Terrestrial Code Chapters 6.8, 6.9., 6.10. and 6.11.
  • 3. 
    Additional measures for breeder farms
  • a) 
    Nest box litter and liners should be kept clean.
  • b) 
    Hatching eggs should be collected at frequent intervals, at least daily, and placed in a new or clean and di si nf ected packaging material.
  • c) 
    Grossly dirty, broken, cracked, or leaker eggs should be collected separately and should not be used as hatching eggs .
  • d) 
    Hatching eggs should be cleaned and sanitised as soon as possible after collection using an approved sanitising agent, in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.
  • e) 
    Hatching eggs or their packaging materials should be marked to assist traceability and veterinary investigations.
  • f) 
    The sanitised hatching eggs should be stored in a dedicated room as soon as possible after collection. Storage conditions should minimise the potential for microbial contamination and growth and ensure maximum hatchability. The room should be well ventilated, kept clean, and regularly disinfected using disinfectants approved for this purpose.
  • 4. 
    Additional measures for hatcheries
  • a) 
    Dead in shell embryos should be removed from hatcheries as soon as they are found and disposed of in a safe and effective manner.
  • b) 
    All hatchery waste, garbage and discarded equipment should be contained or at least covered while on site and removed from the hatchery and its environs as soon as possible.
  • c) 
    After use, hatchery equipment, tables and surfaces should be promptly and thoroughly cleaned and disinfected with an approved disinfectant.
  • d) 
    Egg handlers, chick sexers and chick handlers should wash their hands with soap and water before commencing work and between working with batches of hatching eggs or day-old birds from different breeder flock s .
  • e) 
    Hatching eggs and day-old birds from different breeder flock s should be kept separate during incubation, hatching, sorting and transportation.
  • f) 
    Day-old birds should be delivered to the farm in new containers or in clean, disinfected containers .

Article 6.4.6.

Prevention of further dissemination of infectious disease agents of poultry

When a flock is determined to be infected, in addition to the general biosecurity measures described previously, management procedures should be adjusted to effectively isolate the infected flock from other flock s on the establishment and other epidemiologically related establishments . The following measures are recommended:

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  • 1. 
    Personnel should be trained in the management of infected flock s to prevent the dissemination of infectious disease agents to other flock s and establishments , and to humans (relevant measures include: handling of an infected flock separately, last in sequence and the use of dedicated personnel and clothing and equipment).
  • 2. 
    Epidemiological investigations should be carried out to determine the origin and route of transmission of the infectious disease agent.
  • 3. 
    Poultry litter/faeces and other potentially contaminated farm waste should be disposed of in a safe manner to prevent dissemination of infectious disease agents.
  • 4. 
    Depending on the epidemiology of the disease , the results of a risk assessment , and public and animal health policies, culling may be used to manage infected flock s . When infected flock s are destroyed or slaughtered they should be processed in a manner to minimise exposure of humans and other flock s to the infectious disease agent, and in accordance with recommendations of the V eterinary Service and relevant Chapters in the Terrestrial Code . Based on risk assessment , non-infected, high risk flock s may be culled. Movement of culled poultry should only be allowed for slaughter or destruction.

Before restocking, the poultry house or establishment should be cleaned, disinfected and tested to verify that the cleaning has been effective. Special attention should be paid to feed equipment and water systems.

Microbiological monitoring of the efficacy of disinfection procedures is recommended when pathogenic agents have been detected in the previous flock .

  • 5. 
    Depending on the epidemiology of the disease , risk assessment , vaccine availability and public and animal health policies, vaccination is an option to minimise the dissemination of the infectious disease agent. When used, poultry should be vaccinated in accordance with the directions of the V eterinary Services and the manufacturer’s instructions. Recommendations in the Terrestrial Ma nual should be followed as appropriate.

Article 6.4.7. Recommendations to prevent the dissemination of infectious disease agents from live bird markets

  • 1. 
    Personnel should be educated on the significance of infectious disease agents and the need to apply biosecurity practices to prevent dissemination of these agents. E ducation should be targeted to personnel at all levels of operations in these markets (e.g. drivers, owners, handlers, processors). Programmes should be implemented to raise awareness of consumers of the risks associated with activities of live bird markets.
  • 2. 
    Personnel should wash their hands with soap and water before and after handling birds.
  • 3. 
    All containers and vehicles should be cleaned and disinfected every time they leave the market.
  • 4. 
    Live birds that leave the market should be housed separately from other birds for a period of time to minimise the potential dissemination of infectious disease agents of poultry .
  • 5. 
    Periodically the market should be emptied, cleaned and disinfected . This is of particular importance when an infectious disease agent of poultry deemed significant by the V eterinary Services has been identified in the market or the region.

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  • 6. 
    Where feasible, surveillance should be carried out in these markets to detect infectious disease agents of poultry , especially those agents of zoonotic significance. The surveillance programme should be determined by the V erterinary Services , and in accordance with recommendations in relevant disease specific chapters of the T errestrial C ode .
  • 7. 
    Attempts should be made to ensure the possibility of tracing all birds entering and leaving the markets.

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Annex XV (contd)

CH AP TE R 6.5

PREVENTION, DETECTION AND CONTROL OF SALMONELLA IN POULTRY

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes, but has some comments that should be taken into account in order to clarify the text.

The EU reiterates its will to participate in any upcoming ad hoc group on this issue.

Article 6.5.1. Introduction

This Chapter provides recommendations on the prevention, detection and control of Salmonella in poultry .

Salmonellosis is one of the most common foodborne bacterial diseases in the world. The great majority of Salmonella infections in humans are foodborne with Salmonella Enteritidis and Salmonella Typhimurium accounting for a major part of the problem. Salmonella serotypes and prevalence may vary considerably between localities, districts, regions and countries and therefore, surveillance and identification of the prevalent Salmonella serotypes in humans and poultry should be carried out in order to develop a control programme for the area.

In most food animal species, Salmonella can establish a clinically inapparent infection of variable duration, which is significant as a potential zoonosis . Such animals may be important in relation to the spread of infection between flock s and as causes of human foodborne infection . In the latter case, this can occur when meat and eggs, or their products, enter the food chain thus producing contaminated food.

Article 6.5.2.

Purpose and scope

This Chapter deals with methods for on farm prevention, detection and control of Salmonella in poultry , and complements the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygiene Practice for Meat (CAC/RCP 58-2005) and Code of Hygienic Practice for Eggs and Egg Products (CAC/RCP 15-1976 Revision 2007). A pathogen reduction strategy at the farm level is seen as the first step in a continuum that will assist in reducing the presence of foodborne pathogens in eggs and meat .

Hygiene and biosecurity procedures to be implemented in poultry flock s and hatcheries are described in Chapter 6.4. Hygiene and Biosecurity Procedures in Poultry Production.

The recommendations presented in this Chapter are relevant to the control of all Salmonella with special attention to S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium, as these are common Salmonella serotypes in many countries. It should be noted that the epidemiology of animal and human salmonellosis in a particular locality, district, region or country is important for effective control of Salmonella .

Article 6.5.3.

Definitions (for this Chapter only)

B reeders: means poultry destined for the production of fertile eggs for incubation for the purpose of producing day-old chicks day-old birds .

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Competitive exclusion: means the administration of defined or undefined bacterial flora to poultry to prevent gut colonisation by enteropathogens, including Salmonella .

Cu ling : means the depopulation of a flock before the end of its normal production period.

L ayers: means poultry during the period of laying eggs for human consumption.

EU comment

As these definitions are for this chapter only, they should not be in italics.

Article 6.5.4.

Surveillance of poultry flocks for Salm one la

Where justified by risk assessment , surveillance should be carried out to identify infected flock s in order to take measures that will reduce the prevalence in poultry and the risk of transmission of Salmonella to humans. Sampling methods, frequency and type of samples required should be determined by the V eterinary Services based on a risk assessment . Microbiological testing is preferred to serological testing because of its higher sensitivity in broilers flock s and higher specificity in breeders and layer flock s . In the framework of regulatory programmes for the control of Salmonella in poultry and salmonellosis in humans, confirmatory testing may be required to ensure that decisions are soundly based.

EU comment

It is difficult to call decisions "soundly based" if there is a high chance to miss the infection by confirmatory testing due to variation in the excretion of Salmonella.

Thus the last words "ensure that decisions are soundly based" should be deleted and replaced by the words "exclude false positive or negative results".

Sampling

  • 1. 
    Available methods for sampling

Drag swabs: sampling is done by dragging swabs throughout the poultry building.

Boot swabs: sampling is done by walking throughout the poultry building with absorbent material placed over the footwear of the sampler.

Dust samples: sampling is done by collecting dust from exhaust fans, screens and other equipment in the poultry building.

Faecal samples: multiple fresh faecal/caecal samples collected from different areas in the poultry building.

Meconium, chick box papers, dead in shell and culled chicks at the hatchery.

Hatchery samples: throughout the hatchery, including the inner liner of the incubators.

Additional sampling of equipment and surfaces may be performed to increase sensitivity.

EU comment

The last point above should be deleted as it is now redundant with the new point on dust samples.

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  • 2. 
    Sample size

Refer to the T errestrial Manual (under development).

  • 3. 
    Laboratory methods

Refer to the T errestrial Manual (under development).

  • 4. 
    Time and frequency of testing

Time and frequency of sampling for each poultry type are listed below: a) Breeders and hatcheries i) Breeder flock s before lay

  • • 
    Before the end of the first week of life when the status of the breeding farm and the hatchery is not known or does not comply with this chapter.
  • • 
    Within the four weeks before being moved to another house, or before going into production if the animals will remain in the same house for the production period.
  • • 
    One or more times during the growing period if there is a culling policy in place. The frequency would be determined on commercial considerations.

EU comment

For better clarity, the word "additional" should be added in the point above, after the words "One or more".

  • ii) 
    Breeder flock s in lay
  • • 
    At least at monthly intervals during the laying period.
  • • 
    Additional testing should be determined by the V eterinary Services . iii) Hatcheries
  • • 
    Testing hatcheries may complement on farm testing.
  • • 
    The minimal frequency should be determined by the V eterinary Services.

EU comment

The basis for the sampling frequency should be the detection of the infection before the chicks are delivered to farms. Therefore testing should be at least at three weeks interval (hatching period) both at flock level and certainly in hatcheries, thus :

At the first indent, the word "may" should be replaced by "should";

  • b) 
    Poultry for the production of eggs for human consumption

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The second indent should read: "The minimal frequency should be determined by the

Veterinary Services, and be at least at three weeks interval".

  • i) 
    Flock s grown to be layers
  • • 
    Before the end of the first week of life when the status of the breeding farm and the hatchery is not known or does not comply with this chapter.
  • • 
    Within the four weeks before being moved to another house, or before going into production if the animals will remain in the same house for the production period.
  • • 
    One or more times during the growing period if there is a culling policy in place. The frequency would be determined on commercial considerations.

EU comment

For better clarity, the word "additional" should be added in the point above, after the words "One or more".

  • ii) 
    L ayer flock s
  • • 
    At expected peak of lay for each production cycle (the period of time in the laying cycle when the production of the flock is highest).
  • • 
    One or more times if there is a culling policy in place or if eggs are diverted to processing for the inactivation of the pathogen. The minimal frequency should be determined by the V eteri na ry Servi ces .
  • c) 
    Poultry for the production of meat
  • i) 
    Flock s should be sampled at least once.

EU comment

The above sentence is not clear enough, it should read: "Flocks should be sampled at least once before slaughter", as they meat poultry flocks.

  • ii) 
    Where sampling occurs on farms and where there is a long period (2 weeks or more) between thinning and final depopulation further testing should be considered.
  • iii) 
    Where sampling occurs on farms, flock s should be sampled as late as possible before the first birds are transported to the slaughter house. Where this is done to allow for the implementation of control measures during processing, this must be done at a time that ensures the results are available before slaughter.

Whether sampling occurs on the farm or at the processing plant, there should be an integrated system in place which allows for investigation of the source of positive flocks.

EU comment

There is a need to emphasize the need for a monitoring at farm in order to take control measures such as culling or logistic slaughter.

Thus, in the point ii) above the words "Where sampling occurs on farms and" should be deleted and in point iii) the words "Where sampling occurs on farms" should be deleted and the words "Where this is done to" should be replaced by "In order to".

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Additionally, the last paragraph should read: "Whether sampling occurs on the farm, which is more appropriate for consequent control measures, or at the processing plant, there should be an integrated system in place which allows for investigation of the source of positive flocks." This paragraph should clearly apply to all the article.

  • d) 
    Empty building testing
  • i) 
    Bacteriological monitoring of the efficacy of disinfection procedures is recommended when Salmonella have been detected in the previous flock .

As appropriate, sampling of equipment and surfaces as well as boot swabs or drag swabs of the empty building after depopulation, cleaning and disinfection .

Results from surveillance may lead to the implementation of additional prevention and control measures to reduce the risk of transmission of Salmonella to humans:

  • a) 
    In breeders, control measures may be implemented to reduce the transmission of Salmonella to the next generation, especially for trans-ovarian transmitted serotypes such as S . Enteriditis.
  • b) 
    In layer flock s control measures will reduce and may eliminate contamination of eggs with Salmonella .
  • c) 
    In poultry for meat production, control measures may be implemented at slaughter or further down the food chain.

Article 6.5.5.

Prevention and Control measures

Salmonella prevention and control may be achieved by adopting Good Agricultural Practices and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP), and general measures detailed in Chapter 6.4. Hygiene and Biosecurity Procedures in Poultry Production, in combination with the following additional measures, where appropriate. No single measure used alone will achieve effective Salmonella control.

Additional prevention and control measures include: vaccination, competitive exclusion, flock culling, organic acids and product diversion to processing.

Antimicrobials should not be used to control infection with Salmonella in poultry because the effectiveness of the treatment is limited, may mask the infection at sampling, has the potential to produce residues in meat and eggs and can contribute to the development of antimicrobial resistance. Antimicrobials may also reduce normal flora in the gut and increase the likelihood of colonisation with Salmonella. In special circumstances antimicrobials may be used to salvage animals with high genetic value.

  • 1. 
    Day old chicks Day-old birds used to stock a poultry house should be obtained from breeding flock s and hatcheries that are free from at least S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium and have been monitored according to this Chapter and in which no evidence of S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium has been detected.
  • 2. 
    L ayer and breeder flock s should be stocked from flock s that are free from at least S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium (under study) and have been monitored according to this chapter and in which no evidence of S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium has been detected.
  • 3. 
    Feed contamination with Salmonella is known to be a source of infection for poultry. Therefore, it is recommended to monitor the Salmonella status of poultry feed, and if found positive to take corrective measures. The use of heat treated feeds or feeds subjected to other bacteriostatic or bactericidal treatment (e.g. organic acids) is recommended (e.g. organic acids). Feed should be stored in clean closed containers to prevent access by wild birds and rodents. Spilled feed should be cleaned up immediately to remove attractants for wild birds and rodents.

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  • 4. 
    Competitive exclusion may be used in day old chicks day-old birds to reduce colonisation by Salmonella .

When used, competitive exclusion should be administered according to the instructions provided by the manufacturer and in accordance with the standards and recommendations of the V eterinary Services .

  • 5. 
    Vaccines are used against Salmonella infections caused by different serotypes in various poultry species, including single or combined vaccines. Vaccines produced according to the Terrestrial Manual should be used.

If live vaccines are used it is important that field and vaccine strains be easily differentiated in the laboratory. If serology is used as the surveillance method, it may not be possible to distinguish between vaccination and infection with a field strain.

Vaccination can be used as part of an overall Salmonella control programme. It is recommended that vaccination not be used as the sole control measure.

When the status of the breeding farm and the hatchery from which the flock originates is not known or does not comply with this Chapter, vaccination of flock s , starting with day-old chicks day-old birds , against the Salmonella serotypes known to be significant should be considered.

Vaccination against the Salmonella serotypes known to be significant should be considered when moving day-old chicks day-old birds to a previously contaminated shed so as to minimise the risk of the birds contracting Salmonella i nf ection .

When used, vaccines should be administered according to the instructions provided by the manufacturer and in accordance with the standards and recommendations of the V eterinary Services .

Vaccination against S . Enteritidis can cause a positive reaction in Salmonella Gallinarum serological tests and needs to be considered when implementing measures for these pathogens.

  • 6. 
    Depending on animal health, risk assessment , and public health policies, culling is an option to manage infected breeder and layer flock s . Infected flock s should be destroyed or slaughtered and processed to minimise human exposure to Salmonella .

EU comment

The paragraph 6 above should begin by: "Depending on animal health and welfare".

Moreover, the sentence below should read "If poultry are not culled, eggs for human consumption should be labelled in order to differentiate from table eggs and diverted for processing for inactivation of Salmonella.

If poultry are not culled, eggs for human consumption should be diverted for processing for inactivation of Salmonella .

  • 7. 
    S. Enteritidis is characterised by its ovarian transmission pattern. Countries should set targets for eradicating (or significantly reducing) S. Enteritidis from egg-producing flocks through a guided policy for eradication from the top of the production pyramid, i.e. from grandparent flock s through breeder flock s to layer flock s .
  • 8. 
    As far as the veterinary involvement is concerned, the responsible veterinarian should monitor the results of surveillance testing for Salmonella . This information should be available to the veterinarian before marketing if a veterinary certificate for flock Salmonella status is required. When required by the Competent A uthority , the veterinarian or other authorised person responsible for notification should notify the Competent A uthority if the presence of Salmonella of the relevant serotype is confirmed.

EU comment

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The role of veterinarians is too limited in this paragraph. The veterinarian should have a role in the follow up of the biosecurity measures, the supervision of correct sampling, the verification of result and the encouragement of prudent use of antibiotics in order to avoid Salmonella resistance.

Article 6.5.6.

Prevention of Salm one la spread from infected flocks

If a flock is found infected with specific Salmonella serotypes of concern, the following actions should be taken in addition to general measures detailed in Chapter 6.4. Hygiene and Biosecurity Procedures in Poultry Production:

  • 1. 
    According to the epidemiological situation, investigations should be carried out to determine the origin of the i nfection .

EU comment

It seems important not only to find the origin but also to consider measures avoiding reinfection e.g. of a next flock. Thus the following sentence should be added: "Repetition of infection should be avoided."

  • 2. 
    Movement of poultry flock s at the end of the production cycle should only be allowed for slaughter or destruction. Special precautions should be taken in the transport, slaughter and processing of the birds, e.g. they could be sent to a separate slaughterhouse or processed at the end of a shift before cleaning and disinfection of the equipment.
  • 3. 
    Litter should not be reused. Poultry litter/faeces and other potentially contaminated farm waste should be disposed of in a safe manner to prevent the direct or indirect exposure of humans, livestock and wildlife to Salmonella. Particular care needs to be taken in regard to poultry litter/faeces used to fertilise plants intended for human consumption. If litter is not removed then it should be treated in a manner to inactivate infectious agents, to prevent the spread from one flock to the next.
  • 4. 
    Particular care should be taken in cleaning and disinfection of the poultry house and equipment.
  • 5. 
    Before restocking the facility, a bacteriological examination should be carried out as detailed in this Chapter and the T errestrial Manual .

Article 6.5.7. Recommendations for importation of live poultry (other than day-old birds)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

1.     the poultry originated from an establishment which participates in a Salmonella surveillance programme in accordance with the recommendations in Article 6.5.4.;

2.     the poultry originated from an establishment in which no evidence of S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium has been detected and have had no contact with birds or other material from establishments which do not comply with this chapter;

3.     the poultry originated from an establishment which complies with the recommendations of Chapter 6.4.

Article 6.5.8. Recommendations for importation of day-old birds

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V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

1.     the day-old birds showed no clinical signs of salmonellosis on the day of shipment;

2.     the day-old birds originated from a breeder establishment and hatchery which participates in a Salmonella surveillance programme in accordance with the recommendations in Article 6.5.4.;

3.     the day-old birds originated from a breeder establishment and hatchery in which no evidence of S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium has been detected and have had no contact during setting, incubation or hatching with hatching eggs or other material from poultry which do not comply with this chapter;

4.     the day-old birds originated from a breeder establishment and hatchery which complies with the recommendations of Chapter 6.4.;

5.     the day-old birds were shipped in new and clean containers .

Article 6.5.9. Recommendations for importation of hatching eggs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

1. the hatching eggs originated from a breeder establishment which participates in a Salmonella surveillance programme in accordance with the recommendations in Article 6.5.4.;

2 the hatching eggs originated from a breeder establishment in which no evidence of S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium has been detected and have had no contact with poultry or other material from establishments which do not comply with this Chapter;

3.     the hatching eggs originated from a breeder establishment which complies with the recommendations of Chapter 6.4.;

4.     the hatching eggs were shipped in new and clean packaging materials.

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Annex XV (contd)

CHAPTER 6.6.

SALMONELLA ENTERITIDIS AND

SALMONELLA TYPHIMURIUM

IN POULTRY

Article 6.6.1.

V eterinary A uthorities of import

for breeding birds

the presentation of an interna

ng countri es should require:

na l veterina ry certifica

the

1.

come from an establishment which has been regularly mo with the provisions of Chapter 6.4. (see Article 6.4.9.);

the presence of

2. come from a flock of birds within the establishment in which no

typhimurium has been detected and have had no contact with which do not comply with this standard;

nce of Salmonella enteritidis and Salmonella or other material from poultry flocks

3.

come from an establishment wh Chapter 6.4.

complies with the hygiene and

procedures referred to

Article 6.6.2.

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require:

for da y-old birds

the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attes

the da y-old birds :

1.

2.

showed no

on the day of shipment;

come from an establishment and a hatchery which are regularly monitored for the presence of Salmonella i conformity with the provisions of Chapter 6.4. (see Art

6.4.9.);

3. come from a flock of birds within the establishment in which no typhimurium has been detected and have had no contact during

of Salmonella enteritidis or Salmonella

eggs or other

l from poultry flocks wh

4

come from an establishment and a hatchery wh referred to in Chapter 6.4.;

not comply with this standard; comply with the hygiene and d

or hatching with hatchin g dures

5. were shipped in clean and unused packages.

Article 6.6.3.

V eterinary A uthorities of for hatchi ng eggs

g countries should require:

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Annex XV (contd)

the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the hatching eggs :

1.     come from an establishment which is regularly monitored for the presence of Salmonella in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 6.4. (see Article 6.4.9.);

2.     come from a flock of birds within the establishment in which no evidence of Salmonella enteritidis or Salmonella typhimurium has been detected and have had no contact with hat ching eggs or material from poultry flock s which do not comply with this standard;

3.     come from an establishment which complies with the hygiene and disease security procedures referred to in Chapter 6.4.;

4.     were shipped in clean and unused packages.

text deleted

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Annex XVI

CH AP TE R 6.7.

INTRODUCTION TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTROLLING ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes but has two comments.

Article 6.7.1.

Objective

The purpose of this cChapters 6.8., 6.9., 6.10. and 6.11. is to provide methodologies for OIE Members to appropriately address the emergence or spread of resistant bacteria from the use of antimicrobial agents in animal husbandry and to contain antimicrobial resistance through controlling the use of antimicrobial agents.

Antimicrobial agents are essential drugs for human and animal health and welfare. The OIE recognises the need for access to antimicrobial agents in veterinary medicine: antimicrobial agents are essential for treating, controlling and preventing infectious diseases in animals. The OIE therefore considers that ensuring continued access to effective antimicrobial agents is a priority.

EU comment

In the last sentence above, the words "a priority", with no precision over what, could lead to misinterpretation and should be replaced by "important".

The OIE recognises that antimicrobial resistance is a global public and animal health concern that is influenced by the usage of antimicrobial agents in humans, animals and elsewhere. Those working in the human, animal and plant sectors have a shared responsibility to prevent or minimise pressures for the selection of antimicrobial resistance factors in humans and animals. Arising from its mandate for the protection of animal health and food safety, the OIE developed these chapters to provide guidance to Members in regard to risks in the animal sector.

EU comment

Taking into account that (OIE web-page) “The OIE Member Countries have decided to provide a better guarantee of the safety of food of animal origin by creating greater synergy between the activities of the OIE and those of the Codex Alimentarius Commission”, the EU suggests that the last sentence in the paragraph above read: "Arising from its mandate for the protection of animal health and food safety, and in synergy with activities of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the OIE developed these chapters to provide guidance to Members in regard to risks in the animal sector."

The application of risk management measures should be based on relevant international standards on microbiological risk analysis and supported by sound data and information when available. The methodologies provided in these chapters should be consulted as part of the standard approach to prevent and reduce antimicrobial resistance.

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Annex XVII

CH AP TE R 7.3. TRANSPORT OF ANIMALS BY LAND

EU Comments

The EU acknowledges the work carried out by OIE to address specific requirements for transporting of poultry and agrees with the proposed changes.

Some specific comments are presented within the text.

Preamble: These recommendations apply to the following live domesticated animals : cattle, buffaloes, camels, sheep, goats, pigs, poultry and equines. They will also be largely applicable to some other animals (e.g. deer, other camelids and ratites). Wild, feral and partly domesticated a nimals may need different conditions.

Article 7.3.1. The amount of time animals spend on a journey should be kept to the minimum.

Article 7.3.2.

  • 1. 
    Animal behaviour

A nimal handlers should be experienced and competent in handling and moving farm livestock and understand the behaviour patterns of animals and the underlying principles necessary to carry out their tasks.

The behaviour of individual animals or groups of animals will vary depending on their breed, sex, temperament and age and the way in which they have been reared and handled. Despite these differences, the following behaviour patterns, which are always present to some degree in domestic animals , should be taken into consideration in handling and moving the animals .

Most domestic livestock are kept in herds groups and follow a leader by instinct.

A nimals which are likely to harm each other in a group situation should not be mixed.

The desire of some animals to control their personal space should be taken into account in designing loading and unloading facilities, transport vessels and containers .

Domestic animals will try to escape if any person approaches closer than a certain distance. This critical distance, which defines the flight zone, varies among species and individuals of the same species, and depends upon previous contact with humans. A nimals reared in close proximity to humans (i.e. tame) have a smaller flight zone, whereas those kept in free range or extensive systems may have flight zones which may vary from one metre to many metres. A nimal handlers should avoid sudden penetration of the flight zone which may cause a panic reaction which could lead to aggression or attempted escape and compromise the welfare of the animals .

A nimal handlers should use the point of balance at the animal ’s shoulder to move animals , adopting a position behind the point of balance to move an animal forward and in front of the point of balance to move it backward.

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Domestic animals have a wide-angle vision but only have a limited forward binocular vision and poor perception of depth. This means that they can detect objects and movements beside and behind them, but can only judge distances directly ahead.

Although all most domestic animals have a highly sensitive sense of smell, they may react differently to the smells encountered during travel. Smells which cause negative responses should be taken into consideration when managing a ni mals .

Domestic animal s can hear over a greater range of frequencies than humans and are more sensitive to higher frequencies. They tend to be alarmed by constant loud noises and by sudden noises, which may cause them to panic. Sensitivity to such noises should also be taken into account when handling animals .

An example of a flight zone (cattle)

Handler movement pattern to move cattle forward

  • 2. 
    Distractions and their removal

Design of new loading and unloading facilities or modification of existing facilities should aim to minimise the potential for distractions that may cause approaching animals to stop, baulk or turn back. Below are examples of common distractions and methods for eliminating them:

  • a) 
    reflections on shiny metal or wet floors - move a lamp or change lighting;
  • b) 
    dark entrances — illuminate with indirect lighting which does not shine directly into the eyes of approaching a ni mals ;
  • c) 
    animals seeing moving people or equipment up ahead — install solid sides on chutes and races or install shields;

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  • d) 
    dead ends — avoid if possible by curving the passage, or make an illusory passage;
  • e) 
    chains or other loose objects hanging in chutes or on fences — remove them;
  • f) 
    uneven floors or a sudden drop in floor levels — avoid uneven floor surfaces or install a solid false floor to provide an illusion of a solid and continuous walking surface;
  • g) 
    sounds of air hissing from pneumatic equipment — install silencers or use hydraulic equipment or vent high pressure to the external environment using flexible hosing;
  • h) 
    clanging and banging of metal objects — install rubber stops on gates and other devices to reduce metal to metal contact;
  • i) 
    air currents from fans or air curtains blowing into the face of animals — redirect or reposition equipment.

Article 7.3.3.

Responsibilities

Once the decision to transport the animals has been made, the welfare of the animals during their journey is the paramount consideration and is the joint responsibility of all people involved. The individual responsibilities of persons involved will be described in more detail in this Article.

The roles of each of those responsible are defined below:

  • 1. 
    The owners and managers of the animals are responsible for:
  • a) 
    the general health, overall welfare and fitness of the animals for the journey ;
  • b) 
    ensuring compliance with any required veterinary or other certification;
  • c) 
    the presence of an animal handler competent for the species being transported during the journey with the authority to take prompt action; in case of transport by individual trucks, the truck driver may be the sole animal handler during the journey ;
  • d) 
    the presence of an adequate number of animal handlers during l oading and unloading ;
  • e) 
    ensuring that equipment and veterinary assistance are provided as appropriate for the species and the jour ne y .
  • 2. 
    Business agents or buying/selling agents are responsible for:
  • a) 
    selection of animals that are fit to travel;
  • b) 
    availability of suitable facilities at the start and at the end of the journey for the assembly; loading , transport, unloading and holding of animals , including for any stops at resting points during the journey and for emergencies.
  • 3. 
    A nimal handlers are responsible for the humane handling and care of the animals , especially during loading and unloading , and for maintaining a journey log. To carry out their responsibilities, they should have the authority to take prompt action. In the absence of a separate animal handler , the driver is the animal handler .
  • 4. 
    Transport companies, vehicle owners and drivers are responsible for planning the journey to ensure the care of the animals ; in particular they are responsible for:
  • a) 
    choosing appropriate vehicles for the species transported and the journey ;

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  • b) 
    ensuring that properly trained staff are available for l oading /unloading of animals ;
  • c) 
    ensuring adequate competency of the driver in matters of animal welfare for the species being transported in case a separate animal handler is not assigned to the truck;
  • d) 
    developing and keeping up-to-date contingency plans to address emergencies (including adverse weather conditions) and minimise stress during transport;
  • e) 
    producing a journey plan which includes a loading plan, journey duration, itinerary and location of resting places;
  • f) 
    loading only those animals which are fit to travel, for their correct loading into the vehicle and their inspection during the journey , and for appropriate responses to problems arising; if its fitness to travel is in doubt, the animal should be examined by a veterinarian in accordance with point 3a) of Article 7.3.7.;
  • g) 
    welfare of the animals during the actual transport.
  • 5. 
    Managers of facilities at the start and at the end of the journey and at resting points are responsible for:
  • a) 
    providing suitable premises for loading , unloading and securely holding the animals , with water and feed when required, and with protection from adverse weather conditions until further transport, sale or other use (including rearing or slaughter);
  • b) 
    providing an adequate number of animal handlers to load, unload, drive and hold animals in a manner that causes minimum stress and injury; in the absence of a separate animal handler , the driver is the a ni ma l ha ndler ;
  • c) 
    minimising the opportunities for disease transmission;
  • d) 
    providing appropriate facilities, with water and feed when required;
  • e) 
    providing appropriate facilities for emergencies;
  • f) 
    providing facilities for washing and disinfecting vehicles after unloading ;
  • g) 
    providing facilities and competent staff to allow the humane k illing of animals when required; h) ensuring proper rest times and minimal delay during stops.
  • 6. 
    The responsibilities of Competent A uthorities include:
  • a) 
    establishing minimum standards for animal welfare , including requirements for inspection of animals before, during and after their travel, defining ‘fitness to travel’ and appropriate certification and record keeping;
  • b) 
    setting standards for facilities, containers and vehicles for the transport of animals ;
  • c) 
    setting standards for the competence of animal handlers , drivers and managers of facilities in relevant issues in animal welfare ;
  • d) 
    ensuring appropriate awareness and training of animal handlers , drivers and managers of facilities in relevant issues in animal welfare ;
  • e) 
    implementation of the standards, including through accreditation of / interaction with other organisations;
  • f) 
    monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of standards of health and other aspects of welfare ;

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  • g) 
    monitoring and evaluating the use of veterinary medications;
  • h) 
    giving animal consignments priority at frontiers in order to allow them to pass without unnecessary delay.
  • 7. 
    All individuals, including veterinarians , involved in transporting animals and the associated handling procedures should receive appropriate training and be competent to meet their responsibilities.
  • 8. 
    The receiving Competent A uthority should report back to the sending Competent A uthority on significant animal welfare problems which occurred during the journey .

EU comments

Article 7.3.4.

Competence

  • 1. 
    All people responsible for animals during journeys , should be competent according to their responsibilities listed in Article 7.3.3. Competence may be gained through formal training and/or practical experience.
  • 2. 
    The assessment of the competence of animal handlers should at a minimum address knowledge, and ability to apply that knowledge, in the following areas:
  • a) 
    planning a journey , including appropriate space allowance , and feed, water and ventilation requirements;
  • b) 
    responsibilities for animals during the journey , including loading and unloading ;
  • c) 
    sources of advice and assistance;
  • d) 
    animal behaviour, general signs of disease , and indicators of poor animal welfare such as stress, pain and fatigue, and their alleviation;
  • e) 
    assessment of fitness to travel; if fitness to travel is in doubt, the animal should be examined by a veterinarian ;
  • f) 
    relevant authorities and applicable transport regulations, and associated documentation requirements;
  • g) 
    general disease prevention procedures, including cleaning and disinfection ;
  • h) 
    appropriate methods of animal handling during transport and associated activities such as assembling, loa di ng and unl oa di ng ;
  • i) 
    methods of inspecting animals , managing situations frequently encountered during transport such as adverse weather conditions, and dealing with emergencies, including humane killing ;

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Annex XVII (contd)

  • j) 
    species-specific aspects and age-specific aspects of animal handling and care, including feeding, watering and inspection; and
  • k) 
    maintaining a journey log and other records.

Article 7.3.5.

Planning the journey

  • 1. 
    General considerations
  • a) 
    Adequate planning is a key factor affecting the welfare of animals during a j ourney .
  • b) 
    Before the journey starts, plans should be made in relation to: i) preparation of animals for the journey ;
  • ii) 
    choice of road, rail, roll-on roll-off vessels or containers ;
  • iii) 
    nature and duration of the journey ;
  • iv) 
    vehicle design and maintenance, including roll-on roll-off vessels;
  • v) 
    required documentation;
  • vii) 
    rest, water and feed;
  • viii) 
    observation of animals en route;
  • ix) 
    control of disease ;
  • x) 
    emergency response procedures;
  • xi) 
    forecast weather conditions (e.g. conditions being too hot or too cold to travel during certain periods of the day);
  • xii) 
    transfer time when changing mode of transport, and
  • xiii) 
    waiting time at frontiers and inspection points.
  • c) 
    Regulations concerning drivers (for example, maximum driving periods) should take into account animal welfare whenever possible.
  • 2. 
    Preparation of animals for the journey
  • a) 
    When animals are to be provided with a novel diet or method of water provision during transport, an adequate period of adaptation should be planned. For all animals it is essential that the rest stops during long journeys are long enough to fulfil each animal ’s need for feed and water. Species-specific short period of feed deprivation prior to loading may be desirable.

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  • b) 
    A nimals more accustomed to contact with humans and with being handled are likely to be less fearful of being loaded and transported. A nimal handlers should handle and load animals in a manner that reduces their fearfulness and improves their approachability.
  • c) 
    Behaviour-modifying compounds (such as tranquillisers) or other medication should not be used routinely during transport. Such compounds should only be administered when a problem exists in an individual animal , and should be administered by a veterinarian or other person who has been instructed in their use by a veterinarian .
  • 3. 
    Nature and duration of the journey

The maximum duration of a journey should be determined according to factors such as:

  • a) 
    the ability of the animals to cope with the stress of transport (such as very young, old, lactating or pregnant a ni mals );
  • b) 
    the previous transport experience of the animals ;
  • c) 
    the likely onset of fatigue;
  • d) 
    the need for special attention;
  • e) 
    the need for feed and water;
  • f) 
    the increased susceptibility to injury and disease ;
  • g) 
    space allowance , vehicle design, road conditions and driving quality; h) weather conditions;
  • i) 
    vehicle type used, terrain to be traversed, road surfaces and quality, skill and experience of the driver. 4. Vehicle and container design and maintenance
  • a) 
    V ehicles and containers used for the transport of animals should be designed, constructed and fitted as appropriate for the species, size and weight of the animals to be transported. Special attention should be paid to avoid injury to animals through the use of secure smooth fittings free from sharp protrusions. The avoidance of injury to drivers and animal handlers while carrying out their responsibilities should be emphasised.
  • b) 
    V ehicles and containers should be designed with the structures necessary to provide protection from adverse weather conditions and to minimise the opportunity for animals to escape.
  • c) 
    In order to minimise the likelihood of the spread of infectious disease during transport, vehicles and containers should be designed to permit thorough cleaning and disinfection , and the containment of faeces and urine during a journey .
  • d) 
    V ehicles and containers should be maintained in good mechanical and structural condition.
  • e) 
    V ehicles and containers should have adequate ventilation to meet variations in climate and the thermo-regulatory needs of the animal species being transported; the ventilation system (natural or mechanical) should be effective when the vehicle is stationary, and the airflow should be adjustable.

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  • f) 
    V ehicles should be designed so that the faeces or urine from animals on upper levels do not soil animals on lower levels, nor their feed and water. This condition is not applicable for poultry . They are generally transported in plastic cages which are designed to let air flow through in all directions to obtain a better ventilation.

EU Comments

In point 4. f) of Art 7.3.5, the following sentence should be included at the end of the paragraph:

"However in the case of poultry, measures should be taken to minimise that faeces and urine fall on the animals below"

Justification

Crates are effectively designed to let air flow circulate on the sides but can be equipped with solid floors so as to minimise the leak of urine and faeces.

  • g) 
    When vehicles are carried on board ferries, facilities for adequately securing them should be available.
  • h) 
    If feeding or watering while the vehicle is moving is required, adequate facilities on the vehicle should be available.
  • i) 
    When appropriate, suitable bedding should be added to vehicle floors to assist absorption of urine and faeces, to minimise slipping by animals , and protect animals (especially young animals ) from hard flooring surfaces and adverse weather conditions.
  • 5. 
    Special provisions for transport in vehicles (road and rail) on roll-on/roll-off vessels or for containers
  • a) 
    V ehicles and containers should be equipped with a sufficient number of adequately designed, positioned and maintained securing points enabling them to be securely fastened to the vessel .
  • b) 
    V ehicles and containers should be secured to the vessel before the start of the sea journey to prevent them being displaced by the motion of the vessel .
  • c) 
    Roll-on/roll-off vessels should have adequate ventilation to meet variations in climate and the thermo-regulatory needs of the animal species being transported, especially where the animals are transported in a secondary vehicle /container on enclosed decks.
  • 6. 
    Space allowance
  • a) 
    The number of animals which should be transported on a vehicle or in a container and their allocation to compartments should be determined before loading .
  • b) 
    The space required on a vehicle or in a container depends upon whether or not the animals need to lie down (for example, pigs, camels and poultry), or to stand (horses). A nimals which will need to lie down often stand when first loaded or when the vehicle is driven with too much lateral movement or sudden braking.

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EU Comments

In point 6. b) of Art 7.3.5, "cattle and sheep" should be included in the list of examples of animals that need to lie down during transport.

Justification

Such species as well as pigs, camels and poultry need to lie down during transport.

  • c) 
    When animals lie down, they should all be able to adopt a normal lying posture, without being on top of one another, and allowing necessary thermoregulation.
  • d) 
    When animals are standing, they should have sufficient space to adopt a balanced position as appropriate to the climate and species transported.
  • e) 
    The amount of headroom necessary depends on the species of animal . Each animal should be able to assume its natural standing position for transport (including during loading and unloading ) without coming into contact with the roof or upper deck of the vehicle , and there should be sufficient headroom to allow adequate airflow over the animals . These conditions will not normally apply to poultry . However, under tropical and subtropical conditions poultry benefit from having adequate head room to allow head cooling.

EU Comments

In point 6. e) of Art 7.3.5, in the first sentence of the paragraph above and after the term "vehicle", the EU wishes to replace the rest of the sentence as follow:

"…vehicle. This condition should not apply to poultry except for one day old chicks. There should always be sufficient headroom to allow adequate airflow over the animals".

Justification

  • 1. 
    Day old chicks should be able to stand in order to avoid to be trampled.
  • 2. 
    Sufficient headroom is always necessary for an adequate airflow even outside subtropical or tropical conditions.
  • f) 
    Calculations for the space allowance for each animal should be carried out using the figures given in a relevant national or international document. The number and size of pens on the vehicle should be varied to where possible accommodate already established groups of animals while avoiding group sizes which are too large.
  • g) 
    Other factors which may influence space allowance include:
  • i) 
  • ii) 
    length of journey ;
  • iii) 
    need to provide feed and water on the vehicle ;
  • iv) 
    quality of roads;

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  • v) 
    expected weather conditions; vi) category and sex of the animals . 7. Rest, water and feed
  • a) 
    Suitable water and feed should be available as appropriate and needed for the species, age, and condition of the animals , as well as the duration of the journey , climatic conditions, etc.
  • b) 
    A nimals should be allowed to rest at resting points at appropriate intervals during the journey . The type of transport, the age and species of the animals being transported, and climatic conditions should determine the frequency of rest stops and whether the animals should be unloaded. Water and feed should be available during rest stops.
  • 8. 
    Ability to observe animals during the journey
  • a) 
    A nimals should be positioned to enable each animal to be observed regularly during the j ourney to ensure their safety and good welfare .
  • b) 
    If the animals are in crates or on multi-tiered vehicles which do not allow free access for observation, for example where the roof of the tier is too low, animals cannot be inspected adequately, and serious injury or disease could go undetected. In these circumstances, a shorter journey duration should be allowed, and the maximum duration will vary according to the rate at which problems arise in the species and under the conditions of transport.
  • 9. 
    Control of disease

As animal transport is often a significant factor in the spread of infectious diseases , journey planning should take the following into account:

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  • 10. 
    Emergency response procedures

There should be an emergency management plan that identifies the important adverse events that may be encountered during the journey , the procedures for managing each event and the action to be taken in an emergency. For each important event, the plan should document the actions to be undertaken and the responsibilities of all parties involved, including communications and record keeping.

  • 11. 
    Other considerations
  • a) 
    Extreme weather conditions are hazardous for animals undergoing transport and require appropriate vehicle design to minimise risks. Special precautions should be taken for animals that have not been acclimatised or which are unsuited to either hot or cold conditions. In some extreme conditions of heat or cold, animals should not be transported at all.
  • b) 
    In some circumstances, transportation during the night may reduce thermal stress or the adverse effects of other external stimuli.

Article 7.3.6. Documentation

  • 1. 
    A nimals should not be loaded until the documentation required to that point is complete.
  • 2. 
    The documentation accompanying the consignment should include:
  • a) 
    journey travel plan and emergency management plan;
  • b) 
    date, time and place of loading and unloading ;
  • c) 
    veterinary certification, when required;
  • d) 
    animal welfare competencies of the driver (under study);
  • e) 
    animal identification to allow animal traceability to the premises of departure and, where possible, to the premises of origin;
  • f) 
    details of any animals considered at particular risk of suffering poor welfare during transport (point 3e) of Article 7.3.7.);
  • g) 
    documentation of the period of rest, and access to feed and water, prior to the journey ;
  • h) 
    stock ing density estimate for each load in the consignment;
  • i) 
    the journey log - daily record of inspection and important events, including records of morbidity and mortality and actions taken, climatic conditions, rest stops, travel time and distance, feed and water offered and estimates of consumption, medication provided, and mechanical defects.
  • 3. 
    When veterinary certification is required to accompany consignments of animals , it should address:
  • a) 
    fitness of animals to travel;
  • b) 
    animal identification (description, number, etc.);
  • c) 
    health status including any tests, treatments and vaccinations carried out;

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At the time of certification, the veterinarian should notify the animal handler or the driver of any factors affecting the fitness of animals to travel for a particular journey .

Article 7.3.7. Pre-journey period

  • 1. 
    General considerations
  • a) 
    Pre-journey rest is necessary if the welfare of animals has become poor during the collection period because of the physical environment or the social behaviour of the animals . The need for rest should be judged by a veterinarian or other competent person.
  • b) 
    Pre-journey assembly/holding areas should be designed to: i) securely hold the animals ;
  • ii) 
    maintain a safe environment from hazards, including predators and disease ;
  • iii) 
    protect animals from exposure to severe weather conditions;
  • iv) 
    allow for maintenance of social groups;
  • v) 
    allow for rest, and appropriate water and feed.
  • c) 
    Consideration should be given to the previous transport experience, training and conditioning of the animals , if known, as these may reduce fear and stress in animals .
  • d) 
    Feed and water should be provided pre-journey if the journey duration is greater than the normal interfeeding and drinking interval for the animal . Recommendations for specific-species are described in detail in Article 7.3.12.
  • e) 
    When animals are to be provided with a novel diet or method of feed or water provision during the journey , an adequate period of adaptation should be allowed.
  • f) 
    Before each journey , vehicles and containers should be thoroughly cleaned and, if necessary, treated for animal health and public health purposes, using methods approved by the Competent A uthority . When cleaning is necessary during a journey , this should be carried out with the minimum of stress and risks to the animals .
  • g) 
    Where an animal handler believes that there is a significant risk of disease among the animals to be loaded or significant doubt as to their fitness to travel, the animals should be examined by a veterinarian .
  • 2. 
    Selection of compatible groups

Compatible groups should be selected before transport to avoid adverse animal welfare consequences. The following recommendations should be applied when assembling groups of a nimals :

  • a) 
    A nimals reared together should be maintained as a group; animals with a strong social bond, such as a dam and offspring, should be transported together.

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  • b) 
    A nimals of the same species can be mixed unless there is a significant likelihood of aggression; aggressive individuals should be segregated (recommendations for specific species are described in detail in Article 7.3.12.). For some species, animals from different groups should not be mixed because poor welfare occurs unless they have established a social structure.
  • c) 
    Young or small animals should be separated from older or larger animals , with the exception of nursing mothers with young at foot.
  • d) 
    A nimals with horns or antlers should not be mixed with animals lacking horns or antlers unless judged to be compatible.
  • e) 
    A nimals of different species should not be mixed unless they are judged to be compatible. 3. Fitness to travel
  • a) 
    Each animal should be inspected by a veterinarian or an animal handler to assess fitness to travel. If its fitness to travel is in doubt, the animal should be examined by a veterinarian . A nimals found unfit to travel should not be loaded onto a vehicle , except for transport to receive veterinary attention.
  • b) 
    Humane and effective arrangements should be made by the owner and the agent for the handling and care of any animal rejected as unfit to travel.
  • c) 
    A nimals that are unfit to travel include, but may not be limited to: i) those that are sick, injured, weak, disabled or fatigued;
  • ii) 
    those that are unable to stand unaided and bear weight on each leg;
  • iii) 
    those that are blind in both eyes;
  • iv) 
    those that cannot be moved without causing them additional suffering;
  • v) 
    newborn with an unhealed navel;
  • vi) 
    pregnant animals which would be in the final 10% of their gestation period at the planned time of unloading ;
  • vii) 
    females travelling without young which have given birth within the previous 48 hours;
  • viii) 
    those whose body condition would result in poor welfare because of the expected climatic conditions.
  • d) 
    Risks during transport can be reduced by selecting animals best suited to the conditions of travel and those that are acclimatised to expected weather conditions.
  • e) 
    A nimals at particular risk of suffering poor welfare during transport and which require special conditions (such as in the design of facilities and vehicles , and the length of the journey ) and additional attention during transport, may include:
  • i) 
    large or obese individuals;
  • ii) 
    very young or old animals ;
  • iii) 
    excitable or aggressive animals ;

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  • iv) 
    animals which have had little contact with humans;
  • v) 
    animals subject to motion sickness;
  • vi) 
    females in late pregnancy or heavy lactation, dam and offspring;
  • vii) 
    animals with a history of exposure to stressors or pathogenic agents prior to transport;
  • viii) 
    animals with unhealed wounds from recent surgical procedures such as dehorning.
  • 4. 
    Specific species requirements

Transport procedures should be able to take account of variations in the behaviour of the species. Flight zones, social interactions and other behaviour vary significantly among species and even within species. Facilities and handling procedures that are successful with one species are often ineffective or dangerous with another.

Recommendations for specific species are described in detail in Article 7.3.12.

Article 7.3.8.

Loading

  • 1. 
    Competent supervision
  • a) 
    L oading should be carefully planned as it has the potential to be the cause of poor welfare in transported a ni mals .
  • b) 
    L oading should be supervised and/or conducted by animal handlers . The animals are to be loaded quietly and without unnecessary noise, harassment or force. Untrained assistants or spectators should not impede the process.
  • c) 
    When containers are loaded onto a vehicle , this should be carried out in such a way to avoid poor animal welfare .
  • 2. 
    Facilities
  • a) 
    The facilities for loading including the collecting area, races and loading ramps should be designed and constructed to take into account the needs and abilities of the animals with regard to dimensions, slopes, surfaces, absence of sharp projections, flooring, etc.
  • b) 
    L oading facilities should be properly illuminated to allow the animals to be observed by animal handler(s) , and to allow the ease of movement of the animals at all times. Facilities should provide uniform light levels directly over approaches to sorting pens, chutes, loading ramps, with brighter light levels inside vehicles /containers , in order to minimise baulking. Dim light levels may be advantageous for the catching of poultry and some other animals . Artificial lighting may be required. Loading ramps and other facilities should have a non-slippery flooring.
  • c) 
    Ventilation during loading and the journey should provide for fresh air, the removal of excessive heat, humidity and noxious fumes (such as ammonia and carbon monoxide), and the prevention of accumulations of ammonia and carbon dioxide. Under warm and hot conditions, ventilation should allow for the adequate convective cooling of each animal . In some instances, adequate ventilation can be achieved by increasing the space allowance for animals .

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  • 3. 
    Goads and other aids

When moving animals , their species-specific behaviour should be used (see Article 7.3.12. If goads and other aids are necessary, the following principles should apply:

  • a) 
    A nimals that have little or no room to move should not be subjected to physical force or goads and other aids which compel movement. Electric goads and prods should only be used in extreme cases and not on a routine basis to move animals . The use and the power output should be restricted to that necessary to assist movement of an animal and only when an animal has a clear path ahead to move. Goads and other aids should not be used repeatedly if the animal fails to respond or move. In such cases it should be investigated whether some physical or other impediment is preventing the animal from moving.
  • b) 
    The use of such devices should be limited to battery-powered goads on the hindquarters of pigs and large ruminants, and never on sensitive areas such as the eyes, mouth, ears, anogenital region or belly. Such instruments should not be used on horses, sheep and goats of any age, or on calves or piglets.
  • c) 
    Useful and permitted goads include panels, flags, plastic paddles, flappers (a length of cane with a short strap of leather or canvas attached), plastic bags and rattles; they should be used in a manner sufficient to encourage and direct movement of the animals without causing undue stress.
  • d) 
    Painful procedures (including whipping, tail twisting, use of nose twitches, pressure on eyes, ears or external genitalia), or the use of goads or other aids which cause pain and suffering (including large sticks, sticks with sharp ends, lengths of metal piping, fencing wire or heavy leather belts), should not be used to move animals .
  • e) 
    Excessive shouting at animals or making loud noises (e.g. through the cracking of whips) to encourage them to move should not occur, as such actions may make the animals agitated, leading to crowding or falling.
  • f) 
    The use of well trained dogs to help with the loading of some species may be acceptable.
  • g) 
    A nimals should be grasped or lifted in a manner which avoids pain or suffering and physical damage (e.g. bruising, fractures, dislocations). In the case of quadrupeds, manual lifting by a person should only be used in young animals or small species, and in a manner appropriate to the species; grasping or lifting animals only by their wool, hair, feathers, feet, neck, ears, tails, head, horns, limbs causing pain or suffering should not be permitted, except in an emergency where animal welfare or human safety may otherwise be compromised.
  • h) 
    Conscious animals should not be thrown, dragged or dropped.
  • i) 
    Performance standards should be established in which numerical scoring is used to evaluate the use of such instruments, and to measure the percentage of animals moved with an electric instrument and the percentage of animals slipping or falling as a result of their usage.

Article 7.3.9. Travel

  • 1. 
    General considerations
  • a) 
    Drivers and animal handlers should check the load immediately before departure to ensure that the animals have been properly loaded. Each load should be checked again early in the trip and adjustments made as appropriate. Periodic checks should be made throughout the trip, especially at rest or refuelling stops or during meal breaks when the vehicle is stationary.

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  • b) 
    Drivers should utilise smooth, defensive driving techniques, without sudden turns or stops, to minimise uncontrolled movements of the animals .
  • 2. 
    Methods of restraining or containing animals
  • a) 
    Methods of restraining animals should be appropriate to the species and age of animals involved and the training of the individual animal .
  • b) 
    Recommendations for specific species are described in detail in Article 7.3.12.
  • 3. 
    Regulating the environment within vehicles or containers
  • a) 
    A nimals should be protected against harm from hot or cold conditions during travel. Effective ventilation procedures for maintaining the environment within vehicles or containers will vary according to whether conditions are cold, hot and dry or hot and humid, but in all conditions a build-up of noxious gases should be prevented.
  • b) 
    The environment within vehicles or containers in hot and warm weather can be regulated by the flow of air produced by the movement of the vehicle . In warm and hot weather, the duration of journey stops should be minimised and vehicles should be parked under shade, with adequate and appropriate ventilation.
  • c) 
    To minimise slipping and soiling, and maintain a healthy environment, urine and faeces should be removed from floors when necessary and disposed of in such a way as to prevent the transmission of disease and in compliance with all relevant health and environmental legislation.
  • 4. 
    Sick, injured or dead animals
  • a) 
    A driver or an animal handler finding sick, injured or dead animals should act according to a predetermined emergency response plan.
  • b) 
    Sick or injured animals should be segregated.
  • c) 
    Ferries (roll-on roll-off) should have procedures to treat sick or injured animals during the journey .
  • d) 
    In order to reduce the likelihood that animal transport will increase the spread of infectious disease , contact between transported animals , or the waste products of the transported animals , and other farm animals should be minimised.
  • e) 
    During the journey , when disposal of a dead animal becomes necessary, this should be carried out in such a way as to prevent the transmission of disease and in compliance with all relevant health and environmental legislation.
  • f) 
    When k illing is necessary, it should be carried out as quickly as possible and assistance should be sought from a veterinarian or other person(s) competent in humane k illing procedures. Recommendations for specific species are described in Chapter 7.6. on killing of animals for disease control purposes.
  • 5. 
    Water and feed requirements
  • a) 
    If journey duration is such that feeding or watering is required or if the species requires feed or water throughout, access to suitable feed and water for all the animals (appropriate for their species and age) carried in the vehicle should be provided. There should be adequate space for all animals to move to the feed and water sources and due account taken of likely competition for feed.

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  • b) 
    Recommendations for specific species are described in detail in Article 7.3.12.
  • 6. 
    Rest periods and conditions
  • a) 
    A nimals that are being transported should be rested at appropriate intervals during the journey and offered feed and water, either on the vehicle or, if necessary, unloaded into suitable facilities.
  • b) 
    Suitable facilities should be used en route, when resting requires the unloading of the animals . These facilities should meet the needs of the particular animal species and should allow access of all animals to feed and water.
  • 7. 
    In-transit observations
  • a) 
    A nimals being transported by road should be observed soon after a journey is commenced and whenever the driver has a rest stop. After meal breaks and refuelling stops, the animals should be observed immediately prior to departure.
  • b) 
    A nimals being transported by rail should be observed at each scheduled stop. The responsible rail transporter should monitor the progress of trains carrying animals and take all appropriate action to minimise delays.
  • c) 
    During stops, it should be ensured that the animals continue to be properly confined, have appropriate feed and water, and their physical condition is satisfactory.

Article 7.3.10. Unloading and post-journey handling

  • 1. 
    General considerations
  • a) 
    The required facilities and the principles of animal handling detailed in Article 7.3.8. apply equally to unloading , but consideration should be given to the likelihood that the animals will be fatigued.
  • b) 
    Unloading should be supervised and/or conducted by an animal handler with knowledge and experience of the behavioural and physical characteristics of the species being unloaded. A nimals should be unloaded from the vehicle into appropriate facilities as soon as possible after arrival at the destination but sufficient time should be allowed for unloading to proceed quietly and without unnecessary noise, harassment or force.
  • c) 
    Facilities should provide all animals with appropriate care and comfort, adequate space and ventilation, access to feed (if appropriate) and water, and shelter from extreme weather conditions.
  • d) 
    For details regarding the unloading of animals at a slaughterhouse , see Chapter 7.5. on slaughter of animals for human consumption.
  • 2. 
    Sick or injured animals
  • a) 
    An animal that has become sick, injured or disabled during a journey should be appropriately treated or humanely killed (see Chapter 7.6. on killing of animals for disease control purposes). If necessary, veterinary advice should be sought in the care and treatment of these animals . In some cases, where animals are non-ambulatory due to fatigue, injury or sickness, it may be in the best welfare interests of the animal to be treated or killed aboard the vehicle . Assistance should be sought from a veterinarian or other person(s) competent in humane k illing procedures.
  • b) 
    At the destination, the animal handler or the driver during transit should ensure that responsibility for the welfare of sick, injured or disabled animals is transferred to a veterinarian or other suitable person.

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  • c) 
    If treatment or humane k illing is not possible aboard the vehicle , there should be appropriate facilities and equipment for the humane unloading of animals that are non-ambulatory due to fatigue, injury or sickness. These animals should be unloaded in a manner that causes the least amount of suffering. After unloading , separate pens and other appropriate facilities should be available for sick or injured animals .
  • d) 
    Feed, if appropriate, and water should be available for each sick or injured animal .
  • 3. 
    Addressing disease risks

The following should be taken into account in addressing the greater risk of disease due to animal transport and the possible need for segregation of transported animals at the destination:

  • a) 
    increased contact among animals , including those from different sources and with different disease histories;
  • b) 
    increased shedding of pathogens and increased susceptibility to infection related to stress and impaired defences against disease, including immunosuppression;
  • c) 
    exposure of animals to pathogens which may contaminate vehicles , resting points , mark ets , etc.
  • 4. 
    Cleaning and disinfection
  • a) 
    V ehicles , crates, containers , etc. used to carry the animals should be cleaned before re-use through the physical removal of manure and bedding by scraping, washing and flushing with water and detergent. This should be followed by disinfection when there are concerns about disease transmission.
  • b) 
    Manure, litter, bedding and the bodies of any animals which die during the journey should be disposed of in such a way as to prevent the transmission of disease and in compliance with all relevant health and environmental legislation.
  • c) 
    Establishments like livestock mark ets , slaughterhouses , resting sites, railway stations, etc. where animals are unloaded should be provided with appropriate areas for the cleaning and disinfection of vehicles .

Article 7.3.11. Actions in the event of a refusal to allow the completion of the journey

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Annex XVII (contd)

  • b) 
    in the event of a refusal for animal health reasons, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should provide urgent access to a veterinarian , where possible an OIE veterinarian(s) appointed by the Director General, to assess the health status of the animals with regard to the concerns of the importing country , and the necessary facilities and approvals to expedite the required diagnostic testing;
  • c) 
    the Competent A uthority of the importing country should provide access to allow continued assessment of the health and other aspects of the welfare of the animals ;
  • d) 
    if the matter cannot be promptly resolved, the Competent A uthorities of the ex porting and importing countries should call on the OIE to mediate.
  • 3. 
    In the event that a Competent A uthority requires the animals to remain on the vehicle , the priorities should be:
  • a) 
    to allow provisioning of the vehicle with water and feed as necessary;
  • b) 
    to provide urgently in writing the reasons for the refusal;
  • c) 
    to provide urgent access to an independent veterinarian(s) to assess the health status of the animals , and the necessary facilities and approvals to expedite the required diagnostic testing in the event of a refusal for animal health reasons;
  • d) 
    to provide access to allow continued assessment of the health and other aspects of the welfare of the animals , and the necessary actions to deal with any animal issues which arise.
  • 4. 
    The OIE should utilise its informal procedure for dispute mediation to identify a mutually agreed solution which will address animal health and any other welfare issues in a timely manner.

Article 7.3.12.

Species-specific issues

Camelids of the new world in this context comprise llamas, alpacas, guanaco and vicuna. They have good eyesight and, like sheep, can negotiate steep slopes, though ramps should be as shallow as possible. They load most easily in a bunch as a single animal will strive to rejoin the others. Whilst they are usually docile, they have an unnerving habit of spitting in self-defence. During transport, they usually lie down. They frequently extend their front legs forward when lying, so gaps below partitions should be high enough so that their legs are not trapped when the animals rise.

Cattle are sociable animals and may become agitated if they are singled out. Social order is usually established at about t wo years of age. When groups are mixed, social order has to be re-established and aggression may occur until a new order is established. Crowding of cattle may also increase aggression as the animals try to maintain personal space. Social behaviour varies with age, breed and sex; Bos indicus and B. indicus -cross animals are usually more temperamental than European breeds. Young bulls, when moved in groups, show a degree of playfulness (pushing and shoving) but become more aggressive and territorial with age. Adult bulls have a minimum personal space of six square metres. Cows with young calves can be very protective, and handling calves in the presence of their mothers can be dangerous. Cattle tend to avoid “dead end” in passages.

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Goats should be handled calmly and are more easily led or driven than if they are excited. When goats are moved, their gregarious tendencies should be exploited. Activities which frighten, injure or cause agitation to animals should be avoided. Bullying is particularly serious in goats and can reflect demands for personal space. Housing strange goats together could result in fatalities, either through physical violence, or subordinate goats being refused access to food and water.

Horses in this context include donkeys, mules and hinnies. They have good eyesight and a very wide angle of vision. They may have a history of loading resulting in good or bad experiences. Good training should result in easier loading , but some horses can prove difficult, especially if they are inexperienced or have associated loading with poor transport conditions. In these circumstances, t wo experienced animal handlers can load an animal by linking arms or using a strop below its rump. Blindfolding may even be considered. Ramps should be as shallow as possible. Steps are not usually a problem when horses mount a ramp, but they tend to jump a step when descending, so steps should be as low as possible. Horses benefit from being individually stalled, but may be transported in compatible groups. When horses are to travel in groups, their shoes should be removed. Horses are prone to respiratory disease if they are restricted by period by tethers that prevent the lowering and lifting of their heads.

Pigs have poor eyesight, and may move reluctantly in unfamiliar surroundings. They benefit from well lit loading bays. Since they negotiate ramps with difficulty, these should be as level as possible and provided with secure footholds. Ideally, a hydraulic lift should be used for greater heights. Pigs also negotiate steps with difficulty. A good ‘rule-of-thumb’ is that no step should be higher than the pig’s front knee. Serious aggression may result if unfamiliar animals are mixed. Pigs are highly susceptible to heat stress. Pigs are susceptible to motion sickness when in transit. Feed deprivation prior to loading may be beneficial to prevent motion sickness.

Sheep are sociable animals with good eyesight, a relatively subtle and undemonstrative behaviour and a tendency to “flock together”, especially when they are agitated. They should be handled calmly and their tendency to follow each other should be exploited when they are being moved. Crowding of sheep may lead to damaging aggressive and submissive behaviours as animals try to maintain personal space. Sheep may become agitated if they are singled out for attention, or kept alone, and will strive to rejoin the group. Activities which frighten, injure or cause agitation to sheep should be avoided. They can negotiate steep ramps.

text deleted

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Annex XVII (contd)

CH AP TE R 7.4. TRANSPORT OF ANIMALS BY AIR

Article 7.4.1. Livestock containers

  • 1. 
    Design
  • a) 
    General principles of design

The container should:

  • conform to the size of the standard pallet of the aircraft that will be used to transport animals ; the common sizes are: 224 x 318 cm (88 x 125 in.) and 244 x 318 cm (96 x 125 in.);

not be constructed of material that could be harmful to the animals health or welfare ;

allow observation of the animals and be marked on opposite sides with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) symbols which indicate animals and the upright position;

allow emergency access to animals ;

allow the animal to stand in its normal position without touching the roof of the container or, in the case of open containers , the restraining nets, and provide at least 10 cm (4 in.) clearance above the animal 's head when standing in its normal position; in the case of horses, provide sufficient space above the horses head (21 cm, 8 in. recommended) to allow for the movement required to maintain the horses balance;

protect the animals from adverse weather;

ensure animals stand on a suitable floor to prevent slipping or injury;

have adequate strength to ensure the safety of the animals and to prevent the animals from escaping;

ensure doors can be opened and closed easily, but be secured so that they cannot be opened accidentally;

be free of any nails, bolts and other protrusions or sharp edges that could cause injuries;

be designed to minimise the risk of any opening or space entrapping any portion of the animals body;

if reusable, crates should be constructed of impermeable material that is easily cleaned and disinfected;

ensure faeces and urine cannot escape from the crate; this requires a minimum upturn of 20 cm but it must not block any ventilation openings;

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if designated for stacking be stable, not block any ventilation space and prevent urine and faeces from leaking into the containers below when stacked;

allow for a facility for provision of water and possibly food during transportation of longer than 6 hours duration.

  • b) 
    Ventilation

The container design should:

  • provide adequate ventilation taking into consideration the species stocking density, maximum temperature and humidity of the points of departure, destination, and any interim technical stops;

allow the normal resting or sleeping position to be assumed for certain species and juvenile a ni mals ;

ensure there is no dead air space in the container ;

provide ventilation openings on the walls equal to at least 16% of the wall area; this may be reduced if the container has an open top;

in the case of two-tiered containers , ventilation in the sides should be for cattle equivalent to not less than 20% of the floor area of each deck, and for pigs and sheep up to 40% of the floor area of each deck;

have ventilation openings on all four sides of the crate except that t wo walls may have reduced ventilation space and the other walls have increased space where required by the positioning of the crates during transportation and/or the ventilation pattern of the aircraft;

ensure that any internal supports or dividers do not block the cross ventilation;

not have a solid wall above the height of the animal's head in normal resting position;

in those species where the mouth is normally held near the floor, have at least 25 cm (10 in.) of ventilation space at the level of the animal 's head; this opening should be divided in t wo with a maximum height for any opening of 13 cm; in all containers , there should be a sufficiently large ventilation opening at a height of 25 cm to 30 cm (10 to 11 in.) above floor level on all four sides to allow for circulation;

have some physical means of ensuring the ventilation space is not blocked, such as the use of cleats (wedges) or allowing space between the outside of the container and the pallet.

  • 2. 
    Species requirements

In general, fractious animals or animals in late pregnancy should not be transported by air (see Article 7.4.2.).

  • a) 
    Horses

Should be transported in containers and be separated from each other if they are more than 145 cm (57 in.) in height.

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Crates used to transport horses should:

be strong enough to prevent unruly horses from breaking or escaping from the container under any circumstances;

in the case of multi-horse containers , have partitions of sufficient strength and size to separate the horses and to support each horse's weight;

adjust to allow mare and foal to travel together;

provide the same percentage of open space for ventilation as required in point 1 above, divided between the t wo side walls; however, if the access doors are constructed in such a manner that they may be left open during the flight, the door space may be included in the ventilation space;

be constructed to minimise noise;

allow access to the head during the flight;

have the front end notched and padded to accept the neck of the animal ;

have a secure point for attaching restraining devices;

have a front and rear barrier that will restrict the movement of the horse and will ensure that liquids are deflected into the container ;

ensure horses cannot bite other animals ;

be constructed to resist kicking;

have no fittings or projections in the area likely to be kicked, metal plates should be covered with a protective material;

  • ramps shall be non-skid in nature, have foot battens, and be of a maximum slope of 25 degrees when the container is on a standard 50 cm (20 in.) dolly;
  • not have a step up or down of more than 25 cm (10 in.).
  • b) 
    Swine

Crate design and shipment planning should recognize that swine are extremely susceptible to high heat and humidity and that they normally carry their head near the floor.

In the use of multi-tiered crates, special attention should be paid to ensure air can move through the crate, in accordance with the aircraft's ventilation pattern and capacity to remove heat.

Crate construction should take into consideration the tendency for mature swine to chew.

Litter should be dust-free, shavings or other non toxic materials may be used but not sawdust.

Containers for immature swine should only be constructed when flight is imminent, since rapid growth can result in undersized containers if the flight is delayed.

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In order to reduce fighting, swine shipped in group pens should be housed together as a group prior to shipment and not be mixed with other swine before loading on the aircraft.

  • Mature boars and incompatible females should be shipped in individual crates.
  • Individual crates should be 20 cm (8 in.) longer than the body, 15 cm (6 in.) higher than the loin of the pig and of sufficient width, to allow the pigs to lie on their side.
  • c) 
    Cattle

Crates used to transport cattle should:

  • if multi-tiered or roofed, have at least 33% of the roof and four walls as open space;
  • have at least one ventilation opening 20-25 cm (8-10 in.) above the floor which is of such width that it will not cause injuries to the feet.

Adult bulls should be transported separately unless they have been accustomed to each other. Cattle with and without horns should be separated from each other.

d)   Poultry

Crates/containers containing poultry should be handled and carried carefully with no unnecessary tilting.

The majority of birds transported by air will be newly hatched chicks. These animals are very vulnerable to sudden changes in temperature.

de) Other species

  • A nimals that normally exhibit a herding instinct, including buffalo and deer, can be shipped in group containers providing the mental and physical characteristics of the species are taken into consideration.
  • All crates used to move such animals should have a roof or other method of preventing the animals from escaping.

A nimals in which the horns or antler cannot be removed, should be transported individually.

Deer should not be transported in velvet nor in rut.

Article 7.4.2.

Recommendations for pregnant animals

Heavily pregnant animals should not be carried except under exceptional circumstances. Pregnant animals should not be accepted when the last service or exposure to a male prior to departure has exceeded the following time given here for guidance only:

Where service dates or date of last exposure to a male are not available, the animals should be examined by a veterinarian to ensure that pregnancy is not so advanced that animals are likely to give birth during transport or suffer unnecessarily.

Any animal showing udder engorgement and slackening of the pelvic ligament should be refused.

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Females

Maximum number of days since the last service

Horses

300

Cows

250

Deer (axis, fallow and sika)                                                                  170

(red deer, reindeer)                                                                             185

 

Ewes (sheep)

115

Nannies (goats)

115

Sows (pigs)

90

Article 7.4.3.

Stocking density

The current stock ing densities agreed by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) should continue to be accepted. However, the graphs giving the space requirements should be extended to take into account animals larger and smaller than those dealt with currently.

  • 1. 
    General considerations

When calculating stocking rates, the following should be taken into account:

  • a) 
    it is essential that accurate weights of animals are obtained in view of the limitations imposed by the load capabilities of the aircraft and the space required per animal ;
  • b) 
    in narrow bodied aircraft, there is a loss of floor area in the upper tier of two-tier penning due to the contours of the aircraft;
  • c) 
    space available should be calculated on the inside measurements of the crates or penning system used, not on the floor space of the aircraft;
  • d) 
    multi-tiered crates, high outdoor temperatures at departure, arrival or stopover points, or extreme length of the trip will require an increase in the amount of space per animal ; a 10% decrease in stock ing density is recommended for trips in excess of 24 hours;
  • e) 
    special attention should be paid to the transport of sheep in heavy wool which require an increase in space allotted per animal and to pigs which have limited ability to dissipate heat;
  • f) 
    animals confined in groups, especially in pens, should be stocked at a high enough density to prevent injuries at take-off, during turbulence and at landing, but not to the extent that individual animals cannot lie down and rise without risk of injury or crushing;
  • g) 
    in multi-tiered shipments, it should be recognized that the ventilation and cooling capacity of the aircraft is the limiting factor, especially in narrow bodied aircraft. Ventilation capacity varies on each individual aircraft and between aircraft of the same model.

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  • 2. 
    Recommendations for stocking densities

The following table gives stock ing density recommendations for different domestic species. The values are expressed in kilograms and metres.

 

Species

Weight

Density

Space/ animal

No. of animals per

Animals per single tier pallet

 
 

kg

kg/m²

10 m²

214x264 cm

214x308 cm

234x308 cm

Sheep

25 70

 

Pigs

25 100

147 196

0.17 0.36

 

172 196

0.15 0.51

59 27/8

67 20

 
 

50

220

0.23

43

24

28

31

Calves

70

246

0.28

35/6

20

23

25

80

266

0.30

33

18

21

24

 

90

280

0.32

31

17

20

22

 

300

344

0.84

11-12

6

7

8

Cattle

500

393

1.27

8

4

5

5

600

408

1.45

6-7

3-4

4

4-5

 

700

400

1.63

6

3

3-4

4

32 15

37 18

42 20

 

37 10

44 12

48 14

Article 7.4.4. Preparation for air transport of livestock

  • 1. 
    Health and customs requirements

The legal requirements including animal health, welfare and species conservation, should be ascertained from the country of destination and any in transit countries before the animals are assembled or the transportation is arranged.

Contact the V eterinary A uthorities in the country of origin regarding veterinary certification.

Planning of the transportation should take into account weekends, holidays and airport closures.

Verify that any proposed intransit stops or alternates will not jeopardise the importing or in transit countries health requirements.

Waiting time at customs (cargo handling and cle

welfare problems.

should be re

as much as

to

oid

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  • 2. 
    Environment

A nimals are affected by extremes of temperature. This is especially true of high temperature when compounded by high humidity. Temperature and humidity should therefore be taken into consideration when planning the shipment.

Times of arrival, departure and stopovers should be planned so that the aircraft lands during the coolest hours.

At outside temperatures of below 25°C at the landing point, the aircraft doors should be opened to ensure adequate ventilation. Confirmation should be received from government authorities that animal health legislation does not prevent opening of aircraft doors.

When outside temperatures at any landing point exceed 25°C, prior arrangements should be made to have an adequate air-conditioning unit available when the plane lands.

  • 3. 
    Facilities and equipment

Specific arrangements must be made to ensure that holding and loading facilities including ramps, trucks, and air-conditioning units are available at departure, all in transit and arrival airports. This should include identification of specific staff who are responsible and the method of contacting them, e.g. telephone number and address.

Specific notification must be given to all those responsible for providing facilities or equipment at the destination and in transit stops immediately before departure.

Containers should be loaded so as to ensure access can be made to the animals at all times.

  • 4. 
    Preparation of animals

Vaccination must be done far enough in advance of the departure date to allow for immunity to develop.

Veterinary certification and serological testing must be arranged several weeks in advance of livestock shipment.

Many animals require acclimatisation before they are transported. A nimals such as swine and wild herbivores must be separated and held in the groups that will occupy containers . Mixing of such animals immediately before or during transport is extremely stressing and should be avoided.

Incompatible animals should be transported singly.

Article 7.4.5.

Disinfection and disinfestation

  • 1. 
    Disinfection
  • a) 
    Those parts of the interior of the aircraft destined for the carriage of animals should be thoroughly cleaned of all foreign matters using methods acceptable to aircraft management before being loaded.

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  • b) 
    These parts should be sprayed with a disinfectant:
  • i) 
    suitable for the diseases which could be carried by the animals ;
  • ii) 
    that does not cause problems with the aircraft;
  • iii) 
    that will not leave a residue hazardous to the animals being transported.

If in doubt, the airline should be consulted on the suitability of the disinfectant. A mechanical nebuliser should be used to minimise the amount of disinfectant used.

Suggested disinfectants currently in use are:

  • iv) 
    4% sodium carbonate and 0.1% sodium silicate;
  • v) 
    0.2% citric acid.
  • c) 
    All removeable equipment, penning and containers including loading ramps should be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected in accordance with the requirements of both the ex porting and i mporting countries .
  • d) 
    After disinfection , all equipment to be replaced in the aircraft should be washed with clean water to remove any traces of disinfectant to avoid any damage to the aircraft structures.
  • 2. 
    Disinfestation

Where disinfestation is required, the country requesting the action should be consulted for appropriate procedures.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) Recommendations on the Disinsectisation of Aircraft (WHO Week ly E pidem. Rec. , No. 7, 1985) are recognised as standard.

Article 7.4.6.

Radiation

Radioactive materials must be separated from live animals by a distance of at least 0.5 metre for journeys not exceeding 24 hours, and by a distance of at least 1.0 metre for journeys longer than 24 hours (reference: Technical instructions on storage and loading-separation of the International Civil Aviation Organisation). Special care should be taken with regard to pregnant animals , semen and embryos/ova.

Article 7.4.7.

Tranquilization

Experience has shown that there is considerable risk in sedating animals transported by air. Tranquilizers reduce the ability of the animals to respond to stress during transportation. In addition, the reaction of various species to tranquilization cannot always be foreseen. For these reasons, routine tranquilization is not recommended. Tranquilizers should only be used when a specific problem exists, and should be administered by a veterinarian or by a person who has been instructed in their use. Persons using these drugs should understand the full implications of the effects of the drug in air transport, e.g. certain animals such as horses and elephants should not go down in containers . Drugs should only be administered during the flight with the knowledge and consent of the captain.

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In all cases, when tranquilizers are used, a note should be attached to the container stating the weight of the individual animal , the generic name of the drug used, the dose, the method and time of administration.

Article 7.4.8.

Destruction of carcasses

In the event of any animal death on board, the competent authority of the airport of destination should be notified in advance of landing.

Carcasses should be disposed of under the supervision of and to the satisfaction of the V eterinary A uthority of the country the aircraft is in.

The method of disposal should be based on the risk of introducing a controlled disease .

For carcasses which represent a high risk of introducing disease , the following is recommended:

  • 1. 
    destruction by incineration, rendering or deep burial under the supervision of the V eterinary A uthority ;
  • 2. 
    if removed from the airport site, transportation in a closed, leakproof container .

Article 7.4.9.

Emergency slaughter

Emergency slaughter of animals in aircraft should, in general, only occur when the safety of the aircraft, crew or other animals are involved.

Every aircraft transporting animals should have a method of killing the animals with minimum pain and someone trained in that method.

In all cases when horses or other large animals are to be carried, the method of killing should be discussed with the airline during the planning stages. Suitable methods are:

  • 1. 
    Captive bolt stunner, followed by an injection of a lethal chemical
  • a) 
    Operator should be trained to use the captive bolt stunner on the species or type of animal being transported.
  • b) 
    An expert should determine that the type of captive bolt pistol is adequate for all the animals being transported.
  • c) 
    Some airlines and countries may prohibit the carriage of captive bolt pistols.
  • d) 
    The user should recognise that the noise associated with the captive bolt may excite other animals .
  • e) 
    The requirement that the captive bolt pistol is accurately centered may be difficult to achieve with an excited animal .
  • 2. 
    Injection of a chemical
  • a) 
    Various chemicals may be used to sedate, immobilize or kill animals .

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  • b) 
    Central nervous system depressants such as barbiturate euthanasia solutions must be injected directly into a vein to be effective. This is not normally practical for anyone but an experienced veterinarian or an especially trained and experienced attendant, where the animal is sufficiently fractious to require euthanasia.
  • c) 
    Sedatives such as promazine and its derivatives may make the animal more fractious (see Article 7.4.7.).
  • d) 
    Immobilizing solutions such as succinylcholine are not humane. 3. Firearms

Airlines do not permit the use of firearms which discharge a free bullet because of the danger to the aircraft.

Article 7.4.10.

Handling of food and waste material

Waste material which contains anything of animal origin including food, litter, manure, or animal feed should be handled, collected and disposed of in a manner that ensures it will not be fed to livestock. It should be collected in specified areas, and stored and transported in closed, leakproof containers .

Some importing countries legislation may prohibit or restrict the use of hay or straw during the transportation period. Unloading of hay, straw, other animal feed and litter may be restricted or prohibited by in transit countries .

Article 7.4.11. Disposal of food and waste material

Recommended methods of disposal are:

  • a) 
    incineration to an ash;
  • b) 
    heating at an internal temperature of at least of 100°C for 30 minutes, then disposal in a land fill site;
  • c) 
    controlled burial in a land fill site.

text deleted

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Annex XVII (contd)

CH AP TE R 7.5. SLAUGHTER OF ANIMALS

EU Comments

The EU acknowledges the work carried out by OIE to address specific requirements for the slaughter of poultry and agrees with the proposed changes. Some specific comments are presented within the text.

Moreover, some previous EU comments are reiterated given their importance to the EU.

Article 7.5.1. General principles

  • 1. 
    Object

These recommendations address the need to ensure the welfare of food animals during pre-slaughter and slaughter processes, until they are dead.

These recommendations apply to the slaughter in slaughterhouses of the following domestic animals : cattle, buffalo, bison, sheep, goats, camelids, deer, horses, pigs, ratites, rabbits and poultry. Many of the recommendations do not apply to rabbits and poultry because of the specific manner of handling these animals . Other animals , wherever they have been reared, and all animals slaughtered outside slaugh

should be managed to ensure that their transport , lairage , restraint and slaughter is carried out without causing undue stress to the animals ; the principles underpinning these recommendations apply also to these animals .

  • 2. 
    Personnel

Persons engaged in the unloading , moving, lairage , care, restraint , stunning , slaughter and bleeding of a nimals play an important role in the welfare of those animals . For this reason, there should be a sufficient number of personnel, who should be patient, considerate, competent and familiar with the recommendations outlined in the present Chapter and their application within the national context.

Competence may be gained through formal training and/or practical experience. This competence should be demonstrated through a current certificate from the Competent A uthority or from an independent body accredited by the Competent A uthority .

The management of the slaughterhouse and the V eterinary Services should ensure that slaughterhouse staff are competent and carry out their tasks in accordance with the principles of animal welfare .

  • 3. 
    Animal behaviour

A nimal handlers should be experienced and competent in handling and moving farm livestock, and understand the behaviour patterns of animals and the underlying principles necessary to carry out their tasks.

The behaviour of individual animals or groups of animals will vary, depending on their breed, sex, temperament and age and the way in which they have been reared and handled. Despite these differences, the following behaviour patterns which are always present to some degree in domestic animals , should be taken into consideration in handling and moving the animals .

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Most domestic livestock are kept in herds groups and follow a leader by instinct.

A nimals which are likely to harm each other in a group situation should not be mixed at slaughterhouses .

The desire of some animals to control their personal space should be taken into account in designing facilities.

Annex XVII (contd)

Domestic animals will try to escape if any person approaches closer than a certain distance. This critical distance, which defines the flight zone, varies among species and individuals of the same species, and depends upon previous contact with humans. A nimals reared in close proximity to humans i.e. tame have a smaller flight zone, whereas those kept in free range or extensive systems may have flight zones which may vary from one metre to many metres. A nimal handlers should avoid sudden penetration of the flight zone which may cause a panic reaction which could lead to aggression or attempted escape.

A nimal handlers should use the point of balance at the animal ’s shoulder to move animals , adopting a position behind the point of balance to move an animal forward and in front of the point of balance to move it backward.

Domestic animals have wide-angle vision but only have limited forward binocular vision and poor perception of depth. This means that they can detect objects and movements beside and behind them, but can only judge distances directly ahead.

Although all most domestic animals have a highly sensitive sense of smell, they react in different ways to the smells of slaughterhouses . Smells which cause fear or other negative responses should be taken into consideration when managing animals .

Domestic animals can hear over a greater range of frequencies than humans and are more sensitive to higher frequencies. They tend to be alarmed by constant loud noise and by sudden noises, which may cause them to panic. Sensitivity to such noises should also be taken into account when handling animals .

An example of a flight zone (cattle)

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Handler movement pattern to move cattle forward

  • 4. 
    Distractions and their removal

Distractions that may cause approaching animals to stop, baulk or turn back should be designed out from new facilities or removed from existing ones. Below are examples of common distractions and methods for eliminating them:

  • a) 
    reflections on shiny metal or wet floors — move a lamp or change lighting;
  • b) 
    dark entrances to chutes, races, stun boxes or conveyor restrainers — illuminate with indirect lighting which does not shine directly into the eyes of approaching animals ;
  • c) 
    animals seeing moving people or equipment up ahead — install solid sides on chutes and races or install shields;
  • d) 
    dead ends — avoid if possible by curving the passage, or make an illusory passage;
  • e) 
    chains or other loose objects hanging in chutes or on fences — remove them;
  • f) 
    uneven floors or a sudden drop in floor levels at the entrance to conveyor restrainers — avoid uneven floor surfaces or install a solid false floor under the restrainer to provide an illusion of a solid and continuous walking surface;
  • g) 
    sounds of air hissing from pneumatic equipment — install silencers or use hydraulic equipment or vent high pressure to the external environment using flexible hosing;
  • h) 
    clanging and banging of metal objects — install rubber stops on gates and other devices to reduce metal to metal contact;
  • i) 
    air currents from fans or air curtains blowing into the face of animals — redirect or reposition equipment.

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Article 7.5.2.

Moving and handling animals

  • 1. 
    General considerations

A nimals should be transported to slaughter in a way that minimises adverse animal health and welfare outcomes, and the transport should be conducted in accordance with the OIE recommendations for the transportation of animals (Chapters 7.2. and 7.3.).

The following principles should apply to unloading animals , moving them into lairage pens, out of the lairage pens and up to the slaughter point:

  • a) 
    The conditions of the animals should be assessed upon their arrival for any animal welfare and health problems.
  • b) 
    Injured or sick animals , requiring immediate slaughter, should be killed humanely and without delay, in accordance with the recommendations of the OIE.
  • c) 
    A nimals should not be forced to move at a speed greater than their normal walking pace, in order to minimise injury through falling or slipping. Performance standards should be established where numerical scoring of the prevalence of animals slipping or falling is used to evaluate whether animal moving practices and/or facilities should be improved. In properly designed and constructed facilities with competent animal handlers , it should be possible to move 99% of animals without their falling.
  • d) 
    A nimals for slaughter should not be forced to walk over the top of other animals .
  • e) 
    A nimals should be handled in such a way as to avoid harm, distress or injury. Under no circumstances should animal handlers resort to violent acts to move animals , such as crushing or breaking tails of animals , grasping their eyes or pulling them by the ears. A nimal handlers should never apply an injurious object or irritant substance to animals and especially not to sensitive areas such as eyes, mouth, ears, anogenital region or belly. The throwing or dropping of animals , or their lifting or dragging by body parts such as their tail, head, horns, ears, limbs, wool, hair or feathers, should not be permitted. The manual lifting of small animals is permissible.
  • f) 
    When using goads and other aids, the following principles should apply:
  • i) 
    A nimals that have little or no room to move should not be subjected to physical force or goads and other aids which compel movement. Electric goads and prods should only be used in extreme cases and not on a routine basis to move animals . The use and the power output should be restricted to that necessary to assist movement of an animal and only when an animal has a clear path ahead to move. Goads and other aids should not be used repeatedly if the animal fails to respond or move. In such cases it should be investigated whether some physical or other impediment is preventing the animal from moving.
  • ii) 
    The use of such devices should be limited to battery-powered goads on the hindquarters of pigs and large ruminants, and never on sensitive areas such as the eyes, mouth, ears, anogenital region or belly. Such instruments should not be used on horses, sheep and goats of any age, or on calves or piglets.

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  • iii) 
    Useful and permitted goads include panels, flags, plastic paddles, flappers (a length of cane with a short strap of leather or canvas attached), plastic bags and metallic rattles; they should be used in a manner sufficient to encourage and direct movement of the animals without causing undue stress.
  • iv) 
    Painful procedures (including whipping, tail twisting, use of nose twitches, pressure on eyes, ears or external genitalia), or the use of goads or other aids which cause pain and suffering (including large sticks, sticks with sharp ends, lengths of metal piping, fencing wire or heavy leather belts), should not be used to move animals .
  • v) 
    Excessive shouting at animals or making loud noises (e.g. through the cracking of whips) to encourage them to move should not occur, as such actions may make the animals agitated, leading to crowding or falling.
  • vi) 
    A nimals should be grasped or lifted in a manner which avoids pain or suffering and physical damage (e.g. bruising, fractures, dislocations). In the case of quadrupeds, manual lifting by a person should only be used in young animals or small species, and in a manner appropriate to the species; grasping or lifting such animals only by their wool, hair, feathers, feet, neck, ears, tails, head, horns, limbs causing pain or suffering should not be permitted, except in an emergency where animal welfare or human safety may otherwise be compromised.
  • vii) 
    Conscious animals should not be thrown, dragged or dropped.
  • viii) 
    Performance standards should be established to evaluate the use of such instruments. Numerical scoring may be used to measure the percentage of animals moved with an electric instrument and the percentage of animals slipping or falling at a point in the slaughterhouse . Any risk of compromising animal welfare , for example slippery floor, should be investigated immediately and the defect rectified to eliminate the problem.

EU Comment

In point 1.viii) of Art 7.5.2, the EU wishes to add the following text at the end of the paragraph:

"In addition to resource-based measures, outcome-based measures (e.g. bruises, lesions, behaviour, DFD, PSE, mortality) should be used to monitor the level of welfare of the animals."

Justification

Outcome-based measures are valuable indicators to monitor the welfare of the animals.

2. Specific considerations for poultry

Stocking density in transport crates should be optimum to suit climatic conditions and to maintain species-specific thermal comfort within containers .

Care is especially necessary during loading and unloading to avoid wings being caught, leading to dislocated or broken wing bones in conscious birds. Such injuries will adversely affect carcass and meat quality.

EU Comments

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In the second paragraph of point 2) of Art 7.5.2, the last sentence should be replaced as follow:

"Such injuries will cause pain and suffering to the animals and will adversely affect carcass and meat quality".

Justification

Injuries should be avoided not only for meat quality reasons but also for animal welfare reasons.

Modular systems that involv

of live birds are not

cive to

good animal welfare .

These systems, when used, should be incorporated with a mechanism to facilitate birds sliding out of the transport system, rather than being dropped or dumped on top of each other from heights of more than a metre.

Birds may get trapped or their wings or claws may get caught in the fixtures, mesh or holes in the poorly

signed and/or constructed transport systems.

Und

situatio

gentle release of trapped birds.

ors unloading birds should ensure

Drawers in modular systems and crates should be stacked and de-stacked carefully so as to avoid injury to birds.

Birds should have sufficient space so that all can lie down at the same time without being on top of each other.

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Annex XVII (contd)

Birds with broken bones and/or dislocated joints should be humanely killed before being hung on shackles for processing'.

The number of poultry arriving at the processing plant with broken bones and/or dislocated joints should be recorded in a manner that allows for verification. For poultry , the percentage of chickens with broken or dislocated wings should not exceed 2%, with less than 1% being the goal.

EU Comment

In the last two paragraphs of point 2) of Art 7.5.2, the word "visible" should be included before the words "broken bones".

In the second last sentence of the paragraph above, the following text "in a manner that allows for verification" should be deleted.

Justification

Broken bones in poultry are not always visible.

The recording does not allow verification. The verification is performed before being recorded.

3.2Provisions relevant to animals delivered in containers

  • a) 
    Containers in which animals are transported should be handled with care, and should not be thrown, dropped or knocked over. Where possible, they should be horizontal while being loaded and unloaded mechanically, and stacked to ensure ventilation. In any case they should be moved and stored in an upright position as indicated by specific marks.
  • b) 
    A nimals delivered in containers with perforated or flexible bottoms should be unloaded with particular care in order to avoid injury. Where appropriate, animals should be unloaded from the containers individually.
  • c) 
    A nimals which have been transported in containers should be slaughtered as soon as possible; mammals and ratites which are not taken directly upon arrival to the place of slaughter should have drinking water available to them from appropriate facilities at all times. Delivery of poultry for slaughter should be scheduled such that they are not deprived of water at the premises for longer than 12 hours. A nimals which have not been slaughtered within 12 hours of their arrival should be fed, and should subsequently be given moderate amounts of food at appropriate intervals.

4.3Provisions relevant to restraining and containing animals

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  • iii) 
    equipment engineered to reduce noise of air hissing and clanging metal;
  • iv) 
    absence of sharp edges in restraining equipment that would harm animals ;
  • v) 
    avoidance of jerking or sudden movement of restraining device.
  • b) 
    Methods of restraint causing avoidable suffering should not be used in conscious animals because they cause severe pain and stress:
  • i) 
    suspending or hoisting animals (other than poultry) by the feet or legs;
  • ii) 
    indiscriminate and inappropriate use of stunning equipment;
  • iii) 
    mechanical clamping of the legs or feet of the animals (other than shackles used in poultry and ostriches) as the sole method of restraint ;
  • iv) 
    breaking legs, cutting leg tendons or blinding animals in order to immobilise them;
  • v) 
    severing the spinal cord, for example using a puntilla or dagger, to immobilise animals using electric currents to immobilise animals , except for proper stunning .

Article 7.5.3. Lairage design and construction

  • 1. 
    General considerations

The lairage should be designed and constructed to hold an appropriate number of animals in relation to the throughput rate of the slaughterhouse without compromising the welfa re of the a nimals .

In order to permit operations to be conducted as smoothly and efficiently as possible without injury or undue stress to the animals , the lairage should be designed and constructed so as to allow the animals to move freely in the required direction, using their behavioural characteristics and without undue penetration of their flight zone.

The following recommendations may help to achieve this.

with a minimum number of abrupt corners to negotiate.

  • b) 
    In red meat slaughterhouses , pens, passageways and races should be arranged in such a way as to permit inspection of animals at any time, and to permit the removal of sick or injured animals when considered to be appropriate, for which separate appropriate accommodation should be provided.
  • c) 
    Each animal should have room to stand up and lie down and, when confined in a pen, to turn around, except where the animal is reasonably restrained for safety reasons (e.g. fractious bulls). Fractious animals should be slaughtered as soon as possible after arrival at the slaughterhouse to avoid welfare problems. The lairage should have sufficient accommodation for the number of animals intended to be held. Drinking water should always be available to the animals , and the method of delivery should be appropriate to the type of animal held. Troughs should be designed and installed in such a way as to minimise the risk of fouling by faeces, without introducing risk of bruising and injury in animals , and should not hinder the movement of animals .
  • d) 
    Holding pens should be designed to allow as many animals as possible to stand or lie down against a wall. Where feed troughs are provided, they should be sufficient in number and feeding space to allow adequate access of all animals to feed. The feed trough should not hinder the movement of animals .

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  • e) 
    Where tethers, ties or individual stalls are used, these should be designed so as not to cause injury or distress to the animals and should also allow the animals to stand, lie down and access any food or water that may need to be provided.
  • f) 
    Passageways and races should be either straight or consistently curved, as appropriate to the animal species. Passageways and races should have solid sides, but when there is a double race, the shared partition should allow adjacent animals to see each other. For pigs and sheep, passageways should be wide enough to enable t wo or more animals to walk side by side for as long as possible. At the point where passageways are reduced in width, this should be done by a means which prevents excessive bunching of the animals .
  • g) 
    A nimal handlers should be positioned alongside races and passageways on the inside radius of any curve, to take advantage of the natural tendency of animals to circle an intruder. Where one-way gates are used, they should be of a design which avoids bruising. Races should be horizontal but where there is a slope, they should be constructed to allow the free movement of animals without injury.
  • h) 
    There should be a waiting pen, with a level floor and solid sides, between the holding pens and the race leading to the point of stunning or slaughter , to ensure a steady supply of animals for stunning or slaughter and to avoid having animal handlers trying to rush animals from the holding pens. The waiting pen should preferably be circular, but in any case, so designed that animals cannot be trapped or trampled.
  • i) 
    Ramps or lifts should be used for the loading and unloading of animals where there is a difference in height or a gap between the floor of the vehicle and the unloading area. Unloading ramps should be designed and constructed so as to permit animals to be unloaded from vehicles on the level or at the minimum gradient achievable. Lateral side protection should be available to prevent animals escaping or falling. They should be well drained, with secure footholds and adjustable to facilitate easy movement of animals without causing distress or injury.
  • 3. 
    Construction of lairage
  • a) 
    L airages should be constructed and maintained so as to provide protection from unfavourable climatic conditions, using strong and resistant materials such as concrete and metal which has been treated to prevent corrosion. Surfaces should be easy to clean. There should be no sharp edges or protuberances which may injure the animals .
  • b) 
    Floors should be well drained and not slippery; they should not cause injury to the feet of the animals . Where necessary, floors should be insulated or provided with appropriate bedding. Drainage grids should be placed at the sides of pens and passageways and not where animals would have to cross them. Discontinuities or changes in floor patterns or texture which could cause baulking in the movement of animals should be avoided.
  • c) 
    L airages should be provided with adequate lighting, but care should be taken to avoid harsh lights and shadows, which frighten the animals or affect their movement. The fact that animals will move more readily from a darker area into a well-lit area might be exploited by providing for lighting that can be regulated accordingly.
  • d) 
    L airages should be adequately ventilated to ensure that waste gases (e.g. ammonia) do not build up and that draughts at animal height are minimised. Ventilation should be able to cope with the range of expected climatic conditions and the number of animals the lairage will be expected to hold.
  • e) 
    Care should be taken to protect the animals from excessively or potentially disturbing noises, for example by avoiding the use of noisy hydraulic or pneumatic equipment, and muffling noisy metal equipment by the use of suitable padding, or by minimising the transmission of such noises to the areas where animals are held and slaughtered.
  • f) 
    Where animals are kept in outdoor lairages without natural shelter or shade, they should be protected from the effects of adverse weather conditions.

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Article 7.5.4. Care of animals in lairages

A nimals in lairages should be cared for in accordance with the following recommendations:

  • 1. 
    As far as possible, established groups of animals should be kept together. Each animal should have enough space to stand up, lie down and turn around. A nimals hostile to each other should be separated.
  • 2. 
    Where tethers, ties or individual stalls are used, they should allow animals to stand up and lie down without causing injury or distress.
  • 3. 
    Where bedding is provided, it should be maintained in a condition that minimises risks to the health and safety of the animals , and sufficient bedding should be used so that animals do not become soiled with manure.
  • 4. 
    A nimals should be kept securely in the lairage , and care should be taken to prevent them from escaping and from predators.
  • 5. 
    Suitable drinking water should be available to the animals on their arrival and at all times to animals in lairages unless they are to be slaughtered without delay.
  • 6. 
    If animals are not to be slaughtered as soon as possible, suitable feed should be available to the animals on arrival and at intervals appropriate to the species. Unweaned animals should be slaughtered as soon as possible.
  • 7. 
    In order to prevent heat stress, animals subjected to high temperatures, particularly pigs and poultry, should be cooled by the use of water sprays, fans or other suitable means. However, the potential for water sprays to reduce the ability of animals to thermoregulate (especially poultry) should be considered in any decision to use water sprays. The risk of animals being exposed to very cold temperatures or sudden extreme temperature changes should also be considered.
  • 8. 
    The lairage area should be well lit in order to enable the animals to see clearly without being dazzled. During the night, the lights should be dimmed. Lighting should also be adequate to permit inspection of all animals . Subdued lighting, and for example blue light, may be useful in poultry lairages in helping to calm birds.
  • 9. 
    The condition and state of health of the animals in a lairage should be inspected at least every morning and evening by a veterinarian or, under the veterinarian ’s responsibility, by another competent person, such as an animal handler . A nimals which are sick, weak, injured or showing visible signs of distress should be separated, and veterinary advice should be sought immediately regarding treatment or the animals should be humanely killed immediately if necessary.
  • 10. 
    Lactating dairy animals should be slaughtered as soon as possible. Dairy animals with obvious udder distension should be milked to minimise udder discomfort.
  • 11. 
    A nimals which have given birth during the journey or in the lairage should be slaughtered as soon as possible or provided with conditions which are appropriate for suckling for their welfare and the welfare of the newborn. Under normal circumstances, animals which are expected to give birth during a journey should not be transported.
  • 12. 
    A nimals with horns, antlers or tusks capable of injuring other animals , if aggressive, should be penned separately.

13.   Poultry awaiting slaughter should be protected from adverse weather conditions and provided with adequate ventilation.

14.   Waiting time should be minimised and should not exceed 12 hours.

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EU Comment

In point 14 of Art 7.5.4, the text "and should not exceed 12 hours" should be deleted.

Justification

It is not always possible to define a maximum waiting time since transport time may also be important to consider.

15. Poultry in transport containers should be examined at the time of arrival. Containers should be stacked with sufficient space between the stacks to facilitate inspection of birds and air movement.

to avoid build up of

16. Forced ventilation or other cooling systems may be necessary under certain condit temperature and humidity.

Recommendations for specific species are described in detail in Articles 7.5.5. to 7.5.8.

Article 7.5.5.

Management of foetuses during slaughter of pregnant animals

Under normal circumstances, pregnant animals that would be in the final 10% of their gestation period at the planned time of unloading at the slaughterhouse should be neither transported nor slaughtered. If such an event occurs, an animal handler should ensure that females are handled separately, and the specific procedures described below are applied. In all cases, the welfare of foetuses and dams during slaughter should be safeguarded.

Foetuses should not be removed from the uterus sooner than 5 minutes after the maternal neck or chest cut, to ensure absence of consciousness. A foetal heartbeat will usually still be present and foetal movements may occur at this stage, but these are only a cause for concern if the exposed foetus successfully breathes air.

If a live mature foetus is removed from the uterus, it should be prevented from inflating its lungs and breathing air (e.g. by clamping the trachea).

When uterine, placental or foetal tissues, including foetal blood, are not to be collected as part of the post-slaughter processing of pregnant animals , all foetuses should be left inside the unopened uterus until they are dead. When uterine, placental or foetal tissues are to be collected, where practical, foetuses should not be removed from the uterus until at least 15-20 minutes after the maternal neck or chest cut.

If there is any doubt about consciousness, the foetus should be killed with a captive bolt of appropriate size or a blow to the head with a suitable blunt instrument.

The above recommendations do not refer to foetal rescue. Foetal rescue, the practice of attempting to revive foetuses found alive at the evisceration of the dam, should not be attempted during normal commercial slaughter as it may lead to serious welfare complications in the newborn animal . These include impaired brain function resulting from oxygen shortage before rescue is completed, compromised breathing and body heat production because of foetal immaturity, and an increased incidence of infections due to a lack of colostrum.

Article 7.5.6. Summary analysis of handling and restraining methods and the associated animal welfare issues

 
 

Presentation of animals

Specific procedure

Specific purpose

Animal

welfare

concerns/

implications

Key

animal

welfare

requirements

Applicable species

No restraint

Animals are grouped

Group container

Gas stunning

Specific procedure is suitable only for gas stunning

Competent animal handlers in lairage; facilities; stocking density

Pigs, poultry

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In the field

Free bullet

Inaccurate targeting and inappropriate ballistics not achieving outright kill with first shot

Operator competence

Deer

Group stunning pen

Head-only electrical Captive bolt

Uncontrolled movement of animals impedes use of hand operated electrical and mechanical stunning methods

Competent animal handlers in lairage and at stunning point

Pigs, sheep, goats, calves

Individual

animal

confinement

Stunning pen/box

Electrical and mechanical stunning methods

Loading of animal; accuracy of stunning method, slippery floor and animal falling down

Competent animal handlers

Cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, horses, pigs, deer, camelids, ratites

Restraining methods

Head restraint, upright

Halter/ head collar/bridle

Captive bolt Free bullet

Suitable for halter-trained animals; stress in untrained animals

Competent animal handlers

Cattle, buffalo, horses, camelids

Head restraint, upright

Neck yoke

Captive bolt Electrical-head only

Free bullet Slaughter without stunning

Stress of loading and neck capture; stress of prolonged restraint, horn configuration; unsuitable for fast line speeds, animals struggling and falling due to slippery floor, excessive pressure

Equipment; competent animal handlers, prompt stunning or slaughter

Cattle

Leg restraint

Single leg tied in flexion (animal standing on 3 legs)

Captive bolt Free bullet

Ineffective control of animal movement, misdirected shots

Competent animal handler

Breeding pigs (boars and sows)

Upright restraint

Beak holding

Head restraint in electrical stunning box

Captive bolt Electrical-head only

Electrical-head only

Stress of capture

Stress of capture and positioning

Sufficient competent animal handlers

Competent animal handler

Ostriches

Ostriches

Holding body upright- manual

Manual restraint

Captive bolt Electrical-head only Slaughter without stunning

Stress of capture and restraint; accuracy of stunning/ slaughter

Competent animal handlers

Sheep, goats, calves, ratites, small camelids, poultry

Holding body

upright

mechanical

Mechanical clamp / crush / squeeze/ V-restrainer (static)

Captive bolt

Electrical

methods

Slaughter

without

stunning

Loading of animal and overriding; excessive pressure

Proper design and operation of equipment

Cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, deer, pigs, ostriches

 
 

Lateral restraint – manual or mechanical

Restrainer/ cradle/crush

Slaughter

without

stunning

Stress of restraint

Competent animal handlers

Sheep, goats, calves, camelids, cattle

Presentation of animals

Specific procedure

Specific purpose

Animal

welfare

concerns/

implications

Key

animal

welfare

requirements

Applicable species

Restraining

methods

(contd)

Upright restraint mechanical

Mechanical straddle (static)

Slaughter without stunning Electrical methods Captive bolt

Loading of animal and overriding

Competent animal handlers

Cattle,

sheep, goats, pigs

Upright restraint – manual or mechanical

Wing shackling

Electrical

Excessive tension applied prior to stunning

Competent animal handlers

Ostriches

Restraining and /or conveying methods

Mechanical upright

V-restrainer

Electrical methods Captive bolt Slaughter without stunning

Loading of animal and overriding; excessive pressure, size mismatch between restrainer and animal

Proper design and operation of equipment

Cattle, calves, sheep, goats, pigs

 
 

Mechanical-upright

Mechanical straddle – band

Electrical methods

Loading of animal and overriding, size

Competent animal handlers, proper design

Cattle, calves,

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restrainer (moving)

Captive bolt Slaughter without stunning

mismatch between restrainer and animal

and layout of restraint

sheep, goats, pigs

   

Presentation of

 

Flat bed/deck

birds for

Mechanical -

Tipped out of

shackling prior to

upright

containers on to

electrical

 

conveyors

stunning Gas stunning

Stress and injury due to tipping in dump-module systems height of tipping conscious poultry broken bones and dislocations

Proper design and operation of equipment

Poultry

Suspension and/or inversion

Poultry shackle

Electrical stunning

Slaughter without stunning

Inversion stress; pain from compression on leg bones; Keep restraint as short as possible

Competent animal handlers; proper design and operation of equipment; birds should be hung by both legs

Poultry

Suspension and/or inversion

Cone

Electrical – head-only

Captive bolt Slaughter without stunning

Inversion stress

Competent animal handlers; proper design and operation of equipment

Poultry

Upright restraint

Mechanical leg clamping

Electrical – head-only

Stress of resisting restraint in ostriches

Competent animal handlers; proper equipment design and operation

Ostriches

Restraining by inversion

Rotating box

Fixed side(s) (e.g. Weinberg pen)

Slaughter without stunning

Inversion stress; stress of resisting restraint, prolonged restraint, inhalation of blood and ingesta Keep restraint as brief as possible

Proper design and operation of equipment

Cattle

Compressible side(s)

Slaughter without stunning

Inversion stress, stress of resisting restraint, prolonged restraint

Preferable to rotating box with fixed sides Keep restraint as brief as possible

Proper design and operation of equipment

Cattle

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Annex XVII (contd)

 
 

Presentation of animals

Specific procedure

Body restraint

Casting/ hobbling

Manual

Leg restraints

 

Rope casting

   

Tying of 3 or 4 legs

Specific purpose

Animal

welfare

concerns/

implications

Mechanical stunning methods Slaughter without stunning

Stress of resisting restraint; animal temperament; bruising. Keep restraint as short as possible

Mechanical stunning methods Slaughter without stunning

Stress of resisting restraint; prolonged restraint, animal temperament; bruising Keep restraint as short as possible

Mechanical stunning methods Slaughter without stunning

Stress of resisting restraint; prolonged restraint, animal temperament; bruising Keep restraint as short as possible

Key

animal

welfare

requirements

Applicable species

Competent animal handlers

Sheep, goats, calves, small camelids, pigs

Competent animal handlers

Cattle, camelids

Competent animal handlers

Sheep, goats, small camelids, pigs

Article 7.5.7. Stunning methods

  • 1. 
    General considerations

The competence of the operators, and the appropriateness, and effectiveness of the method used for stunning and the maintenance of the equipment are the responsibility of the management of the slaughterhouse , and should be checked regularly by a Competent A uthority .

Persons carrying out stunning should be properly trained and competent, and should ensure that:

  • a) 
    b) c)
  • d) 
    e) f) g)

the animal is adequately restrained;

animals in restraint are stunned as soon as possible;

the equipment used for stunning is maintained and operated properly in

the

accordance with manufacturer's recommendations, in particular with regard to the species and size of the animal ;

the instrument equipment is applied correctly;

stunned animals are bled out (slaughtered) as soon as possible;

animals are not stunned when slaughter is likely to be delayed; and

backup stunning devices are available for immediate use if the primary method of stunning fails. Provision of a manual inspection area and simple intervention like neck dislocation for poultry would help prevent potential welfare problems.

EU comment

In point 1.g) of Art 7.5.7, the words "captive bolt and" should be included between the word "like" and "neck".

Justification

Captive bolt is a simple method that, like neck dislocation, could be used to prevent welfare problems.

In addition, such persons should be able to recognise when an animal is not correctly stunned and should take appropriate action.

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EU comment

The EU reiterates its previous comment:

Since free bullet is mentioned as a method for slaughter in Article 3.7.5.8, the corresponding details for free bullet that are laid down in the part on killing for disease control purposes should be inserted or referred to here as well.

  • 2. 
    Mechanical stunning

A mechanical device should be applied usually to the front of the head and perpendicular to the bone surface. The following diagrams illustrate the proper application of the device for certain species.

Cattle

Figure source: Humane Slaughter Association (2005) Guidance Notes No. 3: Humane Killing of Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughter Association, The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

The optimum position for cattle is at the intersection of two imaginary lines drawn from the rear of the eyes to the opposite horn buds.

Pigs

Figure source: Humane Slaughter Association (2005) Guidance Notes No. 3: Humane Killing of Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughter Association, The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

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The optimum position for pigs is on the midline just above eye level, with the shot directed down the line of the spinal cord.

Sheep

Figure source: Humane Slaughter Association (2005) Guidance Notes No. 3: Humane Killing of Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughter Association, The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

The optimum position for hornless sheep and goats is on the midline.

Goats

Figure Source: Humane Slaughter Association (2005) Guidance Notes No. 3: Humane Killing of Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughter Association, The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

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Annex XVII (contd)

The optimum position for heavily horned sheep and horned goats is behind the poll, aiming towards the angle of the jaw.

Horses

Figure Source: Humane Slaughter Association (2005) Guidance Notes No. 3: Humane Killing of Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughter Association, The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

The optimum position for horses is at right angles to the frontal surface, well above the point where imaginary lines from eyes to ears cross.

Signs of correct stunning using a mechanical instrument are as follows:

  • a) 
    the animal collapses immediately and does not attempt to stand up;
  • b) 
    the body and muscles of the animal become tonic (rigid) immediately after the shot;
  • c) 
    normal rhythmic breathing stops; and
  • d) 
    the eyelid is open with the eyeball facing straight ahead and is not rotated.

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Poultry

Annex XVII (contd)

Fig

Liv

Source: Humane Slaughte

ciation (20

uidance Notes No. 3: Hu

Killin

of

Hill, Whe

sing Firearms. Published by the Hu

Slaughter

ciation, The

ld

Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

chool, Brewhouse

Fig

Source: Humane Slaughte

ciation (20

uidance Notes No. 3: Hu

Killin

of

Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughte

ciation, Th

ld School, Brewhouse

Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

olts powered by

position for poultry species is at right angles to the frontal surface.

or spring can be used for poultry . The

Firing of a captive bolt according to the manufacturers’ instructions should lead to immediate destruction of the skull and the brain and, as a result, immediate death .

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Annex XVII (contd)

  • 3. 
    Electrical stunning
  • a) 
    General considerations

An electrical device should be applied to the animal in accordance with the following recommendations.

Electrodes should be designed, constructed, maintained and cleaned regularly to ensure that the flow of current is optimal and in accordance with manufacturing specifications. They should be placed so that they span the brain. The application of electrical currents which bypass the brain is unacceptable unless the animal has been stunned. The use of a single current leg-to-leg is unacceptable as a stunning method.

If, in addition, it is intended to cause cardiac arrest, the electrodes should either span the brain and immediately thereafter the heart, on the condition that it has been ascertained that the animal is adequately stunned, or span brain and heart simultaneously.

Electrical stunning equipment should not be applied on animals as a means of guidance, movement, restraint or immobilisation, and shall not deliver any shock to the animal before the actual stunning or k illing .

Electrical stunning apparatus should be tested prior to application on animals using appropriate resistors or dummy loads to ensure the power output is adequate to stun animals .

The electrical stunning apparatus should incorporate a device that monitors and displays voltage (true RMS) and the applied current (true RMS) and that such devices are regularly calibrated at least annually.

Appropriate measures, such as removing excess wool or wetting the skin only at the point of contact, can be taken to minimise impedance of the skin and facilitate effective stunnin

The stunning apparatus required for electrical stunning should be provided with adequate power to achieve continuously the minimum current level recommended for stunning as indicated in the table below.

In all cases, the correct current level shall be attained within one second of the initiation of stun and maintained at least for between one and three seconds and in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Minimum current levels for head-only stunning are shown in the following table.

Species

Minimum current levels for head-only stunning

 

Cattle

1.5 amps

Calves (bovines of less than 6 month of age)

1.0 amps

Pigs

1.25 amps

Sheep and goats

1.0 amps

Lambs

0.7 amps

Ostriches

0.4 amps

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Annex XVII (contd)

  • b) 
    Electrical stunning of birds using a waterbath

There should be no sharp bends or steep gradients in the shackle line and the shackle line should be as short as possible consistent with achieving acceptable line speeds, and ensuring that birds have settled by the time they reach the water bath. A breast comforter can be used effectively to reduce wing flapping and calm birds. The angle at which the shackle line approaches the entrance to the water bath, and the design of the entrance to the water bath, and the draining of excess 'live' water from the bath are all important considerations in ensuring birds are calm as they enter the bath, do not flap their wings, and do not receive pre-stun electric shocks.

In the case of birds suspended on a moving line, measures should be taken to ensure that the birds are not wing flapping at the entrance of the stunner. The birds should be secure in their shackle, but there should not be undue pressure on their shanks. The shackle size should be appropriate to fit the size of the shanks (metatarsal bones) of birds.

Birds should be hung on shackles by both legs.

Birds with dislocated or broken legs or wings should be humanely killed rather than shackled.

The duration between hanging on shackles and stunning should be kept to the minimum. In any event, the time between shackling and stunning should not exceed one minute.

Waterbaths for poultry should be adequate in size and depth for the type of bird being slaughtered, and their height should be adjustable to allow for the head of each bird to be immersed. The electrode immersed in the bath should extend the full length of the waterbath. Birds should be immersed in the bath up to the base of their wings.

The waterbath should be designed and maintained in such a way that when the shackles pass over the water, they are in continuous contact with the earthed rubbing bar.

The control box for the waterbath stunner should incorporate an ammeter which displays the total current flowing through the birds.

The shackle-to-leg contact should be wetted preferably before the birds are inserted in the shackles. In order to improve the electrical conductivity of water, it is recommended that salt be added in the waterbath as necessary. Additional salt should be added regularly as a solution to maintain suitable constant concentrations in the waterbath.

Using waterbaths, birds are stunned in groups and different birds will have different impedances. The voltage should be adjusted so that the total current is the required current per bird as shown in the table hereafter, multiplied by the number of birds in the waterbath at the same time. The following values have been found to be satisfactory when employing a 50 Hertz sinusoidal alternating current.

Birds should receive the current for at least 4 seconds.

While a lower current may also be satisfactory, the current shall in any case be such as to ensure that unconsciousness occurs immediately and lasts until the bird has been killed by cardiac arrest or by bleeding. When higher electrical frequencies are used, higher currents may be required.

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no conscious or live birds enter the scalding tank.

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Annex XVII (contd)

In the case of automatic systems, until fail-safe systems of stunning and bleeding have been introduced, a manual back-up system should be in place to ensure that any birds which have missed the waterbath stunner and/or the automatic neck-cutter are immediately stunned and/or killed immediately, and they are dead before entering scald tank.

To lessen the number of birds that have not been effectively stunned reaching neck cutters, steps should be taken to ensure that small birds do not go on the line amongst bigger birds and that these small birds are stunned separately. The height of the waterbath stunner should be adjusted according to the size of birds to ensure even the small birds are immersed in the water bath up to the base of the wings.

Minimum current for stunning poultry when using 50Hz are as follows:

 

Species

Mininum current (milliamperes per bird)

Broilers

100

Layers (spent hens)

100

Turkeys

150

Ducks and geese

130

Minimum current for stunning poultry when using high frequencies are as follows:

 
 

Minimum current (milliamperes)

per bird

Frequency (Hz)

Chickens

Turkeys

< 200 Hz

100 mA

250 mA

From 200 to 400 Hz

150 mA

400 mA

From 400 to 1500 Hz

200 mA

400 mA

Minimum current for stunning poultry when using high frequencies are as follows:

EU comment

The sentence above is redundant and should be deleted.

Furthermore, the following sentence should be included as last paragraph of point 3 of Art 7.5.7.

"Waterbath stunning equipment should be fitted with a device which displays and records the details of the electrical key parameters."

Justification

Without proper display and record of electrical parameters it is very difficult to ensure that proper parameters are constantly and properly applied.

  • 4. 
    Gas stunning (under study)

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  • a) 
    Stunning of pigs by exposure to carbon dioxide (CO2)

The concentration of CO2 for stunning should be preferably 90% by volume but in any case no less than 80% by volume. After entering the stunning chamber, the animals should be conveyed to the point of maximum concentration of the gas as rapidly as possible and be kept until they are dead or brought into a state of insensibility which lasts until death occur due to bleeding. Ideally, pigs should be exposed to this concentration of CO2 for 3 minutes. Sticking should occur as soon as possible after exit from the gas chamber.

In any case, the concentration of the gas should be such that it minimises as far as possible all stress of the animal prior to loss of consciousness.

The chamber in which animals are exposed to CO2 and the equipment used for conveying them through it shall be designed, constructed and maintained in such a way as to avoid injury or unnecessary stress to the animals . The animal density within the chamber should be such to avoid stacking animals on top of each others.

Annex XVII (contd)

The conveyor and the chamber shall be adequately lit to allow the animals to see their surroundings and, if possible, each other.

It should be possible to inspect the CO2 chamber whilst it is in use, and to have access to the animals in emergency cases.

The chamber shall be equipped to continuously measure and display register at the point of stunning the CO2 concentration and the time of exposure, and to give a clearly visible and audible warning if the concentration of CO2 falls below the required level.

Emergency stunning equipment should be available at the point of exit from the stunning chamber and used on any pigs that do not appear to be dead or completely stunned.

  • b) 
    Inert gas mixtures for stunning pigs

Inhalation of high concentration of carbon dioxide is aversive and can be distressing to animals . Therefore, the use of non-aversive gas mixtures is being developed.

Such gas mixtures include:

  • i) 
    a maximum of 2% by volume of oxygen in argon, nitrogen or other inert gases, or
  • ii) 
    to a maximum of 30% by volume of carbon dioxide and a maximum of 2% by volume of oxygen in mixtures with carbon dioxide and argon, nitrogen or other inert gases.

Exposure time to the gas mixtures should be sufficient to ensure that no pigs regain consciousness before death supervenes through bleeding or cardiac arrest is induced.

  • c) 
    Gas stunning of poultry

The main objective of gas stunning is to avoid the pain and suffering associated with shackling conscious poultry under water bath stunning and k illing systems. Therefore, gas stunning should be limited to birds contained in crates or on conveyors only. The gas mixture should be non-aversive to poultry .

Live poultry contained within transport modules or crates may be exposed to gradually increasing concentrations of CO2 until the birds are properly stunned. No bird should recover consciousness during bleeding.

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Gas stunning of poultry in their transport containers will eliminate the need for live birds' handling at the processing plant and all the problems associated with the electrical stunning . Gas stunning of poultry on a conveyor eliminates the problems associated with the electrical water bath stunning .

Live poultry should be conveyed into the gas mixtures either in transport crates or on conveyor belts.

The following gas procedures have been properly documented for chickens and turkeys but do not necessarily apply for other domestic birds. In any case the procedure should be designed as to ensure that all animals are properly stunned without unnecessary suffering. Some monitoring points for gas stunning could be the following:

  • ensure smooth entry and passage of crates or birds through the system;

void crowding of birds in crates or conveyors;

monitor and maintain gas concentrations continuously during operation;

provide visible and audible alarm systems if gas concentrations are inappropriate to the species;

calibrate gas monitors and maintain verifiable records;

ensure that duration of exposure is adequate to prevent recovery of consciousness;

make provision to monitor and deal with recovery of consciousness;

ensure that blood vessels are cut to induce death in unconscious birds;

ensure that all birds are dead before entering scalding tank;

provide emergency procedures in the event of system failure.

Gas mixtures used for stunning poultry include:

  • a minimum of 2 minutes exposure to 40% carbon dioxide, 30% oxygen and 30% nitrogen, followed by a minimum of one minute exposure to 80% carbon dioxide in air; or
  • a minimum of 2 minutes exposure to any mixture of argon, nitrogen or other inert gases with atmospheric air and carbon dioxide, provided that the carbon dioxide concentration does not exceed 30% by volume and the residual oxygen concentration does not exceed 2% by volume; or
  • a minimum of 2 minutes exposure to argon, nitrogen, other inert gases or any mixture of these gases in atmospheric air with a maximum of 2% residual oxygen by volume; or
  • a minimum of 2 minutes exposure to a minimum of 55% carbon dioxide in air.

a minimum of one minute exposure to 30% carbon dioxide in air, followed by a minimum of one minute exposure to at least 60% carbon dioxide in air.

  • ii) 
    Requirements for effective use are as follows:
  • Compressed gases should be vaporised prior to administration into the chamber and should be at room temperature to prevent any thermal shock; under no circumstances, should solid gases with freezing temperatures enter the chamber.

Gas mixtures should be humidified.

Appropriate gas concentrations of oxygen and carbon dioxide should be monitored and displayed continuously at the level of the birds inside the chamber to ensure that anoxia ensues.

Under no circumstances, should birds exposed to gas mixtures be allowed to regain consciousness. If necessary, the exposure time should be extended.

  • 5. 
    Bleeding

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i)

From the point of view of animal welfare , animals which are stunned with a reversible method should be bled without delay. Maximum stun-stick interval depends on the parameters of the stunning method applied, the species concerned and the bleeding method used (full cut or chest stick when possible). As a consequence, depending on those factors, the slaughterhouse operator should set up a maximum stun-stick interval that

ensures that no animals recover consciousness during bleeding. In any case the following time limits should be applied.

All animals should be bled out by incising both carotid arteries, or the vessels from which they arise (e.g. chest stick). However, when the stunning method used causes cardiac arrest, the incision of all of these vessels is not necessary from the point of view of animal welfare .

It should be possible for staff to observe, inspect and access the animals throughout the bleeding period. Any animal showing signs of recovering consciousness should be re-stunned.

After incision of the blood vessels, no scalding carcass treatment or dressing procedures should be performed on the animals for at least 30 seconds, or in any case until all brain-stem reflexes have ceased.

Stunning method

Maximum delay for bleeding to be started

Electrical methods and non-penetrating captive bolt 20 seconds

CO2

60 seconds (after leaving the chamber)

Article 7.5.8.

Summary analysis of stunning methods and the associated animal welfare issues

 

Method

Specific method

Animal

welfare

concerns/

implications

Key

animal

welfare

requirements

applicable

Species

Comment

Mechanical

Free bullet

Inaccurate targeting and inappropriate ballistics

Operator competence; achieving outright kill with first shot

Cattle, calves, buffalo, deer, horses, pigs (boars and sows)

Personnel safety

Captive bolt penetrating

Inaccurate targeting, velocity and diameter of bolt

Competent operation and maintenance of equipment; restraint; accuracy

Cattle, calves, buffalo, sheep, goats, deer, horses, pigs, camelids, ratites, poultry

(Unsuitable for specimen collection from TSE suspects).

A back-up gun should be available in the event of an ineffective shot

Captive bolt non-penetrating

Inaccurate targeting, velocity of bolt, potentially higher failure rate than penetrating captive bolt

Competent operation and maintenance of equipment; restraint; accuracy

Cattle, calves, sheep, goats, deer, pigs, camelids, ratites, poultry

Presently available devices are not recommended for young bulls and animals with thick skull. This method should only be used for cattle and sheep when alternative methods are not available.

Manual

percussive

blow

Inaccurate targeting; insufficient power; size of instrument

Competent animal

handlers; restraint;

accuracy.

Not recommended for

general use

Young and small mammals, ostriches and poultry

Mechanical devices potentially more reliable. Where manual percussive blow is used, unconsciousness should be achieved with single sharp blow delivered to central skull bones

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Annex XVII (contd)

 

Method

Specific method

Animal

welfare

concerns/

implications

Key

animal

welfare

requirements

applicable

Species

Comment

Electrical

Split application:

  • 1. 
    across head then head to chest;
  • 2. 
    across head then across chest

Accidental pre-stun electric shocks; electrode positioning; application of a current to the body while animal conscious; inadequate current and voltage

Competent operation and maintenance of equipment; restraint; accuracy

Cattle, calves, sheep, goats and pigs, ratites and poultry

Systems involving repeated application of head-only or head-to-leg with short current durations (<1 second) in the first application should not be used.

Single application:

  • 1. 
    head only;
  • 2. 
    head to body;
  • 3. 
    head to leg

Accidental pre-stun electric shocks; inadequate current and voltage; wrong electrode positioning; recovery of consciousness

Competent operation and maintenance of equipment; restraint; accuracy

Cattle, calves, sheep, goats, pigs, ratites, poultry

 
 

Waterbath

Restraint, accidental pre-stun electric shocks; inadequate current and voltage; recovery of consciousness

Competent operation and maintenance of equipment

Poultry only

 

Gaseous

CO2 air/O2 mixture; CO2 inert gas mixture

Aversiveness of high CO2; respiratory distress; inadequate exposure

Concentration; duration of exposure; design, maintenance and operation of equipment; stocking density management

Pigs, poultry

 
 

Inert gases

Recovery of consciousness

Concentration; duration of exposure; design, maintenance and operation of equipment; stocking density management

Pigs, poultry

 

Article 7.5.9.

Summary analysis of slaughter methods and the associated animal welfare issues

 

Slaughter methods

Specific method

Animal

welfare

concerns/

implications

Key requirements

Species

Comments

Bleeding out by severance of blood vessels in the neck without stunning

Bleeding with prior stunning

Full frontal cutting across the throat

Full frontal cutting across the throat

Failure to cut both common carotid arteries; occlusion of cut arteries; pain during and after the cut

Failure to cut both common carotid arteries; occlusion of cut arteries; pain during and after the cut.

High level of operator competency. A very sharp blade or knife of sufficient length so that the point of the knife remains outside the incision during the cut; the point of the knife should not be used to make the incision. The incision should not close over the knife during the throat cut.

A very sharp blade or knife of sufficient length so that the point of the knife remains outside the incision during the cut; the point of the knife should not be used to make the incision. The incision should not close over the knife during the throat cut.

Cattle, buffalo, horses, camelids, sheep, goats, poultry, ratites

No further procedure should be carried out before the bleeding out is completed (i.e. at least 30 seconds for mammals).

The practice to remove hypothetical blood clots just after the bleeding should be discouraged since this may increase animal suffering.

Cattle, buffalo, horses, camelids, sheep, goats

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Annex XVII (contd)

EU comment

In the table of Art 7.5.9, in the last sentence of the comment regarding the first slaughter method listed, the word "may" should be deleted.

Justification

Removing blood clots immediately after bleeding do increase animal suffering.

 

Slaughter methods

Specific method

Animal

welfare

concerns/

implications

Key requirements

Species

Comments

Bleeding with prior stunning (contd)

Neck stab followed by forward cut

Ineffective stunning; failure to cut both common carotid arteries; impaired blood flow; delay in cutting after reversible stunning

Prompt and accurate cutting

Camelids, sheep, goats, poultry, ratites

 
 

Neck stab alone

Ineffective stunning; failure to cut both common carotid arteries; impaired blood flow; delay in cutting after reversible stunning

Prompt and accurate cutting

Camelids, sheep, goats, poultry, ratites

 
 

Chest stick into major arteries or hollow-tube knife into heart

Ineffective stunning; inadequate size of stick wound inadequate length of sticking knife; delay in sticking after reversible stunning

Prompt and accurate sticking

Cattle,

sheep, goats, pigs

 
 

Neck skin cut followed by severance of vessels in the neck

Ineffective stunning; inadequate size of stick wound; inadequate length of sticking knife; delay in sticking after reversible stunning

Prompt and accurate cutting of vessels

Cattle

 
 

Automated mechanical cutting

Ineffective stunning; failure to cut and misplaced cuts. Recovery of

consciousness following reversible stunning systems

Design, maintenance and operation of equipment; accuracy of cut; manual back-up

Poultry only

 
 

Manual neck cut on one side

Ineffective stunning; recovery of consciousness following reversible stunning systems

Prior non-reversible stunning

Poultry only

N.B. slow induction of unconsciousness under slaughter without stunning

 

Oral cut

Ineffective stunning; recovery of consciousness following reversible stunning systems

Prior non-reversible stunning

Poultry only

N.B. slow induction of unconsciousness in non-stun systems

Other methods without stunning

Decapitation with a sharp knife

Pain due to loss of consciousness not being immediate

 

Sheep, goats, poultry

This method is only applicable to Jhatka slaughter

 

Manual neck dislocation and decapitation

Pain due to loss of consciousness not being immediate; difficult to achieve in large birds

Neck dislocation should be performed in one stretch to sever the spinal cord

Poultry only

Slaughter by neck dislocation should be performed in one stretch to sever the spinal cord. Acceptable only when slaughtering small numbers of small birds.

Cardiac arrest in a waterbath electric

Bleeding by evisceration

 

Induction of cardiac arrest

Quail

 

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stunner

 
 

Bleeding by neck cutting

   

Poultry

 

Article 7.5.10. Methods, procedures or practices unacceptable on animal welfare grounds

  • 1. 
    The restraining methods which work through immobilisation by injury such as breaking legs, leg tendon cutting, and severing the spinal cord (e.g. using a puntilla or dagger) cause severe pain and stress in animals . Those methods are not acceptable in any species.
  • 2. 
    The use of the electrical stunning method with a single application leg to leg is ineffective and unacceptable in any species.
  • 3. 
    The slaughter method of brain stem severance by piercing through the eye socket or skull bone without prior stunning is not acceptable in any species.

text deleted

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CH AP TE R 7.6.

KILLING OF ANIMALS FOR DISEASE CONTROL PURPOSES

EU Comments

The EU acknowledges the work carried out by OIE to address specific requirements for the killing of poultry and agrees with the proposed changes. Some specific comments are presented within the text.

Moreover, some previous EU comments are reiterated given their importance to the EU.

Article 7.6.1.

General principles

These recommendations are based on the premise that a decision to kill the animals has been made, and address the need to ensure the welfare of the animals until they are dead.

  • 1. 
    All personnel involved in the humane k illing of animals should have the relevant skills and competencies. Competence may be gained through formal training and/or practical experience.
  • 2. 
    As necessary, operational procedures should be adapted to the specific circumstances operating on the premises and should address, apart from animal welfare , aesthetics of the method of euthanasia, cost of the method, operator safety, biosecurity and environmental aspects, aesthetics of the method of euthanasia and cost of the method.
  • 3. 
    Following the decision to kill the animals , k illing should be carried out as quickly as possible, and normal husbandry should be maintained until the animals are killed.
  • 4. 
    The handling and movement of animals should be minimised and when done, it should be done in accordance with the recommendations described below.
  • 5. 
    Animal restraint should be sufficient to facilitate effective k illing , and in accordance with animal welfare and operator safety requirements; when restraint is required, killing should follow with minimal delay.
  • 6. 
    When animals are killed for disease control purposes, methods used should result in immediate death or immediate loss of consciousness lasting until death ; when loss of consciousness is not immediate, induction of unconsciousness should be non-aversive and should not cause anxiety, pain, distress or suffering in a ni mals .

EU comments

The EU reiterates its previous comment:

Paragraph 6 of Art 7.6.1 should be amended by replacing the part of the sentence after the word "aversive" by "or at least aversive as possible and should not cause avoidable anxiety, pain, distress or suffering in animals."

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Justification

Total non-aversiveness is technically difficult to guarantee under disease control situation.

  • 7. 
    For animal welfare considerations, young animals should be killed before older animals ; for biosecurity considerations, infected animals should be killed first, followed by in-contact animals , and then the remaining a ni mals .
  • 8. 
    There should be continuous monitoring of the procedures by the Competent A uthorities to ensure they are consistently effective with regard to animal welfare , operator safety and biosecurity.
  • 9. 
    When the operational procedures are concluded, there should be a written report describing the practices adopted and their effect on animal welfare , operator safety and biosecurity.
  • 10. 
    These general principles should also apply when animals need to be killed for other purposes such as after natural disasters or for culling animal populations.

Article 7.6.2.

Organisational structure

Disease control contingency plans should be in place at a national level and should contain details of management structure, disease control strategies and operational procedures; anima l welfa re considerations should be addressed within these disease control contingency plans. The plans should also include a strategy to ensure that an adequate number of personnel competent in the humane k illing of animals is available. Local level plans should be based on national plans and be informed by local knowledge.

Disease control contingency plans should address the animal welfare issues that may result from animal movement controls.

The operational activities should be led by an official V eterinarian who has the authority to appoint the personnel in the specialist teams and ensure that they adhere to the required animal welfare and biosecurity standards. When appointing the personnel, he/she should ensure that the personnel involved have the required competencies.

The official V eterinarian should be responsible for all activities across one or more affected premises and should be supported by coordinators for planning (including communications), operations and logistics to facilitate efficient operations.

The official V eterinarian should provide overall guidance to personnel and logistic support for operations on all affected premises to ensure consistency in adherence to the OIE animal welfare and animal health recommendations.

A specialist team, led by a team leader answerable to the official V eterinarian , should be deployed to work on each affected premises. The team should consist of personnel with the competencies to conduct all required operations; in some situations, personnel may be required to fulfil more than one function. Each team should contain a veterinarian or have access to veterinary advice at all times.

In considering the animal welfare issues associated with k illing animals , the key personnel, their responsibilities and competencies required are described in Article 7.6.3.

Article 7.6.3. Responsibilities and competencies of the specialist team

  • 1. 
    Team leader
  • a) 
    Responsibilities

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  • i) 
    plan overall operations on affected premises;
  • ii) 
    determine and address requirements for animal welfare , operator safety and biosecurity;
  • iii) 
    organise, brief and manage team of people to facilitate humane k illing of the relevant animals on the premises in accordance with national regulations and these recommendations;
  • iv) 
    determine logistics required;
  • v) 
    monitor operations to ensure animal welfare , operator safety and biosecurity requirements are met;
  • vi) 
    report upwards on progress and problems;
  • vii) 
    provide a written report at the conclusion of the k illing , describing the practices adopted and their effect on the animal welfare , operator safety and biosecurity outcomes.
  • b) 
    Competencies
  • i) 
    appreciation of normal animal husbandry practices;
  • ii) 
    appreciation of animal welfare and the underpinning behavioural, anatomical and physiological processes involved in the k illing process;
  • iii) 
    skills to manage all activities on premises and deliver outcomes on time;
  • iv) 
    awareness of psychological effects on farmer, team members and general public;
  • v) 
    effective communication skills;
  • vi) 
    appreciation of the environmental impacts caused by their operation.
  • 2. 
    Veterinarian
  • a) 
    Responsibilities
  • i) 
    determine and supervise the implementation of the most appropriate k illing method to ensure that animals are killed without avoidable pain and distress;
  • ii) 
    determine and implement the additional requirements for animal welfare , including the order of k illing ;
  • iii) 
    ensure that confirmation of the death of the animals is carried out by competent persons at appropriate times after the k illing procedure;
  • iv) 
    minimise the risk of disease spread within and from the premises through the supervision of biosecurity procedures;
  • v) 
    continuously monitor animal welfare and biosecurity procedures;
  • vi) 
    in cooperation with the leader, prepare a written report at the conclusion of the k illing , describing the practices adopted and their effect on animal welfare .
  • b) 
    Competencies
  • i) 
    ability to assess animal welfare , especially the effectiveness of stunning and k illing and to correct any deficiencies;
  • ii) 
    ability to assess biosecurity risks.

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  • 3. 
    Animal handlers
  • a) 
    Responsibilities
  • i) 
    review on-site facilities in terms of their appropriateness;
  • ii) 
    design and construct temporary animal handling facilities, when required;
  • iii) 
    move and restrain animals ;
  • iv) 
    continuously monitor animal welfare and biosecurity procedures.
  • b) 
    Competencies
  • i) 
    animal handling in emergency situations and in close confinement is required; ii) an appreciation of biosecurity and containment principles.
  • 4. 
    Animal killing personnel
  • a) 
    Responsibilities

Humane k illing of the animals through effective stunning and k illing should be ensured.

  • b) 
    Competencies
  • i) 
    when required by regulations, licensed to use necessary equipment; ii) competent to use and maintain relevant equipment; iii) competent to use techniques for the species involved; iv) competent to assess effective stunning and k illing .
  • 5. 
    Carcass disposal personnel
  • a) 
    Responsibilities

An efficient carcass disposal (to ensure k illing operations are not hindered) should be ensured.

  • b) 
    Competencies

The personnel should be competent to use and maintain available equipment and apply techniques for the species involved.

  • 6. 
    Farmer/owner/manager
  • a) 
    Responsibilities
  • i) 
    assist when requested.
  • b) 
    Competencies
  • ii) 
    specific knowledge of his/her animals and their environment.

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Article 7.6.4.

Considerations in planning the humane killing of animals

Many activities will need to be conducted on affected premises, including the humane k illing of animals . The team leader should develop a plan for humanely k illing animals on the premises which should include consideration of:

  • 1. 
    minimising handling and movement of animals ;
  • 2. 
    k illing the animals on the affected premises; however, there may be circumstances where the animals may need to be moved to another location for k illing ; when the k illing is conducted at an abattoir , the recommendations in Chapter 7.5. on the slaughter of animals should be followed;
  • 3. 
    the species, number, age and size of animals to be killed, and the order of k illing them;
  • 4. 
    methods of k illing the animals , and their cost;
  • 5. 
    housing, husbandry, location of the animals as well as accessibility of the farm;
  • 6. 
    the availability and effectiveness of equipment needed for k illing of the animals , as well as the time necessary to kill the required number of animals using such methods;
  • 7. 
    the facilities available on the premises that will assist with the k illing including any additional facilities that may need to be brought on and then removed from the premises;
  • 8. 
    biosecurity and environmental issues;
  • 9. 
    the health and safety of personnel conducting the k illing ;
  • 10. 
    any legal issues that may be involved, for example where restricted veterinary drugs or poisons may be used, or where the process may impact on the environment;
  • 11. 
    the presence of other nearby premises holding animals ;
  • 12. 
    possibilities for removal, disposal and destruction of carcasses.

The plan should minimise the negative welfare impacts of the k illing by taking into account the different phases of the procedures to be applied for k illing (choice of the k illing sites, k illing methods, etc.) and the measures restricting the movements of the animals .

Competences and skills of the personnel handling and k illing animals .

In designing a k illing plan, it is essential that the method chosen be consistently reliable to ensure that all animals are humanely and quickly killed.

Article 7.6.5.

Table summarising killing methods described in Articles 7.6.6.-7.6.18.

The methods are described in the order of mechanical, electrical and gaseous, not in an order of desirability from an animal welfare viewpoint.

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Species

Age range

Procedure

Restraint necessary

Animal welfare concerns with inappropriate application

Article reference

Cattle

all

free bullet

no

non-lethal wounding

7.6.6.

 

all except neonates

penetrating captive bolt - followed by pithing or bleeding

yes

ineffective stunning

7.6.7.

 

adults only

non-penetrating captive bolt, followed by bleeding

yes

ineffective stunning, regaining of consciousness before killing

7.6.8.

 

calves only

electrical, two-stage application

yes

pain associated with cardiac arrest after ineffective stunning

7.6.10.

 

calves only

electrical, single application (method 1)

yes

ineffective stunning

7.6.11.

 

all

injection with barbiturates and other drugs

yes

non-lethal dose, pain associated with injection site

7.6.15.

Sheep and goats

all

free bullet

no

non-lethal wounding

7.6.6.

 

all except neonates

penetrating captive bolt, followed by pithing or bleeding

yes

ineffective stunning, regaining of consciousness before death

7.6.7.

 

all except neonates

non-penetrating captive bolt, followed by bleeding

yes

ineffective stunning, regaining of consciousness before death

7.6.8.

 

neonates

non-penetrating captive bolt

yes

non-lethal wounding

7.6.8.

 

all

electrical, two-stage application

yes

pain associated with cardiac arrest after ineffective stunning

7.6.10.

 

all

electrical, single application (method 1)

yes

ineffective stunning

7.6.11.

 

neonates only

CO2 / air mixture

yes

slow induction of unconsciousness, aversiveness of induction

7.6.12.

 

neonates only

nitrogen and/or inert gas mixed with CO2

yes

slow induction of unconsciousness, aversiveness of induction

7.6.13.

 

neonates only

nitrogen and/or inert gases

yes

slow induction of unconsciousness

7.6.14.

 

all

injection of barbiturates and other drugs

yes

non-lethal dose, pain associated with injection site

7.6.15.

Pigs

all, except neonates

free bullet

no

non-lethal wounding

7.6.6.

 

all except neonates

penetrating captive bolt, followed by pithing or bleeding

yes

ineffective stunning, regaining of consciousness before death

7.6.7.

 

neonates only

non-penetrating captive bolt

yes

non-lethal wounding

7.6.8.

 

all1

electrical, two-stage application

yes

pain associated with cardiac arrest after ineffective stunning

7.6.10.

 

all

electrical, single application (method 1)

yes

ineffective stunning

7.6.11.

 

neonates only

CO2 / air mixture

yes

slow induction of unconsciousness, aversiveness of induction

7.6.12.

 

neonates only

nitrogen and/or inert gas mixed with CO2

yes

slow induction of unconsciousness, aversiveness of induction

7.6.13.

 

neonates only

nitrogen and/or inert gases

yes

slow induction of unconsciousness

7.6.14.

 

all

injection with barbiturates and other

yes

non-lethal dose, pain associated with injection site

7.6.15.

Poultry

adults only

non-penetrating captive bolt

yes

ineffective stunning

7.6.8.

 

day-olds and eggs only

maceration

no

non-lethal wounding, non- immediacy

7.6.9.

 

adults only

electrical, single application (method 2)

yes

ineffective stunning

7.6.11.

 

adults only

electrical, single application, followed by killing (method 3)

yes

ineffective stunning; regaining of consciousness before death

7.6.11.

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Species

Age range

Procedure

Restraint necessary

Animal welfare concerns with inappropriate application

Article reference

Poultry (contd)

all

CO2 / air mixture Method 1 Method 2

yes no

slow induction of unconsciousness, aversiveness of induction

7.6.12.

 

all

nitrogen and/or inert gas mixed with CO2

yes

slow induction of unconsciousness, aversiveness of induction

7.6.13.

 

all

nitrogen and/or inert gases

yes

slow induction of unconsciousness

7.6.14.

 

all

injection of barbiturates and other drugs

yes

non-lethal dose, pain associated with injection site

7.6.15.

 

adults only

addition of anaesthetics to feed or water, followed by an appropriate killing method

no

ineffective or slow induction of unconsciousness

7.6.16.

Article 7.6.6.

Free bullet

1.

Introduction

  • a) 
    A free bullet is a projectile fired from a shotgun, rifle, handgun or purpose-made humane killer.
  • b) 
    The most commonly used firearms for close range use are: i) humane killers (specially manufactured/adapted single-shot weapons); ii) shotguns (12, 16, 20, 28 bore and .410); iii) rifles (.22 rimfire); iv) handguns (various calibres from .32 to .45).
  • c) 
    The most commonly used firearms for long range use are rifles (.22, .243, .270 and .308).
  • d) 
    A free bullet used from long range should be aimed to penetrate the skull or soft tissue at the top of the neck of the animals (high neck shot) and to cause irreversible concussion and death and should only be used by properly trained and competent marksmen.
  • 2. 
    Requirements for effective use
  • a) 
    The marksman should take account of human safety in the area in which he/she is operating. Appropriate vision and hearing protective devices should be worn by all personnel involved.
  • b) 
    The marksman should ensure that the animal is not moving and in the correct position to enable accurate targeting and the range should be as short as possible (5 –50 cm for a shotgun) but the barrel should not be in contact with the head of the animals .

c)

  • d) 
    Shot animals should be checked to ensure the absence of brain stem reflexes.

The correct cartridge, calibre and type of bullet for the different species age and size should be used. Ideally, the ammunition should expand upon impact and dissipate its energy within the cranium.

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  • 3. 
    Advantages
  • a) 
    Used properly, a free bullet provides a quick and effective method for k illing .
  • b) 
    It requires minimal or no restraint and can be use to kill from a distance by properly trained and competent marksmen.
  • c) 
    It is suitable for k illing agitated animals in open spaces.
  • 4. 
    Disadvantages
  • a) 
    The method is potentially dangerous to humans and other animals in the area.
  • b) 
    It has the potential for non-lethal wounding.
  • c) 
    Destruction of brain tissue may preclude diagnosis of some diseases .
  • d) 
    Leakage of bodily fluids may present a biosecurity risk.
  • e) 
    Legal requirements may preclude or restrict use.
  • f) 
    There is a limited availability of competent personnel.
  • 5. 
    Conclusion

The method is suitable for cattle, sheep, goats and pigs, including large animals in open spaces.

Figure 1. The optimum shooting position for cattle is at the intersection of two imaginary lines drawn from the rear of the eyes to the opposite horn buds.

Figure source: Humane Slaughter Association (2005) Guidance Notes No. 3: Humane Killing of Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughter Association, The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

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Figure 2. The optimum position for hornless sheep and goats is on the midline.

Figure source: Humane Slaughter Association (2005) Guidance Notes No. 3: Humane Killing of Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughter Association, The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

Figure 3. The optimum shooting position for heavily horned sheep and horned goats is behind the poll aiming towards the angle of the jaw.

Figure Source: Humane Slaughter Association (2005) Guidance Notes No. 3: Humane Killing of Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughter Association, The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

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Figure 4. The optimum shooting position for pigs is just above eye level, with the shot directed down the line of the spinal cord.

Figure source: Humane Slaughter Association (2005) Guidance Notes No. 3: Humane Killing of Livestock Using Firearms. Published by the Humane Slaughter Association, The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Hertfordshire AL4 8AN, United Kingdom (www.hsa.org.uk).

Article 7.6.7.

Penetrating captive bolt

  • 1. 
    Introduction

A penetrating captive bolt is fired from a gun powered by either compressed air or a blank cartridge. There is no free projectile.

The captive bolt should be aimed on the skull in a position to penetrate the cortex and mid-brain of the animal . The impact of the bolt on the skull produces unconsciousness. Physical damage to the brain caused by penetration of the bolt may result in death ; however, pithing or bleeding should be performed as soon as possible after the shot to ensure the death of the animal . Shooting poultry species with the captive bolts results in immediate destruction of the skull and brain, causing death .

EU comment

At the end of the second paragraph of point 1 of Art 7.6.7, a cross-reference to the Chapter 7.5 on Slaughter of Animals should be included here as regard the use of captive bolt in poultry.

  • 2. 
    Requirements for effective use
  • a) 
    For cartridge powered and compressed air guns, the bolt velocity and the length of the bolt should be appropriate to the species and type of animal , in accordance with the recommendations of the manufacturer.
  • b) 
    Captive bolt guns should be frequently cleaned and maintained in good working condition.
  • c) 
    More than one gun may be necessary to avoid overheating, and a back-up gun should be available in the event of an ineffective shot.

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  • d) 
    A nimals should be restrained; at a minimum, they should be penned for cartridge powered guns and in a race for compressed air guns.
  • e) 
    The operator should ensure that the head of the animal is accessible.
  • f) 
    The operator should fire the captive bolt at right angles to the skull in the optimal position (see figures 1, 3 & 4. The optimum shooting position for hornless sheep is on the highest point of the head, on the midline and aim towards the angle of the jaw).
  • g) 
    To ensure the death of the animal , pithing or bleeding should be performed as soon as possible after stunni ng .
  • h) 
    A nimals should be monitored continuously after stunning until death to ensure the absence of brain stem reflexes.
  • 3. 
    Advantages
  • a) 
    Mobility of cartridge powered equipment reduces the need to move animals .
  • b) 
    The method induces an immediate onset of a sustained period of unconsciousness.
  • 4. 
    Disadvantages
  • a) 
    Poor gun maintenance and misfiring, and inaccurate gun positioning and orientation may result in poor a ni ma l welfare .
  • b) 
    Post stun convulsions may make pithing difficult and hazardous.
  • c) 
    The method is difficult to apply in agitated animals .
  • d) 
    Repeated use of a cartridge powered gun may result in over-heating.
  • e) 
    Leakage of bodily fluids may present a biosecurity risk.
  • f) 
    Destruction of brain tissue may preclude diagnosis of some diseases .
  • 5. 
    Conclusions

The method is suitable for poultry , cattle, sheep, goats and pigs (except neonates), when followed by pithing or bleeding.

Article 7.6.8. Non-penetrating captive bolt

  • 1. 
    Introduction

A non-penetrating captive bolt is fired from a gun powered by either compressed air or a blank cartridge. There is no free projectile.

The gun should be placed on the front of the skull to deliver a percussive blow which produces unconsciousness in cattle (adults only), sheep, goats and pigs, and death in poultry and neonate sheep, goats and pigs. Bleeding should be performed as soon as possible after the blow to ensure the death of the animal .

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  • 2. 
    Requirements for effective use
  • a) 
    For cartridge powered and compressed air guns, the bolt velocity should be appropriate to the species and type of animal , in accordance with the recommendations of the manufacturer.
  • b) 
    Captive bolt guns should be frequently cleaned and maintained in good working condition.
  • c) 
    More than one gun may be necessary to avoid overheating, and a back-up gun should be available in the event of an ineffective shot.
  • d) 
    A nimals should be restrained; at a minimum mammals should be penned for cartridge powered guns and in a race for compressed air guns; birds should be restrained in cones, shackles, crushes or by hand.
  • e) 
    The operator should ensure that the head of the animal is accessible.
  • f) 
    The operator should fire the captive bolt at right angles to the skull in the optimal position (figures 1-4).
  • g) 
    To ensure death in non-neonate mammals, bleeding should be performed as soon as possible after stunni ng .
  • h) 
    A nimals should be monitored continuously after stunning until death to ensure the absence of brain stem reflexes.
  • 3. 
    Advantages
  • a) 
    The method induces an immediate onset of unconsciousness, and death in birds and neonates.
  • b) 
    Mobility of equipment reduces the need to move animals .
  • 4. 
    Disadvantages
  • a) 
    As consciousness can be regained quickly in non-neonate mammals, they should be bled as soon as possible after stunni ng .
  • b) 
    Laying hens in cages have to be removed from their cages and most birds have to be restrained.
  • c) 
    Poor gun maintenance and misfiring, and inaccurate gun positioning and orientation may result in poor a ni ma l welfare .
  • d) 
    Post stun convulsions may make bleeding difficult and hazardous.
  • e) 
    Difficult to apply in agitated animals ; such animals may be sedated in advance of the k illing procedure.
  • f) 
    Repeated use of a cartridge powered gun may result in over-heating.
  • g) 
    Bleeding may present a biosecurity risk.
  • 5. 
    Conclusions

The method is suitable for k illing poultry, and neonate sheep, goats and pigs up to a maximum weight of 10 kg.

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Article 7.6.9. Maceration

  • 1. 
    Introduction

Maceration, utilising a mechanical apparatus with rotating blades or projections, causes immediate fragmentation and death in day-old poultry and embryonated eggs.

  • 2. 
    Requirements
  • a) 
    Maceration requires specialised equipment which should be kept in excellent working order.
  • b) 
    The rate of introducing the birds should not allow the equipment to jam, birds to rebound from the blades or the birds to suffocate before they are macerated.
  • 3. 
    Advantages
  • a) 
    Procedure results in immediate death .
  • b) 
    Large numbers can be killed quickly.
  • 4. 
    Disadvantages
  • a) 
    Specialised equipment is required.
  • b) 
    Macerated tissues may present biosecurity or human health risks.
  • c) 
    The cleaning of the equipment can be a source of contamination.
  • 5. 
    Conclusion

The method is suitable for k illing day-old poultry and embryonated eggs.

Article 7.6.10. E lectrical – two-stage application

  • 1. 
    Introduction

A two-stage application of electric current comprises firstly an application of current to the head by scissor-type tongs, immediately followed by an application of the tongs across the chest in a position that spans the heart.

The application of sufficient electric current to the head will induce ‘tonic/clonic’ epilepsy and unconsciousness. Once the animal is unconscious, the second stage will induce ventricular fibrillation (cardiac arrest) resulting in death . The second stage (the application of low frequency current across the chest) should only be applied to unconscious animals to prevent unacceptable levels of pain.

  • 2. 
    Requirements for effective use
  • a) 
    The stunner control device should generate a low frequency (AC sine wave 50 Hz) current with a minimum voltage and current as set out in the following table:

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Animal

Minimum voltage (V)

Minimum current

(A)

Cattle

1 220

1.5 |

Sheep

| 220

1.0 |

Pigs over 6 weeks of age

| 220

1.3 |

Pigs less than 6 weeks of

age

1 125

0.5 |

3.

4.

  • b) 
    Appropriate protective clothing (including rubber gloves and boots) should be worn.
  • c) 
    A nimals should be restrained, at a minimum free-standing in a pen, close to an electrical supply.
  • d) 
    T wo team members are required, the first to apply the electrodes and the second to manipulate the position of the animal to allow the second application to be made.
  • e) 
    A stunning current should be applied via scissor-type stunning tongs in a position that spans the brain for a minimum of 3 seconds; immediately following the application to the head, the electrodes should be transferred to a position that spans the heart and the electrodes applied for a minimum of 3 seconds.
  • f) 
    Electrodes should be cleaned regularly and after use, to enable optimum electrical contact to be maintained.
  • g) 
    A nimals should be monitored continuously after stunning until death to ensure the absence of brain stem reflexes.
  • h) 
    Electrodes should be applied firmly for the intended duration of time and pressure not released until the stun is complete.

Advantages

  • a) 
    The application of the second stage minimises post-stun convulsions and therefore the method is particularly effective with pigs.
  • b) 
    Non-invasive technique minimises biosecurity risk. Disadvantages
  • a) 
    The method requires a reliable supply of electricity.
  • b) 
    The electrodes must be applied and maintained in the correct positions to produce an effective stun and kill.
  • c) 
    Most stunner control devices utilise low voltage impedance sensing as an electronic switch prior to the application of high voltages; in unshorn sheep, contact impedance may be too high to switch on the required high voltage (especially during stage two).
  • d) 
    The procedure may be physically demanding, leading to operator fatigue and poor electrode placement.

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  • 5. 
    Conclusion

The method is suitable for calves, sheep and goats, and especially for pigs (over one week of age).

Article 7.6.11. E lectrical – single application

  • 1. 
    Method 1

Method 1 comprises the single application of sufficient electrical current to the head and back, to simultaneously stun the animal and fibrillate the heart. Provided sufficient current is applied in a position that spans both the brain and heart, the animal will not recover consciousness.

  • a) 
    Requirements for effective use
  • i) 
    The stunner control device should generate a low frequency (30–60 Hz) current with a minimum voltage of 250 volts true RMS under load.
  • ii) 
    Appropriate protective clothing (including rubber gloves and boots) should be worn.
  • iii) 
    A nimals should be individually and mechanically restrained close to an electrical supply as the maintenance of physical contact between the stunning electrodes and the animal is necessary for effective use.
  • iv) 
    The rear electrode should be applied to the back, above or behind the heart, and then the front electrode in a position that is forward of the eyes, with current applied for a minimum of 3 seconds.
  • v) 
    Electrodes should be cleaned regularly between animals and after use, to enable optimum electrical contact to be maintained.
  • vi) 
    Water or saline may be necessary to improve electrical contact with sheep.
  • vii) 
    An effective stun and kill should be verified by the absence of brain stem reflexes.
  • b) 
    Advantages
  • i) 
    Method 1 stuns and kills simultaneously.
  • ii) 
    It minimises post-stun convulsions and therefore is particularly effective with pigs.
  • iii) 
    A single team member only is required for the application.
  • iv) 
    Non-invasive technique minimises biosecurity risk.

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  • c) 
    Disadvantages
  • i) 
    Method 1 requires individual mechanical animal restraint .
  • ii) 
    The electrodes must be applied and maintained in the correct positions to produce an effective stun and kill.
  • iii) 
    Method 1 requires a reliable supply of electricity.
  • d) 
    Conclusion

Method 1 is suitable for calves, sheep, goats, and pigs (over one week of age).

  • 2. 
    Method 2

Method 2 stuns and kills by drawing inverted and shackled poultry through an electrified waterbath stunner. Electrical contact is made between the ‘live’ water and earthed shackle and, when sufficient current is applied, poultry will be simultaneously stunned and killed.

  • a) 
    Requirements for effective use
  • i) 
    A mobile waterbath stunner and a short loop of processing line are required.
  • ii) 
    A low frequency (50-60 Hz) current applied for a minimum of 3 seconds is necessary to stun and kill the birds.
  • iii) 
    Poultry need to be manually removed from their cage, house or yard, inverted and shackled onto a line which conveys them through a waterbath stunner with their heads fully immersed.
  • iv) 
    The required minimum currents to stun and kill dry birds are:

§ Quails - 100 mA/bird

§ Chickens – 160 mA/bird

§ Ducks & geese – 200 mA/bird

§ Turkeys – 250 mA/bird.

A higher current is required for wet birds. v) An effective stun and kill should be verified by the absence of brain stem reflexes.

  • b) 
    Advantages
  • i) 
    Method 2 stuns and kills simultaneously.
  • ii) 
    It is capable of processing large numbers of birds reliably and effectively.
  • iii) 
    This non-invasive technique minimises biosecurity risk.

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  • c) 
    Disadvantages
  • i) 
    Method 2 requires a reliable supply of electricity.
  • ii) 
    Handling, inversion and shackling of birds are required.
  • d) 
    Conclusion

Method 2 is suitable for large numbers of poultry.

  • 3. 
    Method 3

Method 3 comprises the single application of sufficient electrical current to the head of poultry in a position that spans the brain, causing unconsciousness; this is followed by a k illing method (see Article 7.6.17.).

  • a) 
    Requirements for effective use
  • i) 
    The stunner control device should generate sufficient current (more than 600 mA/duck and more than 300 mA/bird) to stun.
  • ii) 
    Appropriate protective clothing (including rubber gloves and boots) should be worn.
  • iii) 
    Birds should be restrained, at a minimum manually, close to an electrical supply.
  • iv) 
    Electrodes should be cleaned regularly and after use, to enable optimum electrical contact to be maintained.
  • v) 
    Birds should be monitored continuously after stunning until death to ensure the absence of brain stem reflexes.
  • b) 
    Advantages

Non-invasive technique (when combined with cervical dislocation) minimises biosecurity risk.

  • c) 
    Disadvantages
  • i) 
    Method 3 requires a reliable supply of electricity and is not suitable for large-scale operations.
  • ii) 
    The electrodes must be applied and maintained in the correct position to produce an effective stun.
  • iii) 
    Birds must be individually restrained.
  • iv) 
    It must be followed by a k illing method.
  • d) 
    Conclusion

Method 3 is suitable for small numbers of poultry.

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Article 7.6.12. CO2 / air mixture (under study)

  • 1. 
    Introduction

Controlled atmosphere k illing is performed by exposing animals to a predetermined gas mixture, either by placing them in a gas-filled container or apparatus (Method 1) or by placing transport modules or crates containing birds in a gas tight container and introducing a gas mixture (Method 2) or by the gas being introduced into a poultry house (Method 3). Method 2 should be used whenever possible, as it eliminates welfare issues resulting from the need to manually remove live birds. Although Method 2 requires handling and crating of the birds, it benefits bird welfare overall (in comparison with Method 1) as it prevents death by smothering or suffocation.

EU comment

In the last sentence of the above paragraph of point 1, Art 7.6.12, the word "prevents" should be replaced by "reduces the risk of"

Justification

It is better to refer to reduction of risk rather than prevention as both methods can lead to suffocation if not properly implemented.

Inhalation of carbon dioxide (CO2) induces respiratory and metabolic acidosis and hence reduces the pH of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and neurones thereby causing unconsciousness and, after prolonged exposure, death . Exposure to carbon dioxide does not induce immediate loss of consciousness, therefore the aversive nature of gas mixtures containing high concentrations of CO2 and the respiratory distress occurring during the induction phase are important considerations for anima l welfa re .

  • 2. 
    Method 1

The animals are placed in a gas-filled container or apparatus.

  • a) 
    Requirements for effective use in a container or apparatus
  • i) 
    Containers or apparatus should allow the required gas concentration to be maintained and accurately measured.
  • ii) 
    When animals are exposed to the gas individually or in small groups in a container or apparatus, the equipment used should be designed, constructed, and maintained in such a way as to avoid injury to the animals and allow them to be observed.
  • iii) 
    A nimals can also be introduced to low concentrations (as low concentrations are not aversive) and the concentration could be increased afterwards and the animals then held in the higher concentration until death is confirmed.
  • iv) 
    Team members should ensure that there is sufficient time allowed for each batch of animals to die before subsequent ones are introduced into the container or apparatus.
  • v) 
    Containers or apparatus should not be overcrowded and measures are needed to avoid animals suffocating by climbing on top of each other.
  • b) 
    Advantages

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  • i) 
    CO2 is readily available.
  • ii) 
    Application methods are simple.
  • c) 
    Disadvantages
  • i) 
    The need for properly designed container or apparatus.
  • ii) 
    The aversive nature of high CO2 concentrations.
  • iii) 
    No immediate loss of consciousness.
  • iv) 
    The risk of suffocation due to overcrowding.
  • v) 
    Difficulty in verifying death while the animals are in the container or apparatus.
  • d) 
    Conclusion

Method 1 is suitable for use in poultry, and neonatal sheep, goats and pigs. 2. Method 2

EU comment

The paragraph of Method 2 should be listed as number 3

Justification

Mistake in the numbering of points

In

method, the

or modules holding the birds are lo

a chamber into which gas

introduced. As illustrated in the example below, a containerised gassing unit (CGU) typically comprises a

chamber

sig

to accommodate poultry

a

The chamber

fitted with gas lines and diffusers, with silencers that are connected via a system of manifolds and gas regulators to gas cylinders. There is a hole at the top to permit displaced air to escape when the container is

filling with

Th

for the operation of CGU include (a) position the

(b) connect the gas cylinder to the

(c) load birds into the

on level, solid, open ground;

(d) shut and secure the

(e) deliver the gas until a concentration of 45% by volume of carbon dioxide has been achieved at the top of

(f)

for the birds to become

cious

open the door and allow gas to

be dispersed in the air (h) remove the module (i) check each drawer for surviving birds (j) humanely kill any survivors and (k) dispose of carcasses appropriately.

Figure source: De

of Clinical Veterinary Science, University of Bristol, United Kingdom.

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r

r

r

r

r

r

Annex XVII (contd)

Figure source: Department of Clinical Veterinary Science, University of Bristol, United Kingdom.

Fig

e: De

Kingdom.

University of Bristol, Langford, Bristol, Unit

a) Requirements for effective use of containerised gassing units (CGU)

  • i) 
    The birds should be caught gently and placed in crates or modules

and at

v)

appropriate stocking densities to allow all birds to sit down.

The crates or module full of birds should be placed inside the container and the door shut only

ii)

when the operator is ready to administer th

  • iii) 
    Ensure the container door is locked and

the gas until a minimu

oncentration of

40% carbon dioxide is achieved at the top of the crates. iv) An appropriate gas meter should be used to monitor and maintain the level of carbon dioxid

continuously during the operation.

Sufficient

sure

of

should be allowed for birds to die before the

the contain

lisation and convulsive wing flapping sounds, which can be

opened.

ation

Remove the cra

can be

to by

near

that the birds are unconscious and that death is imminent.

from the container and leave them in the open air.

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i

f

r

t

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Annex XVII (contd)

  • vi) 
    Each crate or module should be examined and birds checked to ensure they are dead. Dilated pupils and absence of breathing indicate death .
  • vii) 
    Any survivors should be humanely killed.
  • viii) 
    Ducks and geese are resilient to the effects of carbon dioxide and therefore require a minimum of 80% CO2 and a longer period of exposure to die.

b) Advantages

  • i) 
    The gas is introduced quickly and quietly resulting in less turbulence and disturbance to the birds.
  • ii) 
    Gradual increase in the concentration of CO2 minimises the aversive nature of this method for inducing unconsciousness.
  • iii) 
    The use of transport crates or modules to move birds minimises handling. Birds should be handled by trained, experienced catching teams at the time of depopulation of the poultry house.
  • iv) 
    The modules are loaded mechanically into the CGU and a lethal mixture of gas is rapidly introduced into the chamber immediately after sealing.
  • v) 
    CO2 is readily available.
  • vi) 
    Birds are exposed to gas more uniformly and they do not smother each other when compared with Method 1.
  • vii) 
    The volume of gas required can be readily calculated.
  • viii) 
    As the units are operated outdoors, the gas is dispersed quickly at the end of each cycle by opening the door, improving operators health and safety.
  • ix) 
    The system uses skilled catching teams and equipment in daily use by the industry.
  • x) 
    Metal containers can be readily cleansed and disinfected.

EU comment

In Art 7.6.12, point 3b), the points above from vii) to x) should be also listed under point 2 b) between the advantages of Method 1.

Justification

The same conditions apply also to Method 1.

c) Disadvantages

  • i) 
    Requires trained operators, trained catchers, transport modules and fork lift. However, equipment and suitable areas with hard surfaces are usually available.
  • ii) 
    The main limiting factors are speed of catching birds and availability of gas.

EU comment

In point 3 c)ii)of Art 7.6.12, the text "and availability of gas" should be deleted.

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Justification

Gas is usually readily available. Moreover this part of the text is in contradiction with the

point 3 b)v) above.

  • iii) 
    It is difficult to visually confirm death while the birds are still in the container. However, cessation

of vocalisation can be used to determine onset of death . d) Conclusion

  • i) 
    Method 2 is suitable for use in a wide range of poultry systems, providing there is access to vehicles

to carry the containers and handling equipment.

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  • ii) 
    Birds should be introduced into the container or apparatus, which is then sealed and filled as quickly as possible with the required gas concentrations, i.e. more than 40% CO2. Birds are held in this atmosphere until death is confirmed.
  • iii) 
    Method 2 is suitable for use in poultry , and neonatal sheep, goats and pigs. However, CO2 to cause a period of distress in the animals before they lose consciousness.

23. Method 2 3

The gas is introduced into a poultry house.

  • a) 
    Requirements for effective use in a poultry house
  • i) 
    Prior to introduction of the CO2, the poultry house should be appropriately sealed to allow control over the gas concentration. The interval between sealing and gas administration should be kept to the minimum so as to avoid overheating.

Forced ventilation systems, where fitted, will have to be switched off prior to gas administration.

The mains water supply to the poultry house may have to be turned off and water drained to avoid freezing and bursting of water pipes.

Feeders and water troughs should be lifted to avoid obstruction of the gas entry and prevent injury to birds.

ii) Gas delivery pipes or lancets should be positioned appropriately such that birds are not hit directly by very cold gas delivered at high pressures. It may be necessary to exclude birds from the area the front of the delivery pipes, for a distance of about 20 meters, by partitioning the house with nets, wire mesh or similarly perforated materials.

  • iii) 
    The house should be gradually filled with CO2 so that all birds are exposed to a concentration of >40% until they are dead; a vaporiser may be required to prevent freezing.
  • iv) 
    Devices should be used to accurately measure the gas concentration at the maximum height accommodation of birds.
  • b) 
    Advantages
  • i) 
    Applying gas to birds in situ eliminates the need to manually remove live birds.
  • ii) 
    CO2 is readily available.
  • iii) 
    Gradual raising of CO2 concentration minimises the aversiveness of the induction of unconsciousness.
  • c) 
    Disadvantages
  • i) 
    It is difficult to determine volume of gas required to achieve adequate concentrations of CO2 in some poultry houses.
  • ii) 
    It is difficult to verify death while the birds are in the poultry house.

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The extremely low temperature of liquid

ho

formation of solid

may cause concern for bird welfare .

  • d) 
    Conclusion

Method 2 is suitable for use in poultry in closed-environment sheds. This method could be developed for killing pigs. However, CO2 is likely to cause a period of distress in animals before they lose consciousness.

Article 7.6.13. Nitrogen and/ or inert gas mixed with CO2

  • 1. 
    Introduction

CO2 may be mixed in various proportions with nitrogen or an inert gas (e.g. argon), and the inhalation of such mixtures leads to hypercapnic-hypoxia and death when the oxygen concentration by volume is <2%. Various mixtures of CO2 and nitrogen or an inert gas can be administered to kill birds using Methods 1 and 3 described under Article 7.6.12. Whole house gassing with mixtures of CO2 and nitrogen, or an inert gas, has not been tested owing to the complex issues presented by mixing gases in large quantities. Such mixtures however do not induce immediate loss of consciousness, therefore the aversiveness of various gas mixtures containing high concentrations of CO2 and the respiratory distress occurring during the induction phase, are important animal welfare considerations.

Pigs and poultry appear not to find low concentrations of CO2 strongly aversive, and a mixture of nitrogen or argon with <30% CO2 by volume and <2% O2 by volume can be used for k illing poultry, neonatal sheep, goats and pigs.

  • 2. 
    Method 1

The animals are placed in a gas-filled container or apparatus

  • a) 
    Requirements for effective use
  • i) 
    Containers or apparatus should allow the required gas concentrations to be maintained, and the O2 and CO2 concentrations accurately measured during the killing procedure.
  • ii) 
    When animals are exposed to the gases individually or in small groups in a container or apparatus, the equipment used should be designed, constructed, and maintained in such a way as to avoid injury to the animals and allow them to be observed.
  • ii) 
    A nimals should be introduced into the container or apparatus after it has been filled with the required gas concentrations (with <2% O2), and held in this atmosphere until death is confirmed.
  • iv) 
    Team members should ensure that there is sufficient time allowed for each batch of animals to die before subsequent ones are introduced into the container or apparatus.
  • v) 
    Containers or apparatus should not be overcrowded and measures are needed to avoid animals suffocating by climbing on top of each other.

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3.

5. b) Advantages

Low concentrations of CO2 cause little aversiveness and, in combination with nitrogen or an inert gas, produces a fast induction of unconsciousness.

4. c) Disadvantages

  • a) 
    A properly designed container or apparatus is needed.
  • b) 
    It is difficult to verify death while the animals are in the container or apparatus.
  • c) 
    There is no immediate loss of consciousness.
  • d) 
    Exposure times required to kill are considerable.

5d) Conclusion

The method is suitable for poultry, and for neonatal sheep, goats and pigs. Method 2 In this method, the crates or modules holding the birds are loaded into a container and gas is introduced

into the

containerised

(refer to Figures under Article 7.6.12.). As shown in the

ple below, each

transport

or a

unit (CGU) typically comprises a gas-tight chamber designed to accommodate poultr y

Th

which in turn are connected via a system of manifolds and

of the unit to permit displaced air to escape when filling the

or chamber is fitted with gas lines and diffusers, with

tors to gas cylinders. There is a hole at with gas.

Pro

involved in the operation of CGU includes (a) position the

on a level, solid, open

ground; (b) connect gas cylinder to the container (c) load a module of birds into the container, (d) shut and secure the door, (e) deliver the gas to the point where less than 2% by volume of oxygen is found at the top

of the container, (f) allow time for the birds to become unconscious and die, (g) op the gas to be dispersed in air, (h) remove the module, (i) check each drawer for surv

the door and allow humanely kill

survivors, if any; and (k) dispose carcasses appropriately.

a) Requirements for effective use of containerised gassing units (CGU)

  • i) 
    The birds should be cau

gently and placed in crates or modules of appropriate size and at

appropriate stocking densities to allow all birds to sit down.

  • ii) 
    Th

or module of birds should be

the operator is ready to administer the gas mixture.

inside the

and the door shut only when

  • iii) 
    E

v)

the contain

lo

and

achieved at the top of the crates. iv) An appropriate gas meter should be used to monitor and

the gas mixture until <2% residual oxygen

continuously during the operation.

the level of oxygen

fficient exposure

tion of

should be allowed for birds to die before the

lisation and wing

sounds can be observed by

opened. Th

close to the

container and used to determine the onset of death in birds. Remove the crates or modules from

the container and leave them in the

air.

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Annex XVII (contd)

  • vi) 
    Each crate or module should be examined and birds checked to ensure they are dead. Dilated pupils and absence of breathing movements indicate death .
  • vii) 
    Any survivors should be humanely killed.
  • viii) 
    Ducks and geese do not appear to be resilient to the effects of a mixture of 20% carbon dioxide and 80% nitrogen or argon.

b)     Advantages

  • i) 
    The gas mixture is introduced quickly and quietly resulting in less turbulence and disturbance to the birds.
  • ii) 
    The use of transport crates or modules to move birds minimises handling. Birds should be handled by trained, experienced catching teams at the time of depopulation of the poultry house.
  • iii) 
    The modules are loaded mechanically into the CGU and a lethal mixture of gas is rapidly introduced into the chamber immediately after sealing.
  • iv) 
    Mixtures containing up to 20% carbon dioxide in argon are readily available as welding gas cylinders.
  • v) 
    Birds are exposed to gas in a more uniform manner and they do not smother each other when compared with Method 1.
  • vi) 
    T wo CGU can be operated in tandem and throughputs of up to 4,000 chickens per hour are possible.
  • vii) 
    The volume of gas required can be readily calculated.
  • viii) 
    As the units are operated outdoors? the gas is dispersed quickly at the end of each cycle by opening the door, improving operators’ health and safety.
  • ix) 
    The system uses skilled catching teams and equipment in daily use by the industry.
  • x) 
    Metal containers can be readily cleansed and disinfected.

c)     Disadvantages

  • i) 
    Requires trained operators, trained catchers, transport modules and a fork lift. However, such equipment and suitable outdoor areas with a hard surface are usually available.
  • ii) 
    The main limiting factors are speed of catching birds and availability of gas mixtures.
  • iii) 
    It is difficult to visually confirm death while the birds are still in the container. However, cessation of vocalisation can be used to determine the onset of death .

d)     Conclusion

  • i) 
    Method 2 is suitable for use in poultry and in neonatal sheep, goats and pigs.

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  • ii) 
    Method 2 is suitable for use in poultry in a wide range of poultry systems providing that these have access to vehicles to carry containers and handling equipment.
  • iii) 
    A nimals should be introduced into the container or apparatus, which is then sealed and filled as quickly as possible with the gas mixture. A residual oxygen concentration of less than 2% should be achieved and maintained and birds should be held in this atmosphere until death is confirmed.

Article 7.6.14. Nitrogen and/ or inert gases

  • 1. 
    Introduction

This method involves the introduction of animals into a container or apparatus containing nitrogen or an inert gas such as argon. The controlled atmosphere produced leads to unconsciousness and death from hypoxia.

Research has shown that hypoxia is not aversive to pigs and poultry, and it does not induce any signs of respiratory distress prior to loss of consciousness.

  • 2. 
    Requirements for effective use
  • a) 
    Containers or apparatus should allow the required gas concentrations to be maintained, and the O2 concentration accurately measured.
  • b) 
    When animals are exposed to the gases individually or in small groups in a container or apparatus, the equipment used should be designed, constructed, and maintained in such a way as to avoid injury to the animals and allow them to be observed.
  • c) 
    A nimals should be introduced into the container or apparatus after it has been filled with the required gas concentrations (with <2% O2), and held in this atmosphere until death is confirmed.
  • d) 
    Team members should ensure that there is sufficient time allowed for each batch of animals to die before subsequent ones are introduced into the container or apparatus.
  • e) 
    Containers or apparatus should not be overcrowded, and measures are needed to avoid animals suffocating by climbing on top of each other.
  • 3. 
    Advantages

A nimals are unable to detect nitrogen or inert gases, and the induction of hypoxia by this method is not aversive to animals .

  • 4. 
    Disadvantages
  • a) 
    A properly designed container or apparatus is needed.
  • b) 
    It is difficult to verify death while the animals are in the container or apparatus.
  • c) 
    There is no immediate loss of consciousness.
  • d) 
    Exposure times required to kill are considerable.

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  • 5. 
    Conclusion

The method is suitable for poultry and neonatal sheep, goats and pigs.

Article 7.6.15. Lethal injection

  • 1. 
    Introduction

A lethal injection using high doses of anaesthetic and sedative drugs causes CNS depression, unconsciousness and death . In practice, barbiturates in combination with other drugs are commonly used.

  • 2. 
    Requirements for effective use
  • a) 
    Doses and routes of administration that cause rapid loss of consciousness followed by death should be used.
  • b) 
    Prior sedation may be necessary for some animals .
  • c) 
    Intravenous administration is preferred, but intraperitoneal or intramuscular administration may be appropriate, especially if the agent is non-irritating.
  • d) 
    A nimals should be restrained to allow effective administration.
  • e) 
    A nimals should be monitored to ensure the absence of brain stem reflexes.
  • 3. 
    Advantages
  • a) 
    The method can be used in all species.
  • b) 
    Death can be induced smoothly.
  • 4. 
    Disadvantages
  • a) 
    Restraint and/or sedation may be necessary prior to injection.
  • b) 
    Some combinations of drug type and route of administration may be painful, and should only be used in unconscious animals .
  • c) 
    Legal requirements and skill/training required may restrict use to veterinarians.
  • d) 
    Contaminated carcasses may present a risk to other wild or domestic animals .
  • 5. 
    Conclusion

The method is suitable for k illing small numbers of cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry.

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Article 7.6.16. Addition of anaesthetics to feed or water

  • 1. 
    Introduction

An anaesthetic agent which can be mixed with poultry feed or water may be used to kill poultry in houses. Poultry which are only anaesthetised need to be killed by another method such as cervical dislocation.

  • 2. 
    Requirements for effective use
  • a) 
    Sufficient quantities of anaesthetic need to be ingested rapidly for effective response.
  • b) 
    Intake of sufficient quantities is facilitated if the birds are fasted or water is withheld.
  • c) 
    Must be followed by k illing (see Article 7.6.17.) if birds are anaesthetised only.
  • 3. 
    Advantages
  • a) 
    Handling is not required until birds are anaesthetised.
  • b) 
    There may be biosecurity advantages in the case of large numbers of diseased birds.
  • 4. 
    Disadvantages
  • a) 
    Non-target animals may accidentally access the medicated feed or water when provided in an open environment.
  • b) 
    Dose taken is unable to be regulated and variable results may be obtained.
  • c) 
    A nimals may reject adulterated feed or water due to illness or adverse flavour.
  • d) 
    The method may need to be followed by k illing .
  • e) 
    Care is essential in the preparation and provision of treated feed or water, and in the disposal of uneaten treated feed/water and contaminated carcasses.
  • 5. 
    Conclusion

The method is suitable for k illing large numbers of poultry in houses. However, a back-up method should be available to kill birds that are anaesthetized but not killed.

Article 7.6.17. Cervical dislocation and decapitation

  • 1. 
    Cervical dislocation (manual and mechanical)
  • a) 
    Introduction

Unconscious poultry may be killed by either manual cervical dislocation (stretching) or mechanical neck crushing with a pair of pliers. Both methods result in death from cerebral anoxia due to cessation of breathing and/or blood supply to the brain.

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When the number of birds to be killed is small, and other methods of k illing are not available, or are impracticable, conscious birds of less than 3 kilograms may be killed using cervical dislocation in such a way that the blood vessels of the neck are severed and death is instantaneous.

  • b) 
    Requirements for effective use
  • i) 
    Killing should be performed either by manually or mechanically stretching the neck to sever the spinal cord or by using mechanical pliers to crush the cervical vertebrae with consequent major damage to the spinal cord.
  • ii) 
    Consistent results require strength and skill so team members should be rested regularly to ensure consistently reliable results.
  • iii) 
    Birds should be monitored continuously until death to ensure the absence of brain stem reflexes.
  • c) 
    Advantages
  • i) 
    It is a non-invasive k illing method.
  • ii) 
    It can be performed manually on small birds.
  • d) 
    Disadvantages
  • i) 
    Operator fatigue.
  • ii) 
    The method is more difficult in larger birds. iii) Requires trained personnel to perform humanely. iv) Human health and safety concerns due to handling of the birds. v) Additional stress to the animals from handling. 2. Decapitation
  • a) 
    Introduction
  • i) 
    Decapitation results in death by cerebral ischaemia using a guillotine or knife.
  • b) 
    Requirements for effective use
  • i) 
    The required equipment should be kept in good working order.
  • c) 
    Advantages
  • i) 
    The technique is effective and does not require monitoring.
  • d) 
    Disadvantages
  • i) 
    The working area is contaminated with body fluids, which increases biosecurity risks. ii) Pain if consciousness is not lost immediately.

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Article 7.6.18. Pithing and bleeding

  • 1. 
    Pithing
  • a) 
    Introduction

Pithing is a method of k illing animals which have been stunned by a penetrating captive bolt, without immediate death . Pithing results in the physical destruction of the brain and upper regions of the spinal cord, through the insertion of a rod or cane through the bolt hole.

  • b) 
    Requirements for effective use
  • i) 
    Pithing cane or rod is required.
  • ii) 
    An access to the head of the animal and to the brain through the skull is required.
  • iii) 
    A nimals should be monitored continuously until death to ensure the absence of brain stem reflexes.
  • c) 
    Advantages

The technique is effective in producing immediate death .

  • d) 
    Disadvantages
  • i) 
    A delayed and/or ineffective pithing due to convulsions may occur.
  • ii) 
    The working area is contaminated with body fluids, which increases biosecurity risks.
  • 2. 
    Bleeding
  • a) 
    Introduction

Bleeding is a method of k illing animals through the severance of the major blood vessels in the neck or chest that results in a rapid fall in blood pressure, leading to cerebral ischaemia and death .

  • b) 
    Requirements for effective use i) A sharp knife is required.
  • ii) 
    An access to the neck or chest of the animal is required.
  • iii) 
    A nimals should be monitored continuously until death to ensure the absence of brain stem reflexes.
  • c) 
    Advantages

The technique is effective in producing death after an effective stunning method which does not permit pithing.

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  • d) 
    Disadvantages
  • i) 
    A delayed and/or ineffective bleeding due to convulsions may occur.
  • ii) 
    The working area is contaminated with body fluids, which increases biosecurity risks.

The only preclusion against the use of this method for neonates is the design of the stunning tongs that may not facilitate their application across such a small-sized head/body.

text deleted

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CH AP TE R 7.7

GUIDELINES ON STRAY DOG POPULATION CONTROL

EU Comments

The EU can support the changes in the revised chapter on Stray Dog Population Control.

A previous specific comment is reiterated within the text given its importance to the EU.

Preamble: The scope of these recommendations is to deal with stray and feral dogs, which pose serious human health, animal health and welfare problems and have a socio-economic, political, and religious problems in many countries. Whilst acknowledging human health is a priority including the prevention of zoonotic diseases notably rabies, the OIE recognises the importance of controlling dog populations without causing unnecessary or avoidable animal suffering. Veterinary Services should play a lead role in preventing zoonotic diseases and ensuring animal welfare and should be involved in dog population control, coordinating their activities with other competent public institutions and/or agencies.

Article 7.7.1.

Guiding principles

The following recommendations are based on those laid down in Chapter 7.1. Some additional principles are relevant to these recommendations:

  • 1. 
    The promotion of Responsible dog ownership can significantly reduce the numbers of stray dogs and the incidence of zoonotic diseases.
  • 2. 
    Because dog ecology is linked with human activities, control of dog populations has to be accompanied by changes in human behaviour to be effective.

Article 7.7.2. Definitions

Stray dog

means any dog not under direct control by a person or not prevented from roaming. Types of stray dog:

  • a) 
    free-roaming owned dog not under direct control or restriction at a particular time;
  • b) 
    free-roaming dog with no owner;
  • c) 
    feral dog: domestic dog that has reverted to the wild state and is no longer directly dependent upon humans for successful reproduction.

Owne d dog

means a dog with a person that claims responsibility.

Person

this can include more than one individual, and could comprise family/household members or an organisation.

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Re sponsib le dog ownership

means the situation whereby a person (as defined above) accepts and commits to perform various duties according to the legislation in place and focused on the satisfaction of the behavioural, environmental and physical needs of a dog and to the prevention of risk s (aggression, disease transmission or injuries) that the dog may pose to the community, other animals or the environment.

Euth an asia

means the act of inducing death in a humane manner.

D og population c ontrol prog ramme

means a programme with the aim of reducing a stray dog population to a particular level and/or maintaining it at that level and/or managing it in order to meet a predetermined objective (see Article 7.7.3).

Carrying c apac ity

means the upper limit of the dog population density that could be supported by the habitat based on the availability of resources (food, water, shelter), and human acceptance.

Article 7.7.3. Dog population control programme objectives

The objectives of a programme to control the dog population may include the following:

  • 1. 
    improve health and welfare of owned and stray dog population;
  • 2. 
    reduce numbers of stray dogs to an acceptable level;
  • 3. 
    promote responsible ownership;
  • 4. 
    assist in the creation and maintenance of a rabies immune or rabies-free dog population;
  • 5. 
    reduce the risk of zoonotic diseases other than rabies;
  • 6. 
    manage other risks to human health (e.g. parasites);
  • 7. 
    prevent harm to the environment and other animals;
  • 8. 
    prevent illegal trade and trafficking.

Article 7.7.4. Responsibilities and competencies

  • 1. 
    V eterinary A uthority

The V eterinary A uthority is responsible for the implementation of animal health and animal welfare legislation, in coordination with other competent government agencies and institutions. Control of endemic zoonotic diseases such as rabies and parasitic infections (e.g. E chinococcus spp.) would require technical advice from the V eterinary A uthority , as animal health and some aspects of public health are within this Authority’s competence but organising and/or supervising dog control schemes can be the responsibility of nongovernmental organisations and governmental agencies other than the V eterinary A uthority .

EU comment

The EU would like to reiterate its previous comment.

The title of Point 1 of Art 7.7.4 “Veterinary Authority” should be replaced by “Veterinary Authority and Competent Authority".

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Furthermore, the following text should be inserted as second sentence of the paragraph in Point 1 "In some cases animal welfare is under the responsibility of other Competent Authority than the Veterinary Authority”.

Justification

As defined in the Glossary of the Terrestrial Code, ”Competent Authority” includes the Veterinary Authority as well as other Governmental Authority of an OIE Member having the responsibility and competence for ensuring or supervising the implementation of animal health and welfare measures.

  • 2. 
    Other government agencies

The responsibilities of other government agencies will depend on the risk being managed and the objective/nature of the dog population control measures employed.

The ministry or other agency responsible for public health would normally play a leadership role and may have legislative authority in dealing with zoonotic diseases. Control of stray dogs with regard to other human health risks (e.g. stray dogs on roads; dog attacks within communities) may fall within the responsibility of the public health agency but is more likely to be the responsibility of the local government authorities or other agencies for public safety/security operating at the state/provincial or municipal level.

Environment protection agencies may take responsibility for control problems associated with stray dogs when they present a hazard to the environment (e.g. control of feral dogs in national parks; prevention of dog attacks on wildlife or transmission of diseases to wildlife) or where a lack of environmental controls is giving rise to stray dog populations that threaten human health or access to amenities. For example, environmental protection agencies may regulate and enforce measures to prevent dogs from accessing waste or human sewage.

  • 3. 
    Private sector veterinarians

The private sector veterinarian is responsible for providing advice to dog owners or handlers consulting the veterinarian for advice or treatment of a dog. The private sector veterinarian can play an important role in disease surveillance because he/she might be the first to see a dog suffering from a notifiable disease such as rabies. It is necessary that the private sector veterinarian follow the procedure established by the V eterinary A uthority for responding to and reporting a suspected rabies case or a dog that is suffering from any other notifiable disease . Private sector veterinarians also play an important role (often in liaison with the police and/or local authorities) in dealing with cases of neglect that can lead to problems with stray and mismanaged dogs.

The private veterinarian has competence and will normally be involved in dog health programmes and population control measures, including health testing, vaccination, identification, kennelling during the absence of the owner, sterilisation and euthanasia. Two-way communication between the private sector veterinarian and V eterinary A uthority , often via the medium of a veterinary professional organisation, is very important and the V eterinary A uthority is responsible for setting up appropriate mechanisms for this action.

  • 4. 
    Non governmental organisations (NGOs)

Non governmental organisations (NGOs) are potentially important partners of the V eterinary Services in contributing to public awareness and understanding and helping to obtain resources to contribute in a practical way to the design and successful implementation of dog control programmes. NGOs can supply local knowledge on dog populations and features of ownership, as well as expertise in handling and kennelling dogs and the implementation of sterilisation programmes. NGOs can also contribute, together with veterinarians and the authorities in educating the public in responsible dog ownership.

  • 5. 
    Local government authorities

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Local government authorities are responsible for many services and programmes that relate to health, safety and public good within their jurisdiction. In many countries the legislative framework gives authority to local government agencies in regard to aspects of public health, environmental

In many countries local government agencies are responsible for the development and enforcement of legislation relating to dog ownership (e.g. registration, microchipping, vaccination, leash laws, abandonment), the control of stray dogs (e.g. dog catching and shelters) and the alleviation of the problems stray dogs cause in their jurisdiction. This would normally be done with advice from a higher level (national or state/provincial) authority with specialised expertise in regard to public health and animal health. Collaboration with the private sector veterinarians (e.g. in programs to sterilise and vaccinate stray dogs) and NGOs is a common feature of dog control programmes. Regardless of the legislative basis, it is essential to have the co-operation of local government authorities in the control of stray dogs.

  • 6. 
    Dog owners

When a person takes on the ownership of a dog there should be an immediate acceptance of responsibility for that dog, and for any offspring it may produce, for the duration of its life or until a subsequent owner is found. The owner must ensure that the welfare of the dog, including behavioural needs, are respected and the dog is protected, as far as possible, from infectious diseases (e.g. through vaccination and parasite control) and from unwanted reproduction (e.g. through contraception or sterilisation). Owners should ensure that the dog’s ownership is clearly identified (preferably with permanent identification such as a tattoo or microchip) and, where required by legislation, registered on a centralised database. All reasonable steps should be taken to ensure that the dog does not roam out of control in a manner that would pose a problem to the community and/or the environment.

Article 7.7.5.

In the development of a dog population control programme it is recommended that the authorities establish an advisory group, which should include veterinarians, experts in dog ecology, dog behaviour and zoonotic diseases, and representatives of relevant stakeholders (local authorities, human health services/authorities, environmental control services/authorities, NGOs and the public). The main purpose of this advisory group would be to analyse and quantify the problem, identify the causes, obtain public opinion on dogs and propose the most effective approaches to use in the short and long term.

Important considerations are as follows:

  • 1. 
    Identifying the sources of stray dogs
  • a) 
    Owned dogs that roam freely
  • b) 
    Dogs that have been abandoned by their owner, including puppies resulting from uncontrolled breeding of owned dogs.
  • c) 
    Unowned dogs that reproduce successfully.
  • 2. 
    Estimating the existing number, distribution and ecology

Practical tools that are available include registers of dogs, population estimates, and surveys of dogs, owners, dog shelters and veterinarians. The important factors relevant to the dog carrying capacity of the environment include food, shelter, water and human attitudes and behaviour.

A methodology could be established to make an estimate of the total dog population. An overview of appropriate methodologies may be found in Article 7.7.8. The same methodology could be used at appropriate intervals to assess population trends.

  • 3. 
    Regulatory framework

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A regulatory framework that would help authorities establish successful dog control programmes could include the following key elements:

  • a) 
    registration and identification of dogs and licensing of dog breeders;
  • b) 
    vaccination against rabies and other preventive measures against zoonotic disease, as appropriate;
  • c) 
    veterinary procedures (e.g. surgical procedures);
  • d) 
    control of dog movement (national and international);
  • e) 
    control of dangerous dogs;
  • f) 
    regulations on the breeding and sale of dogs;
  • g) 
    environmental controls (e.g. abattoirs , rubbish dumps, dead stock facilities); h)    regulations for dog shelters;
  • i) 
    animal welfare obligations of owners and authorities. 4. Resources available to authorities
  • a) 
    Human resources;
  • b) 
    financial resources;
  • c) 
    technical tools;
  • d) 
    infrastructure;
  • e) 
    cooperative activities;
  • f) 
    public-private-NGO partnerships;
  • g) 
    central-state or province-local partnerships.

Article 7.7.6.

Control measures

The following control measures could be implemented according to the national context and local circumstances. Measures may be used in combination. Euthanasia of dogs, used alone, is not an effective control measure. If used, it should be done humanely (see point 11 of Article 7.7.6.) and in combination with other measures to achieve effective long term control. It is also important that authorities gain an understanding of people’s attitudes towards dog ownership so that they can develop a cooperative approach to the control of dog populations.

  • 1. 
    E ducation and legislation for responsible ownership

Encouraging dog owners to be more responsible will reduce the number of dogs allowed to roam, improve the health and welfare of dogs, and minimise the risk that dogs pose to the community. The promotion of responsible dog ownership through legislation and education is a necessary part of a dog population control programme. Collaboration with local government authorities, animal welfare NGOs, kennel clubs, private veterinarians and veterinary organisations will assist V eterinary A uthorities in establishing and maintaining programmes.

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Education on responsible dog ownership (for the currently owned dog and any offspring it produces) should address the following elements:

  • a) 
    the importance of proper selection and care to ensure the welfare of the dog and any offspring; the latter may include preparing the dog to cope with its environment through attention to socialisation and training;

EU comment

In point 1.a) of Art 7.7.6, the word "for behaviour" should be included between the word "selection" and "and".

Furthermore, the following text “matching the right dog to the right owner / environment and" should be included between the word "include" and "preparing".

Justification

Education on responsible dog ownership should address the importance of proper selection for behaviour as well of choosing the right dog for the right owner and environment.

  • b) 
    registration and identification of dogs (see point 2 of Article 7.7.6.);
  • c) 
    disease prevention, in particular zoonotic disease, e.g. through regular vaccination in rabies endemic areas;
  • d) 
    preventing negative impacts of dogs on the community, via pollution (e.g. faeces and noise), risks to human health through biting or traffic accidents and risks to other dogs, wildlife, livestock and other companion animal species;
  • e) 
    control of dog reproduction.

In order to achieve a shift towards responsible ownership, a combination of legislation, public awareness, education, and promotion of these elements will be required. It may also be necessary to improve access to resources supporting responsible ownership, such as veterinary care, identification and registration services and measures for control of zoonotic diseases.

  • 2. 
    Registration and identification of dogs (licensing)

A core component of dog population control by the Competent A uthorities is the registration and identification of owned dogs. This may include granting licences to owners and breeders. Registration and identification may be emphasized as part of responsible dog ownership and are often linked to animal health programs, for example, mandatory rabies vaccination and traceability.

Registration of animals in a centralised database can be used to support the enforcement of legislation and the reuniting of lost animals with owners. The control of dog reproduction by sterilisation can be encouraged through financial incentives presented by differential licensing fees.

  • 3. 
    Reproductive control

Controlling reproduction in dogs prevents the birth of unwanted puppies and can help address the balance between demand for dogs and the size of the population. It is advisable to focus efforts to control reproduction on those individuals or groups in the dog population identified as the most productive and the most likely to be the sources of unwanted and stray dogs, to ensure best use of resources. Methods of controlling reproduction will require direct veterinary input to individual animals. Involvement of both private and public veterinary sectors may be required to meet demand for services. Subsidisation of sterilisation programmes by government or other organisations may be considered to encourage uptake.

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The control of reproduction is essentially the responsibility of owners and can be incorporated into education on responsible ownership (see point 1 of Article 7.7.6.). Methods for controlling reproduction in dogs include:

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  • a) 
    surgical sterilisation;
  • b) 
    chemical sterilisation;
  • c) 
    chemical contraception;
  • d) 
    separation of female dogs during oestrus from unsterilised males.

Surgical sterilisation should be carried out by a veterinarian and include appropriate anaesthesia and pain management.

Any chemicals or drugs used in controlling reproduction should be shown to have appropriate safety, quality and efficacy for the function required and used according to the manufacturer’s and Competent A uthority ’s regulations. In the case of chemical sterilants and contraceptives, research and field trials may need to be completed before use.

  • 4. 
    Removal and handling

The Competent A uthority should collect dogs that are not under direct supervision and verify their ownership. Capture, transport, and holding of the dogs should be done humanely. The Competent A uthority should develop and implement appropriate legislation and training to regulate these activities. Capture should be achieved with the minimum force required and equipment should be used that supports humane handling. Uncovered wire loops should not be used for capture.

  • 5. 
    Capture and return, rehoming or release

Competent A uthorities have the responsibility to develop minimum standards for the housing (physical facilities) and care of these dogs. There should be provision for holding the dogs for a reasonable period of time to allow for reunion with the owner and, as appropriate, for rabies observation.

  • a) 
    Minimum standards for housing should include the following provisions:
  • i) 
    site selection: Access to drainage, water and electricity are essential and environmental factors such as noise and pollution should be taken into account;
  • ii) 
    kennel size, design and occupancy taking exercise into account;
  • iii) 
    disease control measures including isolation and quarantine facilities.
  • b) 
    Management should address:
  • i) 
    adequate fresh water and nutritious food;
  • ii) 
    regular hygiene and cleaning;
  • iii) 
    routine inspection of the dogs;
  • iv) 
    monitoring of health and provision of required veterinary treatments;
  • v) 
    policies and procedures for rehoming (adoption), sterilisation and euthanasia;
  • vi) 
    training of staff in safe and appropriate handling of dogs;
  • vii) 
    record keeping and reporting to authorities.

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Dogs that are removed from a community may be reunited with the owner or offered to new owners for rehoming. This provides an opportunity to promote responsible ownership and good animal health care (including rabies vaccination). Prior to rehoming, authorities may consider sterilisation of dogs as a population control measure. The suitability of new owners to adopt dogs should be assessed and owners matched with available animals. The effectiveness of rehoming may be limited due to the suitability and number of dogs.

Dogs that are removed from a community may in some cases be provided with health care (including rabies vaccination), sterilised, and released to their local community at or near the place of capture. This method is more likely to be accepted in the situation where the presence of stray dogs is considered to be inevitable and is well tolerated by the local community.

This method is not applicable in all situations and may be illegal in countries or regions where legislation prohibits the abandonment of dogs. Problems caused by dogs, such as noise, faecal pollution, bite injuries and traffic accidents, would not be alleviated as dogs are returned to the local community and their movements are not restricted. If the local community has owned dogs, and sterilised dogs are released, consideration should be given to the risk that this could encourage abandonment of unwanted dogs. In the situation where many dogs are owned, a population control programme that focuses on neutering and responsible ownership may be more appropriate.

It is recommended that before adopting this approach, a cost-benefit analysis is conducted. Factors such as the monetary costs, impact on culture of ownership and public safety should be assessed as well as the benefits for disease control and animal welfare as well as any societal benefits.

  • c) 
    If this method is adopted, the following factors should be addressed:
  • i) 
    raising awareness of the programme within the local community to ensure understanding and support;
  • ii) 
    use of humane methods for catching, transporting and holding dogs;
  • iii) 
    correct surgical technique, anaesthesia and analgesia, followed by post-operative care;
  • iv) 
    disease control may include blanket vaccination (e.g. rabies) and treatments and testing for diseases (e.g. leishmaniasis) followed, as appropriate by treatment or euthanasia of the dog;
  • v) 
    behavioural observation may be used to assess if dogs are suitable for release; if not suitable for release or rehoming, euthanasia should be considered;
  • vi) 
    permanent marking (e.g. tattoo or microchip) to indicate that the animal has been sterilised. Individual identification also allows for tracking of vaccination status and treatment history and identification of a level of ‘ownership’ by the organisation/authority responsible for carrying out this intervention. A visible identification (e.g. collar) may also be used to prevent unnecessary recapture;
  • vii) 
    the dog should be returned to a place that is as near as possible to the place of capture;
  • viii) 
    the welfare of dogs after release should be monitored and action taken if required.

Dogs that are removed from a community may, be too numerous or may be unsuitable for any rehoming scheme. If euthanasia of these unwanted animals is the only option, the procedure should be conducted in accordance with the regulations of the Competent A uthority (see point 11 of Article 7.7.6.)

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  • 6. 
    Environmental controls

Steps should be taken to exclude dogs from sources of food (e.g. rubbish dumps and abattoirs , and installing animal-proof rubbish containers).

This should be linked to a reduction in the dog population by other methods, to avoid animal welfare problems.

  • 7. 
    Control of dog movement – international (export/import)

Chapter 8.10. provides recommendations on the international movement of dogs between rabies free countries and countries considered to be infected with rabies.

  • 8. 
    Control of dog movements – within country (e.g. leash laws, roaming restrictions)

Measures for the control of dog movement in a country are generally invoked for the following reasons:

  • a) 
    for rabies control when the disease is present in a country;
  • b) 
    for public safety reasons;
  • c) 
    for the safety of “owned dogs” in an area or locality when a stray dog control programme is in place;
  • d) 
    to protect wildlife and livestock.

It is necessary to have a regulatory framework and a national or local infrastructure comprising organisation, administration, staff and resources to encourage the finders of stray dogs to report to the Competent A uthority .

  • 9. 
    Regulation of commercial dog dealers

Dog breeders and dealers should be encouraged to form or join an appropriate association. Such associations should encourage a commitment to the raising and selling of physically and psychologically healthy dogs, as unhealthy dogs may be more likely to be abandoned to become part of the stray population. They should encourage breeders and dealers to provide advice on proper care to all new owners of dogs. Regulations covering commercial dog breeders and dealers should include specific requirements for accommodation, provision of suitable food, drink and bedding, adequate exercise, veterinary care and disease control and may require breeders and dealers to allow regular inspection, including veterinary inspection.

  • 10. 
    Reduction in dog bite incidence

The most effective means of reducing prevalence of dog bites are education and placing responsibility on the owner. Dog owners should be educated in principles of responsible dog ownership as described in point 1 of Article 7.7.6. Legal mechanisms that enable the Competent A uthorities to impose penalties or otherwise deal with irresponsible owners are necessary. Mandatory registration and identification schemes will facilitate the effective application of such mechanisms. Young children are the group at highest risk for dog bites. Public education programmes focussed on appropriate dog-directed behaviour have been demonstrated to be effective in reducing dog bite prevalence and these programmes should be encouraged. Authorities should seek advice from dog behaviour experts in developing dog safety education programmes.

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  • 11. 
    Euthanasia

When euthanasia is practised, the general principles in the Code should be followed, with the emphasis on using the most practical, rapid and humane methods and ensuring operator safety. Regardless of the method used, it is important to minimise distress, anxiety and pain by ensuring that operators are appropriately trained.

Table 1 shows a Summary analysis List of methods for the euthanasia of dogs.

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Table 1: Summary analysis List of methods for the euthanasia of dogs

 

Euthanasia method

Specific method

Animal welfare

concerns/

implications

Key animal welfare requirements

Considerations relating to operator security

Advantages

Disadvantages

Chemical

-via injection

Barbiturates

Correct restraint is needed.

IP is slow and may be irritant.

IC injection is a painful procedure.

Recommend to use IV injection.

When using IP injection, the solution may be diluted or local anaesthetic agent used in conjunction.

IC should only be performed on unconscious animal and by skilled operator.

Correct restraint is needed.

Administered under veterinary supervision and requires trained personnel.

Speed of action generally depends on the dose, concentration, route and rate of injection.

Barbiturates induce euthanasia smoothly, with minimal discomfort to the animal.

Barbiturates are less expensive than many other euthanasia agents.

These drugs persist in the carcass and may cause sedation or death in animals that consume the cadaver.

Embutramide +Mebezonium +Tetracaine

Muscle paralysis may occur before lost of consciousness if injection given rapidly

Use slow IV injection with sedation to permit slow rate of injection.

Correct restraint is needed.

To be administered under veterinary supervision and by trained personnel.

Quite low cost.

Unavailable/unlicensed in some countries

Chemical

-via

injection (contd)

Anaesthetic agent overdose (thiopentone or propofenol)

Underdosing may lead to recovery

IV injection of a sufficient dose

Correct restraint is needed.

To be administered under veterinary supervision and by trained personnel.

Generally quick action and minimal discomfort to animal.

Large volume required (cost implications)

Potassium chloride (KCl)

K+ is cardiotoxic and very painful if used without anaesthetic agent.

Only use on anaesthetised animals, IV injection

Requires trained personnel.

Readily available without veterinary control.

Prior need for anaesthetic (cost and availability implications)

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Table 1: Summary analysis List of methods for the euthanasia of dogs (contd)

 

Mechanical

Free bullet

Can be inhumane if shot is inaccurate and dog is only wounded; dog may also escape.

Skilled operator essential.

Risk of injury to operators and spectators.

Not necessary to handle or capture dog.

Brain tissue may be unavailable for rabies diagnosis. Risk of injury to bystanders. Legal constraints on use of firearms.

Penetrating captive bolt followed by pithing where necessary to ensure death

Can be inhumane if shot is inaccurate and dog is only wounded.

Skilled operator essential.

Animal must be restrained. Skilled operator essential.

No risk to operator (cf free bullet) unless risk of dog infected with rabies, due to potential contact with brain tissue

Brain tissue may be unavailable for rabies diagnosis. Legal constraints on use of firearms. May raise aesthetic objections.

Exsanguination

Onset of hypovolaemia may cause dog to become anxious.

Only use on unconscious animal

Danger to operator through use of sharp instrument.

Material requirements minimal.

Must be done on unconscious animal. Aesthetically objectionable

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Table 1: Summary analysis List of methods for the euthanasia of dogs (contd)

 

Euthanasia method

Specific method

Animal welfare concerns/ implications

Key animal welfare requirements

Considerations relating to operator security

Advantages

Disadvantages

Gaseous

Carbon monoxide (CO)

Inadequate concentration of CO is not lethal and can cause suffering. Signs of distress (convulsions, vocalization and agitation) may occur.

Compressed CO in cylinders must be used to achieve and maintain adequate concentration, which must be monitored. Note: fumes from gasoline engines are an irritant and this source of CO is not recommended.

Very hazardous for operator - gas is odourless and causes toxicity at both acute high levels and chronic low levels

Dog dies quite rapidly if concentration of 4 to 6% used.

No odour (therefore no aversive effect). Gas is not flammable or explosive except at concentration greater than 10%.

 

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Table 1: Summary analysis List of methods for the euthanasia of dogs (contd)

 

Euthanasia method

Specific method

Animal welfare

concerns/

implications

Key animal welfare requirements

Considerations relating to operator security

Advantages

Disadvantages

Gaseous

Carbon dioxide (CO2)

Gas is aversive. Inadequate

concentration of CO2 is not lethal and can cause suffering. CO2 is heavier than air, so when incomplete filling of the chamber occurs, dogs may raise their head and avoid exposure. Few studies on adequate concentration and animal welfare.

Compressed CO2 gas chamber is the only acceptable method because the concentration can be monitored and regulated.

Minimal hazard to operator when properly designed equipment used.

Gas is not flammable or explosive and causes quite rapid anaesthesia when correct concentrations used.

Low cost.

Readily available as compressed gas

Unconsciousness can occur in minutes, but death may take some time. Likelihood of suffering before unconsciousness.

Inert gas (nitrogen, N2 argon, Ar)

Loss of consciousness is preceded by hypoxemia and ventilatory stimulation, which may be distressing to the dog.

Re-establishing a low concentration of O2 (i.e. greater than or equal to 6%) in the chamber before death will allow immediate recovery.

Concentration above 98% must be achieved rapidly and maintained. Properly designed equipment must be used

Minimal hazard to operator when properly designed equipment used.

Gas is not flammable or explosive and is odourless.

Readily available as compressed gas.

High cost.

Little data on animal welfare implications in dogs.

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Table 1: Summary analysis List of methods for the euthanasia of dogs (contd)

 

Euthanasia method

Specific method

Animal welfare concerns/ implications

Key animal welfare requirements

Considerations relating to operator security

Advantages

Disadvantages

Gaseous

Anaesthetic gas overdose (halothane or enflurane)

Animal may struggle and become anxious during induction. Vapours may be irritating and can induce excitement.

Supplementation with air or O2 required to avoid hypoxemia during induction phase.

Some gases may be hazardous, especially for pregnant women. General recommendation: Avoid human exposure to greater than or equal to 2ppm to avoid narcosis.

Gas is not flammable or

explosive.

Valuable for use with small

animals (<7kgs) and animals

that are already anesthetised

with gas.

High cost.

Anaesthetic and euthanasia properties of the gas used must be known.

Isoflurane has a pungent odour. Methoxyflurane's action is slow and dog may become agitated.

E lectrical

Electrocution

Cardiac fibrillation occurs before onset of unconsciousness, causing severe pain if dog is conscious. Pain can also be caused by violent extension of the limbs, head and neck.

Method may not be effective if insufficient current applied.

Dogs must be unconscious before being electrocuted. This can be accomplished by electrical stunning (current through the brain to produce an instantaneous stun) or anaesthesia. Electrodes should span the brain in order that the current passed through the brain in order to achieve an effective stun.

Death would result from current passed through the heart of an unconscious animal.

Proper equipment and trained operator is essential.

May be hazardous for operator, who should use protective equipment (boots and gloves).

Low cost.

Inhumane if performed on conscious dog. May raise aesthetic objections.

KEY to abbreviations used in Table 1: IV: intravenous IP: Intraperioneal IC: Intracardiac

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  • a) 
    Comments on methods for the euthanasia of dogs:
  • i) 
    Restraint

When a dog needs to be restrained for any procedure, including euthanasia, this should always be done with full regard for operator security and animal welfare. Some euthanasia methods must be used in association with sedation or anaesthesia in order to be considered humane.

  • ii) 
    Special equipment

When special equipment is needed to perform euthanasia (e.g. gas chamber) the system should be designed for the purpose and regularly maintained in order to achieve operator security and animal welfare.

  • iii) 
    The following methods, procedures and practices are unacceptable on animal welfare grounds:
  • • 
    Chemical methods:

§ Embutramide +Mebezonium +Tetracaine without sedation or by other than IV injection

§ Chloral hydrate

§ Nitrous oxide: may be used with other inhalants to speed the onset of anaesthesia, but alone it does not induce anaesthesia in dogs

§     Ether

§     Chloroform

§     Cyanide

§     Strychnine

§ Neuromuscular blocking agents (nicotine, magnesium sulphate, potassium chloride, all curariform agents) : when used alone, respiratory arrest occurs before loss of consciousness, so the dog may perceive pain

§ Formalin

§ Household products and solvents.

  • • 
    Mechanical methods:

§     Air embolism on conscious animal

§     Burning

§     Exsanguination of conscious animal

§     Decompression: expansion of gas trapped in body cavities may be very painful

§     Drowning

§     Hypothermia, rapid freezing

§ Stunning: stunning is not a euthanasia method, it should always be followed by a method which ensures death.

§ Kill-trapping

§ Electrocution of conscious animal.

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Because neonatal animals and adults with impaired breathing or low blood pressure are resistant to hypoxia, methods that depend upon achieving a hypoxic state (e.g. CO2, CO, N2, Ar) should not be used. These methods should not be used in animals aged less than 2 months, except to produce loss of consciousness and should be followed by another method to cause death. Concussion and cervical dislocation may be used in very small neonatal dogs and only in cases of emergency.

Operators must be well trained in the use of physical techniques to ensure that they are correctly and humanely carried out. The dog must be exsanguinated immediately after concussion or cervical dislocation.

  • iv) 
    Confirmation of death

For all methods of euthanasia used, death must be confirmed before animals are disposed of or left unattended. If an animal is not dead, another method of euthanasia must be performed.

  • v) 
    Carcass disposal

Carcasses should be disposed of in a manner that complies with legislation. Attention must be paid to the risk of residues occurring in the carcase. Incineration is generally the safest way of carcass disposal.

Article 7.7.7 Monitoring and evaluation of dog population control programmes

Monitoring and evaluation allows for comparison of important indicators against the baselines measured during initial assessment (see Article 7.7.5.). The three main reasons for carrying out monitoring and evaluation are:

  • 1. 
    to help improve performance, by highlighting both problems and successful elements of interventions;
  • 2. 
    for accountability, to demonstrate that the programme is achieving its aims;
  • 3. 
    assuming methods are standardised, to compare the success of strategies used in different locations and situations.

Monitoring is a continuous process that aims to check the programme progress against targets and allows for regular adjustments. Evaluation is a periodic assessment, usually carried out at particular milestones to check the programme is having the desired and stated impact. These procedures involve the measurement of ‘indicators’ that are chosen because they reflect important components of the programme at different stages. Selection of suitable indicators requires clear planning of what the programme is aiming to achieve, the best selection of indicators will be one that reflects the interest of all relevant stakeholders. Standardised methodology will facilitate comparison of data from subsequent evaluations and performance between different projects. Indicators can be direct measurements of an area targeted to change (e.g. population of free roaming dogs on public property) or indirect measures that reflect change in a targeted area.

  • 4. 
    Elements that should generally be monitored and evaluated include:
  • a) 
    dog population size, separated by into sub-populations according to ownership and restriction of movement (i.e. roaming unrestricted or restricted by an owner);
  • b) 
    dog welfare, in the target population (e.g. body condition score, skin conditions and injuries or lameness) and as a result of the programme (if interventions involve direct handling of dogs, the welfare of the dogs as result of this handling should be monitored);
  • c) 
    prevalence of zoonotic diseases, such as rabies, in both the animal and human population;
  • d) 
    responsible animal ownership, including measures of attitudes and understanding of responsible ownership and evidence that this is translating into responsible behaviour.
  • 5. 
    There are many sources of information for monitoring and evaluation purposes, including:
  • a) 
    feedback from the local community (e.g. through the use of structured questionnaires, focus groups or ‘open format’ consultation processes);

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  • b) 
    records and opinions obtained from relevant professionals (e.g. veterinarians, medical doctors, law enforcement agencies, educators);
  • c) 
    animal based measurements (e.g. direct observation surveys of population size and welfare status).

The output of activities against budget should be carefully recorded in order to evaluate the effort (or cost) against the outcomes and impact (or benefit) that are reflected in the results of monitoring and evaluation.

Article 7.7.8.

An overview of appropriate methods for estimating the size of dog populations.

Population estimates are necessary for making realistic plans for dog population management and zoonosis control, and for monitoring the success of such interventions. However, for designing effective management plans, data on population sizes alone are insufficient. Additional information is required, such as degrees of supervision of owned dogs, the origin of ownerless dogs, accessibility, etc.

The term “owned” may be restricted to a dog that is registered with licensing authorities, or it may be expanded to unregistered animals that are somewhat supervised and receive shelter and some form of care in individual households. Owned dogs may be well supervised and restrained at all times, or they may be left without control for various time periods and activities. Dogs without owners that claim responsibility may still be accepted or tolerated in the neighbourhood, and individuals may provide food and protection. Such animals are sometimes called “community owned dogs” or “neighbourhood dogs”. For an observer it is frequently impossible to decide if a free roaming dog belongs to someone or not.

The choice of methods for assessing the size of a dog population depends on the ratio of owned versus ownerless dogs, which may not always easy to judge. For populations with a large proportion of owned dogs it may be sufficient to consult dog registration records or to conduct household surveys. These surveys should establish the number of owned dogs and the dog to human ratio in the area. In addition, questions on dog reproduction and demographics, care provided, zoonosis prevention, dog bite incidence, etc. may be asked. Sample questionnaires can be found in the “Guidelines for Dog Population Management” (WHO/WSPA 1990). Standard polling principles must be applied.

If the proportion of ownerless dogs is high or difficult to asses, then one must resort to more experimental approaches. Methods borrowed from wildlife biology can be applied. These methods are described WHO/WSPA’s “Guidelines for Dog Population Management” (1990), and in more detail in numerous professional publications and handbooks, such as Bookhout (1994) and Sutherland (2006). Being generally diurnal and tolerant to human proximity, dogs lend themselves to direct observation and the application of mark-recapture techniques. Nevertheless, a number of caveats and limitations have to be taken into account.. Firstly, the risk of zoonotic disease transmission is increased through close physical contact. Also, the methods are relatively labour intensive, they require some understanding of statistics and population biology, and most importantly, they are difficult to apply to very large areas. One must take into account that dog distribution is non-random, that their populations are not static, and that individual dogs are fairly mobile.

Counting of dogs visible in a defined area is the simplest approach to getting information on population size. One has to take into account that the visibility of dogs depends on the physical environment, but also on dog and human activity patterns. The visibility of animals changes with the time of the day and with seasons as a function of food availability, shelter (shade), disturbance, etc. Repeated standardized counting of dogs visible within defined geographical localities (e.g. wards) and specific times will provide indications of population trends. Direct counting is most reliable if it is applied to small and relatively confined dog populations, e.g. in villages, where it might be possible to recognize individual dogs based on their physical appearance.

Methods using mark-recapture procedures are often considered more reliable. However, they also produce trustworthy results only when a number of preconditions are met. Mortality, emigration and recruitment into the population must be minimal during the census period. One may be able to incorporate corrective factors into the calculations.

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It is therefore important that the recommended census procedures are applied at times of low dispersal and that one selects study plots of shape and size that minimize the effect of dog movements in and out of the observation area. Census surveys should be completed within a few days to a maximum of two weeks in order to reduce demographic changes. In addition, all individuals in the population must have an equal chance of being counted. This is a highly improbable condition for dogs, whose visibility depends on ownership status and degrees of supervision. It is therefore recommended that the investigator determines what fraction of the total population he/she might cover with an observational method and how much this part overlaps with the owned dog segment that he/she assesses with household surveys.

There are essentially t wo ways to obtain a population estimate if it is possible, in a defined area and within a few days, to tag a large number of dogs with a visible mark, e.g. a distinctive collar or a paint smudge. The first method requires that the capture (marking) effort remains reasonably constant for the whole length of the study. By plotting the daily number of dogs marked against the accumulated total of marked dogs for each day one can extrapolate the value representing the total number of dogs in the area. More commonly used in wildlife studies are mark recapture methods (Peterson-Jackson, Lincoln indices). Dogs are marked (tagged) and released back into the population. The population is subsequently sampled by direct observation. The number of marked and unmarked dogs is recorded. One multiplies the number of dogs that were initially marked and released by the number of subsequently observed dogs divided by the number of dogs seen as marked during the re-observation to obtain a total population estimate. Examples for the two methods are given in WHO/WSPA’s “Guidelines for Dog Population Management” (1990).

Since the dog populations of entire countries, states, provinces or even cities are much too large for complete assessment, it is necessary to apply the methods summarized above to sample areas. These should be selected (using common sense) so that results can be extrapolated to larger areas.

Bookhout TA (ed), 1994: Research and Management Techniques for Wildlife and Habitats , 5th ed. The Wildlife Society, Bethesda, Maryland, 740p.

Sutherland WJ (ed), 2006: E cological Census Techniques - A Handbook, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 448 p.

WHO/WSPA, 1990: Guidelines for Dog Population Management . WHO/ZOON/90.165. WHO, Geneva, 116 p.

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Annex XVII (contd)

DR AF T CH APT ER X .X .X .

ANIMAL WELFARE AND BROILER CHICKEN PRODUCTION

EU comments

The EU welcomes the work carried out on the Draft Chapter on Animal Welfare and Broiler Chicken Production, on the understanding that these are guidelines. The EU acknowledges in particular its outcome-based approach but considers that improvements and additional details are needed to bring the text in line with the previously adopted animal welfare chapters.

The EU believes that the document contains draft recommendations expressed in broad and imprecise terms that are not easily usable by competent authorities, veterinarians and poultry producers. As a consequence, redrafting in the form of more precise recommendations is strongly suggested.

The EU recommends the OIE to continue improving this Draft Chapter and to develop recommendations also on the management of breeding flock and hatchery.

Specific comments are presented within the text.

Article X.X.1. Definitions

Broile r

Birds of the species Gallus gallus kept primarily for commercial meat production.

Cag e housing system

In a cage housing system the caretaker accesses the birds from outside the enclosure in which the birds are kept.

Deep litte r housing system

In a deep litter housing system the birds are kept on floors that are is covered with bedding material.

EU comment

In the definition above, the verb "is" should be deleted.

Justification

It is a repetition of the verb.

Slatte d floor housing syste m

In a slatted floor housing system the birds are kept on raised floors, on which droppings don’t accumulate but fall through.

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EU comment

The following sentence should be added at the end of the above paragraph:

"Fully slatted accommodation should preferably not be used as birds requires access to litter"

Justification

Broilers need areas of litter to carry out their natural behaviours such as pecking and scratching. Therefore fully slatted housing systems should not be used.

Article X.X. 2.

Scope

These recommendations cover the production period from arrival of the chick on the farm to harvesting the broiler in commercial production systems. Backyard flocks are not included even if the animals or products are traded locally.

Note 1: Welfare of the broiler during transport to the abattoir is covered in Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.

Note 2: Recommendations on the management of the breeding flock and hatchery and for the period between hatching and arrival on the farm to be developed.

Article X.X.3. Commercial broiler production systems

Commercial broiler production systems include:

  • 1. 
    Intensive systems

Birds are completely confined in a roofed structure, with or without environmental control and usually at a higher stocking density than in other production systems. Birds may be kept in cages (e.g. wire or plastic floor or deep litter floor) or on deep litter, slatted floor or a combination

  • 2. 
    Semi intensive systems

Birds are confined in a roofed structure but provided with an access to a restricted outdoor area. They may be kept in cages (e.g. wire or plastic floor or deep litter floor) or on deep litter, a slatted floor or a combination of the two.

  • 3. 
    Extensive systems

Birds are not confined in a roofed structure and are usually kept at a lower stocking density than in intensive or semi intensive systems.

EU comment

The first sentence above of point 3 of Art X.X.3 should be replaced as follow:

“Birds are not confined in a roofed structure, but have protection by other means and are usually kept at a lower

stocking density than in intensive or semi intensive systems."

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Justification

For matter of clarity, it should be indicated that in extensive systems birds need to have means of protection.

Article X.X.4. Criteria or measurables for the welfare of broilers

The following outcome (animal) based measurables can be useful indicators of welfare:

EU comment

In Art X.X.4, the sentence above should be replaced as follow:

“The following outcome (animal) based measurables can be useful indicators of welfare and should be measured at appropriate time by the animal keepers. The use of these indicators should be adapted to the different situations”.

Moreover Art X.X.4 needs redrafting since indication should be given as to which of the listed outcome-based indicators are of particular importance in different contexts. Furthermore, guidance should be provided as to how the listed indicators should be measured (e.g. scoring system to measure contact dermatitis) and as to the prevalence of a condition that should be recognised as presenting a cause for concern (e.g. what percentage of chickens need to be affected by a particular condition before it is considered to be consistent with poor welfare)

Justification

Further guidance should be provided in order to make proper use of the listed indicators which should be adapted to different situations.

  • 1) 
    Mortality rate (dead, culled)
  • 2) 
    Gait
  • 3) 
    Contact dermatitis
  • 4) 
    Feather condition
  • 5) 
    Disease incidence / morbidity rates
  • 6) 
    Ascites / sudden death syndrome (SDS)
  • 7) 
    Respiratory disease
  • 8) 
    Parasitic diseases
  • 9) 
    Carcass and meat quality (condemnations)

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  • 10) 
    Behaviour: fear, thermal distress, illness
  • a) 
    Human avoidance behaviour
  • b) 
    Spatial distribution:
  • c) 
    Panting and wing spreading.
  • d) 
    Dust bathing
  • e) 
    Feather pecking
  • f) 
    Cannibalism
  • g) 
    Feeding and drinking
  • 11) 
    Water consumption
  • 12) 
    Growth rate
  • 13) 
    Feed conversion
  • 14) 
    Injury rate
  • 15) 
    E ye condition.

Article X.X.5. Recommendations

  • 1. 
    Biosecurity and animal health
  • a) 
    Biosecurity and Disease Prevention

Biosecurity means a set of measures designed to protect a flock from the entry of infectious agents.

EU comment

The first sentence of point 1.a) of Art X.X.5, should be redrafted as follow:

“Biosecurity means a set of measures designed to maintain a flock at a particular health status and to prevent the entry (or exit) of specific infectious agents.”

Justification

Biosecurity is not just about prevention of pathogen entry alone and different biosecurity measures achieve different levels of herd health status.

Biosecurity programmes should be implemented, commensurate with the risk of disease and in accordance with relevant recommendations found in Terrestrial Code chapters on OIE listed diseases.

EU comment

The second sentence of point 1.a) of Art X.X.5, should be redrafted as follow:

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“Biosecurity programmes should be designed and implemented, commensurate with the desired flock health status and current disease risk (endemic and exotic or trans boundary) that is specific to each epidemiological group of animals within a herd.”

Justification

The Terrestrial code on OIE listed diseases are at the higher level, (and generally lower risk) end of the biosecurity scale and many of the relevant measures listed in the TC are at country / state legislative level. Herd level biosecurity is mostly about maintenance of a particular herd health status at a level desired by the owner / keeper and additionally that required by state/ federal / country legislation outwit the Terrestrial Code.

These programmes should address the control of the major routes for disease and pathogen transmission:

  • i) 
    poultry
  • ii) 
    other animals
  • iii) 
    people
  • iv) 
    equipment
  • v) 
    vehicles
  • vi) 
    air
  • vii) 
    water supply
  • viii) 
    feed.

Outcome based measurables: disease incidence, mortality, growth rate and feed conversion.

  • b) 
    Animal Health Management / Preventive Medicine / Veterinary Treatment

Animal health management means a system designed to prevent diseases occurring in a flock and provide treatment if disease occurs in order to optimise the health and welfare of the flock.

Those responsible for the care of birds should be aware of the signs of ill-health or distress, such as reduced food and water intake, reduced growth, changes in behaviour, abnormal conditions of their feathers or droppings, or other physical features.

If persons in charge are not able to identify the causes of ill-health or distress or to correct these or suspect the presence of a listed reportable disease, they should seek advice from those having training and experience, such as poultry veterinarians or other qualified advisers. Veterinary treatments should be prescribed by a qualified veterinarian.

There should be an effective programme for the prevention and treatment of diseases consistent with the programs established by the Veterinary Services as appropriate.

Vaccinations and other treatments administered to chickens should be undertaken with consideration of the welfare of the birds by people skilled in the procedures.

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Culling of sick or injured birds should be done in a humane manner as soon as possible. Similarly, killing birds as may be required for diagnostic purposes should be done in a humane manner.

EU comment

In the sixth paragraph of point 1.b) of Art X.X.5, reference should be made to Chapter 7.6 of the Terrestrial Code for appropriate culling methods.

Outcome based measurables: disease incidence, mortality and poor performance. 2. Environment

  • a) 
    Thermal environment

In intensive and semi intensive production systems every attempt should be made to keep thermal conditions within the recommended range.

A table of recommended ranges will be included EU comment

Although it is very difficult to assign numeric values to measurable given the variations of production systems used by 175 OIE Members, nevertheless the EU encourages OIE to develop a table of recommended ranges of temperature, given its impact on the welfare of broilers.

In extensive production systems appropriate management to mitigate the effects of extreme thermal conditions should be implemented.

Outcome based measurables: rates of mortality, rate of contact dermatitis, water consumption, feed consumption, growth rate, feed conversion and behaviour.

  • b) 
    Lighting

There should be an adequate period of continuous darkness during each 24 hour period to allow the birds to rest.

The light intensity during the light period should be sufficient and homogeneously distributed to allow the chicks to find feed and water in the first few days after they are placed in the house, to stimulate bird activity, and to allow inspection of the birds.

EU comment

In point 2.b) of Art X.X.5, the first sentence above should be redrafted as follow:

“There should be adequate periods of darkness lasting at least 6 hours in total, with at least one uninterrupted period of darkness of at least 4 hours, excluding dimming periods, to allow the birds to rest”.

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Furthermore, in the second paragraph of the same point, the word "sufficient" should be replaced by "of at least 20 lux during the lighting period, measured at bird eye level".

Justification

Although it is very difficult to assign numeric values to measurable given the variations of production systems used by 175 OIE Members, nevertheless ranges should be indicated for parameters having relevant impact on the welfare of broilers.

There is a large body of science supporting the need for a prolonged dark period to allow birds to rest. Scientific studies concluded that except during the first days of life, welfare problems may arise if chickens receive less than 2 hours of darkness per day. Furthermore, various welfare problems are identified at light densities below 20 lux.

Birds should be gradually adjusted to lighting changes.

Outcome based measurables: lameness, feed and water consumption, behavior and injuries.

  • c) 
    Air quality

Adequate ventilation is required at all times to provide fresh air and is one means of controlling temperature and humidity.

Ammonia concentration should not routinely exceed 25 ppm at bird level.

Dust levels should be kept to a minimum. Methods for doing that can include: maintaining appropriate ventilation and optimal relative humidity levels (50% - 80%).

EU comment

In point 2.c) of Art X.X.5, the following sentence should be included at the end of the first paragraph:

"Where the health and welfare of broiler chickens depends on an artificial ventilation system, provision should be made for an appropriate back-up and an alarm system".

Furthermore, in point 2.c) of Art X.X.5, ranges for acceptable dust level should be defined.

Justification

High temperature has a very negative impact on the welfare of broilers chickens, as they are highly susceptible to heat stress. Back-up or alarm system should be in place in case of failure of the artificial ventilation.

Further details are needed in order to make this recommendation usable.

Outcome based measurables: incidence of respiratory diseases, behaviour (panting, huddling), condition of the eyes, growth rate, feed conversion, contact dermatitis, distribution of the birds.

  • d) 
    Acoustic environment EU comment

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The title of point 2.d) of Art X.X.5 should be replaced by “Noise”.

Furthermore, the first sentence of the paragraph should be replaced as follow:

“Exposure of birds to sudden, continuous or loud noises should be minimized where possible to prevent stress and fear reactions (e.g. piling).”

Justification

Continuous noise can stress the birds as it for example could create difficulties for them to carry out natural behaviours such as interactions.

Exposure of birds to sudden or loud noises should be minimized where possible to prevent stress and fear reactions (e.g. piling).

Note: location of farms should, where possible, take into account existing environmental conditions.

Outcome based measurables: daily mortality rate, growth rate, food conversion, injuries, fearfulness and behaviour.

  • e) 
    Nutrition

Birds should be fed a diet containing adequate nutrients to meet their requirements for good health.

Feed and water should be palatable and free from contaminants potentially hazardous to bird health.

Cleaning the water system should be done regularly.

EU comment

The third paragraph of point 2.e) of Art X.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

“Cleaning the water system should be done regularly to prevent growth of hazardous microorganisms”

Justification

For a matter of clarity, the reasons for a regulation/guideline should always be indicated.

Birds must be provided with adequate accessibility to feed on a daily basis. Water should be available continuously.

Special provisions should be made to enable young chicks to access feed and water. EU comment

In point 2.e) of Art X.X.5, it is necessary to specify further type of feed and method of presentation of both feed and water for young chicks.

Justification

Further details are needed in order to make this recommendation usable.

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Outcome based measurables: feed and water consumption, growth rate, food conversion, behaviour, lameness, disease incidence, mortality, morbidity and carcass and meat quality.

  • f) 
    Flooring, bedding, resting surfaces (litter quality)

The floor of a poultry building should be easy to clean and disinfect.

EU comment

In point 2.f) of Art X.X.5, the following text should be included at the end of the sentence above "and should be provided with litter which is dry and friable on the surface. It may be necessary to provide heating to secure that the litter is in a dry and friable condition".

Justification

In order to meet the behavioural needs of chickens, they need access to litter in order to perform scratching and pecking behaviour.

In cold climates or if a floor is wet/moist due to cleaning, heating may be necessary to avoid that the new litter becomes damp.

If litter is recycled it should be managed to minimize any detrimental effects on welfare and health. Litter should be replaced when required to control a disease outbreak in the next flock.

Day old chicks should be housed on a floor suitable for their size.

EU comment

In the third paragraph of point 2.f) of Art X.X.5, a "floor suitable for their size" should be better defined.

Justification

Flooring conditions have an important impact on the welfare of chickens.

If housed on litter based systems, before the one day old chicks enter the building the floor should have a bedding of uncontaminated new substrate (e.g. wood shavings, straw, shredded paper) of sufficient depth to elicit normal behaviour and to protect them from the floor.

EU comment

In point 2.f) of Art X.X.5, the sentence above should be replaced as follow:

“Broiler chickens day olds should have access to litter in all housing systems and before the one day old chicks enter the building the floor should have a bedding of uncontaminated new

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substrate (e.g. wood shavings, straw, shredded paper) of sufficient depth to elicit normal behavior and to protect them from the floor”

Justification

In order to meet the behavioral needs of chickens, they need access to litter in order to perform scratching and pecking behaviour.

Litter quality is partly related to the type of substrate used and partly to different management practices. The type of substrate should be chosen carefully. Litter should be maintained so that it is friable and not dusty, caked or wet.

The floors of cages and slatted systems should be designed, constructed and maintained to adequately support the birds and prevent injuries and to ensure that manure can be adequately removed.

Outcome based measurables: contact dermatitis, breast blisters, feather condition, ascites, lameness, behaviour, eye condition, respiratory disease and growth rate.

  • g) 
    Social environment

Management methods (e.g. reducing light intensity, providing foraging materials, nutritional modifications, reducing stocking density) should be implemented to reduce feather pecking and cannibalism in growing systems where these behaviors are a potential problem.

If these management strategies fail, therapeutic beak trimming should be considered.

EU comment

The second paragraph of point 2.g) of Art X.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

"If these management strategies fail, therapeutic beak trimming should not be considered as other than the last option, after a thorough investigation of the problem."

Justification

Beak trimming should be considered as the last management option.

Outcome based measurables: injuries, behaviour, feather condition, mortality, carcass - and meat quality.

  • h) 
    Stocking density

Broiler chickens should be housed in an acceptable stocking density.

To determine the appropriate stocking density, the following factors should be taken into account: ambient conditions, housing systems, productions systems, litter quality, biosecurity strategy, selection of genetic stocks, and market age of birds should be taken into account so that the floor space provided will ensure good welfare (comfort, ability to express normal postural adjustments and to access feed and water).

EU comment

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Although it is very difficult to assign numeric values to measurable given the variations of production systems used by 175 OIE Members, nevertheless the EU encourages OIE to indicate ranges of acceptable stocking densities according to the different climatic and housing situations.

Outcome based measurables: rates of injuries, rates of contact dermatitis, rates of mortality, behaviour, growth rate, feed conversion, plumage condition and carcass quality.

  • i) 
    Outdoor areas

Management of outdoor areas is important in extensive and semi-intensive production systems.

Land (pasture) management measures should be taken to reduce the risk of birds being infected by parasites transmitted. This might include limiting the stocking density and / or using several pieces of land consecutively (rotation).

Outdoor areas should be managed appropriately to minimize swampy conditions and mud.

EU comment

The above sentence of point 2.i) of Art X.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

"Outdoor areas should be managed appropriately to avoid swampy conditions and mud. Outdoor areas should preferably be placed on well drained grounds.”

Justification

Flooring conditions have an important impact on the welfare of chickens. In particular, swampy conditions and mud are detrimental to bird health and welfare.

Outdoor areas should be managed appropriately to ensure that they are free of poisonous plants and other contaminants.

Particularly in extensive systems where birds do not have access to an indoor area, protection from adverse climatic conditions (e.g. heat, cold, rain) should be provided

Outcome based measurables: incidence of parasitic diseases, growth rate, feather condition and mortality rate.

  • j) 
    Protection from predators

Broilers should be protected from predators.

Outcome based measurables: mortality and injuries.

  • 3. 
    Management
  • a) 
    Genetic selection

Welfare and health considerations, in addition to productivity, should be taken into account when choosing a strain for a particular location or production system.

Outcome based measurables: lameness, ascites, sudden death syndrome (SDS), mortality, feed conversion and growth rate.

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  • b) 
    Painful interventions

Commercial broiler chickens are not typically subjected to management practices that cause pain. However, prophylactic beak-trimming may be required in case of outbreaks of feather pecking and cannibalism, as described earlier. Guidelines for beak-trimming to minimize negative impacts on bird health and performance are presented in Glatz and Miao (2005). Only the minimum amount of beak needed to prevent beak re-growth before market age (ideally, only the hook at the end of the upper beak) should be removed, and the trim should be performed so as to prevent subsequent distortion or deformation of the beak. The beak should be cauterized after cutting to minimise bleeding. Trimming at an early age (before 10 days of age; Hester and Shea-Moore, 2003) is preferred to prevent long-term pain, but since feather pecking and cannibalism develop when the birds are somewhat older prophylactic trimming will likely occur after this time.

There is a small specialty market for capons (castrated male broilers). Because the testes of male chickens are located inside the abdominal cavity, this procedure is a major surgery (Jacob and Mather, 2000) that should be performed only by skilled individuals and with measures to minimize pain, injury, and bleeding. The procedure is described in Jacob and Mather (2000).

Painful interventions (e.g. beak trimming, toe trimming, dubbing) should not be routinely practiced on broilers.

If therapeutic beak trimming is required, it should be carried out by trained and skilled personnel and care should be taken to remove the minimum amount of beak necessary using a method which minimizes pain and controls bleeding.

Surgical caponisation should not be performed without adequate pain and infection control methods and should only be performed by trained and skilled personnel under veterinary supervision.

  • c) 
    Handling and inspection

Broilers should be inspected every day. This inspection should have three main objectives: to pick up dead birds; to identify sick or injured birds to treat or cull them, and to detect and correct any welfare or health problem in the flock (e.g. related to the supply of feed and water, thermal conditions, ventilation, litter quality).

Inspection should be done in such a way that birds are not unnecessarily disturbed, for example personnel should move quietly and slowly through the flock.

When birds are handled they should not be injured or unnecessarily frightened or stressed.

Birds which have an incurable sickness, significant deformity or injury should be removed from the flock and humanely killed as soon as possible.

Cervical dislocation is an acceptable method for killing small numbers of birds if carried out competently. For a complete description of killing methods see Chapter 7.6.17. of the Code.

EU comment

The above sentence of point 3.c) of Art X.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

Cervical dislocation is an acceptable method for ki ling single sma l birds of less than 3 kilograms if carried out competently. For a complete description of ki ling methods see Chapte r 7.6.17. of the Code .”

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Justification

For birds of 3 kilograms or more, cervical dislocation may not be enough to severe the arteries and brain and to create unconsciousness and instant death.

Outcome based measurables: fear, performance, injuries, mortality and morbidity.

  • d) 
    Personnel training

All people responsible for the broilers should be competent according to their responsibilities and should have sufficient knowledge of broiler behaviour, biosecurity, general signs of disease, and indicators of poor animal welfare such as stress, pain and fatigue, and their alleviation.

EU comment

The above paragraph of point 3.d) of Art X.X.5 should be redrafted as follow:

"All people responsible for the broilers should be competent according to their responsibilities. They should attend appropriate training courses to gain sufficient knowledge of broiler behaviour and physiology, practical aspects of the careful handling of chickens, catching, loading and transport, emergency care for chickens, emergency killing and culling, biosecurity, general signs of disease, and indicators of poor animal welfare such as stress, pain and fatigue, and their alleviation."

Justification

Scientific studies indicate that the welfare in broilers is to large extent influenced by the quality of the stockmanship. Therefore, stockmen should be well trained also as regard the proper handling and catching of birds, including emergency killing and culling.

  • e) 
    Emergency Plans

Poultry producers should have emergency plans to minimize and mitigate the consequences of: natural disasters, disease outbreaks and the failure of mechanical equipment. Planning may include the provision of fail safe alarm devices to detect malfunctions, back up generators, access to maintenance providers, alternative heating arrangements, ability to store water on farm, access to water cartage services, adequate on farm storage of feed and alternative feed supply and emergency ventilation.

An emergency plan for animal health should be developed consistent with national programs established or recommended by Veterinary Services as appropriate.

  • f) 
    Location, construction and equipment of farms

The location of poultry farms should be chosen to be safe from the effects of fires and floods and other natural disasters to the extent practical. In addition farms should be sited to avoid or minimize biosecurity risks, exposure of birds to chemical and physical contaminants, noise and adverse climatic conditions.

Housing and equipment to which poultry have access should be designed and maintained to avoid injury or pain to the birds.

Buildings should be constructed and electrical and fuel installations should be fitted to minimise the risk of fire and other hazards.

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Poultry producers should have a maintenance programme in place for all equipment that, in case of failure, can jeopardize broiler welfare.

  • g) 
    On farm harvesting

EU comment

The title of point 3.g) of Art X.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

"On farm slaughter"

Justification

For consistency with the other chapters of the Terrestrial Code, it is better to use the term "slaughter".

Feed should be removed at a suitable time prior to catching.

Water should be available for as long as possible.

Injured and sick birds should be culled or separated prior to harvesting.

Catching should be done by skilled workers and every attempt should be made to minimize stress and fear reactions, and injury.

The broilers should not be picked up by their neck or wings.

The broilers should be put in the transport container carefully.

Mechanical catchers should be designed, operated and maintained to minimize injury, stress and fear to the birds. Contingency plan is advisable in case of mechanical failure.

Catching should preferably be carried out under dim or blue light to calm the birds.

Catching should be scheduled to minimize the time to slaughter as well as climatic stress during catching, transport and holding.

Stocking density in transport containers should suit climatic conditions and maintain comfort.

Containers should be clean and disinfected and designed and maintained to avoid injury to the birds.

Outcome based measurables: incidence of injuries, mortality rate and carcass quality.

  • h) 
    Humane killing

Injured and sick birds should be killed humanely.

Cervical dislocation is considered a humane method for killing small numbers of birds.

EU comment

The above sentence of point 3.h) of Art X.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

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Cervic al dislocation is considered a humane method for ki ling sing le sma l birds of less than 3 kilog rams if c arrie d out c ompe tently.

Justification

For birds of 3 kilograms or more, cervical dislocation may not be enough to severe the arteries and brain and to create unconsciousness and instant death.

For a description of other methods for the humane killing of broilers see Chapter 7.6.5. of the Terrestrial Code .

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Annex XVII (contd)

DR AF T CH APT ER 7 .X .X .

ANIMAL WELFARE AND BEEF CATTLE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS

EU comments

The EU welcomes the work carried out on the Draft Chapter on Animal Welfare and Beef Cattle Production Systems, on the understanding that these are guidelines. The EU acknowledges in particular its outcome-based approach but considers that improvements and additional details are needed to bring the text in line with the previously adopted animal welfare chapters. In particular, resource-based measures are also needed and the outcome-based approach should be accompanied by specific limits for each measure.

The EU believes that the document contains a large number of statements that are not easily usable by competent authorities, veterinarians and beef producers. As a consequence, redrafting in the form of precise recommendations is strongly suggested. (E.G. Article 7.x.5 2: a) Quote "Although cattle can adapt to a wide range of thermal environment particularly if appropriate breeds are used for the anticipated conditions, sudden fluctuations in weather can cause heat or cold stress." Should instead read as "breed of cattle have different abilities to deal with various thermal environments and producers should select the breed of cattle which are adapted to the particular environmental condition they are likely to experience in the chosen husbandry system.")

The term beef should be removed in front of the word cattle within the text of the draft chapter as it is obvious that the chapter deals with beef cattle.

The possibility to address the welfare of calves raised for producing veal meat should be considered.

Specific comments are presented within the text.

Article 7.X.1

Definitions

The ad hoc Group discussed the application of the OIE recommendations and decided that these should be designed with application to commercial beef production. Beef cattle production systems are defined as all commercial cattle productions systems where the purpose of the operation includes some or all of the breeding, rearing and finishing of cattle intended for beef consumption.

EU comment

The first sentence of Art 7.X.1 should be moved to Art 7.X.2 and rephrased as follow:

"These recommendations should be applied to commercial beef production."

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Justification

The above sentence is more related to the scope of the recommendations rather than to definitions. Moreover the sentence should be redrafted for better clarity.

Article 7.X. 2

Scope

The first priority is to address the on farm aspects of the production systems, from birth through to finishing. The areas of emphasis are cow- calf, stockers and finishing beef production.

EU comment

In the first sentence of Art 7.X.2, the words "the first priority" should be replaced by the words "the scope and objective"

Furthermore, in the same sentence the word “rearing” should be included between “stockers” and “and finishing”

Justification:

The terms "first priority" are not clear and leave the impression that other issues such as transport and slaughter are not already covered in other chapters of the code. Furthermore, the rearing phase should be also covered in this draft chapter.

Article 7.X.3 Commercial beef cattle production systems

Commercial beef cattle production systems include:

  • 1. 
    Intensive (stocker and finishing)

Would include cattle that are place on confinement. Animals are depending on the daily animal husbandry for provision of feed, shelter and water.

EU comments

Point 1 of Art 7.X.3 should be replaced as follow:

“These are systems where animals are confined to discrete areas (e.g. buildings) and which are wholly dependent upon handler intervention to provide for basic animal needs such as food, water and shelter, on a daily basis.”

Justification

The current description is not clear. The proposed text would better define an intensive system.

  • 2. 
    Extensive (all areas) Would include from a wide range grazing habitat

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EU comment

In the title of point 2 of Art 7.X.3, the meaning of "(all areas)" is not clear and should be included in the definition of extensive systems; in particular it is not clear if it refers to all categories of beef cattle.

The above definition should be replaced as follow:

“These are systems where animals have the freedom to roam areas outdoors, and which have some autonomy over diet selection (through grazing), water consumption and shelter access within the confines of supply of such resources within their defined grazing area”.

Furthermore, in the definition of this same point, the word "from" should be deleted in the sentence.

Justification

The current description is not clear. The proposed text would better define an extensive system.

  • 3. 
    Semi Intensive (mixed)

Would include a combination of intensive and extensive systems

EU comment

In the title of point 3 of Art 7.X.3, the meaning of "(mixed)" is not clear or is redundant.

The above definition should be replaced as follow:

“These are systems where animals are exposed to any combination of both intensive and extensive husbandry methods, either simultaneously, or varied according to changes in climatic (weather) conditions or physiological state of the animals.”

Justification

The current description is not clear. The proposed text would better define a semi intensive system.

Article 7.X.4 Criteria or measurables for the welfare of beef cattle

The following outcome (animal) based measurables can be useful indicators of welfare

EU comment

In Art 7.X.4, the sentence above should be replaced as follow:

“The following outcome (animal) based measurables are useful indicators of welfare and should be measured and recorded at appropriate time by the animal keepers. The use of these indicators should be adapted to the different situations”.

Justification

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The indicators here described should be recorded and adapted to different situations.

  • 1. 
    behaviour
  • 2. 
    morbidity rates

EU comment

In point 2 of Art 7.X.4, the following example could be provided:

"morbidity rates (such as lameness and injuries)"

Justification

Concrete examples are useful for the future users of these guidelines

  • 3. 
    mortality rates
  • 4. 
    weight gain and body condition score

EU comment

Point 4 of Art 7.X.4, should be replaced as follow:

“growth rates (change in weight ) and body condition score (BCS)”

Justification

Measuring welfare can be both positive and negative therefore “weight gain” is not the measurable indicator but the change in weight (growth rate) or BCS that should be used

  • 5. 
    reproductive rates

EU comment

Point 5 of Art 7.X.4, should be replaced as follow:

“reproductive efficiency and calving ease”

Justification

Welfare is not just measured by how frequently a cow gives birth but by a combination of birth rate, ease of conception after parturition, ease of calving (and mothering ability)

  • 6. 
    physical appearance

EU comment

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In point 6 of Art 7.X.4, the following example could be provided:

“physical appearance (level of cleanliness)”

Justification

Concrete examples are useful for the future users of these guidelines

  • 7. 
    handling responses
  • 8. 
    rate of post-procedures complications

EU comment

Point 8 of Art 7.X.4, should be replaced as follow:

“routine procedure management and post –procedure complications”

Justification

Measurable should include whether a routine procedure is carried out at all through appropriate management or whether alternative procedures that minimise pain can be used (e.g. different techniques and/or where analgesia is considered as part of the procedure).

  • 9. 
    post-mortem pathology EU comment

Point 9 of Art 7.X.4, should be replaced as follow:

“post-mortem pathology & sample analyses”

Justification

The outcome-based measures for evaluating animal health and welfare should better include identifying causes illnesses and mortality using for example lab sample analysis (e.g. bloods) and post mortem pathology (gross and micro pathology).

  • 10. 
    survivability.

EU comment

Point 10 of Art 7.X.4, should be replaced as follow:

“longevity”

Justification

Longevity is a better term for indicating how long an animal survives rather than survivability which is already assessed through mortality rate.

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Article 7.X.5 Recommendations

  • 1. 
    Biosecurity and Animal Health

EU comment

The specific chapters on biosecurity of the Terrestrial Code should be referred to here. a) Biosecurity and disease prevention

Biosecurity means a set of measures designed to protect a herd from the entry of infectious agents.

EU comment

In point 1.a) of Art 7.X.5, the sentence above should be replaced as follow:

“Biosecurity means a set of measures designed to maintain a herd at a particular health status and to prevent the entry (or exit) of infectious agents”.

Justification

The definition is not clear and precise since biosecurity is not just about prevention of pathogen entry alone and different biosecurity measures achieve different levels of herd health status so this change attempt to clarify what biosecurity really means.

Biosecurity programmes should be implemented, commensurate with the risk of disease and in accordance with relevant recommendations found in Terrestrial Code chapters on OIE listed diseases.

EU comment

In point 1.a) of Art 7.X.5, the sentence above should be replaced as follow:

“Biosecurity programmes should be designed and implemented, commensurate with the desired herd health status and current disease risk (endemic and exotic or trans boundary) that is specific to each epidemiological group of animals within a herd.”

Justification

The Terrestrial Code on OIE listed diseases are at the higher level, (and generally lower risk) end of the biosecurity scale and many of the relevant measures listed in the TC are at country / state legislative level. Herd level biosecurity is mostly about maintenance of a particular herd health status at a level desired by the owner / keeper and additionally that required by state/ federal / country legislation outwit the Terrestrial Code.

These programmes should address the control of the major routes for disease and pathogen transmission:

  • i) 
    cattle
  • ii) 
    other animals
  • iii) 
    people

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  • iv) 
    equipment v) vehicles vi) air
  • vii) 
    water supply viii) feed.

Outcome based measurables: morbidity rate, mortality rate, reproductive efficiency. EU comment

In Art 7.X.5, all the outcome based measures listed from point 1 to point 3 should be deleted. The general list in Art 7.X.4 should be referred to.

Justification

Art 7.X.4 already provides with a comprehensive list of outcome based measures that should be chosen and used according to the situation.

  • b) 
    Animal health management

Animal health management is a mean to prevent diseases occurring in cattle herds and also providing treatments for animals when disease occurs. There should be an effective programme for the prevention and treatment of diseases consistent with the programs established by the Veterinary Services as appropriate.

Those responsible for the care of cattle should be aware of the signs of ill-health, such as reduced food and water intake, weight gain and body condition, changes in behaviour or abnormal physical appearance.

EU comment

In point 1.b) of Art 7.X.5, the sentence above should be replaced as follow

“Those responsible for the care of cattle should be aware of the signs of ill-health, such as reduced food and water intake, growth rate and body condition, changes in behaviour or physical appearance, changes in patterns of disease and clinical signs (e.g. high number of abortions) for the particular group/herd”.

Justification

Ill-health may not manifest itself that easily in the individual animal alone and may require looking at changes in disease / symptoms at the group/herd level.

Cattle with higher risk for disease will require more frequent inspection by animal animal handlers . If animal handlers are not able to determine the causes of ill-health or distress or to correct these or suspect the presence of a listed reportable disease. they should seek advice from those having training and experience, such as bovine veterinarians or other qualified advisers. Veterinary treatments should be prescribed by a qualified veterinarian.

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EU comment

In the third paragraph of point 1. b ) of Art 7.X.5, the word "animal" should be deleted in the first sentence before the words "animal handlers". The word "bovine" should be deleted in the second sentence. The word "qualified" should be deleted in the third sentence.

Justification

The word "animal" is typed twice.

The word "bovine" is not necessary and too restrictive since veterinarians in mixed practices are also qualified.

The word "qualified" is not necessary since veterinarians are all qualified to prescribe treatments.

Vaccinations and other treatments administered to cattle should be undertaken by people skilled in the procedures and on the basis of veterinary or other expert advice.

A nimal handlers should have experience in caring for downer cattle. They should also have experience in managing chronically ill or injured animals. Euthanasia on non-responding cattle should be done as soon as recovery is deemed not possible.

Outcome based measurables: morbidity rate, mortality rate, reproductive efficiency, behaviour, physical appearance and body condition score.

  • 2. 
    Environment
  • a) 
    Thermal environment

Although cattle can adapt to a wide range of thermal environment particularly if appropriate breeds are used for the anticipated conditions, sudden fluctuations in weather can cause heat or cold stress.

EU comment

In point 2. a) of Art 7.X.5, the sentence above should be replaced as follow

“Although cattle can adapt to a wide range of thermal environments particularly if appropriate breeds are used for the anticipated conditions, fluctuations can cause heat or cold stress. Neonatal animals are more susceptible to such fluctuations and thermal extremes”

Justification

Fluctuations are a higher risk for neonates.

  • i) 
    Heat stress

The Thermal Heat Index (THI) is influenced by air temperature, relative humidity and wind speed. As the THI increases the risk of hyperthermia increases. Also as cattle are fed longer and become fatter are more susceptible to heat stress.

EU comment

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In point 2. a. i) of Art 7.X.5, a more specific provision for providing shelters/shade to protect animals against heat should be made.

The third sentence of the paragraph above should be rephrased as follow: "Cattle with high metabolic rate are more susceptible to heat stress".

Furthermore, useful and practical ranges to the THI should be provided for the future users of the guidelines.

Justification

The susceptibility to heat stress in cattle depends primarily on the high metabolic rate.

A nimal handlers should be aware of the critical THI threshold for their animals. When the THI is expected to reach this threshold routine daily processes that include cattle movement should cease. As the THI moves into emergency levels the animal handlers should institute an emergency action plan that could include shade, drinking water, sprinkling water to penetrate the hair coat.

EU comment

In the last sentence of point 2. a. i) of Art 7.X.5, the word “emergency” should be replaced by “high”.

Justification

Animal handlers should take action to protect the animals already when the THI reaches high level without waiting till emergency situation.

  • ii) 
    Cold stress

Protection from wind and rain should be provided where possible, particularly for young stock outdoors for the first time. This could be provided by natural or man made shelter structures.

Animal handlers should also ensure that cattle have access to adequate feed and water during cold stress. During time of heavy snow fall or blizzard animal handlers should institute an emergency action plan to provide cattle with shelter, feed and water.

Outcome based measurables : Mortality rates, physical appearance, behaviour

  • b) 
    Lighting

Confined cattle that do not have access to natural light should be provided with sufficient supplementary lighting for their health and welfare, to facilitate natural behaviour patterns and to allow adequate inspection of the animals.

Outcome based measurables: Behaviour, morbidity, physical appearance

  • c) 
    Air quality

Good air quality is an important factor for the health and welfare of cattle in intensive and confined production systems. It is a composite variable of air constituents such as gases, dust and microorganisms that is strongly influenced by the management of the beef producer. The air composition is influenced by the stocking density, the size of the cattle, flooring, bedding, waste management, building design and ventilation system.

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Proper ventilation is important for effective heat dissipation in cattle and preventing the build up of CO2, NH3 and effluent gases in the confinement unit. Poor air quality and ventilation are risk factors for respiratory diseases.

Outcome based measurables: Morbidity rate, behaviour, mortality rate, weight gain, post-mortem pathologies

  • d) 
    Acoustic environment

Cattle are adaptable to different acoustics environments. However, exposure of cattle to sudden or loud noises should be minimized where possible to prevent stress and fear reactions (e.g. stampede). Ventilation fans, feeding machinery or other equipment should be constructed, placed, operated and maintained in such a way that they cause the least possible amount of noise.

EU comment

The title of point 2.d) of Art 7.X.5 should be replaced by “Noise”.

Furthermore in the first sentence of this paragraph, the words “acoustics environments” should be replaced by “different levels and types of noise”

Justification

Clarity for users

Outcome based measurables: Behaviour.

  • e) 
    Nutrition

The nutrient requirements of beef cattle have been well defined. Energy, protein, amino acid, mineral and vitamin contents of the diet are major factors determining the growth, feed efficiency, reproductive efficiency, and body composition.

A nimal handlers should provide cattle a level of nutrition that meets or exceeds their maintenance requirements from the previously reference materials. It should be noted that cattle in certain climates and production systems may experience short term periods of below maintenance nutrition without compromise their welfare.

EU comment

In point 2.e) of Art 7.X.5, the first sentence of the second paragraph should be replaced as follow:

“Cattle should be provided with access to an appropriate quantity and quality of balanced nutrition that meets their physiological needs on a daily basis, irrespective of the system in which they are reared.”

The second sentence of the abovementioned paragraph should also be replaced as follow:

“Where cattle are maintained in extensive conditions short term exposure to climatic extremes may prevent access to nutrition that does not meet daily physiological needs. In such circumstances the handler should ensure that reduced nutrition (whether in quantity and / or quality) is not prolonged and that mitigation strategies are implemented if welfare is at risk of being compromised.”

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Furthermore, in the third sentence of the second paragraph of point 2.e) of Art 7.X.5, the word "compromise" should be replaced by the word "compromising".

Justification

Feeding cattle should meet physiological needs rather than just meeting or exceeding maintenance.

Animal welfare is nearly always likely to be compromised if undernourished as the animal is likely to feel hungry, therefore the focus should be on avoiding and mitigating for longer periods of deprivation.

Animal handlers should have adequate knowledge of appropriate body condition score for their cattle and should not allow body condition score to drop below these critical thresholds. In times of severe drought steps should be taken to avoid starvation of animals wherever possible.

EU comment

In point 2.e) of Art 7.X.5, the first sentence of the third paragraph should be replaced as follow

“Growth rates in young stock and body condition scores in mature stock are key indicators of welfare and nutritional status and animal handlers should be familiar with assessing these as part of their regular animal health and welfare management strategy. In growing animals, weight gain in line with expected growth rates is an indicator of positive health and maybe associated with acceptable or positive welfare whilst reduced growth rates or excessive weight loss or gain animal indicate poor health and welfare. Body condition score in mature cattle is a key indicator of animal health and welfare, and significant changes above and below expected body condition for the physiological state of the animal could be an indicator of compromised health & welfare.”

Furthermore, the second sentence of the same paragraph should be replaced as follow:

“In times of climatic extremes (such as drought or snow storms), stock keepers should endeavour to ensure all stock receive sufficient nutrition to avoid starvation. Where possible mitigation, strategies which may include housing, slaughter or euthanasia should be implemented in advance of such weather extremes.”

Justification

Growth rate and condition score are key welfare indicators and should be better highlighted.

Possible mitigation measures should be listed for the users of the guidelines.

In intensive production systems cattle should have access to adequate feed and water supply to meet their physiological needs.

EU comment

In the above third paragraph of point 2.e) of Art 7.X.5, the text "in intensive production systems" should be deleted.

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Justification

Beef cattle should have access to adequate feed and water supply in all production systems and not only in intensive production systems.

Feedstuffs and feed ingredients should be of satisfactory quality to meet nutritional need and under certain circumstances (e.g., drought, frost, and flood), should be tested for the presence of substances (e.g. mycotoxins and nitrates) that can be detrimental to cattle health and welfare.

Cattle in intensive production systems typically consume diets that contain a high proportion of grain(s) (corn, milo, barley, grain by-products) and a smaller proportion of roughages (hay, straw, silage, hulls, etc.). As the proportion of grain increases in the diet, the relative risk of digestive upset in cattle increase. Animal handlers should understand the impact of cattle size, age, weather patterns, diet composition and sudden diet changes in respect to digestive upsets and their sequelae (acidosis, bloat, liver abscess, laminitis). Where appropriate beef producers should consult a nutritionist (private consultant, university or feed company employee) for advice on ration formulation and feeding programs.

EU comment

In the above fifth paragraph of point 2.e) of Art 7.X.5, the parenthesis in the last sentence should read "(e.g. a private consultant, a university or feed company employee)".

Justification

There might be other technical profiles involved than those mentioned.

Beef producers should become familiar with potential micronutrient deficiencies or excesses for intensive and extensive production systems in their respective geographical areas and use appropriately formulated supplements where necessary.

The water quality and the method of supply can affect welfare. All cattle need adequate supply and access to palatable water that also meets their physiological requirements and free from contaminants potentially hazardous to cattle health.

Outcome based measurables: Mortality rates, morbidity rates, behaviour, weight gain, body condition scoring, reproductive rates.

  • f) 
    Flooring, bedding, resting surfaces (litter quality)

EU comment

In point 2.f) of Art 7.X.5, the words “and outdoor areas” should be included in the title

Justification

Some of the recommendations below are relevant also to outdoor areas.

In all production systems cattle need a comfortable place to rest.

EU comment

The sentence above of point 2.f) of Art 7.X.5, should be replaced as follow:

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“In all systems, all cattle should have access to a well drained and comfortable area that is large enough for all animals in the group to lie down and rest at the same time. Solid floors should be used in the lying area.”

Justification

The changes proposed are more precise in order to ensure that the minimum behavioural and thermal comfort needs of cattle are fulfilled. Moreover, solid floor, as opposed to slatted floor, offers better comfort and longer lying-time.

Pen floor management in intensive production systems can have a significant impact on cattle welfare.

Mud depth should not consistently be deeper than the ankles of cattle in pens.

EU comment

The sentence above of point 2.f) of Art 7.X.5, should be replaced as follow:

“Where there are areas that are not suitable for resting (e.g. excessive water / faecal accumulation), these areas should not be of a depth that would compromise welfare and in any case must not comprise the whole of usable area available to the cattle”

Justification

The current wording is not appropriate, for example "ankle" is not an anatomical term used for cattle.

Slopes of pens should be maintained to allow water to run off away from the feed bunks and not pool excessively in the pens.

If slope is not sufficient to allow for proper drainage, a mound should be constructed in each pen to allow cattle to have a dry place to lie down.

EU comment

The sentence above of point 2.f) of Art 7.X.5 should be deleted

Justification

This sentence is not necessary since it has been already clarified through earlier amendment that all cattle should have access to well drained resting area, irrespective of how this is achieved.

Pens should be thoroughly cleaned after each production cycle as conditions warrant.

EU comment

The sentence above of point 2.f) of Art 7.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

“Pens should be thoroughly cleaned after each production cycle.”

Justification

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The wording "as conditions warrant" is not precise enough.

If animals are housed in a slatted floor shed, the slat width should be appropriate to the hoof size of the animals to prevent injuries.

EU comment

The sentence above of point 2.f) of Art 7.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

“If animals are housed in a slatted floor shed, the slat and gap widths should be appropriate to the hoof size of the animals to prevent injuries. Broken slats should be replaced as soon as possible and where this is not immediately possible in current stock cycle, actions taken to prevent injury. If used as laying area, slatted floors should be coated with rubber or similar material to improve comfort."

Justification

In slatted floor shed, gaps are as important as the slats themselves. Moreover, slatted floors of solid concrete lead to less lying-time and a higher frequency of unnatural behaviour when lying down and getting up.

In straw or other bedding systems the bedding shoud be maintained to allow animals a dry and comfortable place in which to lie.

EU comment

The sentence above of point 2.f) of Art 7.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

“In straw or other bedding systems, the bedding should be maintained to allow all animals within a group simultaneous access to a dry and comfortable place in which to lie.”

Justification

The lying area should be accessible to all cattle at the same time.

Outcome based measurables: Morbidity rates (lameness), behaviour, weight gain, physical appearance.

  • g) 
    Social environment

Management of cattle in outdoor and indoor intensive production systems methods should take into account the social environment of cattle as it relates to animal welfare. Problem areas include: buller activity, mixing of heifers and steers, feeding cattle of different size and age in same pens, insufficient space at the feeder, insufficient water access and mixing of bulls.

In the case of buller animals, they should be identified and removed from the pen immediately. Beef producers should utilize management practices to reintroduce these animals. If reintroduction fails these animals will have to housed separately from the pen mates. Animal handlers should work to feed cattle of the same size and age in the same pens. Depending on feeding systems, health status of the animals and size of the animals beef producer will need to allow adequate feeder space and water access for the cattle.

EU comment

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The first two sentences above of point 2.g) of Art 7.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

"Management of cattle in all systems should take into account the social interactions of cattle within groups. The stock person should understand the dominance hierarchies that develop within different groups and focus on high risk animals (e.g. very young, very old, small or large size for cohort group etc) for evidence of bullying (injury & condition score loss). Stock persons should understand the risks of increased agonistic interactions between animals, particularly after mixing groups.

Design and management of all systems should account for the consequences of mixing calves, heifers, adult cows, steers and bulls of different sizes in various group combinations. Ideally groups should consist of cattle of similar age, sex and weight. Horned cattle should not be kept in groups with dehorned or naturally polled cattle, particularly in confined systems. Any passageways in the accessible areas should be designed to allow cattle to easily pass one another. Where feed is not provided on an ad libitum basis, feeders should be designed so that all cattle in a group can access feed at the same time. Water should ideally be provided ad libitum and drinkers placed in sufficient number to avoid competition at specific times of day. Drinker placement should account for the variation of size of animals in each group to ensure easy access by all."

Justification

Current paragraph refers to a mix of management activities including general and negative indicators of welfare, however it should also focus on actions necessary to provide positive social environment. Furthermore, mixing of horned and dehorned cattle should not be recommended since it leads to bullying with a severe risk of injuries.

Adequate fencing should be provided to minimize any animal welfare problems that may be caused by mixing of inappropriate groups of cattle.

Outcome based measurables: Behavior, physical appearance, weight gain, morbidity and mortality rate

  • h) 
    Stocking density

High stocking densities may have an adverse effect on growth rate, feed efficiency, survivability, carcass quality and behavior (locomotion, resting, feeding and drinking).

In extensive outdoors systems stocking density should be managed to ensure an adequate feed supply for the cattle.

Stocking density should be managed such that crowding does not adverse impact key components of normal behavior of cattle. These include the ability to lie down freely without the risk of injuries, move freely around the pen and access feed and water. Stocking density should also be managed such that weight gain is not adversely affected by crowding. Excessive tongue rolling can be associated with overcrowding of confined cattle.

EU comments

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

In point 2.h) of Art 7.X.5, in the first sentence of the third paragraph above, the word "managed" should be replaced by the word "limited" and the word "adverse" should be replaced by "adversely".

In the second sentence of the same paragraph, the following text "at the same time" should be included between the words "freely" and "without".

The third sentence of the same paragraph should be deleted.

The last sentence of the same paragraph should be replaced as follow:

"If tongue rolling is seen, measure should be taken to adjust diet and stocking densities."

Justification

In order to fulfil their natural behaviour, cattle should have space enough to lie down at the same time.

The third sentence of the mentioned paragraph should be deleted since the effects of stocking densities should primarily focused on the welfare of the animals rather than only on weight gain, as highlighted in the first sentence of the same paragraph.

Any degree of tongue rolling is an indicator of poor welfare linked to diet and stocking densities.

Outcome based measurables: Behavior, Morbidity rate, mortality rate, weight gain, physical appearance.

  • i) 
    Outdoor areas

EU comment

The EU wishes to put under study point 2.i) of Art 7.X.5 "Outdoor areas". The term not applicable is not appropriate and should be deleted.

Justification

This point needs further analysis given the fact that also in outdoor areas a number of conditions should be taken into account to ensure the welfare of cattle.

Not applicable. j) Protection from predators

Where practical, cattle should be protected from predators.

Outcome based measurables: Mortality, behaviour, physical appearance.

EU comment

In point 2.j) of Art 7.X.5, the text "where practical" should be replaced by "As far as possible".

Furthermore in the list of outcome-based measurables listed above, the EU wishes including also the indicator "post-mortem pathology".

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

Justification

It is not always possible to protect cattle from predators. Moreover post-mortem pathology can be useful to identify the predators.

  • 3. 
    Management
  • a) 
    Genetic selection

Welfare and health considerations, in addition to productivity, should be taken into account when choosing a breed for a particular location or production system. Examples of these include nutritional maintenance requirement, ectoparasite resistance and heat tolerance.

Individual animals within breed can be genetically selected to propagate offspring that exhibit the following traits beneficial to animal health and welfare: Maternal ability, birth weight, milking ability, body conformation and temperament.

EU comment

In point 3.a) of Art 7.X.5, the text "ease at calving," should be introduced between the words "maternal ability" and "birth weight".

In addition, the following text should be included at the end of the paragraph above:

"The sire has a highly heritable effect on final calf size and as such can have a significant impact on ease at calving. Sire selection should therefore account for the maturity and size of the female. Heifers should be of a suitable age and size before calving. Heifers and cows should not be implanted / inseminated / mated in such a way that the progeny results in increased risk to both dam and calf health and welfare. "

Justification

The sire has a highly heritable effect on final calf size and as such can have a significant impact on ease at calving.

Outcome based measurables: Morbidity rate, mortality rate, behaviour, physical appearance, reproductive efficiency.

  • b) 
    Weaning

Weaning for the purposes of this document is the term to describe transfer of the calf to a fibrous diet from nursing the dam or being fed with milk or milk replacer. In beef cattle production systems, weaning can be a stressful time in the calf’s life.

Calves should be weaned only when their ruminant digestive systems have developed sufficiently to enable them to maintain growth and welfare.

The practice of creep feeding is sometimes utilised prior to weaning to help the calf more easily adapt to a solid diet.

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

There are different weaning strategies utilised in the beef cattle production systems. These could include abrupt separation, fence line separation and the use of devices placed in the nose of the calf to discourage suckling.

Special care should be taken if abrupt weaning is immediately followed by transportation off farm as research has shown that calves are at risk of increased morbidity under these circumstances.

Beef cattle producers should seek expert advice on the most appropriate time and method of weaning for their type of cattle and production system.

Outcome based measurables: Morbidity rate, mortality rate, behaviour, physical appearance, weight gain.

  • c) 
    Painful husbandry procedures

Surgical husbandry practices that have the potential to cause pain are routinely practiced on cattle for reasons of production efficiency, animal health and welfare and human safety. Where possible, these procedures should be performed in such a way as to minimize any pain and stress on the animal. Options to consider including the performing the procedure at as early an age as possible or where appropriate use of analgesia.

EU comment

The last sentence of the above paragraph of point 3.c) of Art 7.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

"Performing these procedures at as early an age as possible or using anaesthesia and/or analgesia should be considered"

Justification

Pain can be alleviated also by using anaesthesia during the procedure. The use of anaesthesia and analgesia should be accentuated as important option to consider.

Future options for enhancing animal welfare in relation to these procedures include: 1) ceasing the procedure and addressing the current need for the operation through management strategies; 2) breeding animals that do not require the procedure; 3) replacing the current procedure with a non-surgical alternative that has been shown to enhance animal welfare; or 4) performing the procedure in a way that minimises pain.

Example of such interventions include: castration, dehorning, (spaying), tail docking, identification.

  • i) 
    Castration

Castration of beef cattle is performed in many production systems to reduce inter-animal aggression, improve human safety, remove the risk of unwanted pregnancies in the herd, and enhance production efficiency by producing beef that better meets market requirements.

EU comment

In point 3.i) of Art 7.X.5, in the last sentence of the paragraph above the following text should be deleted:

"and enhance production efficiency by producing beef that better meets market requirements"

Justification

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

The benefits of carrying out beef castration should better focus here on human safety and animal health and welfare reasons rather than market requirements.

Where it is necessary to castrate beef cattle, producers should seek guidance from veterinarians as to the optimum method and timing for their type of cattle and production system.

Methods of castration used in beef cattle include surgical (knife) removal of the testes, ischaemic methods (banding or ringing), and crushing of the spermatic cord (burdizzo operation).

Where practical, cattle should be castrated before the age of 3 months, or at the first available handling opportunity beyond this age.

EU comment

The third paragraph of point 3.i) of Art 7.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

"Methods of castration used in beef cattle should include surgical (knife) removal of the testes in preference to ischemic methods (banding or ringing), and crushing of the spermatic cord (burdizzo operation)."

Moreover, the EU seeks for scientific evidence to recommend that castration should be carried out before the age of 3 months.

Justification

Proper surgical removal of testes is less painful and causes less animal welfare problems than ischemic methods.

Producers should seek guidance from veterinarians on the availability and advisability of analgesia/anaesthesia for castration of beef cattle, particularly in older animals.

Operators performing castration of beef cattle should be trained and competent in the procedure used, and be able to recognise the signs of complications.

  • ii) 
    Dehorning

EU comment

The title of point 3.ii) of Art 7.X.5 should be replaced as follow:

"Dehorning/disbudding"

Justification

Disbudding is a practice commonly used for young animals and should be indicated as it avoids dehorning animals later on.

Beef cattle which are naturally horned are commonly dehorned in order to reduce animal injuries and hide damage, improve human safety, and facilitate transport and handling. Where practical and appropriate for the production system, the selection of polled cattle can remove the need for dehorning.

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

Where it is necessary to dehorn beef cattle, producers should seek guidance from veterinary advisers as to the optimum method and timing for their type of cattle and production system.

Where practical, cattle should be dehorned while horn development is still at the horn bud stage, or at the first available handling opportunity beyond this age. This is because the procedure involves less tissue trauma when horn development is still at the horn bud stage, and there is no attachment of horn to the skull of the animal.

Methods of dehorning at the horn bud stage include removal of the horn buds with a knife, thermal cautery of the horn buds, or the application of chemical paste to cauterise the horn buds. Methods of dehorning when horn development has commenced involve the removal through of the horn cutting or sawing at the base of the horn close to the skull.

EU comment

In the fourth paragraph of point 3.ii) of Art 7.X.5, the first sentence should be redrafted as follow:

"Methods of dehorning at the horn bud stage include removal of the horn buds with a knife and thermal cautery of the horn buds which are preferred methods to the application of chemical paste to cauterise the horn buds."

Justification

The application of chemical paste to cauterise the horn buds is more painful and causes more animal welfare problems than the other recommended methods.

Producers should seek guidance from veterinarians on the availability and advisability of analgesia/anaesthesia for dehorning of beef cattle, particularly in older animals.

EU comment

In the fifth paragraph of point 3.c.ii) of Art 7.X.5, in the last part of the sentence the following text “particularly in older animals” should be deleted.

Justification

Even in very young animals dehorning is a painful procedure. Anaesthesia and analgesia effectively diminish pain during surgical procedures and should be used.

Operators performing dehorning of beef cattle should be trained and competent in the procedure used, and be able to recognise the signs of complications.

  • iii) 
    Spaying (ovariectomy)

Spaying of heifers is sometimes required for international trade or to prevent unwanted pregnancies under extensive rangeland conditions. Surgical spaying should be performed by veterinarians or by highly trained operators. Producers should seek guidance from veterinarians on the availability and advisability of analgesia/anaesthesia for spaying of beef cattle.

EU comment

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

In the first sentence of point 3.iii) of Art 7.X.5, the words "for international trade" should be deleted.

In the last sentence of the paragraph above, the text "on the availability and advisability" should be replaced by the "on the use".

Justification

The EU wishes OIE to provide background information on the requirements of spaying.

Analgesia and anaesthesia are a necessity for surgical procedures involving an incision in the abdomen heifers for international trade.

  • iv) 
    Tail docking

Tail docking has been performed in beef cattle to prevent tail tip necrosis in confinement operations. Research shows that increasing space per animal and proper bedding are effectives means in preventing tail tip necrosis. Therefore it is not recommended for producers to dock the tails of beef cattle.

  • v) 
    Identification

Ear-tagging, ear-notching, tattooing, freeze branding and radio frequency identification devices (RFID) are preferred methods of permanently identifying beef cattle from an animal welfare stand point. In some situations however hot iron branding may be required or be the only practical method of permanent identifying beef cattle. If cattle are branded, it should be accomplished quickly, expertly and with the proper equipment. Identification systems should be established also according to the Chapter 4.1. of the Terrestrial Code on General principles on identification and traceability of live animals.

Outcome based measures: Rate of post-procedures complications, mortality rate, behaviour, physical appearance, weight gain.

  • d) 
    Handling and inspection EU comment

In point 3.d) of Art 7.X.5, it should be clearly indicated that electro immobilisation should not be used.

Justification

Electro immobilisation is a handling practice that should be avoided because of its animal welfare implications.

Beef cattle should be inspected at intervals appropriate to the production systems and the risks to the health and welfare of the animals.

EU comment

In point 3.d) of Art 7.X.5, the first sentence above should be redrafted as follow:

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

"In intensive and semi-intensive farming system,s animals should be inspected at least once a day. In other system they should be inspected at regularly intervals sufficient to protect health and welfare"

Justification

In intensive and semi-intensive farming systems the risk of poor welfare is higher and therefore animals should be inspected at least once a day. In the other systems, inspections should be organised with regular intervals as to monitor any animal health and welfare problem that may incur.

Some animals may benefit from more frequent inspection for example: neonatal calves, cows in late gestation, newly weaned calves, and cattle experiencing environmental stress and after painful husbandry or veterinary surgical procedures.

Animal handlers need to be competent in recognising the clinical signs of health, disease and welfare of beef cattle.

Beef cattle identified as sick or injured should be given appropriate treatment at the first available opportunity. If animal handlers are unable to provide appropriate treatment, then the service of veterinarians should be enlisted.

If prognosis of the animal condition is poor with little chance of recovery, humane euthanasia of the animal should be considered. For a description of methods for the humane killing of beef cattle see chapter 7.6.5 of the OIE Terrestrial Code

Recommendations on the handling of cattle are also found in Chapter 7.5., Articles 7.5.1 and 7.5.2 of the OIE Terrestrial Code.

Where beef cattle are herded into a handling facility from extensive conditions, they should be moved quietly. Weather conditions should be taken into account and cattle should not be herded in excessively hot or cold conditions. Cattle should not be driven to the point of collapse. Properly trained dogs can be effective tools for cattle herding.

EU comment

In point 3.d) of Art 7.X.5, in the second last sentence of the paragraph above, the word "collapse" should be replaced by "fatigue".

Justification

Driving of cattle should end at the signs of fatigue of the animals and much earlier than the collapse of the animals.

Outcome based measurables: Handling response, morbidity rate, mortality rate, behaviour, reproductive efficiency, weight gain.

  • e) 
    Personnel training

All people responsible for beef cattle should be competent according to their responsibilities and should understand cattle husbandry, behaviour, biosecurity, general signs of disease, and indicators of poor animal welfare such as stress, pain and discomfort, and their alleviation.

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

EU comments

In point 3.e) of Art 7.X.5, the following text "including social behaviour as described in paragraph point 2.g) of Art 7.X.5." should be included between the words "behaviour," and "biosecurity"

Justification

Social and behavioural needs of cattle are important aspects that people responsible for beef cattle should know in order to handle them properly.

Competence may be gained through formal training and/or practical experience.

Outcome based measurables: Handling response, morbidity rate, mortality rate, behaviour, reproductive efficiency, weight gain.

  • f) 
    Emergency plans

Beef producers should have contingency plans to cover the failure of power, water and feed supply. These plans may include the provision of fail safe alarm devices to detect malfunctions, back up generators, access to maintenance providers, ability to store water on farm, access to water cartage services, adequate on farm storage of feed and alternative feed supply.

Plans should be in place to minimise and mitigate the effects of natural disasters or extreme climatic conditions e.g., heat stress, drought, blizzard and flooding. Emergency plans should also cover the management of the farm in the face of an emergency disease outbreak, consistent with national programs and recommendations of V eterinary Services as appropriate.

EU comment

In point 3.f) of Art 7.X.5, in the last sentence of the above paragraph the following text "in the face of an emergency disease outbreak" should be replaced by "in face of movement restrictions in case of emergency disease outbreak"

Justification

Movement restrictions in case of emergency disease outbreak have an important impact on the management of a farm and should be specifically indicated and taken into account in this context.

  • g) 
    Location, construction and equipment of farms

Farms for beef cattle should be situated in an appropriate geographical location for the health, welfare and productivity of the animals while considering environmental sustainability.

All facilities for beef cattle should be constructed, maintained and operated to minimise the risk to the welfare of the animals and human safety.

EU comment

In point 3.g) of Art 7.X.5, the first sentence should be put under study as the scope of the current wording is too broad.

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

Moreover the following sentence should be included at the end of the second paragraph above

"It is preferable that cattle are not been kept in husbandry systems which require permanent tethering"

Justification

Given its impact on the welfare of cattle, permanent tethering should be avoided.

Equipment for handling and restraining beef cattle should only be used in a way that minimises the risk of injury, pain or distress.

Cattle in intensive or extensive production systems must be offered adequate space for comfort, socialization and environmental management.

EU comment

In the fourth paragraph of point 3.g) of Art 7.X.5, the following text should be added:

"Whenever possible, beef cattle also in intensive and semi-intensive production should have access to pasture."

Justification

Access to pasture and grazing have in several studies proved to be beneficial to animal welfare and health.

In intensive production systems the feeder should be sufficiently large so that animals have adequate access to feed and they should be clean and free of spoiled, moldy, sour, packed or unpalatable feed. Also cattle should have access to clean and clear water at all times.

EU comment

In the above paragraph of point 3.g) of Art 7.X.5, the following text "at the same time" should be included between the word "feed" and "and".

Justification

In order to fulfil their behavioural needs, cattle should have access to feed at the same time.

Floors in housing facilities should be properly drained, and barns and handling alleys should provide traction to prevent injuries to animals and handlers.

Handling alleys and housing pens must be free of sharp edges and protrusions to prevent injury to animals and handlers.

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

Design and operate alleys and gates to avoid impeding cattle movement. Avoid slippery surfaces, especially where cattle enter a single file alley leading to a chute or where they exit the chute. Grooved concrete, metal grating (not sharp), rubber mats or deep sand can be used to minimize slipping and falling. Quiet handling is essential to minimize slipping. When operating gates and catches, reduce excessive noise, which may cause distress to the animals.

Adjust hydraulic or manual restraining chutes to the appropriate size of cattle to be handled. Regular cleaning and maintenance of working parts is imperative to ensure the system functions properly and is safe for the cattle and handlers.

Mechanical and electrical devices used in housing facilities must be safe for animals and humans.

Dipping baths are sometimes used in beef cattle production for ectoparasite control. Where these are used, they should be design and operated to minimise the risk of crowding, injury or drowning.

The loading of the animals at the farms should be conducting accordingly to Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4. (Transport of animals by sea, land and air respectively)

Outcome based measurables: Handling response, morbidity rate, mortality rate, behaviour, weight gain, physical appearance, lameness.

  • h) 
    On farm harvesting

EU comment

The title of point 3.h) of Art 7.X.5 should be replaced as follow "On farm slaughter"

Justification

For consistency with the other chapters of the Terrestrial Code, it is better to use the term "slaughter".

Refer to Section 5.3.3.

  • i) 
    Humane killing

A prompt diagnosis should be made to determine whether the animal should be humanely killed or receive additional care.

Animal handlers should provide feed and water to non-ambulatory cattle at least once daily.

Non-ambulatory animals should be moved very carefully and dragging non-ambulatory animals is unacceptable.

Likewise, animals should not be lifted with chains onto transportation conveyances. Acceptable methods of transporting non-ambulatory animals include a sled, low-boy trailer or in the bucket of a loader.

When treatment is attempted, cattle that are unable to sit up unaided and refuse to eat or drink should be humanely euthanized as soon as recovery is deemed not possible.

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

EU comment

In the fifth paragraph of point 3.i) of Art 7.X.5, the word "sit" should be replaced by the word "stand up".

Justification

Sitting as used for other species with front legs extended is not a natural behaviour, however it is sometimes used for cattle in sternal recumbency.

Cattle that are non-ambulatory must not be sent to a livestock market or to a processing facility. EU comment

In point 3.i) of Art 7.X.5, a complete paragraph dedicated to the management and handling of downer cows should be included.

In the third sentence of point 3.i) above, the following text "that have a chance to recover" should be included between the words "animals" and "should".

Furthermore, the sentence above "Cattle that are non-ambulatory must not be sent to a livestock market or to a processing facility" should be replaced by the following sentence "Cattle that are not fit for transport must not be sent to livestock market or to a processing facility".

Justification

Given the welfare implication, specific recommendations should be addressed to the handling and management of downer cows. In particular, cattle that are not fit for transport should not be moved.

Humane killing should occur without pain or suffering.

The decision to humanely kill an animal and the procedure itself should be undertaken by a competent person.

Reasons for euthanasia may include:

  • i) 
    severe emaciation, weak cattle that are non-ambulatory or at risk of becoming downers;
  • ii) 
    non-ambulatory cattle that will not sit up, refuse to eat or drink, have not responded to therapy;

EU comment

In point 3.i.ii) of Art 7.X.5 above, the word "sit" should be replaced by the word "stand up".

Justification

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

Sitting as used for other species with front legs extended is not a natural behaviour, however it is sometimes used for cattle in sternal recumbency.

  • iii) 
    rapid deterioration of a medical condition for which therapies have been unsuccessful;
  • iv) 
    severe, debilitating pain;
  • v) 
    compound (open) fracture;
  • vi) 
    spinal injury;
  • vii) 
    central nervous system disease; and
  • viii) 
    multiple joint infections with chronic weight loss.

For a description of other methods for the humane killing of beef cattle see Chapter 7.6.5. of the T errestrial C ode .

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ANNEX 2                                  DG B I                                        EN

C HA PT ER 7. X. USE OF ANIMALS IN RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

EU comments

The EU wishes to acknowledge the progress made with the document, especially the inclusion of a specific section addressing the care and accommodation needs of the animals. The EU equally welcomes the number of amendments put forward by the 27 Member States of the EU which are now incorporated in the latest draft.

Specifically we welcome the separation of the tasks of the oversight and the roles and tasks of different oversight bodies. However, the current text still in some cases makes too strong a link between the local committee and the project review. To avoid interference with implementation and establishing fixed roles within the oversight system, the OIE guidelines should not presume specific tasks to any particular body.

Some other earlier comments need to be reiterated due to their importance to the EU, especially when considering the current legislation in place since mid 1980s. These include:

  • 1. 
    Our concern at the lack of mention of “suffering” in the Chapter. The relationship between “pain”, “suffering” and “distress” is a complex one. The terms are not mutually exclusive (for example, pain or distress may be causes of suffering but not exclusively so). It is therefore important that all three concepts are considered in this Chapter, and that a clear definition of “suffering” is added to the list of definitions to include the broader list of negative experiences (or absence of positive stimuli) which may be associated with suffering such as thirst, hunger, breathlessness, nausea, fear, anxiety and boredom. Suffering is at the opposite end of the spectrum from good welfare and can manifest as physical, mental and/or emotional pain, including unpleasant feelings, sensations or perceptions. These are cognitively processed and interpreted by the animal according to its species-specific and individual nature and its past experience. We would therefore welcome a mention of suffering in the Chapter whilst accepting that the main focus should be on pain and distress.
  • 2. 
    It is assumed that the use of live animals in lower education is not considered under this document; however, it does not make a specific statement to its acceptability. It is important that the global guidance explicitly states the unacceptability of the use of live animals for the purposes of lower education and which today is fully replaceable by other means, such as audiovisual tools and artificial animal models.
  • 3. 
    In order to promote high levels of animal welfare, good science and public accountability, the implementation of the oversight framework, especially in terms of project review as well as compliance to with an approved project description, it is imperative that the oversight is independent of those having any vested interest in the project itself.

Preamble

The purpose of this chapter is to provide advice and assistance for OIE Members to follow when formulating regulatory requirements, or other form of oversight, for the use of live animals in research , and education 6. A system of animal use oversight should be implemented in each country. The system will, in practice, vary from country to country and according to cultural, economic, religious and social factors. However, the OIE recommends that Members address all the essential elements identified in these standards in formulating a

6 Wherever the term “research” is used, it includes basic and applied research, testing and the production of biological materials; “education” includes teaching and training.

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regulatory framework that is appropriate to their local conditions. This framework may be delivered through a combination of national, regional and institutional jurisdictions and both public sector and private sector responsibilities should be clearly defined.

The OIE recognises the vital role played by the use of live animals in research and education. The OIE Guiding Principles for Animal Welfare state that such use makes a major contribution to the wellbeing of people and animals and emphasise the importance of the Three Rs of Russell and Burch (1959). Most scientists and members of the public agree that the animals should only be used when necessary and ethically justified (thereby avoiding unnecessary duplication of animal based research); that the minimum number of animals should be used to achieve the scientific or educational goals; and that such use of animals should cause as little pain and/or distress as possible.

EU comments

The EU wish to reiterate its previous comment as follow.

The following sub sentence should be added at the end of the third sentence of the second paragraph above:

"Most scientists and members of the public agree that the animals should only be used when necessary and-ethically justified (thereby avoiding unnecessary duplication of animal based research), and when no other alternative methods, not using live animals, are available; that the minimum number of animals

should... ”

The last sentence should be amended as follows and the following additional sentence added:

"and that such use of animals should cause as little pain and/or distress _as possible. In addition, animal suffering is often recognised separately from pain and distress and should be considered alongside any lasting harm which is expected to be caused to animals."

Justification

In line with the principle of the Three Rs, animals should only be used when no alternative, non-animal methods are available.

The relationship between ‘pain’, ‘suffering’ and ‘distress’ is a complex one. The terms are not mutually exclusive (for example, pain or distress may be causes of suffering but not exclusively so). Suffering needs therefore to be taken into consideration in addition to pain and distress. Pain and distress do not fully cover the meaning of suffering, which is considered to be broader than only physical pain, or the distress experienced when an animal is unable to adapt completely to stressors. Suffering is the opposite of good welfare and is associated with a broad list of negative experiences (or absence of positive stimuli) such as thirst, hunger, breathlessness, nausea, fear, anxiety and boredom.

It is appropriate in the preamble to also make reference to the lasting harm which may be caused to animals when they are used in research and education.

The OIE emphasises the need for humane treatment of sentient animals and that good quality science depends upon good animal welfare. It is the responsibility of all involved in the use of animals to ensure that they give due regard to these recommendations. In keeping with the overall approach to animal welfare detailed in the Guiding Principles, the OIE stresses the importance of standards based on outcomes for the animal.

The OIE recognises the significant role of veterinarians in animal based research. Given their unique training and skills, they are essential members of a team including scientists and animal care technicians. This team approach is based on the concept that everyone involved in the use of animals has an ethical responsibility for the animals’ welfare. The approach also ensures that animal use leads to high quality scientific and educational outcomes and optimum welfare for the animals used.

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The OIE recommends that records on animal use should be maintained, as appropriate to the institution and project proposals and species used, on a regional or national basis. These records may be used to provide a degree of public transparency, without compromising personnel or animal safety, or releasing proprietary information.

EU Comments

The meaning of the final paragraph is unclear. We suggest amending as follows:

“The OIE recommends that records on animal use should be maintained at an institutional level, as appropriate to the institution and project proposals and species used. Key events should be recorded to aid decision making and promote good science and welfare. A summary of these records may be gathered on a regional or national basis. These records may and be used published to provide a degree of public transparency, without compromising personnel or animal safety, or releasing proprietary information.”

Justification

Records should be maintained at an institutional level for the purposes given. However, where publication occurs to aid public transparency, this should be done at a regional or national level to protect individuals and institutes from threat or compromise.

Article 7.X.1

Definitions

B iolog ic al safe ty or b iosafe ty

means the application of knowledge, techniques and equipment to prevent personal, laboratory and environmental exposure to potentially infectious agents or biohazards.

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Annex XVII (contd)

B iosecurity :

means a continuous process of risk assessment and risk management designed to minimise or eliminate microbiological infection with adventitious organisms that can cause clinical disease in the infected animals or humans, or make animals unsuitable for biomedical research. A comprehensive biosecurity programme not only seeks to prevent contamination but also to minimise the loss of animals and scientific data, and to limit the spread of unwanted microorganisms should contamination occur.

B iolog ic al c ontainment or b ioc ontainment

means the system and procedures designed to prevent the accidental release of biological material including allergens. The objective of biocontainment is to confine biohazards and to reduce the potential exposure of the laboratory worker, animals on other studies, persons outside of the laboratory, and the environment to potentially infectious agents.

B ioexclusion

means the prevention of the unintentional transfer of adventitious organisms with subsequent infection of animals , resulting in adverse effects on their health or suitability for research.

Cloned animal

means a genetic copy of another living or dead animal produced by somatic cell nuclear transfer or other reproductive technology.

D istress

means the state of an animal , that has been unable to adapt completely to stressors, and that manifests as abnormal physiological or behavioural responses. It can be acute or chronic and may result in pathological conditions.

Environmental enrichment

means increasing the complexity (e.g. with toys, cage furniture, foraging opportunities, social housing, etc.) in a captive animal ’s environment to foster the expression of non-injurious species-typical behaviours and reduce the expression of maladaptive behaviours, as well as provide cognitive stimulation.

Euth an asia

means the act of inducing death using a method that results in rapid loss of consciousness and minimum pain or distress to the animal .

EU comments

"means the act of inducing death using a method that results in rapid loss of consciousness and with minimum pain or distress to the animal followed by death without recovery of consciousness."

Justification

For clarity, it is important to complete the definition by indicating that death must follow without recovery of consciousness.

E thic al re vie w

means consideration of the validity and justification for using animals including: the potential harms for animals and likely benefits of the use and how these balance; experimental design; implementation of the Three Rs; animal husbandry and care and other related issues such as staff training. Ethical judgements are influenced by prevailing societal attitudes.

E ndangered specie s

means a population of organisms which is at risk of becoming extinct because it is either few in numbers, or threatened by changing environmental or predation parameters.

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Geneticaly alte re d anim al ( GA anim al)

means an animal that has had a random or targeted change in its nuclear or mitochondrial DNA, or the progeny of such an animal(s) , where they have inherited the change, achieved through a deliberate human technological intervention.

H umane endpoint

means the point in time at which an experimental animal ’s pain and/or distress is avoided, terminated, minimised or reduced, by taking actions such as giving treatment to relieve pain and/or distress, terminating a painful procedure, removing the animal from the study, or humanely killing the animal . Ideal humane endpoints are those that can be used to end a study before the onset of pain and/or distress, without jeopardising the study’s objectives. In consultation with the veterinarian , humane endpoints should be described in the Project Proposal and, thus, established prior to commencement of the study. They should form part of the ethical review. Endpoint criteria should be easy to assess over the course of the study. Except in rare cases, death (other than euthanasia) as a planned endpoint is considered ethically unacceptable.

H arm -benefit an alysis

means the process of weighing the likely adverse effects (harms) to the animals against the benefits likely to accrue as a result of the proposed project. The benefits should be maximised and the harms, in terms of pain and distress, should be minimised.

The Three Rs

means the internationally accepted tenet, first described by of Russell and Burch (1959), for the use of animals in research and education. The Three Rs comprise:

§ replacement which refers to methods that do not require the use of animals to achieve the scientific aims;

§ reduction which refers to methods that enable researchers to obtain comparable levels of information from fewer animals or to obtain more information from the same number of animals ;

§ refinement which refers to methods that prevent, alleviate or minimise known and potential pain, distress or lasting harm and/or enhance welfare for the animals used. Refinement includes the appropriate selection of species with a lesser degree of structural and functional complexity in their nervous systems and a lesser apparent capacity for experiences that derive from this complexity. Opportunities for refinement should be considered and implemented throughout the lifetime of the animal and include, for example, housing and transportation as well as procedures and euthanasia.

EU comments

The EU wishes to reiterate part of its previous comment as follow.

In the definition for Refinement word "suffering" should be inserted between words "pain," and "distress".

"..which refers to methods that prevent, alleviate or minimise known and potential pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm and/or enhance welfare for the animals used. Refinement includes the appropriate selection of relevant species with a lesser the least degree of structural and functional complexity in their nervous systems and a lesser the least apparent capacity for experiences that derive from this complexity."

Justification

Suffering needs to be taken into consideration equally with pain and distress. The aim of refinement should always be to select the species which has the least (not simply lesser) capacity to experience pain, suffering distress or lasting harm whilst being relevant to the research being contemplated.

Operant (Instrumental) c onditioning

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means the association that an animal makes between a particular response (such as pressing a bar) and a particular reinforcement that may be positive (for example, a food reward) or negative (e.g. a mild electric shock). As a result of this association, the occurrence of a specific behaviour of the animal can be modified (e.g. increased or decreased in frequency or intensity).

Project Proposal ( or Protoc ol)

means a written description of a study or experiment, programme of work, or other activities that includes the goals of the work, characterises the use of the animals , and includes ethical considerations. The purpose of the Project Proposal is to enable assessment of the quality of, and justification for, the study, work or activity.

EU comments

The use of the term ‘Protocol’ should be deleted.

"Project Proposal ( or Protoc ol) "

Justification

In many regulatory systems, the term ‘Protocol’ is the description of a specific procedure being carried out on animals within a Project. A Protocol does not therefore fulfil the requirements of this definition (e.g. no goals of the work would be included in a Protocol, ethical evaluation would not be feasible on the information included in a Protocol, and it would not be expected to contain any justification for the work) and thus the term Protocol should not be used as a synonym for a Project Proposal.

P ai n

Means an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage. It may elicit protective actions, result in learned avoidance and distress and may modify species-specific traits of behaviour, including social behaviour.

welfare.

Justification

The relationship between ‘pain’, ‘suffering’ and ‘distress’ is a complex one. The terms are not mutually exclusive (for example, pain or distress may be causes of suffering but not exclusively so). Suffering needs therefore to be taken into consideration in addition to pain and distress. Pain and distress do not cover the meaning of suffering, which is considered to be broader than only physical pain, or the distress experienced when an animal is unable to adapt completely to stressors and manifests abnormal physiological or behavioural responses. Suffering is the opposite of good welfare and is associated with a broad list of negative experiences (or absence of important positive stimuli) such as thirst, hunger, breathlessness, nausea, fear, anxiety and boredom.

Article 7.X.2.

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Scope

EU comments

The EU would like to reiterate its earlier comment concerning species covered under Aquatic Code.

Animals used in research and education would commonly include vertebrates such as fish and amphibians. Furthermore, the welfare of some species of invertebrate animals where there may be sufficient scientific evidence of their potential capacity to feel and experience pain, suffering and distress should also be addressed. Therefore these issues should be also considered within the Aquatic Code.

These standards apply to animals as defined in the Terrestrial Code (excluding bees) bred, supplied and/or used in research, (including testing) and higher education. A nimals to be used for production of biologicals and/or humanely killed for harvesting their cells, tissues and organs for scientific purposes are also covered. Members should consider both the species and the developmental stage of the animal in implementing these standards.

EU comments

In the scope a new sentence after the first one should be added as follows:

"…(including testing) and higher education. The use of animals in lower education should be prohibited and replaced by non-animal methods and by other tools. Animals to be used for production.."

Justification

In the field of education and teaching, it is important that the use of animals involving pain, distress, suffering or lasting harm is limited only to higher education and training whereas use of animals in lower education should be prohibited. The objectives in the lower education can today be achieved via the use of other modern techniques such as audio visual material, interactive computer programmes and artificial animal models.

Article 7.X.3.

The Oversight Framework

The role of a Competent A uthority is to implement a system (governmental or other) for verification of compliance by institutions. This usually involves a system of authorisation (such as licensing or registering of institutions, scientists, and/or projects) and compliance may be assessed at the institutional, regional and/or national level.

A requirement for keeping records on animal use, as appropriate to the institution, project proposal and species, should be included. It may be appropriate to maintain such records on a regional or national basis and to provide some degree of public access without compromising personnel or animal safety, or releasing proprietary information.

EU comments

The text in the above paragraph should be deleted as it merely duplicates what is said in paragraph 4 of the Preamble.

The oversight framework encompasses both ethical review of animal use and considerations related to animal care and welfare . This may be accomplished by a single body or distributed across different groups. Different systems of oversight may involve animal welfare officers, regional/local committees, or national bodies. Typically each institution utilises a local committee (often referred to as Animal Care and Use Committee, Animal Ethics Committee or Animal Care Committee) to deliver this oversight framework. Where the local committee does not perform ethical review, this may be undertaken by regional or national ethical review bodies. It is important that the local committee reports to senior management within the institution to ensure it has appropriate authority,

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resources and support. Such a committee should undertake periodic review of its own policies, procedures and performance.

EU comments

In the text above a new paragraph should be separated from word "Typically" onwards with changes as follows:

"Typically An each institution may utilises a local committee (often referred to as Animal Care and Use Committee, Animal Ethics Committee, Animal Welfare Body or Animal Care Committee) to deliver some or all of this oversight framework. Where the local committee does not perform ethical review, this may be undertaken by regional or national ethical review bodies. It is important that the local committee reports to senior management within the institution to ensure it has an appropriate authority, resources and support. Such a committee should undertake periodic review of its own policies, procedures and performance.

Ethical review of animal use may be undertaken by regional or national ethical review bodies or by local committees. If this task is carried out by the local committee, consideration should be given as to how impartiality and independence from those with vested interests in the project is to be achieved."

Justification

It is important that the functions of the different types of committees and the tasks of the oversight are not predetermined by these guidelines. This should be decided at the time of implementation as the existing infrastructure in the respective country/area/region.

In order to promote high level of animal welfare, good science and public accountability, it is imperative that the project review is independent of those having vested interests in the project itself.

In providing this oversight and ensuring the implementation of the Three Rs, the following expertise should be included as a minimum:

one scientist with experience in animal research, whose role is to ensure that protocols are designed and implemented in accordance with sound science;

one veterinarian , with the necessary expertise to work with research animals , whose specific role is to provide advice on the care, use and welfare of such animals .

one public member to represent general community interests who is independent of the institution and is not involved in the use of animals in research.

EU comments

The third bullet point should be edited as follows:

  • • 
    one public member to represent general community interests who is independent of the institution science and care of the animals and is not involved in the use of animals in research.

Justification

A requirement to involve a public member who is independent of the institution may cause significant problems of confidentiality and security for many institutions. The policy objective is to have someone who is independent of the science or the day-to-day care of the animals to provide a broader view,

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representative of the general public. This may be achieved with an individual who is part of the institution but NOT part of the animal related research activities – e.g. a company accountant, librarian, HR professional, professor of theology, etc.

Additional expertise may be sought from the animal care staff, as these professional and technical staff are centrally involved in ensuring the welfare of animals used. Other participants may include statisticians, information scientists and ethicists and biosafety specialists, as appropriate to the studies conducted. It may be appropriate, in teaching institutions, to involve a student representative.

EU comments

The paragraph above should be amended as follows:

"Additional expertise, especially relative to general care and welfare, may be sought from the animal care staff, as these professional and technical staff are centrally involved in ensuring the welfare of animals used. Other participants, especially in relation to ethical review, may include statisticians, information scientists and ethicists and biosafety specialists, as appropriate to the studies conducted. It may be appropriate, in teaching institutions, to involve a student representativeon."

Justification

It is important to make the difference between the requirements for the general animal welfare and care and those related to the ethical review. Furthermore, there should be no presumption as to the type of oversight body and the tasks of the oversight. This is a matter for the implementation.

Oversight responsibilities include three key elements: 1. Project Proposal Review

Project Proposals, or significant amendments to these, should be reviewed and approved prior to commencement of the work, should identify the person with primarily responsibility for the project and should include a description of the following elements, where relevant:

  • a) 
    the scientific or educational aims, including consideration of the relevance of the experiment to human or animal health, the environment, or the advancement of biological knowledge;
  • b) 
    an informative, non-technical (lay) summary may enhance understanding of the project and facilitate the ethical review of the proposal by allowing full and equitable participation of members of the local committee who may be dealing with matters outside their specific field. Subject to safeguarding confidential information, such summaries may be made publicly available.

EU comments

The point b) above should be amended as follows:

"an informative, non-technical (lay) summary may enhance understanding of the project and facilitate the ethical review of the proposal by allowing full and equitable participation of members of the the oversight bodylocal committee who may be dealing with matters outside their specific field. Subject to safeguarding confidential information, such summaries may be made publicly available"

Justification

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There should be no presumption as to the type of oversight body and the tasks of the oversight. This is a matter for the implementation.

  • c) 
    the experimental design, including justification for choice of species, source and number of animals , including any proposed reuse;
  • d) 
    the experimental procedures;
  • e) 
    methods of handling and restraint and consideration of refinements such as animal training and operant conditioning;
  • f) 
    the methods to avoid or minimise pain, discomfort, distress or lasting impairment of physical or physiological function, including the use of anaesthesia and/or analgesia;

EU comments

The point f) should be amended as follows:

"..the methods to avoid or minimise pain, discomfort, distress or lasting impairment of physical or physiological function, including the use of anaesthesia and/or analgesia and other means to ameliorate discomfort such as warmth, soft bedding and assisted feeding;"

Justification

It is important to emphasize the diversity of means to minimise pain, suffering and distress and to ameliorate discomfort in addition to those in relation only to techniques or medication.

  • g) 
    application of humane endpoints and the final disposition of animals , including methods of euthanasia;
  • h) 
    consideration of the general health, husbandry and care of the species proposed to be used, including environmental enrichment and any special housing requirements;
  • i) 
    ethical considerations such as the application of the Three Rs and a harm/benefit analysis;
  • j) 
    an indication of any special health and safety risks; and
  • k) 
    resources/infrastructure necessary to support the proposed work (e.g. facilities, equipment, qualified staff).

EU comments

A new point l) should be added as follows:

"l) the proposed duration of the project which should not normally exceed five years"

Justification

To ensure high level of animal welfare and facilitate a proper oversight, it is important for the projects to be limited in time. This will allow the latest techniques on the Three Rs and the best practisce to be implemented in a timely fashion and without unnecessary delay.

The oversight body has a critical responsibility in determining the acceptability of Project Proposals, taking account of the animal welfare implications, the advancement of knowledge and scientific merit, as well as the societal benefits, in a risk-based assessment of each project using live animals .

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Following approval of a Project Proposal, consideration should be given to implementing an oversight method to ensure that animal activities conform with those described in the approved Project Proposal. This process is often referred to as post approval monitoring. Such monitoring may be achieved through animal observations made during the conduct of routine husbandry procedures; observations made by the veterinary staff during their rounds; or by inspections by the local oversight committee, animal welfare officer, compliance/quality assurance officer or government inspector.

EU comments

The above paragraph should be amended as follows:

… or by inspections by the local oversight bodycommittee, which may be the local committee, animal welfare officer, compliance/quality assurance officer or government inspector."

Justification

For the reasons of ensuring compliance, high level of animal welfare and public accountability the oversight method has to be independent to those managing the projects or having vested interests on it.

It is important that the functions of the different types of committees and the tasks of the oversight are not predetermined by these guidelines. This should be decided at the time of implementation as the existing infrastructure in the respective country/area/region.

  • 2. 
    Facility inspection

There should be regular inspections of the facilities, at least annually. These inspections should include the following elements:

  • a) 
    the animals and their records, including cage labels;
  • b) 
    husbandry practices;
  • c) 
    maintenance, cleanliness and security of the facility;
  • d) 
    type and condition of caging and other equipment;
  • e) 
    environmental conditions of the animals at the cage and room level;
  • f) 
    procedure areas such as surgery; necropsy and animal research laboratories.
  • g) 
    support areas such as washing equipment; animal feed, bedding and drug storage locations. h) occupational health and safety concerns Principles of risk management should be followed when determining the frequency and nature of inspections.
  • 3. 
    Animal care and use programme review

The animal care and use programme reflects the policies and practices of the institution. It should include the functioning of the local oversight committee; training and competency of staff; veterinary care; husbandry and operational conditions, including emergency plans; sourcing and final disposition of animals ;

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"Following approval of a project proposal, consideration should be given to implementing an independent

(of those managing the projects) oversight method to ensure that animal activities conform…"

and occupational health and safety. The programme should be reviewed regularly and should be included in relevant regulations to empower the Competent A uthority to take appropriate action to ensure compliance.

EU comments

The above paragraph should be amended as follows:

“The animal care and use programme reflects the policies and practices of the institution in complying with regulations and relevant guidance. It should include consideration of the functioning of the local oversight committee; training and competency of staff; veterinary care; husbandry and operational conditions, including emergency plans; sourcing and final disposition of animals; and occupational health and safety. The programme should be reviewed regularly. and A requirement for the components of such a programme should be included in relevant regulations to empower the Competent Authority to take appropriate action to ensure compliance”

Justification

The revised text more clearly describes the purpose of the animal care and use programme, and how it should be incorporated into a regulatory system.

Article 7.X.4.

Assurance of Training and Competency

An essential component of the animal care and use programme is the assurance that the personnel working with the animals are appropriately trained and qualified to work with the species used and the procedures to be performed, including ethical considerations. A system (institutional, regional or national) to assure competency should be in place, which includes supervision during the training period. Continuing professional and paraprofessional educational opportunities should be made available to relevant staff. Senior management, given their overarching responsibility for the animal care and use programme, should be knowledgeable about related issues.

EU comments

The following sentences should be modified as follows:

" An essential component of the animal care and use programme is the assurance that the personnel working with the animals are appropriately trained and qualified competent to work with the species used and the procedures to be performed, including ethical considerations. A system (institutional, regional or national) to assure competency should be in place, which includes supervision during the training period until competence has been demonstrated."

…“Senior management, given their overarching responsibility for the animal care and use programme, should be knowledgeable about issues related issues to the competence of staff.”

Justification

The competence of the persons dealing with animals plays one of the highest roles in ensuring good animal welfare. Therefore it is appropriate to continue supervision until the competence is demonstrated.

The final sentence is difficult to understand. We believe the revision reflects what is intended.

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  • 1) 
    Scientific staff. Researchers using animals have a direct ethical and legal responsibility for all matters relating to the welfare of the animals in their care. Due to the specialised nature of animal research, focused training should be undertaken to supplement educational and experiential backgrounds of scientists (including visiting scientists) before initiating a study. Focused training may include such topics as the national and/or local regulatory framework and institutional policies. The laboratory animal veterinarian is often a resource for this and other training. Scientific staff should have demonstrated competency in procedures related to their research (e.g. surgery, anaesthesia, sampling and administration, etc.).
  • 2) 
    Veterinarians. It is important that veterinarians working in an animal research environment have veterinary medical knowledge and experience in the species used, including normal behaviour, and they should understand research methodology. Relevant approvals issued by the V eterina ry sta tutory body and appropriate national or regional schemes (where these exist) should be adopted as the reference for veterinary training.

EU comment

The first sentence should finish "at species used" and the paragraph amended with a new sentence as follows:

"Veterinarians. It is important that veterinarians working in an animal research environment have veterinary medical knowledge and experience in the species used., including normal behaviour, and they should understand research methodology . Furthermore, they should be educated and experienced in normal behaviour, behavioural needs, stress responses and adaptability as well as research methodologies."

Justification

It is important that the veterinarians have also acquired the necessary experience to allow competent analysis and detection of changes in normal behaviour and recognition of early signs of stress.

  • 3) 
    Animal Care Staff. Animal care staff should receive training that is consistent with the scope of their work responsibilities and have demonstrated competency in the performance of these tasks.
  • 4) 
    Students. Students should learn scientific and ethical principles using nonanimal methods (videos, computer models, etc) when such methods can effectively reduce or replace the use of animals and still meet learning objectives. Wherever it is necessary for students to participate in classroom or research activities involving animals , they should receive appropriate supervision in the use of animals until such time that they have demonstrated competency in the related procedure(s).

EU comment

In the last sentence of the paragraph above, the word "live" should be included before "animal" (when mentioned for the first time). The sentence would read:

"Students should learn scientific and ethical principles using non-animal methods (videos, computer models, etc) when such methods can effectively reduce or replace the use of live animals and still meet learning objectives. Wherever it is necessary for students to participate in classroom or research activities involving live animals, they should receive appropriate supervision in the use of animals until such time that they have demonstrated competency in the related procedure(s).

Justification

In the area of education and training the choice is often between live and dead animals and in this context it is important to emphasise that the text refers specifically to the use of live animals and their replacement.

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  • 5) 
    Members of the local oversight committee or others involved with oversight. Continuing education about the use of animals in research and education, including associated ethics, regulatory requirements and their institutional responsibility, should be provided.

EU comments

The point 5) above should be amended as follows:

Members of the local oversight committee or others involved with oversight, including ethical review. Continuing education about the use of animals in research and education, including associated ethics, regulatory requirements and their institutional responsibility, should be provided.”

Justification

There should be no presumption as to the type of oversight body and the tasks of the oversight. This is a matter for implementation.

Occupational health and safety training for research animal related risks should be provided as part of the assurance of training and competency for personnel. This might include consideration of human infectious diseases which may infect research animals and thus compromise research results, as well as possible zoonoses. Personnel should understand that there are t wo categories of hazards, those that are intrinsic to working in an animal facility and those associated with the research. Specific training may be required for particular species, for specific procedures, and for the use of appropriate protective measures for personnel who may be exposed to animal allergens. Research materials, such as chemicals of unknown toxicity, biological agents and radiation sources, may present special hazards

Article 7.X.5.

Provision of Veterinary Care

Adequate veterinary care includes responsibility for promoting an a nimal 's welfa re before, during and after research procedures and providing advice and guidance based on best practice. Veterinary care includes attention to the physical and behavioural status of the animal . The veterinarian must have authority and responsibility for making judgements concerning animal welfare . Veterinary advice should be available at all times.

EU comments

The last sentence above should be amended as follows:

"Veterinary advice, or advice from a suitably-qualified expert where more appropriate, should be available at all times.

Justification

A veterinarian may not always be the most appropriate or best qualified person in cases of unusual species such as reptiles.

  • 1) 
    Clinical Responsibilities. Preventive medicine programmes that include vaccinations, ectoparasite and endoparasite treatments and other disease control measures should be initiated according to currently

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acceptable veterinary medical practices appropriate to the particular animal species and source. Disease surveillance is a major responsibility of the veterinarian and should include routine monitoring of colony animals for the presence of parasitic, bacterial and viral agents that may cause overt or sub clinical diseases . The veterinarian must have the authority to use appropriate treatment or control measures, including euthanasia if indicated, and access to appropriate resources, following diagnosis of an animal disease or injury. Where possible, the veterinarian should discuss the situation with the scientist to determine a course of action consistent with experimental goals. Controlled drugs prescribed by the veterinary staff must be managed in accordance with applicable regulations.

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Annex XVII (contd)

  • 2) 
    Post mortem examinations. In the case of unexpected disease or deaths , the veterinarian should provide advice based on post mortem examination results. As part of health monitoring, a planned programme of post mortem examinations may be considered.
  • 3) 
    Veterinary Medical Records. Medical records, including post mortem records, are considered to be a key element of a programme of adequate veterinary care for animals used in research and education. Application of performance standards within the medical record programme allows the veterinarian to effectively employ professional judgment, ensuring that the animal receives the highest level of care available.

EU comments

The point 3) should be amended as follows:

Veterinary Medical Records. Veterinary mM edical records, including post mortem records, are considered to be a key element of a programme of adequate veterinary care for animals used in research and education. Application of performance standards within the veterinary medical record programme allows…”

Justification

It is confusing to refer to “medical records” when the meaning is “veterinary medical records”.

  • 4) 
    Advice on zoonotic risks and notifiable diseases. The use of some species of animals poses a significant risk of the transmission of zoonotic disease (e.g. some nonhuman primates). The veterinarian should be consulted to identify sources of animals that minimise these risks and to advise on measures that may be taken in the animal facility to minimize the risk of transmission (e.g. personal protective equipment, air pressure differentials in animal holding rooms, etc.). A nimals brought into the institution may carry diseases that require notification to government officials. It is important that the veterinarian be aware of, and complies with, these requirements.
  • 5) 
    Advice on surgery and postoperative care. A programme of adequate veterinary care includes input into the review and approval process of preoperative, surgical and postoperative procedures by an appropriately qualified veterinarian . A veterinarian 's inherent responsibility includes providing advice concerning preoperative procedures, aseptic surgical techniques, the competence of staff to perform surgery and the provision of postoperative care. Veterinary oversight should include the detection and resolution of emerging patterns of surgical and post procedural complications.
  • 6) 
    Advice on analgesia, anaesthesia and euthanasia. Adequate veterinary care includes providing advice on the proper use of anaesthetics, analgesics, and methods of euthanasia.
  • 7) 
    Advice on humane endpoints. Humane endpoints should be established prior to commencement of a study in consultation with the veterinarian who also plays an important role in ensuring that approved humane endpoints are followed during the course of the study. It is essential that the veterinarian have the authority to ensure euthanasia is carried out as required to relieve pain and distress unless the Project Proposal approval specifically does not permit such intervention on the basis of the scientific purpose and the ethical evaluation.

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Article 7.X.6. Source of animals

A nimals to be used for research should be of high quality to ensure the validity of the data.

  • 1) 
    Animal procurement. A nimals must be acquired legally. It is preferable that animals are purchased from recognised sources producing or securing high quality animals .

Purpose bred animals should be used whenever these are available and animals that are not bred for the intended use should be avoided unless scientifically justified or the only available source. In the case of farm animals , non traditional breeds and species, and animals captured in the wild, non purpose bred animals are often used to achieve specific study goals. The use of wild caught nonhuman primates is generally discouraged.

EU comments

The EU wishes to reiterate its previous comment, however replacing a partial obligation by recognition of an ultimate objective.

The following sentence should be added at the end of the paragraph above:

"The use of wild caught nonhuman primates is generally discouraged. Only purpose-bred animals should be used in line with the ultimate goal of shifting towards the use of second or higher generation purpose bred (F2+) animals.

Justification

For scientific, animal welfare and biodiversity reasons, the non-human primates used in experiments should be of second or higher generation, well characterised, purpose bred animals. Attempts should be made to move towards this goal and breeding strategies should be put in place to further this aim.

  • 2) 
    Documentation. Relevant documentation related to the source of the animals , including health and other veterinary certification, breeding records, genetic status and animal identification, should accompany the a ni mals .

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  • 3) 
    Animal health status. The health status of animals can have a significant impact on scientific outcomes. There also may be occupational health and safety concerns related to animal health status. A nimals should have appropriate health profiles for their intended use. The health status of animals should be known before initiating research.
  • 4) 
    Genetically defined animals. A known genetic profile of the animals used in a study can reduce variability in the experimental data resulting from genetic drift and increase the reproducibility of the results. Genetically defined animals are used to answer specific research questions and are the product of sophisticated and controlled breeding schemes which must be validated by periodic genetic monitoring, typically using biochemical or immunological markers. Detailed and accurate documentation of the colony breeding records must be maintained
  • 5) 
    Genetically altered or cloned animals. If genetically altered or cloned animals are used, such use should be conducted in accordance with relevant regulatory guidance. With such animals , as well as harmful mutant lines arising from spontaneous mutations, consideration should be given to addressing and monitoring special husbandry and welfare needs associated with abnormal phenotypes. Records should be kept of biocontainment requirements, genetic information, and individual identification, and be communicated by the animal provider to the recipient. Archiving and sharing of genetically altered lines is recommended to facilitate the sourcing of these customised animals .
  • 6) 
    Animals captured in the wild. If wild animals are to be used, the capture technique should be humane and give due regard to human and animal health and safety. Field studies have the potential to cause disturbance to the habitat thus adversely affecting both target and non-target species. The potential for such disturbance should be assessed and minimised. The effects of a series of stressors, such as trapping, handling, transportation, sedation, anaesthesia, marking and sampling, can be cumulative, and may produce severe, possibly fatal, consequences. An assessment of the potential sources of stress and management plans to eliminate or minimise distress should form part of the Project Proposal.
  • 7) 
    Endangered species. Endangered species should only be used in exceptional circumstances where there is strong scientific justification that the desired outcomes cannot be achieved using any other species.
  • 8) 
    Transport, importation and exportation. A nimals should be transported under conditions that are appropriate to their physiological and behavioural needs and pathogen status, with care to ensure appropriate physical containment of the animals as well as exclusion of contaminants. The amount of time animals spend on a journey should be kept to a minimum. It is important to ensure that relevant documentation accompanies animals during transport to avoid unnecessary delays during the journey from the sender to the receiving institution.
  • 9) 
    Risks to biosecurity. To reduce risks to biosecurity related to animals , the pathogen status of animals should be confirmed and appropriate biocontainment and bioexclusion measures should be practised. Biosecurity risks to animals arising from exposure to humans should also be addressed.

Article 7.X.7.

Physical Facility and Environmental Conditions

A well-planned, well-designed, well-constructed, and properly maintained facility should include animal holding rooms as well as areas for support services such as for procedures, surgery and necropsy, cage washing and appropriate storage. An animal facility should be designed and constructed in accordance with all applicable building standards. The design and size of an animal facility depend on the scope of institutional research activities, the animals to be housed, the physical relationship to the rest of the institution, and the geographic location. For indoor housing, non-porous, non-toxic and durable materials should be used which can be easily cleaned and sanitised. A nimals should normally be housed in facilities designed for that purpose. Security measures (e.g. locks, fences, cameras, etc.) should be in place to protect the animals and prevent their escape. For many species (e.g. rodents), environmental conditions should be controllable to minimise physiological changes which may be potentially confounding scientific variables and of welfare concern.

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Important environmental parameters to consider include ventilation, temperature and humidity, lighting and noise:

  • 1) 
    Ventilation. The volume and physical characteristics of the air supplied to a room and its diffusion pattern influence the ventilation of an animal 's primary enclosure and are thus important determinants of its microenvironment. Factors to consider when determining the air exchange rate include range of possible heat loads; the species, size, and number of animals involved; the type of bedding or frequency of cage changing; the room dimensions; and the efficiency of air distribution from the secondary to the primary enclosure. Control of air pressure differentials is an important tool for biocontainment and bioexclusion.
  • 2) 
    Temperature and humidity. Environmental temperature is a physical factor which has a profound effect on the welfare of animals . Typically, animal room temperature should be monitored and controlled. The range of daily fluctuations should be kept to a minimum to avoid repeated large demands on the animals ’ metabolic and behavioural processes to compensate for changes in the thermal environment. Relative humidity may also be controlled, but not nearly as narrowly as temperature.

EU comments

The final two sentences in 2) should be amended as follows:

“The range of daily fluctuations should be kept to a minimum appropriately limited to avoid repeated large demands on the animals’ metabolic and behavioural processes to compensate for large changes in the thermal environment as well as to promote reproducible and valid scientific data. Relative humidity may also be controlled where appropriate for the species., but not nearly as narrowly as temperature .”

Justification

Performance criteria rather than engineering standards should be applied to deciding what is appropriate for temperature and humidity control. Furthermore, the significant impact on carbon footprint of excessive control is not justifiable.

  • 3) 
    Lighting. Light can affect the physiology, morphology and behaviour of various animals . In general, lighting should be diffused throughout an animal holding area and provide appropriate illumination for the welfare of the animals while facilitating good husbandry practices, adequate inspection of animals and safe working conditions for personnel. It may also be necessary to control the light/dark cycle.
  • 4) 
    Noise. Separation of human and animal areas minimises disturbance to animal occupants of the facility. Noisy animals , such as dogs, pigs, goats, and nonhuman primates, should be housed away from quieter animals , such as rodents, rabbits, and cats. Consideration should be given to insulating holding rooms and procedure rooms to mitigate the effects of noise sources. Many species are sensitive to high frequency sounds and thus the location of potential sources of ultrasound should be considered.

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EU comments

The second sentence in 4) should be amended as follows:

“Noisy animals, such as dogs, pigs, goats, and nonhuman primates, should be housed in a manner which ensures they do not adversely affect the welfare of away from quieter animals, such as rodents, rabbits, and cats.”

Justification

Performance criteria should be applied to deciding what is appropriate for adjacent housing.

Article 7.X.8.

Husbandry

Good husbandry practices enhance the health and welfare of the animals used and contribute to the scientific validity of animal research. Animal care and accommodation should, as a minimum, demonstrably conform to relevant published animal care, accommodation and husbandry guidelines and regulations.

The housing environment and husbandry practices should take into consideration the normal behaviour of the species, including their social behaviour and age of the animal , and should minimise stress to the animal . During the conduct of husbandry procedures, personnel should be keenly aware of their potential impact on the animalswelfare .

  • 1) 
    Transportation. Transportation is a typically stressful experience for animals should be transported. Every precaution should be taken to avoid unnecessary stress through inadequate ventilation, exposure to extreme temperatures, lack of feed and water, long delays, etc. Consignments of animals should be accepted into the facility without avoidable delay and, after inspection, should be transferred to clean cages or pens and be supplied with feed and water as appropriate.
 

EU comment

     

The first sentence of the paragraph

above should end after "stressful

experience

for animals".

Justification

     

The sentence was unclear.

     
  • 2) 
    Acclimatisation. Newly received animals should be given a period for physiological and behavioural stabilisation before their use. The length of time for stabilisation will depend on the type and duration of transportation, the age and species involved, place of origin, and the intended use of the animals . Facilities should be available to isolate animals showing signs of ill health.
  • 3) 
    Cages and pens. Cages and pens should be made out of material that can be readily cleaned and decontaminated. Their design should be such that the animals are unlikely to injure themselves. Space allocations should be reviewed and modified as necessary to address individual housing situations and animal needs (for example, for prenatal and postnatal care, obese animals , and group or individual housing). Whenever it is appropriate, social animals should be housed in pairs or groups, rather than individually, provided that such housing is not contraindicated by the protocol in question and does not pose an undue risk to the animals .

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  • 4) 
    Enrichment.. A nimals should be housed with a goal of maximising species specific behaviours and avoiding or minimising stress induced behaviours. One way to achieve this is to enrich the structural and social environment of the research animals and to provide opportunities for physical and cognitive activity. Such provision should not compromise the health and safety of the animals or people, nor significantly interfere with the scientific goals.
  • 5) 
    Feeding. Provision should be made for each animal to have access to feed to satisfy its physiological needs. Precautions should be taken in packing, transporting and storing feed to avoid chemical, physical and microbiological contamination, deterioration or destruction. Utensils used for feeding should be regularly cleaned and, if necessary, sterilised.
  • 6) 
    Water. Uncontaminated potable drinking water should normally be available at all times. Watering devices, such as drinking tubes and automatic watering systems, should be checked daily to ensure their proper maintenance, cleanliness, and operation.
  • 7) 
    Bedding. Animal bedding is a controllable environmental factor that can influence experimental data and animal welfare . Bedding should be dry, absorbent, non-dusty, non-toxic and free from infectious agents, vermin or chemical contamination. Soiled bedding should be removed and replaced with fresh material as often as is necessary to keep the animals clean and dry.
  • 8) 
    Hygiene. The successful operation of a facility depends very much on good hygiene. Special care should be taken to avoid spreading infection between animals through fomites, including through personnel traffic between animal rooms. Adequate routines and facilities for the cleaning, washing, decontamination and, when necessary, sterilisation of cages, cage accessories and other equipment should be established. A very high standard of cleanliness and organisation should also be maintained throughout the facility.
  • 9) 
    Identification. Animal identification is an important component of record keeping. A nimals may be identified individually or by group. Where it is desirable to individually identify animals , this should be done by a reliable and the least painful method.

EU comments

An additional point 10 should be added as follows:

"10) Handling. Staff dealing with animals should have a caring and respectful attitude towards the animals and to be competent in the handling and restraint. Familiarising animals to handling during routine husbandry and procedures reduces stress both to animals and personnel. For some species, for example dogs and non-human primates, a training programme to encourage cooperation during procedures can be beneficial to the animals, the animal care staff and the scientific programme. For certain species, social contact with humans should be a priority. However, in some cases handling should be avoided. This may be particularly the case with wild animals. Consideration should be given to setting up habituation and training programmes suitable for the animals, the procedures and length of projects.

Justification

The role of competence of personnel and proper handling of animals cannot be underestimated in ensuring high quality animal welfare. Handling encompasses also familiarising animals to routine procedures as a way to reduce stress and anxiety. However, this should be appropriate to the species as well as the type and length of projects.

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Annex XVIII

CH AP TE R 8.1 ANTHRAX

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes, but wishes the OIE continue its work in order to answer Members' questions on the justification / feasibility of certain procedures.

However the EU would like to point out the health problems associated with use of formaldehyde and mB

Article 8.1.1.

General provisions

This chapter is intended to manage the human and animal health risks associated with the presence Bacillus anthracis in commodities and the environment.

There is no evidence that anthrax is transmitted by animals before the onset of clinical and pathological signs. Early detection of outbreak s , quarantine of affected premises, destruction of diseased animals and fomites, and implementation of appropriate sanitary procedures at abattoirs and dairy factories will ensure the safety of products of animal origin intended for human consumption.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period for anthrax shall be 20 days.

Anthrax should be notifiable in the whole country.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed below.

Article 8.1.1.bis

Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any anthrax related conditions:

  • a) 
    semen and in vivo derived cattle embryos collected and handled in accordance with Chapters 4.5.,4.6., and 4.7., as relevant.

EU comments

The EU proposes that "a)" above is deleted as there is no b), and that the words "of clinically healthy animals" are added after "semen".

In vivo derived embryos should not be a safe commodity as this does not reflect the requirements for collection from healthy animals in Chapter 4.6

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Article 8.1.2.

Recommendations for the importation of ruminants, equines and pigs

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of anthrax on the day of shipment; AND
  • 2. 
    were kept for the 20 days prior to shipment in an establishment where no case of anthrax was officially declared during that period; or
  • 3. 
    were vaccinated, not less than 20 days and not more than 6 months prior to shipment in accordance with the T errestrial Manual .

Article 8.1.3. for the importation of products of animal origin (from ruminants, equines and pigs)

intended for agricultural or industrial use

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

1.     originate from animals not showing clinical signs of anthrax; or

2.     have been processed to ensure the destruction of both bacillary and spore forms of Bacillus anthracis , in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study).

Article 8.1.4.

Recommendations for the importation of fresh meat and meat products destined for human consumption

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products originate from animals which:

  • 1. 
    have shown no sign of anthrax during ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections; and
  • 2. 
    were not immunised against anthrax using live vaccine during the 21 days prior to slaughter ; and

EU comments

In order to be consistent with some other chapters, the word "immunised" should be replaced by "vaccinated.

And after the words 21 days" should be added "or more depending on the manufacturer recommendations".

23. come from establishments which are not placed under quarantine on account of anthrax control and in which:

a)     there has been no case of anthrax during the 20 days prior to slaughter ;

b)     no vaccination against anthrax has been carried out during the 42 days prior to slaughter .

Article 8.1.5.

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Recommendations for the importation of hides, skins and hair (from ruminants, equines and pigs)

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products originate from animals which:

  • 1. 
    have shown no sign of anthrax during ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections; and
  • 2. 
    come from establishments which are not placed under quarantine on account of anthrax control.

Article 8.1.6. Recommendations for the importation of wool

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

1. originate from animals showing no clinical signs of anthrax at the time of shearing;

21. originate from establishments where no case of anthrax has been reported since the previous shearing of all animals;

OR

32. have been treated in accordance with the recommendations in Article 8.1.11.

Article 8.1.7.

Recommendations for the importation of milk and milk products intended for human consumption

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    originate from animals showing no clinical signs of anthrax at the time of milking; or
  • 2. 
    were processed using a heat treatment of 120 °C for 106 seconds at least equivalent to pasteurisation (under study).

Reference

Sa X u, Theodore P. Labuza, and Francisco Diez-Gonzalez (2006). Thermal Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis Spores in Cow’s Milk. Applied and Environmental Microbiology, June 2006, Vol. 72, No. 6: p. 4479–4483.

Article 8.1.8. Recommendations for the importation of bristles (from pigs)

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products originate from animals which:

1.     have shown no sign of anthrax during ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections; and

2.     come from establishments which are not placed under quarantine on account of anthrax control; OR

3.     have been processed to ensure the destruction of B. anthracis by: a) boiling for 60 minutes; and

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EU comments:

The EU proposes to add "at least at 100 degrees C" for clarity.

b)     drying in hot air.

c)     immersion for 24 hours in a 2% solution of formaldehyde at >20 °C.

References

  • • 
    Böhm, Reinhard. Institut fur Umwelt-und Tierhygiene Sowie Tiermedizin mit Tierklinik, Universität Hohenheim. Personal communication to Dr Wolf-Arno Valder, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission.
  • • 
    Spotts Whitney, EA, Beatty, ME , Taylor, TH, Weyant, R, Sobel, J, Arduino, MJ, Ashford, DA. (2003) Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis spores. E merging I nfectious Disease s 9(6): 623-627.

Article 8.1.9.

for importation of Procedures for the inactivation of B. anthrac is spores in skins and

trophies from wild animals

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these products have been processed to ensure the destruction of B. anthracis by one of the following methods:

In situations in which skins and trophies from wild animals may be contaminated with B. anthracis spores, the following disinfection procedure is recommended:

1.     fumigation with ethylene oxide 500 mg/L, at relative humidity 20-40%, at 55 °C for 30 minutes; or

2.     fumigation with formaldehyde 400 mg/m3, at relative humidity 30%, at >15 °C for 4 hours; or

3.     fumigation with methylene bromide 3.4-3.9 g/L, in the presence of moisture, at room temperature for 24 hours; or

EU comments

The EU wishes to point out that there are environmental and harmful effects concerning the use of both methylene bromide and formaldehyde (which also the WHO has ruled is a dangerous compound). Methylene bromide is not allowed in the EU. Could the OIE look at other possible methods or give advice on the use of these substances.

This comment is valid for the articles 11, 14 and 15.

4. gamma irradiation with a dose of 40 kGy.

References

  • • 
    Böhm, Reinhard. Institut fur Umwelt-und Tierhygiene Sowie Tiermedizin mit Tierklinik, Universität Hohenheim. Personal communication to Dr Wolf-Arno Valder, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission.

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  • • 
    Turnbull P., Cosivi O. (2008) Anthrax in humans and animals, 4th Edition, WHO/FAO/OIE
  • • 
    Spotts Whitney, EA, Beatty, ME , Taylor, TH, Weyant, R, Sobel, J, Arduino, MJ, Ashford, DA. (2003) Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis spores. E merging I nfectious Disease s 9(6): 623-627.

Article 8.1.10.

Procedures for the inactivation of B. anthrac is spores in bone-meal and meat-and-bone meal

The following procedure should be used to inactivate any B. anthracis spores which may be present during the production of bone-meal or meat-and-bone meal from ruminants, equines and pigs:

1.     the raw material should be reduced to a maximum particle size of 50 mm before heating; and

2.     the raw material should be heated under saturated steam conditions to a temperature of not less than 133°C for a minimum of 20 minutes at an absolute pressure of 3 bar.

References

  • • 
    Böhm, Reinhard. Institut fur Umwelt-und Tierhygiene Sowie Tiermedizin mit Tierklinik, Universität Hohenheim. Personal communication to Dr Wolf-Arno Valder, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission.
  • • 
    Turnbull P., Cosivi O. (2008) Anthrax in humans and animals, 4th Edition, WHO/FAO/OIE

Article 8.1.11.

Procedures for the inactivation of B. anthrac is spores in wool and hair

In situations in which wool or hair may be contaminated with B. anthracis spores, the following five-step di si nf ecti on procedure is recommended:

1.     immersion in 0.25-0.3% soda liquor for 10 minutes at 450.5 °C;

2.     immersion in soap liquor for 10 minutes at 450.5 °C;

3.     immersion in 2% formaldehyde solution for 10 minutes at 450.5 °C;

4.     a second immersion in 2% formaldehyde solution for 10 minutes at 450.5 °C;

5.     rinsing on cold water followed by drying in hot air.

References

  • • 
    Böhm, Reinhard. Institut fur Umwelt-und Tierhygiene Sowie Tiermedizin mit Tierklinik, Universität Hohenheim. Personal communication to Dr Wolf-Arno Valder, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission.
  • • 
    Turnbull P., Cosivi O. (2008) Anthrax in humans and animals, 4th Edition, WHO/FAO/OIE

Article 8.1.12.

Procedures for the inactivation of B. anthrac is spores in manure, dung and bedding

In situations in which manure, dung or bedding may be contaminated with B. anthracis spores, the following are recommended:

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1.     small volumes by incineration; or

2.     chemothermal treatment by composting with quicklime as follows:

a)     mix the manure with granulated quicklime at a rate of 100 kg quicklime per m3 and spray with wa

b)     turn the material after 5 weeks;

c)     leave for a further 5 weeks.

Note: spontaneous combustion of the composting pile is possible.

References

  • • 
    Böhm, Reinhard. Institut fur Umwelt-und Tierhygiene Sowie Tiermedizin mit Tierklinik, Universität Hohenheim. Personal communication to Dr Wolf-Arno Valder, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission.

Article 8.1.13.

Procedures for the inactivation of B. anthrac is spores in liquid manure (slurry)

In situations in which liquid manure (slurry) may be contaminated with B. anthracis spores, the following is recommended:

1. disinfection with formalin (35% aqueous solution of formaldehyde) with stirring one hour stirring daily;

a)     for slurry up to 5% dry matter, 50 kg formalin per m3 for 4 days;

b)     for slurry >5% and <10% dry matter, 100 kg formalin per m3 for 4 days.

References

  • • 
    Böhm Reinhard. Institut fur Umwelt-und Tierhygiene Sowie Tiermedizin mit Tierklinik, Universität Hohenheim. Personal communication to Dr Wolf-Arno Valder, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission.
  • • 
    Turnbull P., Cosivi O. (2008) Anthrax in humans and animals, 4th Edition, WHO/FAO/OIE

Article 8.1.14.

Procedures for the disinfection of surfaces in animal houses, buildings contaminated with B. anth rac is

In situations in which surfaces in animal houses, stables, vehicles , etc. may be contaminated with B. anthracis spores, the following three-step approach is recommended:

1. a preliminary disinfection should be carried out using one of the following disinfectants at a rate of 1-1.5 L/m3 for 2 hours;

a)     10% formaldehyde (approximately 30% formalin); or

b)     4% glutaraldehyde (pH 8.0-8.5);

2. all surfaces should be washed and scrubbed using ample hot water and, when cleaned and waste water is free from dirt particles, dried;

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3. a final disinfection step should be carried out using one of the following disinfectants applied at a rate of 0.4 L/m3 for 2 hours;

a)     10% formaldehyde (approximately 30% formalin), repeated after one hour; or

b)     4% glutaraldehyde (pH 8.0-8.5), repeated after one hour; or

c)     3% hydrogen peroxide; or

d)     1% peracetic acid, repeated after one hour.

Note: Formaldehyde and glutaraldehyde should not be used at temperatures below 10 °C. Hydrogen peroxide and peracetic acid are not suitable in the presence of blood.

References

  • • 
    Turnbull P., Cosivi O. (2008) Anthrax in humans and animals, 4th Edition, WHO/FAO/OIE
  • • 
    Spotts Whitney, EA, Beatty, ME , Taylor, TH, Weyant, R, Sobel, J, Arduino, MJ, Ashford, DA. (2003) Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis spores. E merging I nfectious Disease s 9(6): 623-627.

Article 8.1.15.

Procedures for the fumigation of rooms contaminated with B. anthrac is

Contaminated rooms which cannot be cleared before cleaning and disinfection can be fumigated to eliminate B. anthracis spores. The following procedure is recommended:

1.     all windows, doors and vents to the outside should be sealed with heavy adhesive tape; and

2.     for rooms up to 30 m3, 4 L of water containing 400 ml of concentrated formalin (37% w/v formaldehyde) in an electric kettle (with a timing switch to turn it off) should be boiled away and the room left overnight. Room temperature should be >15 °C.

Note: Formaldehyde fumigation is hazardous and proper respirators should be on hand for operator safety. The effectiveness of the fumigation process should be verified by exposing dried discs of filter paper which have been dipped in a suspension of spores of B. subtilis var globigii or B. cereus or Sterne vaccine strain of B. anthracis and placed in the room before fumigation is started. At the end of fumigation, the discs should be placed on nutrient agar plates containing 0.1% histidine and incubated overnight at 37 °C. If fumigation has been effective, there will be no bacterial growth.

References

  • • 
    Turnbull P., Cosivi O. (2008) Anthrax in humans and animals, 4th Edition, WHO/FAO/OIE

EU comments

The EU proposes that the above 2 Articles are deleted as they do not relate to trade and are purely advice on control \ methods.

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text deleted

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Annex XIX

CH AP TE R 8.3. BLUETONGUE

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes, but in the absence of data regarding in vivo derived embryos being at risk of transmitting BVT-8 if treated in accordance with the IETS Manual, it is suggested to delete the words "except for BTV8 (under study)", and has some other comments.

Article 8.3.1. General provisions

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the infective period for bluetongue virus (BTV) shall be 60 days.

Historically, tThe global BTV distribution is has been confined currently between the latitudes of approximately 53°N and north of 34°S with a recent extension in Northern Europe.

In the absence of clinical disease in a country or zone within this part of the world, its BTV status should be determined by an ongoing surveillance programme (in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21.). The programme may need to be adapted to target parts of the country or zone at a higher risk due to historical, geographical and climatic factors, ruminant population data and Culicoides ecology, or proximity to enzootic or incursional zones as described in Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21.

All countries or zones adjacent to a country or zone not having free status should be subjected to similar surveillance . The surveillance should be carried out over a distance of at least 100 kilometres from the border with that country or zone , but a lesser distance could be acceptable if there are relevant ecological or geographical features likely to interrupt the transmission of BTV or a bluetongue surveillance programme (in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21.) in the country or zone not having free status supports a lesser distance.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the BTV status of the ruminant population of the exportin g country or z one .

Article 8.3.2.

Trade in Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any BTV related conditions regardless of the BTV status of the ruminant population of the ex porting country or zone :

  • 1. 
    milk and milk products ;
  • 2. 
    meat and meat products ;
  • 3. 
    hides and skins;
  • 4. 
    wool and fiber;

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EU comment

The EU proposes that the word "fiber" is replaced by "fibre" to correct the English spelling.

  • 5. 
    in vivo derived bovine embryos and oocytes collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7., except for BTV8 (under study)

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the BTV status of the ruminant population of the exportin g country or z one .

Article 8.3.3.

BTV free country or zone

  • 1. 
    A country or a zone may be considered free from BTV when bluetongue is notifiable in the whole country and either:
  • a. 
    the country or zone lies wholly north of 53°N or south of 34°S, and is not adjacent to a country or zone not having a free status; or

EU comments

The EU proposes that the whole sentence a) above is deleted as it has said before as these zones are now superfluous and the epidemiology of the disease does not any more allow such an assertion.

  • b. 
    a surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21. has demonstrated no evidence of BTV in the country or zone during the past 2 years; or
  • c. 
    a surveillance programme has demonstrated no evidence of Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors in the country or zone .

EU comments:

All culicoides can be vectors so the EU proposes to delete "likely to be competent", in coherence with the point 2 below.

  • 2. 
    A BTV free country or zone in which ongoing vector surveillance , performed according to point 5 of Article 8.3.19., has found no evidence that of Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors are present will not lose its free status through the importation of vaccinated, seropositive or infective animals, or semen or embryos/ova from infected countries or infected z ones .

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  • 3. 
    A BTV free country or zone in which surveillance has found evidence that Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors are present will not lose its free status through the importation of vaccinated or seropositive animals from infected countries or infected z ones , provided:
  • a. 
    the animals have been vaccinated, at least 60 days prior to dispatch, in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual with a vaccine which covers all serotypes whose presence has been demonstrated in the source population through a surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21., and the animals are identified in the accompanying certification as having been vaccinated; or
  • b. 
    the animals are not vaccinated and a surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21. has been in place in the source population for a period of, at least 60 days immediately prior to dispatch, and no evidence of BTV transmission has been detected are demonstrated to have specific antibodies against the bluetongue virus serotypes whose presence has been demonstrated in the ex porting country or zone .
  • 4. 
    A BTV free country or zone adjacent to an infected country or infected zone should include a zone as described in Article 8.3.1. in which surveillance is conducted in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21. Animals within this zone must be subjected to continuing surveillance . The boundaries of this zone must be clearly defined, and must take account of geographical and epidemiological factors that are relevant to BTV transmission.

Article 8.3.4.

BTV seasonally free zone

A BTV seasonally free zone is a part of an infected country or an infected zone for which for part of a year, surveillance demonstrates no evidence either of BTV transmission or of adult Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors.

For the application of Articles 8.3.7., 8.3.10. and 8.3.13., the seasonally free period is taken to commence the day following the last evidence of BTV transmission (as demonstrated by the surveillance programme), and of the cessation of activity of adult Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors.

For the application of Articles 8.3.7., 8.3.10. and 8.3.13., the seasonally free period is taken to conclude either:

  • 1. 
    at least 28 days before the earliest date that historical data show bluetongue virus activity has recommenced; or
  • 2. 
    immediately if current climatic data or data from a surveillance programme indicate an earlier resurgence of activity of adult Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors.

A BTV seasonally free zone in which surveillance has found no evidence that Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors are present will not lose its free status through the importation of vaccinated, seropositive or infective animals, or semen or embryos/ova from infected countries or infected zones .

Article 8.3.5.

BTV infected country or zone

A BTV infected country or infected zone is a clearly defined area where evidence of BTV has been reported during the past 2 years.

Article 8.3.6. Recommendations for importation from BTV free countries or zones

for ruminants and other BTV susceptible herbivores

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V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the animals were kept in a BTV free country or zone since birth or for at least 60 days prior to shipment; or
  • 2. 
    the animals were kept in a BTV free country or zone for at least 28 days, then were subjected, with negative results, to a serological test to detect antibody to the BTV group according to the Terrestrial Manual and remained in the BTV free country or zone until shipment; or
  • 3. 
    the animals were kept in a BTV free country or zone for at least 7 days, then were subjected, with negative results, to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual , and remained in the BTV free country or zone until shipment; or
  • 4. 
    the animals:
  • a. 
    were kept in a BTV free country or zone for at least 7 days;
  • b. 
    were vaccinated, at least 60 days before the introduction into the free country or zone , in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual against all serotypes whose presence has been demonstrated in the source population through a surveillance programme as described in Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21.;
  • c. 
    were identified as having been vaccinated; and
  • d. 
    remained in the BTV free country or zone until shipment; AND
  • 5. 
    if the animals were exported from a free zone , either:
  • a. 
    did not transit through an infected zone during transportation to the place of shipment ; or
  • b. 
    were protected from attack from Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors at all times when transiting through an infected z one ; or
  • c. 
    had been vaccinated in accordance with point 4 above.

Article 8.3.7. Recommendations for importation from BTV seasonally free zones

for ruminants and other BTV susceptible herbivores

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    were kept during the seasonally free period in a BTV seasonally free zone since birth or for at least 60 days prior to shipment; or
  • 2. 
    were kept during the BTV seasonally free period in a BTV seasonally free zone for at least 28 days prior to shipment, and were subjected during the residence period in the zone to a serological test to detect antibody to the BTV group according to the Terrestrial Manual , with negative results, carried out at least 28 days after the commencement of the residence period; or
  • 3. 
    were kept during the BTV seasonally free period in a BTV seasonally free zone for at least 14 days prior to shipment, and were subjected during the residence period in the zone to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual , with negative results, carried out at least 14 days after the commencement of the residence period; or
  • 4. 
    were kept during the seasonally free period in a BTV seasonally free zone and were vaccinated, at least 60 days before the introduction into the free country or zone , in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual against all serotypes whose presence has been demonstrated in the source population through a surveillance programme

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in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21. and were identified as having been vaccinated and remained in the BTV free country or zone until shipment;

AND

  • 5. 
    if the animals were exported from a free zone , either:
  • a. 
    did not transit through an infected zone during transportation to the place of shipment ; or
  • b. 
    were protected from attack from Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors at all times when transiting through an infected z one ; or
  • c. 
    were vaccinated in accordance with point 4 above.

Article 8.3.8. Recommendations for importation from BTV infected countries or zones

for ruminants and other BTV susceptible herbivores

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    were protected from attack from Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors in an insect proof establishment for at least 60 days prior to shipment and during transportation to the place of shipment ; or
  • 2. 
    were protected from attack from Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors in an insect proof establishment for at least 28 days prior to shipment and during transportation to the place of shipment , and were subjected during that period to a serological test according to the Terrestrial Manual to detect antibody to the BTV group, with negative results, carried out at least 28 days after introduction into the quarantine station insect proof establishment ; or
  • 3. 
    were protected from attack from Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors in an insect proof establishment for at least 14 days prior to shipment and during transportation to the place of shipment , and were subjected during that period to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual , with negative results, carried out at least 14 days after introduction into the quarantine station insect proof establishment ; or
  • 4. 
    were vaccinated, at least 60 days before shipment, in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual against all serotypes whose presence has been demonstrated in the source population through a surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21., and were identified in the accompanying certification as having been vaccinated or,

5.    if animals demonstrated to have antibodies for at least 60 days prior to dispatch against all serotypes whose presence has been demonstrated in the source population through a surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21., have been protected from vectors for at least 60 days prior to shipment; or

5. are not vaccinated, a surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21. has been in place in the source population for a period of at least 60 days immediately prior to shipment, and no evidence of BTV transmission has been detected and were protected from attack from Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors during transportation to the place of shipment .

Article 8.3.9. Recommendations for importation from BTV free countries or zones

for semen of ruminants and other BTV susceptible herbivores

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V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a. 
    were kept in a BTV free country or zone for at least 60 days before commencement of, and during, collection of the semen; or
  • b. 
    were subjected to a serological test according to the Terrestrial Manual to detect antibody to the BTV group, between 21 and 60 days after the last collection for this consignment, with negative results; or
  • c. 
    were subjected to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual on blood samples collected at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every 7 days (virus isolation test) or at least every 28 days (PCR test) during, semen collection for this consignment, with negative results;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 8.3.10. Recommendations for importation from BTV seasonally free zones

for semen of ruminants and other BTV susceptible herbivores

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a. 
    were kept during the BTV seasonally free period in a seasonally free zone for at least 60 days before commencement of, and during, collection of the semen; or
  • b. 
    were subjected to a serological test according to the Terrestrial Manual to detect antibody to the BTV group, with negative results, at least every 60 days throughout the collection period and between 21 and 60 days after the final collection for this consignment; or
  • c. 
    were subjected to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual on blood samples collected at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every 7 days (virus isolation test) or at least every 28 days (PCR test) during, semen collection for this consignment, with negative results;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 8.3.11. Recommendations for importation from BTV infected countries or zones

for semen of ruminants and other BTV susceptible herbivores

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that: 1. the donor animals:

  • a. 
    were protected from attack from Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors for at least 60 days before commencement of, and during, collection of the semen; or
  • b. 
    were subjected to a serological test according to the Terrestrial Manual to detect antibody to the BTV group, with negative results, at least every 60 days throughout the collection period and between 21 and 60 days after the final collection for this consignment; or

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  • c. 
    were subjected to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual on blood samples collected at commencement and conclusion of, and at least every 7 days (virus isolation test) or at least every 28 days (PCR test) during, semen collection for this consignment, with negative results;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 8.3.12.

Recommendations for importation from BTV free countries or zones

for in vivo derived embryos of ruminants (other than bovines) and other BTV susceptible herbivores and for in vitro produced bovine embryos

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females:
  • a. 
    were kept in a BTV free country or zone for at least the 60 days prior to, and at the time of, collection of the embryos; or
  • b. 
    were subjected to a serological test according to the Terrestrial Manual to detect antibody to the BTV group, between 21 and 60 days after collection, with negative results; or
  • c. 
    were subjected to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual on a blood sample taken on the day of collection, with negative results;
  • 2. 
    the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7.

Article 8.3.13.

Recommendations for importation from BTV seasonally free zones

for in vivo derived embryos/oocytes of ruminants (other than bovines) and other BTV susceptible herbivores and for in vitro produced bovine embryos

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females:
  • a. 
    were kept during the seasonally free period in a seasonally free zone for at least 60 days before commencement of, and during, collection of the embryos/oocytes; or
  • b. 
    were subjected to a serological test according to the Terrestrial Manual to detect antibody to the BTV group, between 21 and 60 days after collection, with negative results; or
  • c. 
    were subjected to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual on a blood sample taken on the day of collection, with negative results;
  • 2. 
    the embryos/oocytes were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7., Chapter4.8. and Chapter 4.9., as relevant.

Article 8.3.14.

Recommendations for importation from BTV infected countries or zones

for in vivo derived embryos/oocytes of ruminants (other than bovines) and other BTV susceptible herbivores and for in vitro produced bovine embryos

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V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females:
  • a. 
    were protected from attack from Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors for at least 60 days before commencement of, and during, collection of the embryos/oocytes; or
  • b. 
    were subjected to a serological test according to the Terrestrial Manual to detect antibody to the BTV group, between 21 and 60 days after collection, with negative results; or
  • c. 
    were subjected to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual on a blood sample taken on the day of collection, with negative results;
  • 2. 
    the embryos/oocytes were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7., Chapter4.8. and Chapter 4.9., as relevant.

Article 8.3.15.

Protecting animals from Culicoides attack

When transporting animals through BTV infected countries or infected zones , V eterinary A uthorities should require strategies to protect animals from attack from Culicoides likely to be competent BTV vectors during transport, taking into account the local ecology of the vector.

Potential risk management strategies include:

  • 1. 
    treating animals with insect repellents prior to and during transportation;
  • 2. 
    loading , transporting and unloading animals at times of low vector activity (i.e. bright sunshine, low temperature);
  • 3. 
    ensuring vehicles do not stop en route during dawn or dusk, or overnight, unless the animals are held behind insect proof netting;
  • 4. 
    darkening the interior of the vehicle , for example by covering the roof and/or sides of vehicles with shadecloth;
  • 5. 
    surveillance for vectors at common stopping and offloading points to gain information on seasonal variations;
  • 6. 
    using historical information , ongoing and/or BTV modelling information from appropriately verified and validated BTV epidemiological models to identify low risk ports and transport routes.

Article 8.3.16.

Surveillance: introduction

Articles 8.3.16. to 8.3.21. define the principles and provide a guide on the surveillance for BT complementary to Chapter 1.4., applicable to Members seeking to determine their BT status. This may be for the entire country or zone . Guidance for Members seeking free status following an outbreak and for the maintenance of BT status is also provided.

BT is a vector-borne infection transmitted by different species of Culicoides insects in a range of ecosystems. An important component of BT epidemiology is vectorial capacity which provides a measure of disease risk that incorporates vector competence, abundance, biting rates, survival rates and extrinsic incubation period . However, methods and tools for measuring some of these vector factors remain to be developed, particularly in a field context. Therefore, surveillance for BT should focus on transmission in domestic ruminants.

Susceptible wild ruminant populations should be included in surveilla nce when these animals are intended for trade.

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The impact and epidemiology of BT differ widely in different regions of the world and therefore it is impossible to provide specific recommendations for all situations. It is incumbent upon Members to provide scientific data that explain the epidemiology of BT in the region concerned and adapt the surveillance strategies for defining their infection status (free, seasonally free or infected country or zone ) to the local conditions. There is considerable latitude available to Members to justify their infection status at an acceptable level of confidence.

Surveillance for BT should be in the form of a continuing programme.

Article 8.3.17. Surveillance: case definition

For the purposes of surveillance , a case refers to an animal infected with BT virus (BTV).

For the purposes of international trade , a distinction must be made between a case as defined below and an animal that is potentially infectious to vectors. The conditions for trade are defined in Articles 8.3.1. to 8.3.15. of this chapter.

The purpose of surveillance is the detection of virus circulation in a country or zone and not determination of the status of an individual animal or herds . Surveillance deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by BTV, but also with the evidence of infection with BTV in the absence of clinical signs.

The following defines the occurrence of BTV infection:

  • 1. 
    BTV has been isolated and identified as such from an animal or a product derived from that animal, or
  • 2. 
    viral antigen or viral ribonucleic acid (RNA) specific to one or more of the serotypes of BTV has been identified in samples from one or more animals showing clinical signs consistent with BT, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case , or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with BTV, or
  • 3. 
    antibodies to structural or nonstructural proteins of BTV that are not a consequence of vaccination have been identified in one or more animals that either show clinical signs consistent with BT, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case , or give cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with BTV.

Article 8.3.18. Surveillance: general conditions and methods

  • 1. 
    A surveillance system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. should be under the responsibility of the V eterinary A uthority . In particular:
  • a. 
    a formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating outbreak s of disease should be in place;
  • b. 
    a procedure should be in place for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspect cases of BT to a laboratory for BT diagnosis as described in the Terrestrial Manual ;
  • c. 
    a system for recording, managing and analysing diagnostic and surveillance data should be in place.
  • 2. 
    The BT surveillance programme should:
  • a. 
    in a country/zone free or seasonally free, include an early warning system for reporting suspicious cases . Farmers and workers, who have day-to-day regular contact with domestic ruminants, as well as diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of BT to the V eterinary A uthority . They should be supported directly or indirectly (e.g. through private veterinarians or V eterinary para-professionals ) by government information programmes and the V eterinary A uthority . An effective surveillance system will periodically identify suspicious cases that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is BTV. The rate at which such suspicious cases are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. All suspected cases of BT

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should be investigated immediately and samples should be taken and submitted to a laboratory . This requires that sampling kits and other equipment are available for those responsible for surveillance ;

  • b. 
    conduct random or targeted serological and virological surveillance appropriate to the infection status of the country or zone .

Generally, the conditions to prevent exposure of susceptible animals to BTV infected vectors will be difficult to apply. However, under specific situations, in establishments such as a rtificial insemination centres or quarantine stations exposure to vectors may be preventable. The testing requirements for animals kept in these facilities are described in Articles 8.3.11. and 8.3.14.

Article 8.3.19.

Surveillance strategies

The target population for surveillance aimed at identification of disease and/or infection should cover susceptible domestic ruminants within the country or zone . Active and passive surveillance for BTV infection should be ongoing. Surveillance should be composed of random or targeted approaches using virological, serological and clinical methods appropriate for the infection status of the country or zone .

The strategy employed may be based on surveillance using randomised sampling that would demonstrate the absence of BTV infection at an acceptable level of confidence. The frequency of sampling should be dependent on the epidemiological situation. Random surveillance is conducted using serological tests described in the T errestrial Manual . Positive serological results may be followed up with virological methods as appropriate.

Targeted surveillance (e.g. based on the increased likelihood of infection in particular localities or species) may be an appropriate strategy. Virological and serological methods may be used concurrently to define the BTV status of targeted populations.

A Member should justify the surveillance strategy chosen as being adequate to detect the presence of BTV infection in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the prevailing epidemiological situation. It may, for example, be appropriate to target clinical surveillance at particular species likely to exhibit clinical signs (e.g. sheep). Similarly, virological and serological testing may be targeted to species that rarely show clinical signs (e.g. cattle).

In vaccinated populations, serological and virological surveillance is necessary to detect the BTV types circulating to ensure that all circulating types are included in the vaccination programme.

If a Member wishes to declare freedom from BTV infection in a specific zone , the design of the surveillance strategy would need to be aimed at the population within the zone .

For random surveys, the design of the sampling strategy will need to incorporate epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing will need to be large enough to detect evidence of infection if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size and expected prevalence determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The Member must justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of surveillance and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the design prevalence in particular needs to be based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Irrespective of the survey approach selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated for the vaccination/infection history and the different species in the target population.

Irrespective of the testing system employed, surveillance system design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There needs to be an effective procedure for following up positives to ultimately determine with a high level of confidence, whether they are indicative of infection or not. This should

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involve both supplementary tests and follow-up investigation to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling unit as well as those which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

The principles involved in surveillance for disease /infection are technically well defined. The design of surveillance programmes to prove the absence of BTV infection /circulation needs to be carefully followed to avoid producing results that are either insufficiently reliable to be accepted by international trading partners, or excessively costly and logistically complicated. The design of any surveillance programme, therefore, requires inputs from professionals competent and experienced in this field.

  • 1. 
    Clinical surveillance

Clinical surveillance aims at the detection of clinical signs of BT at the flock /herd level. Whereas significant emphasis is placed on the diagnostic value of mass serological screening, surveillance based on clinical inspection should not be underrated, particularly during a newly introduced infection . In sheep and occasionally goats, clinical signs may include oedema, hyperaemia of mucosal membranes, coronitis and cyanotic tongue.

BT suspects detected by clinical surveillance should always be confirmed by labora tory testing.

  • 2. 
    Serological surveillance

An active programme of surveillance of host populations to detect evidence of BTV transmission is essential to establish BTV status in a country or zone . Serological testing of ruminants is one of the most effective methods of detecting the presence of BTV. The species tested depends on the epidemiology of BTV infection, and the species available, in the local area. Cattle are usually the most sensitive indicator species. Management variables that may influence likelihood of infection , such as the use of insecticides and animal housing, should be considered.

Surveillance may include serological surveys, for example abattoir surveys, the use of cattle as sentinel animals (which must be individually identifiable), or a combination of methods. Surveillance may also be conducted by sampling and testing of bulk milk using an ELISA, as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual .

The objective of serological surveillance is to detect evidence of BTV circulation. Samples should be examined for antibodies against BTV using tests prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual . Positive BTV antibody tests results can have four possible causes:

  • a. 
    natural infection with BTV,
  • b. 
    vaccination against BTV,
  • c. 
    maternal antibodies,
  • d. 
    positive results due to the lack of specificity of the test.

It may be possible to use sera collected for other survey purposes for BTV surveillance . However, the principles of survey design described in these recommendations and the requirements for a statistically valid survey for the presence of BTV infection should not be compromised.

The results of random or targeted serological surveys are important in providing reliable evidence that no BTV infection is present in a country or zone . It is, therefore, essential that the survey is thoroughly documented. It is critical to interpret the results in light of the movement history of the animals being sampled.

Serological surveillance in a free zone should target those areas that are at highest risk of BTV transmission, based on the results of previous surveillance and other information. This will usually be towards the boundaries of the free zone . In view of the epidemiology of BTV infection, either random or targeted sampling is suitable to select herds and/or animals for testing.

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A protection zone within a free country or zone should separate it from a potentially infected country or in zone . Serological surveillance in a free country or zone should be carried out over an appropriate distance from the border with a potentially infected country or infected zone , based upon geography, climate, history of infection and other relevant factors.

Serological surveillance in infected zones will identify changes in the boundary of the zone, and can also be used to identify the BTV types circulating. In view of the epidemiology of BTV infection, either random or targeted sampling is suitable.

  • 3. 
    Virological surveillance

Isolation and genetic analysis of BTV from a proportion of infected animals is beneficial in terms of providing information on serotype and genetic characteristics of the viruses concerned.

Virological surveillance using tests described in the T errestria l Ma nual can be conducted:

  • a. 
    to identify virus circulation in at risk populations,
  • b. 
    to confirm clinically suspect cases ,
  • c. 
    to follow up positive serological results,
  • d. 
    to better characterize the genotype of circulating virus in a country or zone .
  • 4. 
    Sentinel animals

Sentinel animals are a form of targeted surveillance with a prospective study design. They are the preferred strategy for BTV surveillance . They comprise groups of unexposed animals managed at fixed locations and sampled regularly to detect new BTV infections .

The primary purpose of a sentinel animal programme is to detect BTV infections occurring at a particular place, for instance sentinel groups may be located on the usual boundaries of infected zones to detect changes in distribution of BTV. In addition, sentinel animal programmes allow the timing and dynamics of infections to be observed.

A sentinel animal programme should use animals of known source and history of exposure, control management variables such as use of insecticides and animal housing (depending on the epidemiology of BTV in the area under consideration), and be flexible in its design in terms of sampling frequency and choice of tests.

Care is necessary in choosing the sites for the sentinel groups. The aim is to maximise the chance of detecting BTV activity at the geographical location for which the sentinel site acts as a sampling point. The effect of secondary factors that may influence events at each location, such as climate, may also be analysed. To avoid bias, sentinel groups should comprise animals selected to be of similar age and susceptibility to BTV infection. Cattle are the most appropriate sentinels but other domestic ruminant species may be used. The only feature distinguishing groups of sentinels should be their geographical location.

Sera from sentinel animal programmes should be stored methodically in a serum bank to allow retrospective studies to be conducted in the event of new serotypes being isolated.

The frequency of sampling will depend on the reason for choosing the sampling site. In endemic areas, virus isolation will allow monitoring of the serotypes and genotypes of BTV circulating during each time period. The borders between infected and non infected areas can be defined by serological detection of infective period . Monthly sampling intervals are frequently used. Sentinels in declared free zones add to confidence that BTV infections are not occurring unobserved. In such cases, sampling prior to and after the possible period of transmission is sufficient.

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Definitive information on BTVs circulating in a country or zone is provided by isolation and identification of the viruses. If virus isolation is required, sentinels should be sampled at sufficiently frequent intervals to ensure that samples are collected during the period of viraemia.

  • 5. 
    Vector surveillance

BTV is transmitted between ruminant hosts by species of Culicoides which vary across the world. It is therefore important to be able to identify potential vector species accurately although many such species are closely related and difficult to differentiate with certainty.

The main purpose of vector surveillance is to determine areas of different levels of risk define high, medium and low-risk areas and local details of seasonality by determining the various vector species present in an area, their respective seasonal occurrence, and abundance. Vector surveillance has particular relevance to potential areas of spread. Long term surveillance can also be used to assess vector suppression measures.

The most effective way of gathering this information should take account of the biology and behavioural characteristics of the local vector species of Culicoides and may include the use of Onderstepoort-type light traps or similar, operated from dusk to dawn in locations adjacent to domestic ruminants, or the use of drop traps over ruminant animals.

Vector surveillance should be based on scientific sampling techniques. The choice of the number and type of traps to be used in vector surveillance and the frequency of their use should take into account the size and ecological characteristics of the area to be surveyed.

The operation of vector surveillance sites at the same locations as sentinel animals is advisable.

The use of a vector surveillance system to detect the presence of circulating virus is not recommended as a routine procedure as the typically low vector infection rates mean that such detections can be rare. Other surveillance strategies (e.g. the use of sentinel animals of domestic ruminants) are preferred to detect virus circulation.

Article 8.3.20. Documentation of BTV infection free status

  • 1. 
    Members declaring freedom from BTV infection for the country or zone: additional surveillance procedures

In addition to the general conditions described in the above-mentioned articles, a Member declaring freedom from BTV infection for the entire country or a zone should provide evidence for the existence of an effective surveillance programme. The strategy and design of the surveillance programme will depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances and should be planned and implemented according to general conditions and methods described in this chapter, to demonstrate absence of BTV infection during the preceding 24 months in susceptible domestic ruminant populations. This requires the support of a laboratory able to undertake identification of BTV infection through virus detection and antibody tests described in the Terrestrial Manual . This surveillance should be targeted to non-vaccinated animals. Clinical surveillance may be effective in sheep while serological surveillance is more appropriate in cattle.

  • 2. 
    Additional requirements for countries or zones that practise vaccination

Vaccination to prevent the transmission of BTV may be part of a disease control programme. The level of flock or herd immunity required to prevent transmission will depend on the flock or herd size, composition (e.g. species) and density of the susceptible population. It is therefore impossible to be prescriptive. The vaccine must also comply with the provisions stipulated for BTV vaccines in the Terrestrial Manual . Based on the epidemiology of BTV infection in the country or zone , it may be that a decision is reached to vaccinate only certain species or other subpopulations.

In countries or zones that practise vaccination, there is a need to perform virological and serological tests to ensure the absence of virus circulation. These tests should be performed on non-vaccinated subpopulations

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or on sentinels. The tests have to be repeated at appropriate intervals according to the purpose of the surveillance programme. For example, longer intervals may be adequate to confirm endemicity, while shorter intervals may allow on-going demonstration of absence of transmission.

Article 8.3.21.

The use and interpretation of serological and virus detection tests

  • 1. 
    Serological testing

Ruminants infected with BTV produce antibodies to structural and non-structural viral proteins, as do animals vaccinated with current modified live virus vaccines. Antibodies to the BTV serogroup antigen are detected with high sensitivity and specificity by competitive ELISA (c-ELISA) and to a lesser extent by AGID as described in the Terrestrial Manual . Positive c-ELISA results can be confirmed by neutralization assay to identify the infecting serotype(s); however, BTV infected ruminants can produce neutralizing antibodies to serotypes of BTV other than those to which they were exposed (false positive results), especially if they have been infected with multiple serotypes.

  • 2. 
    Virus detection

The presence of BTV in ruminant blood and tissues can be detected by virus isolation or polymerase chain reaction (PCR) as described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Interpretation of positive and negative results (both true and false) differs markedly between these tests because they detect different aspects of BTV infection , specifically (1) infectious BTV (virus isolation) and (2) nucleic acid (PCR). The following are especially relevant to interpretation of PCR assays:

  • a. 
    The nested PCR assay detects BTV nucleic acid in ruminants long after the clearance of infectious virus. Thus positive PCR results do not necessarily coincide with active infection of ruminants. Furthermore, the nested PCR assay is especially prone to template contamination, thus there is considerable risk of false positive results.
  • b. 
    PCR procedures other than real time PCR allow sequence analysis of viral amplicons from ruminant tissues, insect vectors or virus isolates. These sequence data are useful for creating data bases to facilitate important epidemiological studies, including the possible distinction of field and vaccine virus strains of BTV, genotype characterization of field strains of BTV, and potential genetic divergence of BTV relevant to vaccine and diagnostic testing strategies.

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It is essential that BTV isolates are sent regularly to the OIE Reference Laboratories for genetic and antigenic characterization.

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Annex XX

CH AP TE R 8.5. FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE

EU comments

The EU could support the proposed changes, but has important comments that should be taken on board.

In particular, the EU strongly suggests keeping the article regarding compartments under study, as there are no field experience whatsoever to corroborate any effectiveness of the proposed measures. It would be very dangerous to validate such procedures without any solid scientific and practical background. Furthermore, some modifications should be applied on the draft in order to make the potential compartmentalisation better applicable.

Moreover, the article 8.5.23 should be updated in order to better define the notion of "official control programme".

The EU supports the changes for better surveillance information to be supplied to the OIE for maintenance of FMD but would ask the OIE to set up an ad hoc group to look at this information in detail.

Article 8.5.1. Introduction

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period for foot and mouth disease (FMD) shall be 14 days.

For the purposes of this Chapter, ruminants include animals of the family of Camelidae (except Camelus dromedarius ).

For the purposes of this Chapter, a case includes an animal infected with FMD virus (FMDV).

For the purposes of international trade , this Chapter deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by FMDV, but also with the presence of infection with FMDV in the absence of clinical signs.

The following defines the occurrence of FMDV infection:

  • 1. 
    FMDV has been isolated and identified as such from an animal or a product derived from that animal; or
  • 2. 
    viral antigen or viral ribonucleic acid (RNA) specific to one or more of the serotypes of FMDV has been identified in samples from one or more animals, whether showing clinical signs consistent with FMD or not, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected outbreak of FMD, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with FMDV; or
  • 3. 
    antibodies to structural or nonstructural proteins of FMDV that are not a consequence of vaccination, have been identified in one or more animals showing clinical signs consistent with FMD, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected outbreak of FMD, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with FMDV.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

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Article 8.5.2.

FMD free country where vaccination is not practised

Susceptible animals in the FMD free country where vaccination is not practised should be protected from neighbouring infected countries by the application of animal health measures that effectively prevent the entry of the virus, taking into consideration physical or geographical barriers. These measures may include a protection zone .

To qualify for inclusion in the existing list of FMD free countries where vaccination is not practised, a Member should:

  • 1. 
    have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;
  • 2. 
    send a declaration to the OIE stating that:
  • a) 
    there has been no outbreak of FMD during the past 12 months;
  • b) 
    no evidence of FMDV infection has been found during the past 12 months;
  • c) 
    no vaccination against FMD has been carried out during the past 12 months;
  • d) 
    no vaccinated animal has been introduced since the cessation of vaccination;
  • 3. 
    supply documented evidence that:
  • a) 
    surveillance for both FMD and FMDV infection in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. is in operation;
  • b) 
    regulatory measures for the early detection, prevention and control of FMD have been implemented.

c)    describes in detail the boundaries and measures of a protection zone , if applicable.

The Member will be included in the list only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE. Retention on the list requires that the information in points 2 and 3b) above be re-submitted annually and changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events including those relevant to points 3b) and c) should be reported to the OIE according to the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

Article 8.5.3.

FMD free country where vaccination is practised

Susceptible animals in the FMD free country where vaccination is practised should be protected from neighbouring infected countries by the application of animal health measures that effectively prevent the entry of the virus, taking into consideration physical or geographical barriers. These measures may include a protection zone .

To qualify for inclusion in the list of FMD free countries where vaccination is practised, a Member should:

  • 1. 
    have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;
  • 2. 
    send a declaration to the OIE stating that there has been no outbreak of FMD for the past 2 years and no evidence of FMDV circulation for the past 12 months, with documented evidence that:

a)    there has been no outbreak of FMD during the past 2 years;

b)   no evidence of FMDV circulation has been found during the past 12 months;

3.     supply documented evidence that:

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  • a) 
    surveillance for FMD and FMDV circulation in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. is in operation, and that regulatory measures for the prevention and control of FMD have

b)   regulatory measures for the early detection, prevention and control of FMD have been implemented;

c)    describes in detail the boundaries and measures of a protection zone , if applicable;

bd) routine vaccination is carried out for the purpose of the prevention of FMD;

ce) the vaccine used complies with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual .

The Member will be included in the list only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE. Retention on the list requires that the information in point 2 and 3 above be re-submitted annually and changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events including those relevant to points 3b) and c) should be reported to the OIE according to the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

If a Member that meets the requirements of a FMD free country where vaccination is practised wishes to change its status to FMD free country where vaccination is not practised, the status of this country remains unchanged for a period of at least 12 months after vaccination has ceased. Evidence should also be provided showing that FMDV infection has not occurred during that period.

Article 8.5.4.

FMD free zone where vaccination is not practised

A FMD free zone where vaccination is not practised can be established in either a FMD free country where vaccination is practised or in a country of which parts are infected. In defining such zones the principles of Chapter 4.3. should be followed. Susceptible animals in the FMD free zone should be protected from the rest of the country and from neighbouring countries if they are of a different animal health status by the application of animal health measures that effectively prevent the entry of the virus, taking into consideration physical or geographical barriers. These measures may include a protection z one .

To qualify for inclusion in the list of FMD free zones where vaccination is not practised, a Member should:

  • 1. 
    have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;
  • 2. 
    send a declaration to the OIE stating that it wishes to establish a FMD free zone where vaccination is not practised, and that within the proposed FMD free zone:
  • a) 
    there has been no outbreak of FMD during the past 12 months;
  • b) 
    no evidence of FMDV infection has been found during the past 12 months;
  • c) 
    no vaccination against FMD has been carried out during the past 12 months;
  • d) 
    no vaccinated animal has been introduced into the zone since the cessation of vaccination, except in accordance with Article 8.5.9.;

e) documented evidence shows that surveillance in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to for both FMD and FMDV infection;

3. supply documented evidence that:

a)    surveillance for FMD and FMDV infection in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. is in operation;

b)   regulatory measures for the early detection, prevention and control of FMD have been implemented. 34. describe in detail:

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a)    regulatory measures for the prevention and control of both FMD and FMDV infection,

ba) the boundaries of the proposed FMD free zone and, if applicable, the protection zone or physical or geographical barriers,

b)   the boundaries and measures of a protection zone , if applicable,

  • c) 
    the system for preventing the entry of the virus (including the control of the movement of susceptible animals) into the proposed FMDV free zone (in particular if the procedure described in Article 8.5.9. is implemented),

and supply documented evidence that these are properly implemented and supervised.

The proposed free zone will be included in the list of FMD free zones where vaccination is not practised only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE.

The information required in points 2, 3 and 34 b-c) above should be re-submitted annually and changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events including those relevant to points 3ab) and 34b) should be reported to the OIE according to the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

Article 8.5.5.

FMD free zone where vaccination is practised

A FMD free zone where vaccination is practised can be established in either a FMD free country where vaccination is not practised or in a country of which parts are infected. In defining such zones the principles of Chapter 4.3. should be followed. Susceptible animals in the FMD free zone where vaccination is practised should be protected from neighbouring countries or zones if they are of a lesser animal health status , by the application of animal health measures that effectively prevent the entry of the virus, taking into consideration physical or geographical barriers. These measures may include a protection z one .

To qualify for inclusion in the list of FMD free zones where vaccination is practised, a Member should:

  • 1. 
    have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;
  • 2. 
    send a declaration to the OIE stating that it wishes to establish a FMD free zone where practised and that within the proposed FMD free zone;
  • a) 
    there has been no outbreak of FMD for the past 2 years;
  • b) 
    no evidence of FMDV circulation for has been found during the past 12 months;

c)    documented evidence shows that surveillance in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5 for FMD and FMDV circulation;

3.    supply documented evidence that:

a)    surveillance for FMD and FMDV infection in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. is in operation;

b)   regulatory measures for the early detection, prevention and control of FMD have been implemented;

c)    routine vaccination is carried out for the purpose of the prevention of FMD;

d)   the vaccine used complies with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual ;

3. supply documented evidence that the vaccine used complies with the standards described in the Terrestr Ma nua l ;

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  • 4. 
    describe in detail:

a)    regulatory measures for the prevention and control of both FMD and FMDV

ba) the boundaries of the proposed FMD free zone where vaccination is practised and, if applicable, the protection z one or physical or geographical barriers,

b)   the boundaries and measures of a protection zone , if applicable,

  • c) 
    the system for preventing the entry of the virus (including the control of the movement of susceptible animals) into the proposed FMD free zone (in particular if the procedure described in Article 8.5.9. is implemented),

and supply documented evidence that these are properly implemented and supervised.

The proposed free zone will be included in the list of FMD free zones where vaccination is practised only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE. The information required in points 2, 3 and 4 b-c) above should be re-submitted annually and changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events including those relevant to points 4a3b) and 4b) should be reported to the OIE according to the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

If a Member that has a zone which meets the requirements of a FMD free zone where vaccination is practised wishes to change the status of the zone to FMD free zone where vaccination is not practised, the status of this zone remains unchanged for a period of at least 12 months after vaccination has ceased. Evidence should also be provided showing that FMDV infection has not occurred in the said zone during that period.

Article 8.5.5.bis

FMD free compartment

A FMD free compartment can be established in either a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is practised or in an infected country or zone . In defining such a compartment the principles of Chapters 4.3. and 4.4. should be followed. Susceptible animals in the FMD free compartment should be separated from any other susceptible animals subpopulations by the application of an effective biosecurity management system.

A Member wishing to establish a FMD free compartment should:

1.     have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting and if not FMD free, have a surveillance system for FMD in place according to Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.42. that allows an accurate knowledge of the prevalence of FMD in the country or zone ;

2.     declare for the FMD free compartment that:

a)     there has been no outbreak of FMD during the past 12 months;

b)     no evidence of FMDV infection has been found during the past 12 months;

c)     vaccination against FMD is prohibited;

d)     no animal vaccinated against FMD within the past 12 months is in the compartment ;

e)     animals, semen and embryos should only enter the compartment in accordance with relevant Articles in this chapter;

ef) documented evidence shows that surveillance in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. is in operation for both FMD and FMDV infection;

fg) an animal identification and traceability system in accordance with Chapters 4.1 and 4.2. is in place;

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3. describe in detail the animal subpopulation in the compartment in detail and the biosecurity plan management system for prevention and control of both FMD and FMDV infection, including the system for preventing the entry of the virus and its implementation and supervision.

EU comment

The EU still thinks that a FMD compartment should be first approved in a zone where FMD is controlled. Thus:

  • the point 1 should read: "have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting and if not FMD free, have an official control programme and a surveillance system for FMD in place according to Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.42. that allows an accurate knowledge of the prevalence of FMD in the country or zone
  • the following paragraph should be added at the end of the article: "The compartment should be approved by the Veterinary Authority. The first approval should only be granted when no outbreak of FMD has occurred within the zone in which the compartment is situated, during the last 3 months."

Article 8.5.6.

FMD infected country or zone

A FMD infected country is a country that does not fulfil the requirements to qualify as either a FMD free country where vaccination is not practised or a FMD free country where vaccination is practised.

A FMD infected zone is a zone that does not fulfil the requirements to qualify as either a FMD free zone where vaccination is not practised or a FMD free zone where vaccination is practised.

Article 8.5.7.

Establishment of a containment zone within a FMD free country or zone

In the event of limited outbreak s within a FMD free country or zone, including within a protection zone , with or without vaccination, a single containment zone , which includes all cases , can be established for the purpose of minimizing the impact on the entire country or zone .

For this to be achieved, the V eterinary A uthority should provide documented evidence that:

  • 1. 
    the outbreak s are limited based on the following factors:
  • a) 
    immediately on suspicion, a rapid response including notification has been made;
  • b) 
    standstill of animal movements has been imposed, and effective controls on the movement of other commodities mentioned in this Chapter are in place;
  • c) 
    epidemiological investigation (trace-back, trace-forward) has been completed;
  • d) 
    the infection has been confirmed;
  • e) 
    the primary outbreak and likely source of the outbreak has been identified;
  • f) 
    all cases have been shown to be epidemiologically linked;
  • g) 
    no new cases have been found in the containment zone within a minimum of two incubation periods as defined in Article 8.5.1. after the stamping-out of the last detected case is completed;

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  • 2. 
    a stamping-out policy has been applied;
  • 3. 
    the susceptible animal population within the containment zones should be clearly identifiable as belonging to the containment z one ;
  • 4. 
    increased passive and targeted surveillance in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. in the rest of the country or zone has been carried out and has not detected any evidence of infection ;
  • 5. 
    animal health measures that effectively prevent the spread of the FMDV to the rest of the country or zone , taking into consideration physical and geographical barriers, are in place;
  • 6. 
    ongoing surveillance in the containment zone is in place;

The free status of the areas outside the containment zone would be suspended pending the establishment of the containment zone . The free status of these areas could be reinstated irrespective of the provisions of Article 8.5.8., once the containment zone is clearly established, by complying with points 1 to 6 above. The containment zone should be managed in such a way that it can be demonstrated that commodities for international trade can be shown to have originated outside the containment z one.

The recovery of the FMD free status of the containment zone should follow the provisions of Article 8.5.8.

Article 8.5.8.

Recovery of free status

  • 1. 
    When a FMD outbreak or FMDV infection occurs in a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised, one of the following waiting periods is required to regain the status of FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised:
  • a) 
    3 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46.; or
  • b) 
    3 months after the slaughter of all vaccinated animals where a stamping-out policy , emergency vaccination and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46.; or
  • c) 
    6 months after the last case or the last vaccination (according to the event that occurs the latest), where a stamping-out policy , emergency vaccination not followed by the slaughtering of all vaccinated animals, and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46., provided that a serological survey based on the detection of antibodies to nonstructural proteins of FMDV demonstrates the absence of infection in the remaining vaccinated population.

Where a stamping-out policy is not practised, the above waiting periods do not apply, and Article 8.5.2. or 8.5.4. applies.

  • 2. 
    When a FMD outbreak or FMDV infection occurs in a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is practised, one of the following waiting periods is required to regain the status of FMD free country or zone where vaccination is practised:
  • a) 
    6 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy , emergency vaccination and serological surveillance in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. are applied, provided that the serological surveillance based on the detection of antibodies to nonstructural proteins of FMDV demonstrates the absence of virus circulation; or
  • b) 
    18 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy is not applied, but emergency vaccination and serological surveillance in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. are applied, provided that the serological surveillance based on the detection of antibodies to nonstructural proteins of FMDV demonstrates the absence of virus circulation.

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3. When a FMD outbreak or FMDV infection occurs in a FMD free compartment, Article 8.5.5.bis. applies.

Article 8.5.9.

Transfer directly to slaughter of FMD susceptible animals from an infected zone to a free zone (where vaccination either is or is not practised) within a country

In order not to jeopardise the status of a free zone , FMD susceptible animals should only leave the infected zone if moved by mechanised transport directly to slaughter in the nearest designated abattoir located in a protection zone directly to slaughter .

In the absence of an abattoir in a protection zone , live FMD susceptible animals can be transported to the nearest abattoir in a free zone directly to slaughter only under the following conditions:

  • 1. 
    no FMD susceptible animal has been introduced into the establishment of origin and no animal in the establishment of origin has shown clinical signs of FMD for at least 30 days prior to movement;
  • 2. 
    the animals were kept in the establishment of origin for at least 3 months prior to movement;
  • 3. 
    FMD has not occurred within a 10-kilometre radius of the establishment of origin for at least 3 months prior to movement;
  • 4. 
    the animals must be transported under the supervision of the V eterinary A uthority in a vehicle , which was cleansed and disinfected before loading , directly from the establishment of origin to the abattoir without coming into contact with other susceptible animals;
  • 5. 
    such an abattoir is not approved for the export of fresh meat during the time it is handling the meat of animals from the infected zone ;
  • 6. 
    vehicles and the abattoir must be subjected to thorough cleansing and disinfection immediately after use.

All products obtained from the animals and any products coming into contact with them must be considered infected, and treated in such a way as to destroy any residual virus in accordance with Articles 8.5.32. to 8.5.39.

Animals moved into a free zone for other purposes must be moved under the supervision of the V eterinary A uthority and comply with the conditions in Article 8.5.12.

Article 8.5.10.

Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is not practised or FMD free compartments

for FMD susceptible animals

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of FMD on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were kept since birth or for at least the past 3 months in a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised or a FMD free compartment ;
  • 3. 
    have not been vaccinated;

4.    if transiting an infected zone , were not exposed to any source of FMD infection during transportation to the place of shi pment .

Article 8.5.11.

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Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is practised

for domestic ruminants and pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of FMD on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were kept in a FMD free country or zone since birth or for at least the past 3 months; and
  • 3. 
    have not been vaccinated and were subjected, with negative results, to tests for antibodies against FMD virus,

when destined to a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised;

4.    if transiting an infected zone , were not exposed to any source of FMD infection during transportation to the place of shi pment .

Article 8.5.12. Recommendations for importation from FMD infected countries or zones

for domestic ruminants and pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of FMD on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were kept in the establishment of origin since birth, or
  • a) 
    for the past 30 days, if a stamping-out policy is in force in the exporting country , or
  • b) 
    for the past 3 months, if a stamping-out policy is not in force in the exporting country , and that FMD has not occurred within a ten-kilometre radius of the establishment of origin for the relevant period as defined in points a) and b) above; and
  • 3. 
    were isolated in an establishment for the 30 days prior to shipment, and all animals in isolation were subjected to diagnostic tests (probang and serology) for evidence of FMDV infection with negative results at the end of that period, and that FMD did not occur within a ten-kilometre radius of the establishment during that period; or
  • 4. 
    were kept in a quarantine station for the 30 days prior to shipment, all animals in quarantine were subjected to diagnostic tests (probang and serology) for evidence of FMDV infection with negative results at the end of that period, and that FMD did not occur within a ten-kilometre radius of the quarantine station during that period;
  • 5. 
    were not exposed to any source of FMD infection during their transportation from the quarantine station to the place of shi pment .

Article 8.5.13.

Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is not practised or FMD free compartments

for fresh semen of domestic ruminants and pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that: 1. the donor animals:

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  • a) 
    showed no clinical sign of FMD on the day of collection of the semen;
  • b) 
    were kept for at least 3 months prior to collection in a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised or a FMD free compartment ;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 8.5.14.

Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is not practised or FMD free compartments

for frozen semen of domestic ruminants and pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a) 
    showed no clinical sign of FMD on the day of collection of the semen and for the following 30 days;
  • b) 
    were kept for at least 3 months prior to collection in a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is

not practised or a FMD free compartment for at least 3 months prior to collection;

  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 8.5.15. Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is practised

for semen of domestic ruminants and pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a) 
    showed no clinical sign of FMD on the day of collection of the semen and for the following 30 days;
  • b) 
    were kept for at least 3 months prior to collection in a FMD free country or zone free from FMD;
  • c) 
    if destined to a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised:
  • i) 
    have not been vaccinated and were subjected, not less than 21 days after collection of the semen, to tests for antibodies against FMD virus, with negative results; or
  • ii) 
    had been vaccinated at least twice, with the last vaccination not more than 12 and not less than one month prior to collection;
  • 2. 
    no other animal present in the artificial insemination centre has been vaccinated within the month prior to collection;
  • 3. 
    the semen:
  • a) 
    was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and 4.6.;
  • b) 
    was stored in the country of origin for a period of at least one month following collection, and during this period no animal on the establishment where the donor animals were kept showed any sign of FMD.

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Article 8.5.16. Recommendations for importation from FMD infected countries or zones

for semen of domestic ruminants and pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a) 
    showed no clinical sign of FMD on the day of collection of the semen;
  • b) 
    were kept in an establishment where no animal had been added in the 30 days before collection, and that FMD has not occurred within 10 kilometres for the 30 days before and after collection;
  • c) 
    have not been vaccinated and were subjected, not less than 21 days after collection of the semen, to tests for antibodies against FMD virus, with negative results; or
  • d) 
    had been vaccinated at least twice, with the last vaccination not more than 12 and not less than one month prior to collection;
  • 2. 
    no other animal present in the artificial insemination centre has been vaccinated within the month prior to collection;
  • 3. 
    the semen:
  • a) 
    was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and 4.6.;
  • b) 
    was subjected, with negative results, to a test for FMDV infection if the donor animal has been vaccinated within the 12 months prior to collection;
  • c) 
    was stored in the country of origin for a period of at least one month following collection, and during this period no animal on the establishment where the donor animals were kept showed any sign of FMD.

Article 8.5.17.

Recommendations for the importation of in vivo derived embryos of cattle

Irrespective of the FMD status of the exporting country or, zone or compartment , V eterinary A uthorities should authorise without restriction on account of FMD the import or transit through their territory of in vivo derived embryos of cattle subject to the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7.or Chapter 4.9.

Article 8.5.18.

Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is not practised or FMD free compartments

for in vitro produced embryos of cattle

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females:
  • a) 
    showed no clinical sign of FMD at the time of collection of the oocytes;

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  • b) 
    were kept at the time of collection in a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised or a FMD free compartment ;
  • 2. 
    fertilisation was achieved with semen meeting the conditions referred to in Articles 8.5.13., 8.5.14., 8.5.15. or 8.5.16., as relevant;
  • 3. 
    the oocytes were collected, and the embryos were processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.8. or Chapter 4.9., as relevant.

Article 8.5.19. Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is practised

for in vitro produced embryos of cattle

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females:
  • a) 
    showed no clinical sign of FMD at the time of collection of the oocytes;
  • b) 
    were kept for at least 3 months prior to collection in a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is practised;
  • c) 
    if destined for a FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised or a FMD free co mpartme nt :
  • i) 
    have not been vaccinated and were subjected, with negative results, to tests for antibodies against FMD virus; or
  • ii) 
    had been vaccinated at least twice, with the last vaccination not less than one month and not more than 12 months prior to collection;
  • 2. 
    no other animal present in the establishment has been vaccinated within the month prior to collection;
  • 3. 
    fertilization was achieved with semen meeting the conditions referred to in Articles 8.5.13., 8.5.14., 8.5.15. or 8.5.16., as relevant;
  • 4. 
    the oocytes were collected, and the embryos were processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.8. or Chapter 4.9., as relevant.

Article 8.5.20.

Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is not practised or FMD free compartments

for fresh meat of FMD susceptible animals

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat comes from animals which:

  • 1. 
    have been kept in the FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised or in a FMD free compartment since birth, or which have been imported in accordance with Article 8.5.10., Article 8.5.11. or Article 8.5.12.;
  • 2. 
    have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections for FMD with favourable results.

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Article 8.5.21. Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is practised

for fresh meat of cattle and buffaloes (Bubalus bubalis ) (excluding feet, head and viscera)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat comes from animals which:

  • 1. 
    have been kept in the FMD free country or zone where vaccination is practised since birth, or which have been imported in accordance with Article 8.5.10., Article 8.5.11. or Article 8.5.12.;
  • 2. 
    have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections for FMD with favourable results.

Article 8.5.22. Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones where vaccination is practised

for fresh meat or meat products of pigs and ruminants other than cattle and buffaloes

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat comes from animals which:

  • 1. 
    have been kept in the FMD free country or zone where vaccination is practised since birth, or which have been imported in accordance with Article 8.5.10., Article 8.5.11. or Article 8.5.12.;
  • 2. 
    have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections for FMD with favourable results.

EU comments

The EU would like to know the difference between the above 2 articles. As the conditions are the same they could be amalgamated into one for clarity. Is there a difference for meat products from cattle and buffalo (no article refer to them)? Why are feet and viscera not excluded for pigs and other ruminants?

Article 8.5.23.

Recommendations for importation from FMD infected countries or zones, where an official control programme exists, involving compulsory systematic vaccination of cattle

EU comment

This article should be updated (or another article drafted) in order to better define the motion of "official control programme".

for fresh meat of cattle and buffaloes (Bubalus bubalis ) (excluding feet, head and viscera)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat:

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  • 1. 
    comes from animals which:
  • a) 
    have remained in the ex porting country for at least 3 months prior to slaughter ;
  • b) 
    have remained, during this period, in a part of the country where cattle are regularly vaccinated against FMD and where official controls are in operation;
  • c) 
    have been vaccinated at least twice with the last vaccination not more than 12 months and not less than one month prior to slaughter ;
  • d) 
    were kept for the past 30 days in an establishment , and that FMD has not occurred within a ten-kilometre radius of the establishment during that period;
  • e) 
    have been transported, in a vehicle which was cleansed and disinfected before the cattle were loaded, directly from the establishment of origin to the approved abattoir without coming into contact with other animals which do not fulfil the required conditions for export;
  • f) 
    have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir :
  • i) 
    which is officially designated for export;
  • ii) 
    in which no FMD has been detected during the period between the last disinfection carried out before slaughter and the shipment for export has been dispatched;
  • g) 
    have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections for FMD with favourable results within 24 hours before and after slaughter ;
  • 2. 
    comes from deboned carcasses:
  • a) 
    from which the major lymphatic nodes have been removed;
  • b) 
    which, prior to deboning, have been submitted to maturation at a temperature above + 2°C for a minimum period of 24 hours following slaughter and in which the pH value was below 6.0 when tested in the middle of both the longissimus dorsi.

Article 8.5.24. Recommendations for importation from FMD infected countries or zones

for meat products of domestic ruminants and pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the entire consignment of meat comes from animals which have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections for FMD with favourable results;
  • 2. 
    the meat has been processed to ensure the destruction of the FMD virus in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Article 8.5.32.;
  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the meat products with any potential source of FMD virus.

Article 8.5.25.

Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones (where vaccination either is or is not practised) or FMD free compartments

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for milk and milk products intended for human consumption and for products of animal origin (from FMD susceptible animals) intended for use in animal feeding or for agricultural or industrial use

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these products come from animals which have been kept in a FMD free country or, zone or compartment since birth, or which have been imported in accordance with Article 8.5.10., Article 8.5.11. or Article 8.5.12.

Article 8.5.26.

Recommendations for importation from FMD infected countries or zones where an official control programme exists

for milk , cream, milk powder and milk products

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these products:
  • a) 
    originate from herds or flock s which were not infected or suspected of being infected with FMD at the time of milk collection;
  • b) 
    have been processed to ensure the destruction of the FMD virus in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Article 8.5.36. and in Article 8.5.37.;
  • 2. 
    the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the products with any potential source of FMD virus.

Article 8.5.27. Recommendations for importation from FMD infected countries

for blood and meat-meals (from domestic or wild ruminants and pigs)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the manufacturing method for these products included heating to a minimum core temperature of 70°C for at least 30 minutes.

Article 8.5.28. Recommendations for importation from FMD infected countries

for wool, hair, bristles, raw hides and skins (from domestic or wild ruminants and pigs)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these products have been processed to ensure the destruction of the FMD virus in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Articles 8.5.33., 8.5.34. and 8.5.35.;
  • 2. 
    the necessary precautions were taken after collection or processing to avoid contact of the products with any potential source of FMD virus.

V eterinary A uthorities can authorise, without restriction, the import or transit through their territory of semi-processed hides and skins (limed hides, pickled pelts, and semi-processed leather - e.g. wet blue and crust leather), provided that these products have been submitted to the usual chemical and mechanical processes in use in the tanning industry.

Article 8.5.29.

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Recommendations for importation from FMD infected countries or zones

for straw and forage

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these co mmodities :

  • 1. 
    are free of grossly identifiable contamination with material of animal origin;
  • 2. 
    have been subjected to one of the following treatments, which, in the case of material sent in bales, has been shown to penetrate to the centre of the bale:
  • a) 
    either to the action of steam in a closed chamber such that the centre of the bales has reached a minimum temperature of 80°C for at least 10 minutes,
  • b) 
    or to the action of formalin fumes (formaldehyde gas) produced by its commercial solution at 35-40% in a chamber kept closed for at least 8 hours and at a minimum temperature of 19°C;

OR

  • 3. 
    have been kept in bond for at least 3 months (under study) before being released for export.

Article 8.5.30.

Recommendations for importation from FMD free countries or zones (where vaccination either is or is not practised)

for skins and trophies derived from FMD susceptible wild animals

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these products are derived from animals that have been killed in such a country or zone , or which have been imported from a country or zone free of FMD (where vaccination either is or is not practised).

Article 8.5.31. Recommendations for importation from FMD infected countries or zones

for skins and trophies derived from FMD susceptible wild animals

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these products have been processed to ensure the destruction of the FMD virus in conformity with the procedures referred to in Article 8.5.38.

Article 8.5.32. Procedures for the inactivation of the FMD virus in meat

For the inactivation of viruses present in meat, one of the following procedures should be used:

  • 1. 
    Canning

Meat is subjected to heat treatment in a hermetically sealed container to reach an internal core temperature of at least 70°C for a minimum of 30 minutes or to any equivalent treatment which has been demonstrated to inactivate the FMD virus.

  • 2. 
    Thorough cooking

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Meat, previously deboned and defatted, shall be subjected to heating so that an internal temperature of 70°C or greater is maintained for a minimum of 30 minutes.

After cooking, it shall be packed and handled in such a way that it cannot be exposed to a source of virus.

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  • 3. 
    Drying after salting

When rigor mortis is complete, the meat must be deboned, salted with cooking salt (NaCl) and completely dried. It must not deteriorate at ambient temperature.

‘Drying’ is defined in terms of the ratio between water and protein which must not be greater than 2.25:1.

Article 8.5.33.

Procedures for the inactivation of the FMD virus in wool and hair

For the inactivation of viruses present in wool and hair for industrial use, one of the following procedures should be used:

  • 1. 
    industrial washing, which consists of the immersion of the wool in a series of baths of water, soap and sodium hydroxide (soda) or potassium hydroxide (potash);
  • 2. 
    chemical depilation by means of slaked lime or sodium sulphide;
  • 3. 
    fumigation in formaldehyde in a hermetically sealed chamber for at least 24 hours. The most practical method is to place potassium permanganate in containers (which must NOT be made of plastic or polyethylene) and add commercial formalin; the amounts of formalin and potassium permanganate are respectively 53 ml and 35 g per cubic metre of the chamber;
  • 4. 
    industrial scouring which consists of the immersion of wool in a water-soluble detergent held at 60-70°C;
  • 5. 
    storage of wool at 18°C for 4 weeks, or 4°C for 4 months, or 37°C for 8 days.

Article 8.5.34.

Procedures for the inactivation of the F MD virus in bristles

For the inactivation of viruses present in bristles for industrial use, one of the following procedures should be used:

  • 1. 
    boiling for at least one hour;
  • 2. 
    immersion for at least 24 hours in a 1% solution of formaldehyde prepared from 30 ml commercial formalin per litre of water.

Article 8.5.35.

Procedures for the inactivation of the FMD virus in raw hides and skins

For the inactivation of viruses present in raw hides and skins for industrial use, the following procedure should be used: salting for at least 28 days in sea salt containing 2% sodium carbonate.

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Article 8.5.36.

Procedures for the inactivation of the FMD virus in milk and cream for human consumption

For the inactivation of viruses present in milk and cream for human consumption, one of the following procedures should be used:

  • 1. 
    a sterilisation process applying a minimum temperature of 132°C for at least one second (ultra-high temperature [UHT]), or
  • 2. 
    if the milk has a pH less than 7.0, a sterilisation process applying a minimum temperature of 72°C for at least 15 seconds (high temperature - short time pasteurisation [HTST]), or
  • 3. 
    if the milk has a pH of 7.0 or over, the HTST process applied twice.

Article 8.5.37.

Procedures for the inactivation of the FMD virus in milk for animal consumption

For the inactivation of viruses present in milk for animal consumption, one of the following procedures should be used:

  • 1. 
    the HTST process applied twice;
  • 2. 
    HTST combined with another physical treatment, e.g. maintaining a pH 6 for at least one hour or additional heating to at least 72°C combined with dessication;
  • 3. 
    UHT combined with another physical treatment referred to in point 2 above.

Article 8.5.38.

Procedures for the inactivation of the FMD virus in skins and trophies from wild animals susceptible to the disease

For the inactivation of viruses present in skins and trophies from wild animals susceptible to FMD, one of the following procedures should be used prior to complete taxidermal treatment:

  • 1. 
    boiling in water for an appropriate time so as to ensure that any matter other than bone, horns, hooves, claws, antlers or teeth is removed;
  • 2. 
    gamma irradiation at a dose of at least 20 kiloGray at room temperature (20°C or higher);
  • 3. 
    soaking, with agitation, in a 4% (w/v) solution of washing soda (sodium carbonate - Na2CO3) maintained at pH 11.5 or above for at least 48 hours;
  • 4. 
    soaking, with agitation, in a formic acid solution (100 kg salt [NaCl] and 12 kg formic acid per 1,000 litres water) maintained at below pH 3.0 for at least 48 hours; wetting and dressing agents may be added;
  • 5. 
    in the case of raw hides, salting for at least 28 days with sea salt containing 2% washing soda (sodium carbonate - Na2CO3).

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Article 8.5.39.

Procedures for the inactivation of the FMD virus in casings of small ruminants and pigs

For the inactivation of viruses present in casings of small ruminants and pigs, the following procedures should be used: salting for at least 30 days either with dry salt (NaCl) or with saturated brine (Aw < 0.80), or with phosphate salts/sodium chloride mixture, and kept at room temperature at about 20?C during this entire period.

Article 8.5.40.

Surveillance: introduction

Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. define the principles and provide a guide for the surveillance of FMD in accordance with Chapter 1.4. applicable to Members seeking establishment of freedom from FMD, either with or without the use of vaccination. Guidance is provided for Members seeking reestablishment of freedom from FMD for the entire country or for a zone , either with or without vaccination or a compartment , following an outbreak , and for the maintenance of FMD status.

The impact and epidemiology of FMD differ widely in different regions of the world and therefore it is impossible to provide specific recommendations for all situations. Surveillance strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from FMD at an acceptable level of confidence will need to be adapted to the local situation. For example, the approach to proving freedom from FMD following an outbreak caused by a pig-adapted strain of FMD virus (FMDV) should differ significantly from an application designed to prove freedom from FMD for a country or zone where African buffaloes (Syncerus caffer ) provide a potential reservoir of infection . It is incumbent upon the Member to submit a dossier to the OIE in support of its application that not only explains the epidemiology of FMD in the region concerned but also demonstrates how all the risk factors are managed. This should include provision of scientifically-based supporting data. There is therefore considerable latitude available to Members to provide a well-reasoned argument to prove that the absence of FMDV infection (in non-vaccinated populations) or circulation (in vaccinated populations) is assured at an acceptable level of confidence.

Surveillance for FMD should be in the form of a continuing programme designed to establish that the whole territory or part of it is free from FMDV infection /circulation.

For the purposes of this Chapter, virus circulation means transmission of FMDV as demonstrated by clinical signs, serological evidence or virus isolation.

Article 8.5.41. Surveillance: general conditions and methods

  • 1. 
    A surveillance system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. should be under the responsibility of the V eterinary A uthority . A procedure should be in place for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspect cases of FMD to a laboratory for FMD diagnoses as described in the Terrestrial Manual .
  • 2. 
    The FMD surveillance programme should:

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  • a) 
    include an early warning system throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspicious cases. Farmers and workers who have day-to-day contact with livestock, as well as diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of FMD. They should be supported directly or indirectly (e.g. through private veterinarians or veterinary para-professionals ) by government information programmes and the V eterinary A uthority . All suspect cases of FMD should be investigated immediately. Where suspicion cannot be resolved by epidemiological and clinical investigation, samples should be taken and submitted to a laboratory . This requires that sampling kits and other equipment are available for those responsible for surveillance . Personnel responsible for surveillance should be able to call for assistance from a team with expertise in FMD diagnosis and control;
  • b) 
    implement, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical inspection and serological testing of high-risk groups of animals, such as those adjacent to a FMD infected country or infected zone (for example, bordering a game park in which infected wildlife are present).

An effective surveillance system will periodically identify suspicious cases that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is FMDV. The rate at which such suspicious cases are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. Applications for freedom from FMDV infection /circulation should, in consequence, provide details of the occurrence of suspicious cases and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of laboratory testing and the control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation (quarantine, movement stand-still orders, etc.).

Article 8.5.42. Surveillance strategies

  • 1. 
    Introduction

The target population for surveillance aimed at identifying disease and infection should cover all the susceptible species within the country or, z one or compartment .

The design of surveillance programmes to prove the absence of FMDV infection /circulation needs to be carefully followed to avoid producing results that are either insufficiently reliable to be accepted by the OIE or international trading partners, or excessively costly and logistically complicated. The design of any surveillance programme, therefore, requires inputs from professionals competent and experienced in this field.

The strategy employed may be based on randomised sampling requiring surveillance consistent with demonstrating the absence of FMDV infection /circulation at an acceptable level of statistical confidence. The frequency of sampling should be dependent on the epidemiological situation.

Targeted surveillance (e.g. based on the increased likelihood of infection in particular localities or species) may be an appropriate strategy. The Member should justify the surveillance strategy chosen as adequate to detect the presence of FMDV infection /circulation in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the epidemiological situation. It may, for example, be appropriate to target clinical surveillance at particular species likely to exhibit clear clinical signs (e.g. cattle and pigs). If a Member wishes to apply for recognition of a specific zone within the country as being free from FMDV infection /circulation, the design of the survey and the basis for the sampling process would need to be aimed at the population within the zone .

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For random surveys, the design of the sampling strategy will need to incorporate an epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing will need to be large enough to detect infection /circulation if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size and expected disease prevalence determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The Member must justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of surveillance and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the design prevalence in particular clearly needs to be based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Irrespective of the survey design selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated for the vaccination/infection history and production class of animals in the target population.

Irrespective of the testing system employed, surveillance design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There needs to be an effective procedure for following-up positives to ultimately determine with a high level of confidence, whether they are indicative of infection /circulation or not. This should involve both supplementary tests and follow-up investigation to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling unit as well as herds which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

  • 2. 
    Clinical surveillance

Clinical surveillance aims at detecting clinical signs of FMD by close physical examination of susceptible animals. Whereas significant emphasis is placed on the diagnostic value of mass serological screening, surveillance based on clinical inspection should not be underrated. It may be able to provide a high level of confidence of detection of disease if a sufficiently large number of clinically susceptible animals is examined.

Clinical surveillance and laboratory testing should always be applied in series to clarify the status of FMD suspects detected by either of these complementary diagnostic approaches. Laboratory testing may confirm clinical suspicion, while clinical surveillance may contribute to confirmation of positive serology. Any sampling unit within which suspicious animals are detected should be classified as infected until contrary evidence is produced.

A number of issues must be considered in clinical surveillance for FMD. The often underestimated labour intensity and the logistical difficulties involved in conducting clinical examinations should not be underestimated and should be taken into account.

Identification of clinical cases is fundamental to FMD surveillance . Establishment of the molecular, antigenic and other biological characteristics of the causative virus, as well as its source, is dependent upon disclosure of such animals. It is essential that FMDV isolates are sent regularly to the regional reference laboratory for genetic and antigenic characterization.

  • 3. 
    Virological surveillance

Virological surveillance using tests described in the T errestria l Ma nual should be conducted:

  • a) 
    to monitor at risk populations;
  • b) 
    to confirm clinically suspect cases;
  • c) 
    to follow up positive serological results;

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  • d) 
    to test “normal” daily mortality, to ensure early detection of infection in the face of vaccination or in establishments epidemiologically linked to an outbrea k .
  • 4. 
    Serological surveillance

Serological surveillance aims at detecting antibodies against FMDV. Positive FMDV antibody test results can have four possible causes:

  • a) 
    natural infection with FMDV;
  • b) 
    vaccination against FMD;
  • c) 
    maternal antibodies derived from an immune dam (maternal antibodies in cattle are usually found only up to 6 months of age but in some individuals and in some species, maternal antibodies can be detected for considerably longer periods);
  • d) 
    heterophile (cross) reactions.

It is important that serological tests, where applicable, contain antigens appropriate for detecting antibodies against viral variants (types, subtypes, lineages, topotypes, etc.) that have recently occurred in the region concerned. Where the probable identity of FMDVs is unknown or where exotic viruses are suspected to be present, tests able to detect representatives of all serotypes should be employed (e.g. tests based on nonstructural viral proteins – see below).

It may be possible to use serum collected for other survey purposes for FMD surveillance . However, the principles of survey design described in this Chapter and the requirement for a statistically valid survey for the presence of FMDV should not be compromised.

The discovery of clustering of seropositive reactions should be foreseen. It may reflect any of a series of events, including but not limited to the demographics of the population sampled, vaccinal exposure or the presence of field strain infection . As clustering may signal field strain infection , the investigation of all instances must be incorporated in the survey design. If vaccination cannot be excluded as the cause of positive serological reactions, diagnostic methods should be employed that detect the presence of antibodies to nonstructural proteins (NSPs) of FMDVs as described in the Terrestrial Manual .

The results of random or targeted serological surveys are important in providing reliable evidence that FMDV infection is not present in a country or, zone or compartment . It is therefore essential that the survey be thoroughly documented.

Article 8.5.43.

Members applying for recognition of freedom from FMD for the whole country or a zone where vaccination is not practised: additional surveillance procedures

In addition to the general conditions described in the above-mentioned articles, a Member applying for recognition of FMD freedom for the country or a zone where vaccination is not practised should provide evidence for the existence of an effective surveillance programme. The strategy and design of the surveillance programme will depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances and will be planned and implemented according to general conditions and methods in this Chapter, to demonstrate absence of FMDV infection , during the preceding 12 months in susceptible populations. This requires the support of a national or other laboratory able to undertake identification of FMDV infection through virus/antigen/genome detection and antibody tests described in the Terrestrial Manual .

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Article 8.5.44.

Members applying for recognition of freedom from FMD for the whole country or a zone where vaccination is practised: additional surveillance procedures

In addition to the general conditions described in the above-mentioned articles, a Member applying for recognition of country or zone freedom from FMD with vaccination should show evidence of an effective surveillance programme planned and implemented according to general conditions and methods in this Chapter. Absence of clinical disease in the country or zone for the past 2 years should be demonstrated. Furthermore, surveillance should demonstrate that FMDV has not been circulating in any susceptible population during the past 12 months. This will require serological surveillance incorporating tests able to detect antibodies to NSPs as described in the Terrestrial Manual . Vaccination to prevent the transmission of FMDV may be part of a disease control programme. The level of herd immunity required to prevent transmission will depend on the size, composition (e.g. species) and density of the susceptible population. It is therefore impossible to be prescriptive. However, the aim should, in general, be to vaccinate at least 80% of the susceptible population. The vaccine must comply with the Terrestrial Manual . Based on the epidemiology of FMD in the country or zone , it may be that a decision is reached to vaccinate only certain species or other subsets of the total susceptible population. In that case, the rationale should be contained within the dossier accompanying the application to the OIE for recognition of status.

EU comments

The EU proposes that the OIE look into the wording of the vaccination coverage as it should read: "However, the aim should, in general, be that 80% of the susceptible animals are protected".

Evidence to show the effectiveness of the vaccination programme should be provided.

Article 8.5.45.

Members re-applying for recognition of freedom from F MD for the whole country or a zone where vaccination is either practised or not practised, following an outbreak: additional surveillance procedures

In addition to the general conditions described in the above-mentioned articles, a country re-applying for country or zone freedom from FMD where vaccination is practised or not practised should show evidence of an active surveillance programme for FMD as well as absence of FMDV infection /circulation.

This will require serological surveillance incorporating, in the case of a country or a zone practising vaccination, tests able to detect antibodies to NSPs as described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Four strategies are recognised by the OIE in a programme to eradicate FMDV infection following an outbreak :

  • 1. 
    slaughter of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals;
  • 2. 
    slaughter of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals;
  • 3. 
    slaughter of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, without subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals;
  • 4. 
    vaccination used without slaughter of affected animals or subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals.

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The time periods before which an application can be made for re-instatement of freedom from FMD depends on which of these alternatives is followed. The time periods are prescribed in Article 8.5.8.

In all circumstances, a Member re-applying for country or zone freedom from FMD with vaccination or without vaccination should report the results of an active surveillance programme implemented according to general conditions and methods in this Chapter.

Article 8.5.46. The use and interpretation of serological tests (see Figure 1)

The recommended serological tests for FMD surveillance are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Animals infected with FMDV produce antibodies to both the structural proteins (SP) and the nonstructural proteins (NSP) of the virus. Tests for SP antibodies to include SP-ELISAs and the virus neutralisation test (VNT). The SP tests are serotype specific and for optimal sensitivity should utilise an antigen or virus closely related to the field strain against which antibodies are being sought. Tests for NSP antibodies include NSP I-ELISA 3ABC and the electro-immunotransfer blotting technique (EITB) as recommended in the Terrestrial Manual or equivalent validated tests. In contrast to SP tests, NSP tests can detect antibodies to all serotypes of FMD virus. Animals vaccinated and subsequently infected with FMD virus develop antibodies to NSPs, but in some, the titre may be lower than that found in infected animals that have not been vaccinated. Both the NSP I-ELISA 3ABC and EITB tests have been extensively used in cattle. Validation in other species is ongoing. Vaccines used should comply with the standards of the Terrestrial Manual insofar as purity is concerned to avoid interference with NSP antibody testing.

Serological testing is a suitable tool for FMD surveillance . The choice of a serosurveillance system will depend on, amongst other things, the vaccination status of the country. A country, which is free from FMD without vaccination, may choose serosurveillance of high-risk subpopulations (e.g. based on geographical risk for exposure to FMDV). SP tests may be used in such situations for screening sera for evidence of FMDV infection /circulation if a particular virus of serious threat has been identified and is well characterised. In other cases, NSP testing is recommended in order to cover a broader range of strains and even serotypes. In both cases, serological testing can provide additional support to clinical surveillance . Regardless of whether SP or NSP tests are used in countries that do not vaccinate, a diagnostic follow-up protocol should be in place to resolve any presumptive positive serological test results.

In areas where animals have been vaccinated, SP antibody tests may be used to monitor the serological response to the vaccination. However, NSP antibody tests should be used to monitor for FMDV infection /circulation. NSP-ELISAs may be used for screening sera for evidence of infection /circulation irrespective of the vaccination status of the animal. All herds with seropositive reactors should be investigated. Epidemiological and supplementary laboratory investigation results should document the status of FMDV infection /circulation for each positive herd . Tests used for confirmation should be of high diagnostic specificity to eliminate as many false positive screening test reactors as possible. The diagnostic sensitivity of the confirmatory test should approach that of the screening test. The EITB or another OIE-accepted test should be used for confirmation.

Information should be provided on the protocols, reagents, performance characteristics and validation of all tests used.

  • 1. 
    The follow-up procedure in case of positive test results if no vaccination is used in order to establish or reestablish FMD free status without vaccination

Any positive test result (regardless of whether SP or NSP tests were used) should be followed up immediately using appropriate clinical, epidemiological, serological and, where possible, virological investigations of the reactor animal at hand, of susceptible animals of the same epidemiological unit and of susceptible animals that have been in contact or otherwise epidemiologically associated with the reactor animal. If the follow-up investigations provide no evidence for FMDV infection , the reactor animal shall be classified as FMD negative. In all other cases, including the absence of such follow-up investigations, the reactor animal should be classified as FMD positive.

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  • 2. 
    The follow-up procedure in case of positive test results if vaccination is used in order to establish or reestablish FMD free status with vaccination

In case of vaccinated populations, one has to exclude that positive test results are indicative of virus circulation. To this end, the following procedure should be followed in the investigation of positive serological test results derived from surveillance conducted on FMD vaccinated populations.

The investigation should examine all evidence that might confirm or refute the hypothesis that the positive results to the serological tests employed in the initial survey were not due to virus circulation.

All the epidemiological information should be substantiated, and the results should be collated in the final report.

It is suggested that in the primary sampling units where at least one animal reacts positive to the NSP test, the following strategy(ies) should be applied:

  • a) 
    Following clinical examination, a second serum sample should be taken from the animals tested in the initial survey after an adequate interval of time has lapsed, on the condition that they are individually identified, accessible and have not been vaccinated during this period. Antibodyies titres against NSP in the population at the time of retest should be statistically either equal to or lower than those observed in the initial test if virus is not circulating.

The animals sampled should remain in the holding pending test results and should be clearly identifiable. If the three conditions for retesting mentioned above cannot be met, a new serological survey should be carried out in the holding after an adequate period of time, repeating the application of the primary survey design and ensuring that all animals tested are individually identified. These animals should remain in the holding and should not be vaccinated, so that they can be retested after an adequate period of time.

  • b) 
    Following clinical examination, serum samples should be collected from representative numbers of cattle susceptible animals that were in physical contact with the primary sampling unit. The magnitude and prevalence of antibody reactivity observed should not differ in a statistically significant manner from that of the primary sample if virus is not circulating.
  • c) 
    Following clinical examination, epidemiologically linked herds should be serologically tested and satisfactory results should be achieved if virus is not circulating.
  • d) 
    Sentinel animals can also be used. These can be young, unvaccinated animals or animals in which maternally conferred immunity has lapsed and belonging to the same species resident within the positive initial sampling units. They should be serologically negative if virus is not circulating. If other susceptible, unvaccinated ruminants (sheep, goats) animals are present, they could act as sentinels to provide additional serological evidence.

L aboratory results should be examined in the context of the epidemiological situation. Corollary information needed to complement the serological survey and assess the possibility of viral circulation includes but is not limited to:

  • characterization of the existing production systems;
  • results of clinical surveillance of the suspects and their cohorts;
  • quantification of vaccinations performed on the affected sites;
  • sanitary protocol and history of the establishments with positive reactors;
  • control of animal identification and movements;

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  • other parameters of regional significance in historic FMDV transmission.

The entire investigative process should be documented as standard operating procedure within the surveillance programme.

F ig. 1. Schematic repre sentation of lab oratory te sts

for determining e vidence of F MDV infection

through or fo lowing se rolog ic al surve ys

Key:

ELISA

VNT

NSP

3ABC

EITB

SP

Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

Virus neutralisation test

Nonstructural protein(s) of foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV)

NSP antibody test

Electro-immuno transfer blotting technique (Western blot for NSP antibodies of FMDV)

Structural protein test

No evidence of FMDV

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S

Annex XXI

CH AP TE R 8.16. WEST NILE FEVER

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes, and urges the OIE to find data on geese and ducks in order to eventually delete either the words "geese", "ducks" or the words "(under study)".

Article 8.16.1.

General provisions

West Nile fever (WNF) is a zoonotic disease caused by certain strains of the mosquito transmitted West Nile virus (WNV).

For the purpose of this chapter, the susceptible species are equidae, geese, ducks (under study) and chicken and turkey chicks less than 12 days old (under study) and birds other than poultry .

EU comment

One "and" should be deleted.

WNV is maintained in a mosquito–bird–mosquito transmission cycle, whereas humans and equidae are considered dead-end hosts. Most human infections occur by natural transmission from mosquitoes.

In relation to domestic animal trade, geese and ducks pose a risk for the spread of the WNV as some species have been documented to develop a viraemia sufficient to infect mosquitoes.

Surveillance for WNF should be carried out according to Chapter X.X.

EU comments

The EU proposes to correct the typing mistake in X.X by removing the full stop.

The following criteria define the occurrence of WNF:

  • 1. 
    WNV has been isolated from an animal that shows signs consistent with WNF; or
  • 2. 
    viral antigen or viral ribonucleic acid (RNA) specific to WNV has been identified in samples from one or more animals that show clinical signs consistent with WNF, or that is epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected outbreak of WNF; or
  • 3. 
    antibodies to WNV that are not a consequence of vaccination, have been identified in an animal, that shows clinical signs consistent with WNF, or that is epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected outbreak of WNF.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period for WNF shall be 15 days.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

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When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the WNF status of the ex porting country or zone .

Article 8.16.2. Trade in Safe commodities

Members should not impose trade restrictions on dead-end hosts such as horses.

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities and any products made from these, V eterinary A uthorities should not require any WNV related conditions, regardless of the WNF status of the ex porting country or zone :

  • 1. 
    hatching eggs ;
  • 2. 
    eggs for human consumption;
  • 3. 
    egg products;
  • 4. 
    poultry semen;
  • 5. 
    fresh meat and meat products of poultry ;
  • 6. 
    products of poultry origin intended for use in animal feeding, or for agricultural or industrial use;
  • 7. 
    feathers and down from poultry ;
  • 8. 
    semen of horses;
  • 9. 
    meat and meat products of horses.

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the WNF status of the ex porting countr y or zone .

Article 8.16.3. WNF free country or zone

  • 1. 
    A country or zone may be considered free from WNF when WNF is notifiable in the whole country and either:
  • a. 
    no occurrence of WNF cases , where infection occurred within the territory of the Member, have been recorded for the past 2 years; or
  • b. 
    a surveillance programme in accordance with Chapter X.X. has demonstrated no evidence of WNV in the country or zone during the past 2 years.
  • 2. 
    A WNF free country or zone will not lose its free status through the importation from WNF infected countries or infected zones of:
  • a. 
    seropositive animals;
  • b. 
    semen, embryo or ova;
  • c. 
    animals vaccinated in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual at least 30 days prior to dispatch, and are identified in the accompanying certification as having been vaccinated; or

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  • d. 
    animals not vaccinated if a surveillance programme in accordance with Chapter X.X. has been in place in the source population for a period of 30 days immediately prior to dispatch, and no evidence of WNV transmission has been detected.

Article 8.16.4. WNF seasonally free country or zone

  • 1. 
    A WNF seasonally free country or zone is one in which for part of a year, surveillance demonstrates no evidence either of WNV transmission or presence of mosquitoes likely to be competent WNV vectors.
  • 2. 
    For the application of Article 8.16.6., the seasonally free period is taken to commence 21 days following the last evidence of WNV transmission (as demonstrated by the surveillance programme), or the cessation of activity of mosquitoes likely to be competent WNV vectors.
  • 3. 
    For the application of Article 8.16.6., the seasonally free period is taken to conclude either:
  • a. 
    at least 21 days before the earliest date that historical data show WNV transmission cycle has recommenced; or
  • b. 
    immediately if current climatic data or data from a surveillance programme indicate an earlier resurgence of activity of mosquitoes likely to be competent WNV vectors.
  • 4. 
    A WNF seasonally free country or zone will not lose its free status through the importation from WNF infected countries or infected zones of:
  • a. 
    seropositive animals;
  • b. 
    semen, embryo or ova;
  • c. 
    animals vaccinated in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual at least 30 days prior to dispatch, and are identified in the accompanying certification as having been vaccinated; or
  • d. 
    animals not vaccinated if a surveillance programme in accordance with Chapter X.X. has been in place in the source population for a period of 30 days immediately prior to dispatch, and no evidence of WNV transmission has been detected.

Article 8.16.5. Recommendations for importation from WNF free countries or zones

for susceptible species (other than horses) ducks (under study), geese and birds other than poultry V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the animals were kept in a WNF free country or zone since birth or for at least 30 days prior to shipment; or
  • 2. 
    the animals were kept in a WNF free country or zone for at least 15 days, were subjected, with negative results, to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual carried out on a sample collected at least 3 days after the commencement of the residence period and remained in the WNF free country or zone until shipment; or

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Annex XXI (contd)

  • 3. 
    the animals:
  • a. 
    were vaccinated in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual 30 days before introduction into the free country or zone ; and
  • b. 
    were identified as having been vaccinated; and
  • c. 
    were kept in a WNF free country or zone for at least 15 days; and
  • d. 
    remained in the WNF free country or zone until shipment; AND
  • 4. 
    if the animals were exported from a WNF free zone , either:
  • a. 
    did not transit through an infected country or infected zone during transportation to the place of shipment ; or
  • b. 
    were protected from mosquito attacks at all times when transiting through an infected country or infected zone ; or
  • c. 
    had been vaccinated in accordance with point 3 above.

Article 8.16.6. Recommendations for importation from WNF seasonally free countries or zones

for susceptible species (other than horses) ducks (under study), geese and birds other than poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    were kept during the seasonally free period in a WNF seasonally free country or zone since birth or for at least 30 days prior to shipment; or
  • 2. 
    were kept during the WNF seasonally free period in a WNF seasonally free country or zone for at least 15 days prior to shipment, and were subjected during the residence period in the country or zone to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual , with negative results, carried out on a sample collected at least 3 days after the commencement of the residence period and remained in the WNF seasonally free country or zone until shipment; or
  • 3. 
    were kept during the seasonally free period in a WNF seasonally free country or zone for at least 15 days, and were vaccinated in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual 30 days before introduction into the free country or zone against WNF, were identified as having been vaccinated and remained in the WNF seasonally free country or zone until shipment;

AND

  • 4. 
    if the animals were exported from a WNF seasonally free country or zone , either:
  • a. 
    did not transit through an infected country or infected zone during transportation to the place of shipment ; or

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Annex XXI (contd)

  • b. 
    were protected from mosquito attacks at all times when transiting through an infected country or infected zone ; or
  • c. 
    were vaccinated in accordance with point 3 above.

Article 8.16.7. Recommendations for importation from WNF infected countries or infected zones

for susceptible species (other than horses) ducks (under study) and geese

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    were protected from mosquito attacks for at least 30 days prior to shipment; or
  • 2. 
    were subjected to a serological test according to the Terrestrial Manual to detect WNV neutralizing antibodies with positive results; or
  • 3. 
    were protected from mosquito attacks for at least 15 days prior to shipment, and were subjected during that period to an agent identification test according to the Terrestrial Manual , with negative results, carried out on a sample collected at least 3 days after being introduced in the mosquito-free zone ; or
  • 4. 
    were vaccinated at least 30 days before shipment in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual against WNV and were identified in the accompanying certification as having been vaccinated; or
  • 5. 
    are not vaccinated and a surveillance programme in accordance with Chapter X.X. has been in place in the source population for a period of 30 days immediately prior to shipment, and no evidence of WNV transmission has been detected;

AND

  • 6. 
    were protected from mosquito attacks during transportation to the place of shipment .

Article 8.16.8. Recommendations for the importation from WNF infected countries of birds

for birds other than poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the birds showed no clinical sign of WNF on the day of shipment; and
  • 2. 
    the birds were kept in a quarantine station in a mosquito-free environment for 30 days prior to shipment and a statistically valid sample was subjected, with negative results, to an agent identification test at least 3 days after the commencement of the residence period.

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Annex XXI (contd)

Article 8.16.9.

Protecting animals from mosquito attacks

When transporting animals through WNF infected countries or infected zones , V eterinary A uthorities should require strategies to protect susceptible animals from mosquito attacks during transport, taking into account the local ecology of the mosquitoes.

Potential risk management strategies include:

  • 1. 
    treating animals with insect repellents prior to and during transportation;
  • 2. 
    ensuring vehicles do not stop en route unless the animals are held behind insect proof netting;
  • 3. 
    surveillance for vectors at common stopping and offloading points to gain information on seasonal variations;
  • 4. 
    integrated pest management practices at holding, common stopping and offloading points;
  • 5. 
    using historical, ongoing and/or WNF modelling information to identify low risk ports and transport routes.

text deleted

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Annex XXII

CH AP TE R 9.1. ACARAPISOSIS OF HONEY BEES

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes and is ready to participate in the coming ad hoc group of January 2010.

Article 9.1.1. General provisions

For the purposes of this Chapter, acarapisosis, acarine disease or tracheal mite infestation is a disease of the adult honey bee Apis mellifera L. , and possibly of other A pis species (such as A pis cerana ). It is caused by the Tarsonemid mite A carapis woodi (Rennie). The mite is an internal obligate parasite of the respiratory system, living and reproducing mainly in the large prothoracic trachea of the bee. Early signs of infection normally go unnoticed, and only when infection is heavy does it become apparent; this is generally in the early spring. The infection spreads by direct contact from adult bee to adult bee, with newly emerged bees under 10 days old being the most susceptible. The mortality rate may range from moderate to high.

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the acarapisosis status of the honey bee population of the ex porti ng country or z one .

Article 9.1.2. Trade in Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any acarapisosis related conditions, regardless of the acarapisosis status of the honey bee population of the ex porting country or z one :

  • 1. 
    honey bee semen and honey bee venom;
  • 2. 
    used equipment associated with beekeeping;
  • 3. 
    honey for human consumption, beeswax, honey bee-collected pollen, propolis and royal jelly.

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this Chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this Chapter relevant to the acarapisosis status of the honey bee population of the ex porti ng countr y or z one .

Article 9.1.3. Determination of the acarapisosis status of a country or zone/ compartment

The acarapisosis status of a country or zone /compartment (under study) can only be determined after considering the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    a risk assessment has been conducted, identifying all potential factors for acarapisosis occurrence and their historic perspective;

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  • 2. 
    acarapisosis should be notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study) and all clinical signs suggestive of acarapisosis should be subjected to field and laboratory investigations;
  • 3. 
    an on-going awareness programme should be in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of acarapisosis;
  • 4. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees should have current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries in the whole country.

Article 9.1.4. Country or zone/ compartment (under study) free from acarapisosis

  • 1. 
    Historically free status

A country or zone /compartment (under study) may be considered free from acarapisosis after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.1.3. but without formally applying a specific surveillance programme if the country or zone /compartment (under study) complies with the provisions of Chapter 1.4.

  • 2. 
    Free status as a result of an eradication programme

A country or zone /compartment (under study) which does not meet the conditions of point 1 above may be considered free from acarapisosis after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.1.3. and when:

  • a. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries existing in the country or z one /compartment (under study);
  • b. 
    acarapisosis is notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study), and any clinical cases suggestive of acarapisosis are subjected to field and laboratory investigations;
  • c. 
    for the 3 years following the last reported case of acarapisosis, annual surveys supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, have been carried out on a representative sample of apiaries in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to provide a confidence level of at least 95% of detecting acarapisosis if at least 1% of the apiaries were infected at a within-apiary prevalence rate of at least 5% of the hives; such surveys may be targeted towards apiaries , areas and seasons with a higher likelihood of disea se ;
  • d. 
    to maintain free status, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, is carried out on a representative sample of apiaries in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to indicate that there has been no new cases ; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with a higher likelihood of disease ;
  • e. 
    (under study) there is no self-sustaining feral population of A. mellifera or other possible host species in the country or z one /compartment (under study);
  • f. 
    the importation of the commodities listed in this Chapter into the country or zone /compartment (under study) is carried out in conformity with the recommendations of this Chapter.

Article 9.1.5.

Recommendations for the importation of live queen honey bees, worker bees and drones with or without associated brood combs

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the bees come from a country or zone /compartment (under study) free from acarapisosis.

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Article 9.1.6.

Recommendations for the importation of eggs, larvae and pupae of honey bees

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    were sourced from an officially free country or zone /compartment (under study); or
  • 2. 
    were examined by an official laboratory and declared free of all life stages of A. woodi ; or
  • 3. 
    have originated from queens in a quarantine station and were examined microscopically and found free of all

life stages of A. woodi .

text deleted

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Annex XXII (contd)

CH AP TE R 9.2. AMERICAN FOULBROOD OF HONEY BEES

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes and is ready to participate in the coming ad hoc group of January 2010.

Article 9.2.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of this Chapter, American foulbrood is a disease of the larval and pupal stages of the honey bee A pis mellifera and other A pis spp., and occurs in most countries where such bees are kept. Paenibacillus larvae , the causative organism, is a bacterium that can produce over one billion spores in each infected larva. The spores are very long-living and extremely resistant to heat and chemical agents, and only the spores are capable of inducing the disease .

Combs of infected apiaries may show distinctive clinical signs which can allow the disease to be diagnosed in the field. However, subclinical infections are common and require laboratory diagnosis.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period for American foulbrood shall be 15 days (not including the wintering period which may vary according to country).

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the American foulbrood status of the honey bee population of the ex porting country or zone .

Article 9.2.2.

Trade in Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any American foulbrood related conditions, regardless of the American foulbrood status of the honey bee population of the ex porting country or zone :

  • 1. 
    honey bee semen;
  • 2. 
    honey bee venom.

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this Chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this Chapter relevant to the American foulbrood status of the honey bee population of the ex porting countr y or zone .

Article 9.2.3.

Determination of the American foulbrood status of a country or zone/ compartment

The American foulbrood status of a country or zone /compartment (under study) can only be determined after considering the following criteria:

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  • 1. 
    a risk assessment has been conducted, identifying all potential factors for American foulbrood occurrence and their historic perspective;
  • 2. 
    American foulbrood should be notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study) and all clinical signs suggestive of American foulbrood should be subjected to field and/or laboratory investigations;
  • 3. 
    an on-going awareness programme should be in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of American foulbrood;
  • 4. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees should have current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries in the country.

Article 9.2.4. Country or zone/ compartment (under study) free from American foulbrood

  • 1. 
    Historically free status

A country or zone /compartment (under study) may be considered free from the disease after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.2.3. but without formally applying a specific surveillance programme if the country or zone /compartment (under study) complies with the provisions of Chapter 1.4.

  • 2. 
    Free status as a result of an eradication programme

A country or zone /compartment (under study) which does not meet the conditions of point 1 above may be considered free from American foulbrood after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.2.3. and when:

  • a. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries existing in the country or z one /compartment (under study);
  • b. 
    American foulbrood is notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study), and any clinical cases suggestive of American foulbrood are subjected to field and/or laboratory investigations;
  • c. 
    for the 5 years following the last reported isolation of the American foulbrood agent, annual surveys supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, have been carried out on a representative sample of apiaries in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to provide a confidence level of at least 95% of detecting American foulbrood if at least 1% of the apiaries were infected at a within-apiary prevalence rate of at least 5% of the hives; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with the last reported isolation of the American foulbrood agent;
  • d. 
    to maintain free status, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, is carried out on a representative sample of hives in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to indicate that there has been no new isolations; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with a higher likelihood of isolation;

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Annex XXII (contd)

  • e. 
    (under study) there is no self-sustaining feral population of A. mellifera or other possible host species in the country or z one /compartment (under study);
  • f. 
    all equipment associated with previously infected apiaries has been sterilised or destroyed;
  • g. 
    the importation of the commodities listed in this Chapter into the country or zone /compartment (under study) is carried out in conformity with the recommendations of this Chapter.

Article 9.2.5.

Recommendations for the importation of live queen honey bees, worker bees and drones with or without associated brood combs

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the bees come from a country or zone /compartment (under study) officially free from American foulbrood.

Article 9.2.6. Recommendations for the importation of eggs, larvae and pupae of honey bees

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    were sourced from a free country or zone /compartment (under study); or
  • 2. 
    have been isolated from queens in a quarantine station , and all workers which accompanied the queen or a representative sample of eggs or larvae were examined for the presence of P. larvae by bacterial culture or PCR in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 9.2.7. Recommendations for the importation of used equipment associated with beekeeping

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the equipment was sterilised under the supervision of the V eterinary A uthority by either immersion in 1% sodium hypochlorite for at least 30 minutes (suitable only for non-porous materials such as plastic and metal), gamma irradiation using a cobalt-60 source at a dose rate of 10 kGy, or processing to ensure the destruction of both bacillary and spore forms of P. larvae , in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study).

Article 9.2.8.

Recommendations for the importation of honey, honey bee-collected pollen, beeswax, propolis and royal jelly

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries officially free from American foulbrood should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

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Annex XXII (contd)

  • 1. 
    were collected in a country or zone /compartment (under study) free from American foulbrood; or
  • 2. 
    have been processed to ensure the destruction of both bacillary and spore forms of P. larvae , in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study).

text deleted

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Annex XXII (contd)

CH AP TE R 9.3. EUROPEAN FOULBROOD OF HONEY BEES

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes and is ready to participate in the coming ad hoc group of January 2010.

Article 9.3.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of this Chapter, European foulbrood is a disease of the larval and pupal stages of the honey bee A pis mellifera and other A pis spp., and occurs in most countries where such bees are kept. The causative agent is the non-sporulating bacterium Melissococcus plutonius . Subclinical infections are common and require laboratory diagnosis. I nfection remains enzootic because of mechanical contamination of the honeycombs. Recurrences of disease can therefore be expected in subsequent years.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period for European foulbrood shall be 15 days (not including the wintering period which may vary according to country).

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the European foulbrood status of the honey bee population of the ex porting country or zone .

Article 9.3.2.

Trade in Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any European foulbrood related conditions, regardless of the European foulbrood status of the honey bee population of the ex porting country or zone :

  • 1. 
    honey bee semen;
  • 2. 
    honey bee venom.

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this Chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this Chapter relevant to the European foulbrood status of the honey bee population of the ex porting countr y or zone .

Article 9.3.3.

Determination of the European foulbrood status of a country or zone/ compartment

The European foulbrood status of a country or zone /compartment (under study) can only be determined after considering the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    a risk assessment has been conducted, identifying all potential factors for European foulbrood occurrence and their historic perspective;

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  • 2. 
    European foulbrood should be notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study) and all

clinical signs suggestive of European foulbrood should be subjected to field and laboratory

  • 3. 
    an on-going awareness programme should be in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of European foulbrood;
  • 4. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees should have current knowledge of, and authority over, all apiaries in the whole country.

Article 9.3.4. Country or zone/ compartment (under study) free from European foulbrood

  • 1. 
    Historically free status

A country or zone /compartment (under study) may be considered free from the disease after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.3.3. but without formally applying a specific surveillance programme if the country or zone /compartment (under study) complies with the provisions of Chapter 1.4.

  • 2. 
    Free status as a result of an eradication programme

A country or zone /compartment (under study) which does not meet the conditions of point 1 above may be considered free from European foulbrood after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.3.3. and when:

  • a. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries existing in the country or z one /compartment (under study);
  • b. 
    European foulbrood is notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study), and any clinical cases suggestive of European foulbrood are subjected to field and laboratory investigations;
  • c. 
    for the 3 years following the last reported isolation of the European foulbrood agent, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, have been carried out on a representative sample of apiaries in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to provide a confidence level of at least 95% of detecting European foulbrood if at least 1% of the apiaries were infected at a within-apiary prevalence rate of at least 5% of the hives; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with the last reported isolation of the European foulbrood agent;
  • d. 
    to maintain free status, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, is carried out on a representative sample of hives in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to indicate that there has been no new isolations; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with a higher likelihood of isolation;
  • e. 
    (under study) there is no self-sustaining feral population of A. mellifera or other possible host species in the country or z one /compartment (under study);
  • f. 
    the importation of the commodities listed in this Chapter into the country or zone /compartment (under study) is carried out in conformity with the recommendations of this Chapter.

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Annex XXII (contd)

Article 9.3.5.

Recommendations for the importation of live queen honey bees, worker bees and drones with or without associated brood combs

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the bees come from a country or zone /compartment (under study) free from European foulbrood.

Article 9.3.6. Recommendations for the importation of eggs, larvae and pupae of honey bees

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    were sourced from a free country or zone /compartment (under study); or
  • 2. 
    have been isolated from queens in a quarantine station , and all workers which accompanied the queen or a representative sample of eggs or larvae were examined for the presence of M. plutonius by bacterial culture or PCR in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 9.3.7. Recommendations for the importation of used equipment associated with beekeeping

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the equipment was sterilised under the supervision of the V eterinary A uthority by either immersion in 0.5% sodium hypochlorite for at least 20 minutes (suitable only for non-porous materials such as plastic and metal), gamma irradiation using a cobalt-60 source at a dose rate of 10 kGy, or processing to ensure the destruction of M. plutonius , in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study).

Article 9.3.8.

Recommendations for the importation of honey, honey bee-collected pollen, beeswax, propolis and royal jelly

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    were collected in a country or zone /compartment (under study) free from European foulbrood; or
  • 2. 
    have been processed to ensure the destruction of M. plutonius , in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study).

text deleted

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Annex XXII (contd)

CH AP TE R 9.4

SMALL HIVE BEETLE INFESTATION ( Aet hina t umida)

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes and is ready to participate in the coming ad hoc group of January 2010.

Article 9.4.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of this Chapter, small hive beetle (SHB) is an infestation of bee colonies by the beetle A ethina tumida , which is a free-living predator and scavenger affecting populations of the honey bee A pis mellifera L. It can also parasitise bumble bee Bombus terrestris colonies under experimental conditions, and although infestation has not been demonstrated in wild populations, Bombus spp. must also be considered to be susceptible to infestation.

The adult beetle is attracted to bee colonies to reproduce, although it can survive and reproduce independently in other natural environments, using other food sources, including certain types of fruit. Hence once it is established within a localised environment, it is extremely difficult to eradicate.

The life cycle of A. tumida begins with the adult beetle laying eggs within infested hives. These are usually laid in irregular masses in crevices or brood combs. After 2-6 days, the eggs hatch and the emerging larvae begin to feed voraciously on brood comb, bee eggs, pollen and honey within the hive. The SHB has a high reproductive potential. Each female can produce about 1,000 eggs in its 4 to 6 months of life. At maturation (approximately 10-29 days after hatching), the larvae exit the hive and burrow into soil around the hive entrance. Adult beetles emerge after an average of 3-4 weeks, although pupation can take between 8 and 60 days depending on temperature and moisture levels.

The life span of an adult beetle depends on environmental conditions such as temperature and humidity but, in practice, adult beetles can live for at least 6 months and, in favourable reproductive conditions, the female is capable of laying new egg batches every 5-12 weeks. The beetle is able to survive at least 2 weeks without food and 50 days on brood combs.

Early signs of infestation may go unnoticed, but the growth of the beetle population is rapid, leading to high bee mortality in the hive. Because A. tumida can be found and can thrive within the natural environment, and can fly up to 6-13 km from its nest site, it is capable of dispersing rapidly and directly colonising hives. Dispersal includes following or accompanying swarms. Spread of infestation does not require contact between adult bees. However, the movement of adult bees, honeycomb and other apiculture products and used equipment associated with bee-keeping may all cause infestations to spread to previously unaffected colonies.

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the A. tumida status of the honey bee and bumble bee population of the ex porting country or zone .

Article 9.4.2. Trade in Safe commodities

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When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any small hive beetle infestation related conditions, regardless of the A. tumida status of the honey bee and bumble bee population of the ex porting country or zone :

  • 1. 
    honey bee semen and honey bee venom;
  • 2. 
    packaged extracted honey for human consumption, refined or rendered beeswax, propolis and frozen or dried royal jelly.

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this Chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this Chapter relevant to the A. tumida status of the honey bee and bumble bee population of the ex porting countr y or zone .

Article 9.4.3. Determination of the A. tumida status of a country or zone

The A. tumida status of a country or zone can only be determined after considering the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    A. tumida infestation should be notifiable in the whole country, and all signs suggestive of A. tumida infestation should be subjected to field and laboratory investigations;
  • 2. 
    on-going awareness and training programmes should be in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of A. tumida infestation;
  • 3. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees should have current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries in the country.

Article 9.4.4.

Country or zone free from A. tumida

  • 1. 
    Historically free status

A country or zone may be considered free from the pest after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.4.3. but without formally applying a specific surveillance programme if the country or zone complies with the provisions of Chapter 1.4.

  • 2. 
    Free status as a result of an eradication programme

A country or zone which does not meet the conditions of point 1 above may be considered free from A. tumida infestation after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.4.3. and when:

  • a. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries existing in the country or zone ;
  • b. 
    A. tumida infestation is notifiable in the whole country or zone , and any clinical cases suggestive of A. tumida infestation are subjected to field and laboratory investigations; a contingency plan is in place describing controls and inspection activities;
  • c. 
    for the 5 years following the last reported case of A. tumida infestation, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, has been carried out on a representative sample of apiaries in the country or zone to provide a confidence level of at least 95% of detecting A. tumida infestation if at least 1% of the apiaries were infested at a within-apiary prevalence rate of at least 5% of the hives; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with a higher likelihood of infestation;
  • d. 
    to maintain free status, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, is

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carried out on a representative sample of apiaries to indicate that there have been no new cases ; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with a higher likelihood of infestation;

  • e. 
    all equipment associated with previously infested apiaries has been destroyed, or cleaned and sterilised to ensure the destruction of A. tumida spp., in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study);
  • f. 
    the soil and undergrowth in the immediate vicinity of all infested apiaries has been treated with a soil drench or similar suitable treatment that is efficacious in destroying incubating A. tumida larvae and pupae;
  • g. 
    the importation of the commodities listed in this Chapter into the country or zone is carried out, in conformity with the recommendations of this Chapter.

Article 9.4.5.

Recommendations for the importation of individual consignments containing a single live queen honey bee or queen bumble bee, accompanied by a small number of associated attendants (a maximum of 20 attendants per queen)

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the bees come from a country or zone officially free from A. tumida infestation.

OR

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate including an attestation from the V eterinary A uthority of the exporting third country stating that:

  • 1. 
    the bees come from hives or colonies which were inspected immediately prior to dispatch and show no signs or suspicion of the presence of A. tumida or its eggs, larvae or pupae; and
  • 2. 
    the bees come from an area of at least 100 km radius where no apiary has been subject to any restrictions associated with the occurrence of A. tumida for the previous 6 months; and
  • 3. 
    the bees and accompanying packaging presented for export have been thoroughly and individually inspected and do not contain A. tumida or its eggs, larvae or pupae; and
  • 4. 
    the consignment of bees is covered with fine mesh through which a live beetle cannot enter.

Article 9.4.6.

Recommendations for the importation of live worker bees, drone bees or bee colonies with or without associated brood combs or for live bumble bees

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the bees come from a country or zone officially free from A. tumida infestation; and
  • 2. 
    the bees and accompanying packaging presented for export have been inspected and do not contain A. tumida or its eggs, larvae or pupae; and
  • 3. 
    the consignment of bees is covered with fine mesh through which a live beetle cannot enter.

Article 9.4.7. Recommendations for the importation of eggs, larvae and pupae of honey bees or bumble bees

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V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    the products were sourced from a country or zone free from A. tumida infestation;
  • 2. 
    the products have been bred and kept under a controlled environment within a recognised establishment which is supervised and controlled by the V eterinary A uthority ;
  • 3. 
    the establishment was inspected immediately prior to dispatch and all eggs, larvae and pupae show no clinical signs or suspicion of the presence of A. tumida or its eggs or larvae or pupae, and
  • 4. 
    the packaging material, containers, accompanying products and food are new and all precautions have been taken to prevent contamination with A. tumida or its eggs, larvae or pupae.

Article 9.4.8. Recommendations for the importation of used equipment associated with beekeeping

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the equipment: EITHER
  • a. 
    comes from a country or zone free from A. tumida infestation; and
  • b. 
    contains no live honey bees or bee brood; OR
  • c. 
    contains no live honey bees or bee brood; and
  • d. 
    has been thoroughly cleaned, and treated to ensure the destruction of A. tumida spp., in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study); and

AND

  • 2. 
    all precautions have been taken to prevent infestation/contamination.

Article 9.4.9.

Recommendations for the importation of honey-bee collected pollen and beeswax (in the form of honeycomb)

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

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Annex XXII (contd)

  • 1. 
    the products: EITHER
  • a. 
    comes from a country or zone free from A. tumida infestation; and
  • b. 
    contains no live honey bees or bee brood; OR
  • c. 
    contains no live honey bees or bee brood; and
  • d. 
    has been thoroughly cleaned, and treated to ensure the destruction of A. tumida spp., in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study);

AND

  • 2. 
    all precautions have been taken to prevent infestation/contamination.

Article 9.4.10.

Recommendations for the importation of comb honey

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    comes from a country or zone free from A. tumida infestation; and
  • 2. 
    contains no live honey bees or bee brood; OR
  • 3. 
    were subjected to a treatment at a temperature of -12°C or lower in the core of the product during at least 24 hours.

text deleted

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Annex XXII (contd)

CH AP TE R 9.5. TROPILAELAPS INFESTATION OF HONEY BEES

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes and is ready to participate in the coming ad hoc group of January 2010. The EU strongly urges the OIE to ensure that the mitigating treatments are dealt with by the ad hoc group as a matter of priority (articles 9.5.7 and 8).

Article 9.5.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of this Chapter, Tropilaelaps infestation of the honey bee A pis mellifera L. is caused by the mites Tropilaelaps clareae , T. k oenigerum , T. thaii and T. mercedesae . The mite is an ectoparasite of brood of A pis mellifera L., A pis laboriosa and A pis dorsata , and cannot survive for periods of more than 7 days away from bee brood.

Early signs of infection normally go unnoticed, but the growth in the mite population is rapid leading to high hive mortality. The infection spreads by direct contact from adult bee to adult bee, and by the movement of infested bees and bee brood. The mite can also act as a vector for viruses of the honey bee.

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the Tropilaelaps status of the honey bee population of the ex porti ng country or z one .

Article 9.5.2.

Trade in Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any Tropilaelaps infestation related conditions, regardless of the Tropilaelaps status of the honey bee population of the ex porti ng country or z one :

  • 1. 
    honey bee semen, honey bee eggs and honey bee venom;
  • 2. 
    extracted honey for human consumption and beeswax (not in the form of honeycomb).

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this Chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this Chapter relevant to the Tropilaelaps status of the honey bee population of the ex porti ng countr y or z one .

Article 9.5.3.

Determination of the Trop ilae lap s status of a country or zone/ compartment

The Tropilaelaps status of a country or zone /compartment (under study) can only be determined after considering the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    a risk assessment has been conducted, identifying all potential factors for Tropilaelaps occurrence and their

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historic perspective;

  • 2. 
    Tropilaelaps infestation should be notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study) and all clinical signs suggestive of Tropilaelaps infestation should be subjected to field and laboratory investigations;
  • 3. 
    an on-going awareness programme should be in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of T ropilaelaps infestation;
  • 4. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees should have current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries in the country.

Article 9.5.4. Country or zone/ compartment (under study) free from T ropilae lap s spp

  • 1. 
    Historically free status

A country or zone /compartment (under study) may be considered free from the disease after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.5.3. but without formally applying a specific surveillance programme if the country or zone /compartment (under study) complies with the provisions of Chapter 1.4.

  • 2. 
    Free status as a result of an eradication programme

A country or zone /compartment (under study) which does not meet the conditions of point 1 above may be considered free from Tropilaelaps infestation after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.5.3. and when:

  • a. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries existing in the country or z one /compartment (under study);
  • b. 
    Tropilaelaps infestation is notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study), and any clinical cases suggestive of Tropilaelaps infestation are subjected to field and laboratory investigations;
  • c. 
    for the 3 years following the last reported case of Tropilaelaps infestation, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, have been carried out on a representative sample of apiaries in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to provide a confidence level of at least 95% of detecting Tropilaelaps infestation if at least 1% of the apiaries were infected at a within-apiary prevalence rate of at least 5% of the hives; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with a higher likelihood of infestation;
  • d. 
    to maintain free status, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, is carried out on a representative sample of apiaries in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to indicate that there has been no new cases ; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with a higher likelihood of disease ;
  • e. 
    (under study) there is no self-sustaining feral population of A. mellifera , A. dorsata or A. laboriosa , or other possible host species in the country or zone /compartment (under study);
  • f. 
    the importation of the commodities listed in this Chapter into the country or zone /compartment (under study) is carried out, in conformity with the recommendations of this Chapter.

Article 9.5.5.

Recommendations for the importation of live queen honey bees, worker bees and drones with associated brood combs

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the bees come from a country or zone /compartment (under study) officially free from Tropilaelaps infestation.

Article 9.5.6.

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Recommendations for the importation of live queen honey bees, worker bees and drones without associated brood combs

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the bees have been held in isolation from brood and bees with access to brood, for a period of at least 7 days.

Article 9.5.7.

Recommendations for the importation of used equipment associated with beekeeping

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the equipment:

  • 1. 
    comes from a country or zone /compartment (under study) free from Tropilaelaps infestation; or
  • 2. 
    contains no live honey bees or bee brood and has been held away from contact with live honey bees for at least 7 days prior to shipment; or
  • 3. 
    has been treated to ensure the destruction of Tropilaelaps spp., in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study).

Article 9.5.8.

Recommendations for the importation of honey-bee collected pollen, beeswax (in the form of honeycomb), comb honey and propolis

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    come from a country or zone /compartment (under study) free from Tropilaelaps infestation; or
  • 2. 
    contain no live honey bees or bee brood and has been held away from contact with live honey bees for at least 7 days prior to shipment; or
  • 3. 
    have been treated to ensure the destruction of Tropilaelaps spp., in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study).

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Annex XXII (contd)

CH AP TE R 9.6. VARROOSIS OF HONEY BEES

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes and is ready to participate in the coming ad hoc group of January 2010. The EU strongly urges the OIE to ensure that the mitigating treatments are dealt with by the ad hoc group as a matter of priority (articles 9.6.7 and 8).

Article 9.6.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of this Chapter, varroosis is a disease of the honey bee A pis mellifera L. It is caused by the Korea and Japan haplotypes of the mite V arroa destructor , the original hosts of which are the Korea and Japan haplotypes of A pis cerana (under study). The mite is an ectoparasite of adults and brood of A pis mellifera L. During its life cycle, sexual reproduction occurs inside the honey bee brood cells. Early signs of infection normally go unnoticed, and only when infection is heavy does it become apparent. The infection spreads by direct contact from adult bee to adult bee, and by the movement of infested bees and bee brood. The mite can also act as a vector for viruses of the honey bee.

The number of parasites steadily increases with increasing brood activity and the growth of the bee population, especially late in the season when clinical signs of infestation can first be recognised. The life span of an individual mite depends on temperature and humidity but, in practice, it can be said to last from some days to a few months.

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the varroosis status of the honey bee population of the ex porti ng country or z one .

Article 9.6.2.

Trade in Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any varroosis related conditions, regardless of the varroosis status of the honey bee population of the ex porting country or zone :

  • 1. 
    honey bee semen, honey bee eggs and honey bee venom;
  • 2. 
    extracted honey for human consumption and beeswax (not in the form of honeycomb).

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this Chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this Chapter relevant to the varroosis status of the honey bee population of the ex porti ng countr y or z one .

Article 9.6.3.

Determination of the varroosis status of a country or zone/ compartment

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The varroosis status of a country or zone /compartment (under study) can only be determined after considering the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    a risk assessment has been conducted, identifying all potential factors for varroosis occurrence and their historic perspective;
  • 2. 
    varroosis should be notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study) and all clinical signs suggestive of varroosis should be subjected to field and laboratory investigations;
  • 3. 
    an on-going awareness programme should be in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of varroosis;
  • 4. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees should have current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries in the country.

Article 9.6.4. Country or zone/ compartment (under study) free from varroosis

  • 1. 
    Historically free status

A country or zone /compartment (under study) may be considered free from the disease after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.6.3. but without formally applying a specific surveillance programme (historical freedom) if the country or zone /compartment (under study) complies with the provisions of Chapter 1.4.

  • 2. 
    Free status as a result of an eradication programme

A country or zone /compartment (under study) which does not meet the conditions of point 1 above may be considered free from varroosis after conducting a risk assessment as referred to in Article 9.6.3. and when:

  • a. 
    the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority with responsibility for reporting and control of diseases of honey bees has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domesticated apiaries existing in the country or z one /compartment (under study);
  • b. 
    varroosis is notifiable in the whole country or zone /compartment (under study), and any clinical cases suggestive of varroosis are subjected to field and laboratory investigations;
  • c. 
    for the 3 years following the last reported case of varroosis, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, have been carried out on a representative sample of apiaries in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to provide a confidence level of at least 95% of detecting varroosis if at least 1% of the apiaries were infected at a within-apiary prevalence rate of at least 5% of the hives; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with a higher likelihood of disease ;
  • d. 
    to maintain free status, an annual survey supervised by the V eterinary A uthority , with negative results, is carried out on a representative sample of apiaries in the country or zone /compartment (under study) to indicate that there has been no new cases ; such surveys may be targeted towards areas with a higher likelihood of disease ;
  • e. 
    (under study) there is no self-sustaining feral population of A. mellifera , the Korea and Japan haplotypes of A pis cerana or other possible host species in the country or zone /compartment (under study);
  • f. 
    the importation of the commodities listed in this Chapter into the country or zone /compartment (under study) is carried out in conformity with the recommendations of this Chapter.

Article 9.6.5. Recommendations for the importation of live queen honey bees, worker bees and drones with or

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without associated brood combs

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the bees come from a country or zone /compartment (under study) officially free from varroosis.

Article 9.6.6. Recommendations for the importation of larvae and pupae of honey bees

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    were sourced from a free country or zone /compartment (under study); or
  • 2. 
    have originated from queens in a quarantine station and were inspected and found free of Varroa destructor .

Article 9.6.7. Recommendations for the importation of used equipment associated with beekeeping

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the equipment:

  • 1. 
    comes from a country or zone /compartment (under study) free from varroosis; or
  • 2. 
    contains no live honey bees or bee brood and has been held away from contact with live honey bees for at least 7 days prior to shipment; or
  • 3. 
    has been treated to ensure the destruction of V arroa destructor , in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study).

Article 9.6.8.

Recommendations for the importation of honey-bee collected pollen, beeswax (in the form of honeycomb), comb honey and propolis

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    come from a country or zone /compartment (under study) free from varroosis; or
  • 2. 
    contain no live honey bees or bee brood and has been held away from contact with live honey bees for at least 7 days prior to shipment; or
  • 3. 
    have been treated to ensure the destruction of V arroa destructor , in conformity with one of the procedures

referred to in Chapter X.X. (under study).

text deleted

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Annex XXIII

CH AP TE R 10. 4. AVIAN INFLUENZA

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes but has some comments.

Article 10.4.1. General provisions

  • 1. 
    For the purposes of international trade , avian influenza in its notifiable form (NAI) is defined as an infection of poultry caused by any influenza A virus of the H5 or H7 subtypes or by any AI virus with an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) greater than 1.2 (or as an alternative at least 75% mortality) as described below. NAI viruses can be divided into highly pathogenic notifiable avian influenza (HPNAI) and low pathogenicity notifiable avian influenza (LPNAI):
  • a. 
    HPNAI viruses have an IVPI in 6-week-old chickens greater than 1.2 or, as an alternative, cause at least 75% mortality in 4-to 8-week-old chickens infected intravenously. H5 and H7 viruses which do not have an IVPI of greater than 1.2 or cause less than 75% mortality in an intravenous lethality test should be sequenced to determine whether multiple basic amino acids are present at the cleavage site of the haemagglutinin molecule (HA0); if the amino acid motif is similar to that observed for other HPNAI isolates, the isolate being tested should be considered as HPNAI;
  • b. 
    LPNAI are all influenza A viruses of H5 and H7 subtype that are not HPNAI viruses.
  • 2. 
    Poultry is defined as ‘all domesticated birds, including backyard poultry , used for the production of meat or eggs for consumption, for the production of other commercial products, for restocking supplies of game, or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as fighting cocks used for any purpose’.

Birds that are kept in captivity for any reason other than those reasons referred to in the preceding paragraph, including those that are kept for shows, races, exhibitions, competitions or for breeding or selling these categories of birds as well as pet birds, are not considered to be poultry .

  • 3. 
    For the purposes of international trade , this chapter deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by NAI virus, but also with the presence of infection with NAI virus in the absence of clinical signs.
  • 4. 
    For the purposes of international trade , a Member should not impose immediate bans on the trade in poultry commodities in response to a notification, according to Article 1.2.3. of the Terrestrial Code , of infection with HPAI and LPAI virus in birds other than poultry , including wild birds.
  • 5. 
    Antibodies to H5 or H7 subtype of NAI virus, which have been detected in poultry and are not a consequence of vaccination, have to be immediately investigated. In the case of isolated serological positive results, NAI infection may be ruled out on the basis of a thorough epidemiological and laboratory investigation that does not demonstrate further evidence of NAI infection.
  • 6. 
    The following defines the occurrence of infection with NAI virus:
  • a. 
    HPNAI virus has been isolated and identified as such or viral RNA specific for HPNAI has been detected in poultry or a product derived from poultry ; or

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  • b. 
    LPNAI virus has been isolated and identified as such or viral RNA specific for LPNAI has been detected in poultry or a product derived from poultry .

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , ‘NAI free establishment’ means an establishment in which the poultry have shown no evidence of NAI infection, based on surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.28. to 10.4.34.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period for NAI shall be 21 days.

Standards for diagnostic tests, including pathogenicity testing, are described in the Terrestrial Manual . Any vaccine used should comply with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 10.4.2. Determination of the NAI status of a country, zone or compartment

The NAI status of a country, a zone or a compartment can be determined on the basis of the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    NAI is notifiable in the whole country, an on-going NAI awareness programme is in place, and all notified suspect occurrences of NAI are subjected to field and, where applicable, laboratory investigations;
  • 2. 
    appropriate surveillance is in place to demonstrate the presence of infection in the absence of clinical signs in poultry , and the risk posed by birds other than poultry ; this may be achieved through a NAI surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 10.4.28. to 10.4.34.;
  • 3. 
    consideration of all epidemiological factors for NAI occurrence and their historical perspective.

Article 10.4.3.

NAI free country, zone or compartment

A country, zone or compartment may be considered free from NAI when it has been shown that neither HPNAI nor LPNAI infection in poultry has been present in the country, zone or compartment for the past 12 months, based on surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.28. to 10.4.34.

If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone or compartment , NAI free status can be regained:

  • 1. 
    In the case of HPNAI infections , 3 months after a stamping-out policy (including disinfection of all affected establishments ) is applied, providing that surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.28. to 10.4.34. has been carried out during that three-month period.
  • 2. 
    In the case of LPNAI infections , poultry may be kept for slaughter for human consumption subject to conditions specified in Articles 10.4.20. or 10.4.21. or a stamping-out policy may be applied; in either case, 3 months after the disinfection of all affected establishments , providing that surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.28. to 10.4.34. has been carried out during that three-month period.

Article 10.4.4. HPNAI free country, zone or compartment

A country, zone or compartment may be considered free from HPNAI when:

  • 1. 
    it has been shown that HPNAI infection in poultry has not been present in the country, zone or compartment for the past 12 months, although its LPNAI status may be unknown; or

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Annex XXIII (contd)

  • 2. 
    when, based on surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.28. to 10.4.34., it does not meet the criteria for freedom from NAI but any NAI virus detected has not been identified as HPNAI virus.

The surveillance may need to be adapted to parts of the country or existing zones or compartments depending on historical or geographical factors, industry structure, population data, or proximity to recent outbreaks .

If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone or compartment , HPNAI free status can be regained 3 months after a stamping-out policy (including disinfection of all affected esta blishments ) is applied, providing that surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.4.28. to 10.4.34. has been carried out during that three-month period.

Article 10.4.5. Recommendations for importation from a NAI free country, zone or compartment

for live poultry (other than day-old poultry)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the poultry showed no clinical sign of NAI on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    the poultry were kept in a NAI free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched or for at least the past 21 days;
  • 3. 
    the poultry are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers ;
  • 4. 
    if the poultry have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.4.6.

Recommendations for the importation of live birds other than poultry

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    on the day of shipment, the birds showed no clinical sign of infection with a virus which would be considered NAI in poultry on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    the birds were kept in isolation approved by the V eterinary Services since they were hatched or for at least the 21 days prior to shipment and showed no clinical sign of infection with a virus which would be considered NAI in poultry during the isolation period;
  • 3. 
    a statistically valid sample of the birds, selected in accordance with the provisions of Article 10.4.30, at a design prevalence acceptable to the importing countr y was subjected to a diagnostic test within 14 days prior to shipment to demonstrate freedom from infection with a virus which would be considered NAI in poultry ;
  • 4. 
    the birds are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers ;
  • 5. 
    if the birds have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

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Annex XXIII (contd)

Article 10.4.7.

Recommendations for importation from a NAI free country, zone or compartment

for day-old live poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the poultry were kept in a NAI free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched;
  • 2. 
    the poultry were derived from parent flock s which had been kept in a NAI free country, zone or compartment for at least 21 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
  • 3. 
    the poultry are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers ;
  • 4. 
    if the poultry or the parent flock s have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.4.8. Recommendations for importation from a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment

for day-old live poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the poultry were kept in a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched;
  • 2. 
    the poultry were derived from parent flock s which had been kept in a NAI free establishment for at least 21 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
  • 3. 
    the poultry are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers ;
  • 4. 
    if the poultry or the parent flock s have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.4.9.

Recommendations for the importation of day-old live birds other than poultry

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    on the day of shipment, the birds showed no clinical signs of infection with a virus which would be considered suggestive of NAI in poultr y on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    the birds were hatched and kept in isolation approved by the V eterinary Services ;
  • 3. 
    the parent flock birds were subjected to a diagnostic test at the time of the collection of the eggs to demonstrate freedom from infection with NAIV;
  • 4. 
    the birds are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers ;

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Annex XXIII (contd)

  • 5. 
    if the birds or parent flock s have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.4.10. Recommendations for importation from a NAI free country, zone or compartment

for hatching eggs of poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the eggs came from a NAI free country, zone or compartment ;
  • 2. 
    the eggs were derived from parent flock s which had been kept in a NAI free country, zone or compartment for at least 21 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
  • 3. 
    the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers packaging materials;
  • 4. 
    if the parent flock s have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.4.11. Recommendations for importation from a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment

for hatching eggs of poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the eggs came from a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment ;
  • 2. 
    the eggs were derived from parent flock s which had been kept in a NAI free establishment for at least 21 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
  • 3. 
    the eggs have had their surfaces sanitised (in accordance with Chapter 6.4.);
  • 4. 
    the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers packaging materials;
  • 5. 
    if the parent flock s have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.4.12.

Recommendations for the importation of hatching eggs from birds other than poultry

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the parent flock birds were subjected to a diagnostic test 7 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs to demonstrate freedom from infection with NAIV;

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Annex XXIII (contd)

  • 2. 
    the eggs have had their surfaces sanitized (in accordance with Chapter 6.4.);
  • 3. 
    the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers packaging materials;
  • 4. 
    if the parent flock s have been vaccinated against NAI, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.4.13. Recommendations for importation from a NAI free country, zone or compartment

for eggs for human consumption

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the eggs were produced and packed in a NAI free country, zone or compartment ;
  • 2. 
    the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers packaging materials.

Article 10.4.14. Recommendations for importation from a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment

for eggs for human consumption

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the eggs were produced and packed in a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment ;
  • 2. 
    the eggs have had their surfaces sanitized (in accordance with Chapter 6.4.);
  • 3. 
    the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers packaging materials.

Article 10.4.15.

Recommendations for importation of egg products of poultry

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the commodity is derived from eggs which meet the requirements of Articles 10.4.11. or 10.4.14.; or
  • 2. 
    the commodity has been processed to ensure the destruction of NAI virus in accordance with Article 10.4.26.; AND
  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.

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Annex XXIII (contd)

Article 10.4.16.

Recommendations for importation from a NAI free country, zone or compartment

for poultry semen

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the donor poultry :

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of NAI on the day of semen collection;
  • 2. 
    were kept in a NAI free country, zone or compartment for at least the 21 days prior to and at the time of semen collection.

Article 10.4.17. Recommendations for the importation from a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment

for poultry semen

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the donor poultry :

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of HPNAI on the day of semen collection;
  • 2. 
    were kept in a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment for at least the 21 days prior to and at the time of semen collection.

Article 10.4.18.

Recommendations for the importation of semen of birds other than poultry

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the donor birds:

  • 1. 
    were kept in isolation approved by the V eterinary Services for at least the 21 days prior to semen collection;
  • 2. 
    showed no clinical sign of infection with a virus which would be considered NAI in poultry during the isolation period;
  • 3. 
    were tested within 14 days prior to semen collection and shown to be free of NAI infection.

Article 10.4.19. Recommendations for importation from a NAI free country, zone or compartment

for fresh meat of poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of fresh meat comes from poultr y :

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1.    which have been kept in a NAI free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched or for at least the past 21 days;

2.    which have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir in a NAI free country, zone or compartment and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2. and have been found free of any signs suggestive of NAI.

Article 10.4.20. Recommendations for importation from either a NAI or a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment

for fresh meat of poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of fresh meat comes from poultry :

  • 1. 
    which have been kept in a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment free from HPNAI since they were hatched or for at least the past 21 days;
  • 2. 
    which have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir in a HPNAI free country, zone or compartment free from HPNAI and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2. and have been found free of any signs suggestive of NAI.

Article 10.4.21.

Recommendations for the importation of meat products of poultry

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the commodity is derived from fresh meat which meet the requirements of Articles 10.4.19. or 10.4.20.; or
  • 2. 
    the commodity has been processed to ensure the destruction of NAI virus in accordance with Article 10.4.27.; AND
  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.

Article 10.4.22.

Recommendations for the importation of products of poultry origin, other than feather meal and poultry meat meal, intended for use in animal feeding, or for agricultural or industrial use other than feather meal

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these commodities were processed in a NAI free country, zone or compartment from poultry which were kept in a NAI free country, zone or compartment from the time they were hatched until the time of slaughter or for at least the 21 days preceding slaughter ; or
  • 2. 
    these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of NAI virus (under study);

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AND

  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.

Article 10.4.23.

Recommendations for the importation of feathers and down of poultry

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these commodities originated from poultry as described in Articles 10.4.19. or 10.4.20. and were processed in a NAI free country, zone or compartment ; or

EU comments

The EU points out that as Article 10.4.19 has been deleted the reference to it here should be deleted.

  • 2. 
    these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of NAI virus (under study); AND
  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.

Article 10.4.24.

Recommendations for the importation of feathers and down of birds other than poultry

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of NAI virus (under study); and
  • 2. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.

Article 10.4.25.

Recommendations for the importation of feather meal and poultry meat meal

Regardless of the NAI status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these commodities were processed in a NAI free country, zone or compartment from poultry which were kept in a NAI free country, zone or compartment from the time they were hatched until the time of slaughter or for at least the 21 days preceding slaughter ; or
  • 2. 
    these commodities have been processed either;
  • a. 
    with moist heat at a minimum temperature of 118ºC for minimum of 40 minutes; or
  • b. 
    with a continuous hydrolysing process under at least 3.79 bar of pressure with steam at a minimum temperature of 122 ºC for a minimum of 15 minutes; or

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c. with an alternative rendering process that ensures that the internal temperature throughout the product reaches at least 74 ºC.

EU comments

The EU thinks that in order to be clear and applicable the time of treatment should be 1 second provided the temperature is achieved throughout.

AND

  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NAI virus.

Article 10.4.26.

Procedures for the inactivation of the AI virus in eggs and egg products

The following times for industry standard temperatures are suitable for the inactivation of AI virus present in eggs and egg products:

 
 

Temperature (°C)

Time

Whole egg

60

188 seconds

Whole egg blends

60

188 seconds

Whole egg blends

61.1

94 seconds

Liquid egg white

55.6

870 seconds

Liquid egg white

56.7

232 seconds

10% salted yolk

62.2

138 seconds

Dried egg white

67

20 hours

Dried egg white

54.4

513 hours

The listed temperatures are indicative of a range that achieves a 7-log kill. Where scientifically documented, variances from these times and temperatures may also be suitable when they achieve the inactivation of the virus.

EU comments

The EU proposes to add the word "Core" before the word temperature. The EU queries the temperature/time for liquid egg whites as the time recommended for the temperature of 55.6 is normally of 256 seconds. The reference used is Swayne and Beck Av Path 2004 and Thomas and al J Food Protection 2008.

Article 10.4.27. Procedures for the inactivation of the AI virus in meat

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A procedure which produces a core temperature of 70ºC for 3.5 seconds is suitable for the inactivation of AI virus present in meat.

Temperature (°C) Time

Poultry meat 60.0

507 seconds

 
 

65.0

42 seconds

 

70.0

3.5 seconds

 

73.9

0.51 seconds

EU comments

The EU proposes to add the word "Core" before the word temperature.

The time recommended for the temperature of 60 degrees is normally of 70 seconds. The reference used is Swayne and Beck Av Path 2004 and Thomas and al J Food Protection 2008.

In addition general wording before and after the table should be brought into line with the

previous Article e.g replace first sentence by "The following times for industry standard

temperatures are suitable for the inactivation of AI virus present in meat" and similarly for

the last sentence Article 10.4.28.

Surveillance: introduction

Articles 10.4.28. to 10.4.34. define the principles and provide a guide on the surveillance of for NAI complementary to Chapter 1.4., applicable to Members seeking to determine their NAI status. This may be for the entire country, zone or compartment . Guidance for Members seeking free status following an outbreak and for the maintenance of NAI status is also provided.

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The presence of avian influenza viruses in wild birds creates a particular problem. In essence, no Member can declare itself free from avian influenza (AI) in wild birds. However, the definition of NAI in this Chapter refers to the infection in poultry only, and Articles 10.4.28. to 10.4.34. were developed under this definition.

The impact and epidemiology of NAI differ widely in different regions of the world and therefore it is impossible to provide specific recommendations for all situations. Surveillance strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from NAI at an acceptable level of confidence will need to be adapted to the local situation. Variables such as the frequency of contacts of poultry with wild birds, different biosecurity levels and production systems and the commingling of different susceptible species including domestic waterfowl require specific surveillance strategies to address each specific situation. It is incumbent upon the Member to provide scientific data that explains the epidemiology of NAI in the region concerned and also demonstrates how all the risk factors are managed. There is therefore considerable latitude available to Members to provide a well-reasoned argument to prove that absence of NAI virus (NAIV) infection is assured at an acceptable level of confidence.

Surveillance for NAI should be in the form of a continuing programme designed to establish that the country, zone or compartment , for which application is made, is free from NAIV infection.

Article 10.4.29.

Surveillance: general conditions and methods

  • 1. 
    A surveillance system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. should be under the responsibility of the V eterinary A uthority . In particular:
  • a. 
    a formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating outbreak s of disease or NAI infection should be in place;
  • b. 
    a procedure should be in place for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspect cases of NAI to a laboratory for NAI diagnosis as described in the Terrestrial Manual ;
  • c. 
    a system for recording, managing and analysing diagnostic and surveillance data should be in place.
  • 2. 
    The NAI surveillance programme should:
  • a. 
    include an early warning system throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspicious cases. Farmers and workers, who have day-to-day contact with poultry , as well as diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of NAI to the V eterinary A uthority . They should be supported directly or indirectly (e.g. through private veterinarians or veterinary para-professionals ) by government information programmes and the V eterinary A uthority . All suspected cases of NAI should be investigated immediately. As suspicion cannot always be resolved by epidemiological and clinical investigation alone, samples should be taken and submitted to a laboratory for appropriate tests. This requires that sampling kits and other equipment are available for those responsible for surveillance . Personnel responsible for surveillance should be able to call for assistance from a team with expertise in NAI diagnosis and control. In cases where potential public health implications are suspected, notification to the appropriate public health authorities is essential;
  • b. 
    implement, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical inspection, serological and virological testing of high-risk groups of animals, such as those adjacent to a NAI infected country, zone or compartment , places where birds and poultry of different origins are mixed, such as live bird markets, poultry in close proximity to waterfowl or other potential sources of NAIV.

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An effective surveillance system will periodically identify suspicious cases that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is NAIV. The rate at which such suspicious cases are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. Applications for freedom from NAIV infection should, in consequence, provide details of the occurrence of suspicious cases and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of laboratory testing and the control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation (quarantine, movement stand-still orders, etc.).

Article 10.4.30. Surveillance strategies

  • 1. 
    Introduction

The target population for surveillance aimed at identification of disease and infection should cover all the susceptible poultry species within the country, zone or compartment . Active and passive surveillance for NAI should be ongoing. The frequency of active surveillance should be at least every 6 months. Surveillance should be composed of random and targeted approaches using virological, serological and clinical methods.

The strategy employed may be based on randomised sampling requiring surveillance consistent with demonstrating the absence of NAIV infection at an acceptable level of confidence. Random surveillance is conducted using serological tests described in the Terrestrial Manual . Positive serological results should be followed up with virological methods.

Targeted surveillance (e.g. based on the increased likelihood of infection in particular localities or species) may be an appropriate strategy. Virological and serological methods should be used concurrently to define the NAI status of high risk populations.

A Member should justify the surveillance strategy chosen as adequate to detect the presence of NAIV infection in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the prevailing epidemiological situation, including cases of HPAI detected in any birds. It may, for example, be appropriate to target clinical surveillance at particular species likely to exhibit clear clinical signs (e.g. chickens). Similarly, virological and serological testing could be targeted to species that may not show clinical signs (e.g. ducks).

If a Member wishes to declare freedom from NAIV infection in a specific zone or compartment , the design of the survey and the basis for the sampling process would need to be aimed at the population within the zone or compa rtment .

For random surveys, the design of the sampling strategy will need to incorporate epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing will need to be large enough to detect infection if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size and expected disease prevalence determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The Member must justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of surveillance and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the design prevalence in particular clearly needs to be based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Irrespective of the survey approach selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated for the vaccination/infection history and the different species in the target population.

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Irrespective of the testing system employed, surveillance system design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There needs to be an effective procedure for following up positives to ultimately determine with a high level of confidence, whether they are indicative of infection or not. This should involve both supplementary tests and follow-up investigation to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling unit as well as flock s which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

The principles involved in surveillance for disease /infection are technically well defined. The design of surveillance programmes to prove the absence of NAIV infection/circulation needs to be carefully followed to avoid producing results that are either insufficiently reliable, or excessively costly and logistically complicated. The design of any surveillance programme, therefore, requires inputs from professionals competent and experienced in this field.

  • 2. 
    Clinical surveillance

Clinical surveillance aims at the detection of clinical signs of NAI at the flock level. Whereas significant emphasis is placed on the diagnostic value of mass serological screening, surveillance based on clinical inspection should not be underrated. Monitoring of production parameters, such as increased mortality, reduced feed and water consumption, presence of clinical signs of a respiratory disease or a drop in egg production, is important for the early detection of NAIV infection. In some cases, the only indication of LPNAIV infection may be a drop in feed consumption or egg production.

Clinical surveillance and laboratory testing should always be applied in series to clarify the status of NAI suspects detected by either of these complementary diagnostic approaches. L aboratory testing may confirm clinical suspicion, while clinical surveillance may contribute to confirmation of positive serology. Any sampling unit within which suspicious animals are detected should have restrictions imposed upon it until NAI infection is ruled out.

Identification of suspect flock s is vital to the identification of sources of NAIV and to enable the molecular, antigenic and other biological characteristics of the virus to be determined. It is essential that NAIV isolates are sent regularly to the regional Reference Laboratory for genetic and antigenic characterization.

  • 3. 
    Virological surveillance

Virological surveillance using tests described in the T errestria l Ma nual should be conducted:

  • a. 
    to monitor at risk populations;
  • b. 
    to confirm clinically suspect cases;
  • c. 
    to follow up positive serological results;
  • d. 
    to test ‘normal’ daily mortality, to ensure early detection of infection in the face of vaccination or in establishments epidemiologically linked to an outbrea k .
  • 4. 
    Serological surveillance

Serological surveillance aims at the detection of antibodies against NAIV. Positive NAIV antibody test results can have four possible causes:

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  • a. 
    natural infection with NAIV;
  • b. 
    vaccination against NAI;
  • c. 
    maternal antibodies derived from a vaccinated or infected parent flock are usually found in the yolk and can persist in progeny for up to 4 weeks;
  • d. 
    false positive results due to the lack of specificity of the test.

It may be possible to use serum collected for other survey purposes for NAI surveillance . However, the principles of survey design described in these recommendations and the requirement for a statistically valid survey for the presence of NAIV should not be compromised.

The discovery of clusters of seropositive flock s may reflect any of a series of events, including but not limited to the demographics of the population sampled, vaccinal exposure or infection . As clustering may signal infection , the investigation of all instances must be incorporated in the survey design. Clustering of positive flock s is always epidemiologically significant and therefore should be investigated.

If vaccination cannot be excluded as the cause of positive serological reactions, diagnostic methods to differentiate antibodies due to infection or vaccination should be employed.

The results of random or targeted serological surveys are important in providing reliable evidence that no NAIV infection is present in a country, zone or compartment . It is therefore essential that the survey be thoroughly documented.

  • 5. 
    Virological and serological surveillance in vaccinated populations

The surveillance strategy is dependent on the type of vaccine used. The protection against AI is haemagglutinin subtype specific. Therefore, t wo broad vaccination strategies exist: 1) inactivated whole AI viruses, and 2) haemagglutinin expression-based vaccines.

In the case of vaccinated populations, the surveillance strategy should be based on virological and/or serological methods and clinical surveillance . It may be appropriate to use sentinel birds for this purpose. These birds should be unvaccinated, AI virus antibody free birds and clearly and permanently identified. Sentinel birds should be used only if no appropriate laboratory procedures are available. The interpretation of serological results in the presence of vaccination is described in Article 10.4.34.

Article 10.4.31.

Documentation of NAI or HPNAI free status

  • 1. 
    Members declaring freedom from NAI or HPNAI for the country, zone or compartment: additional surveillance procedures

In addition to the general conditions described in above mentioned articles, a Member declaring freedom from NAI or HPNAI for the entire country, or a zone or a compartment should provide evidence for the existence of an effective surveillance programme. The strategy and design of the surveillance programme will depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances and should be planned and implemented according to general conditions and methods described in this Chapter, to demonstrate absence of NAIV or HPNAIV infection, during the preceding 12 months in susceptible poultry populations (vaccinated and non-vaccinated). This requires the support of a laboratory able to undertake identification of NAIV or HPNAIV infection through virus detection and antibody tests described in the Terrestrial Manual . This surveillance may be targeted to poultry population at specific risks linked to the types of production, possible direct or indirect contact with wild birds, multi-age flock s , local trade patterns including live bird markets, use of possibly contaminated surface water, and the presence of more than one species on the holding and poor biosecurity measures in place.

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  • 2. 
    Additional requirements for countries, zones or compartments that practise vaccination

Vaccination to prevent the transmission of HPNAI virus may be part of a disease control programme. The level of flock immunity required to prevent transmission will depend on the flock size, composition (e.g. species) and density of the susceptible poultry population. It is therefore impossible to be prescriptive. The vaccine must also comply with the provisions stipulated for NAI vaccines in the Terrestrial Manual . Based on the epidemiology of NAI in the country, zone or compartment , it may be that a decision is reached to vaccinate only certain species or other poultry subpopulations.

In all vaccinated flock s there is a need to perform virological and serological tests to ensure the absence of virus circulation. The use of sentinel poultry may provide further confidence of the absence of virus circulation. The tests have to be repeated at least every 6 months or at shorter intervals according to the risk in the country, z one or compartment .

Evidence to show the effectiveness of the vaccination programme should also be provided.

Article 10.4.32.

Countries, zones or compartments declaring that they have regained freedom from NAI or HPNAI following an outbreak: additional surveillance procedures

In addition to the general conditions described in the above-mentioned articles, a Member declaring that it has regained country, zone or compartment freedom from NAI or HPNAI virus infection should show evidence of an active surveillance programme depending on the epidemiological circumstances of the outbreak to demonstrate the absence of the infection . This will require surveillance incorporating virus detection and antibody tests described in the Terrestrial Manual . The use of sentinel birds may facilitate the interpretation of surveillance results.

A Member declaring freedom of country, zone or compartment after an outbreak of NAI or HPNAI (with or without vaccination) should report the results of an active surveillance programme in which the NAI or HPNAI susceptible poultry population undergoes regular clinical examination and active surveillance planned and implemented according to the general conditions and methods described in these recommendations. The surveillance should at least give the confidence that can be given by a randomized representative sample of the populations at risk.

Article 10.4.33.

NAI free establishments within HPNAI free compartments: additional surveillance procedures

The declaration of NAI free establishments requires the demonstration of absence of NAIV infection. Birds in these establishments should be randomly tested using virus detection or isolation tests, and serological methods, following the general conditions of these recommendations. The frequency of testing should be based on the risk of infection and at a maximum interval of 21 days.

Article 10.4.34.

The use and interpretation of serological and virus detection tests

Poultry infected with NAI virus produce antibodies to haemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), nonstructural proteins (NSPs), nucleoprotein/matrix (NP/M) and the polymerase complex proteins. Detection of antibodies against the polymerase complex proteins will not be covered in this Chapter. Tests for NP/M antibodies include direct         and blocking         ELISA,         and         agar         gel         immunodiffusion (AGID)

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tests. Tests for antibodies against NA include the neuraminidase inhibition (NI), indirect fluorescent antibody and direct and blocking ELISA tests. For the HA, antibodies are detected in haemagglutination inhibition (HI), ELISA and neutralization (SN) tests. The HI test is reliable in avian species but not in mammals. The SN test can be used to detect subtype specific antibodies to the haemagglutinin and is the preferred test for mammals and some avian species. The AGID test is reliable for detection of NP/M antibodies in chickens and turkeys, but not in other avian species. As an alternative, blocking ELISA tests have been developed to detect NP/M antibodies in all avian species.

The HI and NI tests can be used to subtype AI viruses into 16 haemagglutinin and 9 neuraminidase subtypes. Such information is helpful for epidemiological investigations and in categorization of AI viruses.

Poultry can be vaccinated with a variety of AI vaccines including inactivated whole AI virus vaccines, and haemagglutinin expression-based vaccines. Antibodies to the haemagglutinin confer subtype specific protection. Various strategies can be used to differentiate vaccinated from infected birds including serosurveillance in unvaccinated sentinel birds or specific serological tests in the vaccinated birds.

AI virus infection of unvaccinated birds including sentinels is detected by antibodies to the NP/M, subtype specific HA or NA proteins, or NSP. Poultry vaccinated with inactivated whole AI vaccines containing an influenza virus of the same H sub-type but with a different neuraminidase may be tested for field exposure by applying serological tests directed to the detection of antibodies to the NA of the field virus. For example, birds vaccinated with H7N3 in the face of a H7N1 epidemic may be differentiated from infected birds (DIVA) by detection of subtype specific NA antibodies of the N1 protein of the field virus. Alternatively, in the absence of DIVA, inactivated vaccines may induce low titres of antibodies to NSP and the titre in infected birds would be markedly higher. Encouraging results have been obtained experimentally with this system, but it has not yet been validated in the field. In poultry vaccinated with haemagglutinin expression-based vaccines, antibodies are detected to the specific HA, but not any of the other AI viral proteins. Infection is evident by antibodies to the NP/M or NSP, or the specific NA protein of the field virus. Vaccines used should comply with the standards of the T errestrial Manual .

All flock s with seropositive results should be investigated. Epidemiological and supplementary laboratory investigation results should document the status of NAI infection/circulation for each positive flock .

A confirmatory test should have a higher specificity than the screening test and sensitivity at least equivalent than that of the screening test.

Information should be provided on the performance characteristics and validation of tests used.

  • 1. 
    The follow-up procedure in case of positive test results if vaccination is used

In case of vaccinated populations, one has to exclude the likelihood that positive test results are indicative of virus circulation. To this end, the following procedure should be followed in the investigation of positive serological test results derived from surveillance conducted on NAI-vaccinated poultry . The investigation should examine all evidence that might confirm or refute the hypothesis that the positive results to the serological tests employed in the initial survey were not due to virus circulation. All the epidemiological information should be substantiated, and the results should be collated in the final report.

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Knowledge of the type of vaccine used is crucial in developing a serological based strategy to differentiate infected from vaccinated animals.

  • a. 
    Inactivated whole AI virus vaccines can use either homologous or heterologous neuraminidase subtypes between the vaccine and field strains. If poultry in the population have antibodies to NP/M and were vaccinated with inactivated whole AI virus vaccine, the following strategies should be applied:
  • i. 
    sentinel birds should remain NP/M antibody negative. If positive for NP/M antibodies, indicating AI virus infection, specific HI tests should be performed to identify H5 or H7 AI virus infection;
  • ii. 
    if vaccinated with inactivated whole AI virus vaccine containing homologous NA to field virus, the presence of antibodies to NSP could be indicative of infection . Sampling should be initiated to exclude the presence of NAIV by either virus isolation or detection of virus specific genomic material or proteins;
  • iii. 
    if vaccinated with inactivated whole AI virus vaccine containing heterologous NA to field virus, presence of antibodies to the field virus NA or NSP would be indicative of infection . Sampling should be initiated to exclude the presence of NAIV by either virus isolation or detection of virus specific genomic material or proteins.
  • b. 
    Haemagglutinin expression-based vaccines contain the HA protein or gene homologous to the HA of the field virus. Sentinel birds as described above can be used to detect AI infection. In vaccinated or sentinel birds, the presence of antibodies against NP/M, NSP or field virus NA is indicative of infection . Sampling should be initiated to exclude the presence of NAIV by either virus isolation or detection of virus specific genomic material or proteins.
  • 2. 
    The follow-up procedure in case of positive test results indicative of infection for determination of infection due to HPNAI or LPNAI virus

The detection of antibodies indicative of a NAI virus infection as indicated in point a)i) above will result in the initiation of epidemiological and virological investigations to determine if the infections are due to HPNAI or LPNAI viruses.

Virological testing should be initiated in all antibody-positive and at risk populations. The samples should be evaluated for the presence of AI virus, by virus isolation and identification, and/or detection of influenza A specific proteins or nucleic acids (Figure 2). Virus isolation is the gold standard for detecting infection by AI virus and the method is described in the Terrestrial Manual . All AI virus isolates should be tested to determine HA and NA subtypes, and in vivo tested in chickens and/or sequencing of HA proteolytic cleavage site of H5 and H7 subtypes for determination of classification as HPNAI, LPNAI or LPAI (not notifiable) viruses. As an alternative, nucleic acid detection tests have been developed and validated; these tests have the sensitivity of virus isolation, but with the advantage of providing results within a few hours. Samples with detection of H5 and H7 HA subtypes by nucleic acid detection methods should either be submitted for virus isolation, identification, and in vivo testing in chickens, or sequencing of nucleic acids for determination of proteolytic cleavage site as HPNAI or LPNAI viruses. The antigen detection systems, because of low sensitivity, are best suited for screening clinical field cases for infection by Type A influenza virus looking for NP/M proteins. NP/M positive samples should be submitted for virus isolation, identification and pathogenicity determination.

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Annex XXIII (contd)

L aboratory results should be examined in the context of the epidemiological situation. Corollary information needed to complement the serological survey and assess the possibility of viral circulation includes but is not limited to:

  • a. 
    characterization of the existing production systems;
  • b. 
    results of clinical surveillance of the suspects and their cohorts;
  • c. 
    quantification of vaccinations performed on the affected sites;
  • d. 
    sanitary protocol and history of the affected establishments ;
  • e. 
    control of animal identification and movements;
  • f. 
    other parameters of regional significance in historic NAIV transmission.

The entire investigative process should be documented as standard operating procedure within the epidemiological surveillance programme.

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Annex XXIII (contd)

F ig. 1. Schematic repre sentation of lab oratory te sts

for de te rmining evidenc e of N AI infection

through or fo lowing se rolog ic al surve ys

17701/09 ANNEX 2

LT/hl

DG B I

493

EN

Annex XXIII (contd)

F ig. 2. Schematic repre sentation of lab oratory te sts

for de te rmining evidenc e of N AI infection

using virolog ic al methods

The above diagram indicates the tests which are recommended for use in the investigation of poultry flocks.

 

Key:

AGID

Agar gel immunodiffusion

DIVA

Differentiating infected from vaccinated animals

ELISA

Enzyme-linked immunosorbant assay

HA

Haemagglutinin

HI

Haemagglutination inhibition

NA

Neuraminidase

NP/M

Nucleoprotein and matrix protein

NSP

Nonstructural protein

17701/09 ANNEX 2

LT/hl

DG B I

494

EN

No evidence of NAIV

text deleted

17701/09 ANNEX 2

LT/hl

DG B I

495

EN

S

Annex XXIV

C HA PT ER 10 .13. NEWCASTLE DISEASE

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes, and wishes one comment in article 10.13.5 to be taken into account by the TAHSC.

Article 10.13.1. General provisions

  • 1. 
    For the purposes of international trade , Newcastle disease (ND) is defined as an infection of poultry caused by a virus (NDV) of avian paramyxovirus serotype 1 (APMV-1) that meets one of the following criteria for virulence:
  • a. 
    the virus has an intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) in day-old chicks (Gallus gallus ) of 0.7 or greater; or
  • b. 
    multiple basic amino acids have been demonstrated in the virus (either directly or by deduction) at the C-terminus of the F2 protein and phenylalanine at residue 117, which is the N-terminus of the F1 protein. The term ‘multiple basic amino acids’ refers to at least three arginine or lysine residues between residues 113 and 116. Failure to demonstrate the characteristic pattern of amino acid residues as described above would require characterisation of the isolated virus by an ICPI test.

In this definition, amino acid residues are numbered from the N-terminus of the amino acid sequence deduced from the nucleotide sequence of the F0 gene, 113–116 corresponds to residues –4 to –1 from the cleavage site.’

  • 2. 
    Poultry is defined as ‘all domesticated birds, including backyard poultry , used for the production of meat or eggs for consumption, for the production of other commercial products, for restocking supplies of game, or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as fighting cocks used for any purpose’.

Birds that are kept in captivity for any reason other than those reasons referred to in the preceding paragraph, including those that are kept for shows, races, exhibitions, competitions, or for breeding or selling these categories of birds as well as pet birds, are not considered to be poultry .

  • 3. 
    This Chapter deals with NDV infection of poultry as defined in point 2 above, in the presence or absence of clinical signs. For the purposes of international trade , a Member should not impose immediate bans on the trade in poultry commodities in response to a notification, according to Article 1.2.3. of the Terrestrial Code , of infection with NDV in birds other than poultry , including wild birds.
  • 4. 
    The occurrence of infection with NDV is defined as the isolation and identification of NDV as such or the detection of viral RNA specific for NDV.
  • 5. 
    For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period for ND shall be 21 days.
  • 6. 
    Standards for diagnostic tests, including pathogenicity testing, are described in the Terrestrial Manual . When the use of ND vaccines is appropriate, those vaccines should comply with the standards described in the T errestrial Ma nua l .

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Article 10.13.2. Determination of the ND status of a country, zone or compartment

The ND status of a country, a zone or a compartment can be determined on the basis of the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    ND is notifiable in the whole country, an on-going ND awareness programme is in place, and all notified suspect occurrences of ND are subjected to field and, where applicable, laboratory investigations;
  • 2. 
    appropriate surveillance is in place to demonstrate the presence of NDV infection in the absence of clinical signs in poultry , this may be achieved through an ND surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 10.13.22. to 10.13.26.;
  • 3. 
    consideration of all epidemiological factors for ND occurrence and their historical perspective.

Article 10.13.3.

ND free country, zone or compartment

A country, zone or compartment may be considered free from ND when it has been shown that NDV infection in poultry has not been present in the country, zone or compartment for the past 12 months, based on surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.13.22. to 10.13.26.

If infection has occurred in poultry in a previously free country, zone or compartment , ND free status can be regained three months after a stamping-out policy (including disinfection of all affected establishments ) is applied, providing that surveillance in accordance with Articles 10.13.22. to 10.13.26. has been carried out during that three-month period.

Article 10.13.4.

Recommendations for importation from an ND free country, zone or compartment as defined in Article 10.13.3.

for live poultry (other than day-old poultry)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the poultry showed no clinical sign suggestive of ND on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    the poultry were kept in an ND free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched or for at least the past 21 days;
  • 3. 
    the poultry are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers ;
  • 4. 
    if the poultry have been vaccinated against ND, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

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Annex XXIV (contd)

Article 10.13.5.

Recommendations for the importation of live birds other than poultry

Regardless of the ND status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the birds showed no clinical sign suggestive of infection by NDV on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    the birds were kept in isolation approved by the V eterinary Services since they were hatched or for at least the 21 days prior to shipment and showed no clinical sign of infection during the isolation period;
  • 3. 
    a statistically valid sample of the birds at a design prevalence acceptable to the importing country was subjected to a diagnostic test within 14 days prior to shipment to demonstrate freedom from infection with NDV;

EU comment

In order to be consistent with the change proposed in the AI chapter, and for the same reason of helping trading partners to design import conditions, the point 3 above should be modified by replacing the words "at a design prevalence acceptable to the importing country" by "selected in accordance with the provisions of Article 10.13.24".

  • 4. 
    the birds are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers ;
  • 5. 
    if the birds have been vaccinated against ND, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.13.6. Recommendations for importation from an ND free country, zone or compartment

for day-old live poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the poultry were hatched and kept in an ND free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched;
  • 2. 
    the poultry were derived from parent flock s which had been kept in an ND free country, zone or compartment for at least 21 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
  • 3. 
    the poultry are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers .
  • 4. 
    if the poultry or parent flock s have been vaccinated against ND, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.13.7.

Recommendations for the importation of day-old live birds other than poultry

Regardless of the ND status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

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  • 1. 
    the birds showed no clinical sign suggestive of infection by NDV on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    the birds were hatched and kept in isolation approved by the V eterinary Services ;
  • 3. 
    the parent flock birds were subjected to a diagnostic test at the time of the collection of the eggs to demonstrate freedom from infection with NDV;
  • 4. 
    the birds are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers ;
  • 5. 
    if the birds or parent flock s have been vaccinated against ND, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.13.8. Recommendations for importation from an ND free country, zone or compartment

for hatching eggs of poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the birds:

  • 1. 
    the eggs came from an ND free country, zone or compartment ;
  • 2. 
    the eggs were derived from parent flock s which had been kept in an ND free country, zone or compartment for at least 21 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs;
  • 3. 
    the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers packaging materials;
  • 4. 
    if the parent flock s have been vaccinated against ND, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.13.9.

Recommendations for the importation of hatching eggs from birds other than poultry

Regardless of the ND status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the parent flock birds were subjected to a diagnostic test 7 days prior to and at the time of the collection of the eggs to demonstrate freedom from infection with NDV;
  • 2. 
    the eggs have had their surfaces sanitized (in accordance with Chapter 6.4.);
  • 3. 
    the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers packaging materials;
  • 4. 
    if the parent flock s have been vaccinated against ND, it has been done in accordance with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual and the nature of the vaccine used and the date of vaccination have been attached to the certificate .

Article 10.13.10. Recommendations for importation from an ND free country, zone or compartment

for eggs for human consumption

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

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  • 1. 
    the eggs were produced and packed in an ND free country, zone or compartment ;
  • 2. 
    the eggs are transported in new or appropriately sanitized containers packaging materials.

Article 10.13.11.

Recommendations for importation of egg products of poultry

Regardless of the ND status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the commodity is derived from eggs which meet the requirements of Article 10.13.10.; or
  • 2. 
    the commodity has been processed to ensure the destruction of NDV in accordance with Article 10.13.20. (under study);

AND

  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the egg products with any source of NDV.

Article 10.13.12. Recommendations for importation from an ND free country, zone or compartment

for poultry semen

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the donor poultry :

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign suggestive of ND on the day of semen collection;
  • 2. 
    were kept in an ND free country, zone or compartment for at least the 21 days prior to and at the time of semen collection.

Article 10.13.13.

Recommendations for the importation of semen of birds other than poultry

Regardless of the ND status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the donor birds:

  • 1. 
    were kept in isolation approved by the V eterinary Services for at least the 21 days prior to and on the day of semen collection;
  • 2. 
    showed no clinical sign suggestive of infection with NDV during the isolation period and on the day of semen collection;
  • 3. 
    were subjected to a diagnostic test within 14 days prior to semen collection to demonstrate freedom from infection with NDV.

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Annex XXIV (contd)

Article 10.13.14.

Recommendations for importation from an ND free country, zone or compartment

for fresh meat of poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of fresh meat comes from poultry :

  • 1. 
    which have been kept in an ND free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched or for at least the past 21 days;
  • 2. 
    which have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir in an ND free country, zone or compartment and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2. and have been found free of any sign suggestive of ND.

Article 10.13.15. Recommendations for importation of meat products of poultry

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the commodity is derived from fresh meat which meet the requirements of Article 10.13.14.; or
  • 2. 
    the commodity has been processed to ensure the destruction of NDV in accordance with Article 10.13.21. (under study);

AND

  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NDV.

Article 10.13.16.

Recommendations for the importation of products of poultry origin, other than feather meal and poultry meat meal, intended for use in animal feeding, or for agricultural or industrial use other than feather meal

Regardless of the ND status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these commodities were processed in a ND free country, zone or compartment from poultry which were kept in a ND free country, zone or compartment from the time they were hatched until the time of slaughter or for at least the 21 days preceding slaughter ; or
  • 2. 
    these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of NDV (under study); AND
  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NDV.

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Annex XXIV (contd)

Article 10.13.17.

Recommendations for the importation of feathers and down of poultry

Regardless of the ND status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these commodities originated from poultry as described in Article 10.13.14. and were processed in a ND free country, zone or compartment ; or
  • 2. 
    these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of NDV (under study); AND
  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NDV.

Article 10.13.18.

Recommendations for the importation of feathers and down of birds other than poultry

Regardless of the ND status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of NDV (under study); and
  • 2. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of NDV

Article 10.13.19.

Recommendations for the importation of feather meal and poultry meat meal

Regardless of the ND status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    these commodities were processed in a ND free country, zone or compartment from poultry which were kept in a ND free country, zone or compartment from the time they were hatched until the time of slaughter or for at least the 21 days preceding slaughter ; or
  • 2. 
    these commodities have been processed either:
  • a. 
    with moist heat at a minimum temperature of 118ºC for minimum of 40 minutes; or
  • b. 
    with a continuous hydrolysing process under at least 3.79 bar of pressure with steam at a minimum temperature of 122 ºC for a minimum of 15 minutes; or

c.    with an alternative rendering process that ensures that the internal temperature throughout the product reaches at least 74 ºC for a minimum of 280 seconds;

AND

  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken to avoid contact of the commodity with any source of ND virus.

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Annex XXIV (contd)

Article 10.13.20.(under study)

Procedures for the inactivation of the ND virus in eggs and egg products

The following times and temperatures are suitable for the inactivation of ND virus present in eggs and egg products:

 
 

Temperature (°C)

Time

Whole egg

55

2,521 seconds

Whole egg

57

1,596 seconds

Whole egg

59

674 seconds

Liquid egg white

55

2,278 seconds

Liquid egg white

57

986 seconds

Liquid egg white

59

301 seconds

10% salted yolk

55

176 seconds

Dried egg white

57

50.4 hours

EU comments

The EU proposes to add the word "Core" before the word temperature.

The listed temperatures are indicative of a range that achieves a 7-log kill. Where scientifically documented, variances from these times and temperatures may also be suitable when they achieve the inactivation of the virus.

Article 10.13.21.(under study)

Procedures for the inactivation of the ND virus in meat

A procedure which produces a core temperature of 70ºC for 574 seconds is suitable for the inactivation of ND virus present in meat.

 
 

Temperature (°C)

Time

Poultry meat

65.0

840 seconds

 

70.0

574 seconds

 

74.0

280 seconds

 

80.0

203 seconds

EU comments

17701/09 ANNEX 2

LT/hl

DG B I

503

EN

The EU proposes to add the word "Core" before the word temperature. In addition general wording before and afte the table should be brought into line with the previous Article e.g replace first sentence by "The following times for industry standard temperatures are suitable for the inactivation of AI virus present in meat" and similarly for the last sentence

Article 10.13.22.

Surveillance: introduction

Articles 10.13.22. to 10.13.26. define the principles and provide a guide on the surveillance for ND as defined in Article 10.13.1. and is complementary to Chapter 1.4. It is applicable to Members seeking to determine their ND status. This may be for the entire country, zone or compartment . Guidance for Members seeking free status following an outbreak and for the maintenance of ND status is also provided.

Surveillance for ND is complicated by the known occurrence of avian paramyxovirus serotype 1 (APMV-1) infections in many bird species, both domestic and wild, and the widespread utilization of ND vaccines in domestic poul try .

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Annex XXIV (contd)

The impact and epidemiology of ND differ widely in different regions of the world and therefore it is not possible to provide specific recommendations for all situations. Therefore, surveillance strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from ND at an acceptable level of confidence will need to be adapted to the local situation. Variables such as the frequency of contacts of poultry with wild birds, different biosecurity levels, production systems and the commingling of different susceptible species require specific surveillance strategies to address each specific situation. It is incumbent upon the Member to provide scientific data that explains the epidemiology of ND in the region concerned and also demonstrates how all the risk factors are managed. There is, therefore, considerable latitude available to Members to provide a well-reasoned argument to prove freedom from NDV infection .

Surveillance for ND should be in the form of a continuing programme designed to establish that the country, zone or compartment , for which application is made, is free from NDV infection .

Article 10.13.23. Surveillance: general conditions and methods

  • 1. 
    A surveillance system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. should be under the responsibility of the V eterinary A uthority . In particular there should be in place:
  • a. 
    a formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating outbreaks of disease or NDV infection ;
  • b. 
    a procedure for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspect cases of ND to a laboratory for ND diagnosis as described in the Terrestrial Manual ;
  • c. 
    a system for recording, managing and analysing diagnostic and surveillance data.
  • 2. 
    The ND surveillance programme should:
  • a. 
    include an early warning system throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspicious cases. Farmers and workers, who have day-to-day contact with poultry , as well as diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of ND to the V eterinary A uthority . They should be supported directly or indirectly (e.g. through private veterinarians or veterinary para-professionals ) by government information programmes and the V eterinary A uthority . All suspected cases of ND should be investigated immediately. As suspicion cannot be resolved by epidemiological and clinical investigation alone, samples should be taken and submitted to a laboratory for appropriate tests. This requires that sampling kits and other equipment are available to those responsible for surveillance . Personnel responsible for surveillance should be able to call for assistance from a team with expertise in ND diagnosis and control;
  • b. 
    implement, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical, virological and serological surveillance of high risk groups of poultry within the target population (e.g. those adjacent to an ND infected country, zone , compartment , places where birds and poultry of different origins are mixed, or other sources of NDV).

An effective surveillance system may identify suspicious cases that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is due to NDV infection . The rate at which such suspicious cases are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. Applications for freedom from NDV infection should provide details of the occurrence of suspicious cases and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of laboratory testing and the control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation (quarantine, movement stand-still orders, etc.).

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Annex XXIV (contd)

Article 10.13.24.

Surveillance strategies

  • 1. 
    Introduction

Any surveillance programme requires inputs from professionals competent and experienced in this field and should be thoroughly documented. The design of surveillance programmes to prove the absence of NDV infection / circulation needs to be carefully followed to avoid producing results that are either unreliable, or excessively costly and logistically complicated.

If a Member wishes to declare freedom from NDV infection in a country, zone or compartment , the subpopulation used for surveillance of for the disease / infection should be representative of all poultry within the country, zone or compartment . Multiple surveillance methods should be used concurrently to accurately define the true ND status of poultry populations. Active and passive surveillance for ND should be ongoing with the frequency of active surveillance being appropriate to the disease situation in the country. Surveillance should be composed of random and/or targeted approaches, dependent on the local epidemiological situation and using clinical, virological and serological methods as described in the Terrestrial Manual . If alternative tests are used they must have been validated as fit-for-purpose in accordance with OIE standards. A Member should justify the surveillance strategy chosen as adequate to detect the presence of NDV infection in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the prevailing epidemiological situation.

In surveys, the sample size selected for testing should be statistically justified to detect infection at a predetermined target prevalence. The sample size and expected prevalence determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The survey design and frequency of sampling should be dependent on the historical and current local epidemiological situation. The Member should justify the choice of survey design and confidence level based on the objectives of surveillance and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

Targeted surveillance (e.g. based on the increased likelihood of infection in a population) may be an appropriate strategy.

It may, for example, be appropriate to target clinical surveillance at particular species likely to exhibit clear clinical signs (e.g. unvaccinated chickens). Similarly, virological and serological testing could target species that may not show clinical signs (Article 10.13.2.) of ND and are not routinely vaccinated (e.g. ducks). Surveillance may also target poultry populations at specific risk, for example direct or indirect contact with wild birds, multi-age flock s , local trade patterns including live poultry markets, the presence of more than one species on the holding and poor biosecurity measures in place. In situations where wild birds have been shown to play a role in the local epidemiology of ND, surveillance of wild birds may be of value in alerting V eterinary Services to the possible exposure of poultry , and in particular, of free ranging poultry .

The sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests are key factors in the choice of survey design, which should anticipate the occurrence of false positive and false negative reactions. Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated for the vaccination / infection history and for the different species in the target population. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false reactions are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There needs to be an effective procedure for following up positives to ultimately determine with a high level of confidence, whether they are indicative of infection or not. This should involve both supplementary tests and follow-up investigation to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling unit as well as flock s which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

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Annex XXIV (contd)

The results of active and passive surveillance are important in providing reliable evidence that no NDV infection is present in a country, zone or compartment .

  • 2. 
    Clinical surveillance

Clinical surveillance aims to detect clinical signs suggestive of ND at the flock level and should not be underestimated as an early indication of infection . Monitoring of production parameters (e.g. a drop in feed or water consumption or egg production) is important for the early detection of NDV infection in some populations, as there may be no, or mild clinical signs, particularly if they are vaccinated. Any sampling unit within which suspicious animals are detected should be considered as infected until evidence to the contrary is produced. Identification of infected flock s is vital to the identification of sources of NDV.

A presumptive diagnosis of clinical ND in suspect infected populations should always be confirmed by virological testing in a laboratory . This will enable the molecular, antigenic and other biological characteristics of the virus to be determined.

It is desirable that NDV isolates are sent promptly to an OIE Reference Laboratory for archiving and further characterization if required.

  • 3. 
    Virological surveillance

Virological surveillance should be conducted using tests described in the T errestrial Manual to:

  • a. 
    monitor at risk populations;
  • b. 
    confirm suspect clinical cases;
  • c. 
    follow up positive serological results in unvaccinated populations or sentinel birds;
  • d. 
    test ‘normal’ daily mortalities (if warranted by an increased risk e.g. infection in the face of vaccination or in establishments epidemiologically linked to an outbrea k ).
  • 4. 
    Serological surveillance

Where vaccination is carried out, serological surveillance is of limited value. Serological surveillance cannot be used to discriminate between NDV and other APMV-1. Test procedures and interpretations of results are as described in the Terrestrial Manual . Positive NDV antibody test results can have five possible causes:

  • a. 
    natural infection with APMV-1;
  • b. 
    vaccination against ND;
  • c. 
    exposure to vaccine virus;
  • d. 
    maternal antibodies derived from a vaccinated or infected parent flock are usually found in the yolk and can persist in progeny for up to 4 weeks;
  • e. 
    non-specific test reactions.

It may be possible to use serum collected for other survey purposes for ND surveillance . However, the principles of survey design described in these recommendations and the requirement for a statistically valid survey for the presence of NDV should not be compromised.

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Annex XXIV (contd)

Discovery of seropositive, unvaccinated flock s must be investigated further by conducting a thorough epidemiological investigation. Since seropositive results are not necessarily indicative of infection , virological methods should be used to confirm the presence of NDV in such populations. Until validated strategies and tools to differentiate vaccinated animals from those infected with field APMV-1 are available, serological tools should not be used to identify NDV infection in vaccinated populations.

  • 5. 
    Use of sentinel poultry

There are various applications of the use of sentinel poultry as a surveillance tool to detect virus circulation. They may be used to monitor vaccinated populations or species which are less susceptible to the development of clinical disease for the circulation of virus. Sentinel poultry should be immunologically naïve and may be used in vaccinated flock s . In case of the use of sentinel poultry , the structure and organisation of the poultry sector, the type of vaccine used and local epidemiological factors will determine the type of production systems where sentinels should be placed, the frequency of placement and monitoring of the sentinels.

Sentinel poultry must be in close contact with, but should be identified to be clearly differentiated from, the target population. Sentinel poultry must be observed regularly for evidence of clinical disease and any disease incidents investigated by prompt laboratory testing. The species to be used as sentinels should be proven to be highly susceptible to infection and ideally develop clear signs of clinical disease . Where the sentinel poultry do not necessarily develop overt clinical disease a programme of regular active testing by virological and serological tests should be used (the development of clinical disease may be dependent on the sentinel species used or use of live vaccine in the target population that may infect the sentinel poultry ). The testing regime and the interpretation of the results will depend on the type of vaccine used in the target population. Sentinel birds should be used only if no appropriate laboratory procedures are available.

Article 10.13.25. Documentation of ND free status: additional surveillance procedures

The requirements for a country, zone or compartment to declare freedom from ND are given in Article 10.13.3.

A Member declaring freedom of a country, zone or compartment (with or without vaccination) should report the results of a surveillance programme in which the ND susceptible poultry population undergoes regular surveillance planned and implemented according to the general conditions and methods described in these recommendations.

  • 1. 
    Members declaring freedom from ND for the country, zone or compartment

In addition to the general conditions described in the Terrestrial Code , a Member declaring freedom from ND for the entire country, or a zone or a compartment should provide evidence for the existence of an effective surveillance programme. The surveillance programme should be planned and implemented according to general conditions and methods described in this Chapter to demonstrate absence of NDV infection in poultry during the preceding 12 months.

  • 2. 
    Additional requirements for countries, zones or compartments that practice vaccination

Vaccination against ND may be used as a component of a disease prevention and control programme. The vaccine used must comply with the provisions of the Terrestrial Manual .

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Annex XXIV (contd)

In vaccinated populations there is a need to perform surveillance to ensure the absence of NDV circulation. The use of sentinel poultry may provide further confidence of the absence of virus circulation. The surveillance should be repeated at least every 6 months or at shorter intervals according to the risk in the country, zone or compartment , or evidence to show the effectiveness of the vaccination programme is regularly provided.

Article 10.13.26.

Countries, zones or compartments regaining freedom from ND following an outbreak: additional surveillance procedures

A Member regaining country, zone or compartment freedom from ND should show evidence of an active surveillance programme depending on the epidemiological circumstances of the outbreak to demonstrate the absence of the i nfection .

A Member declaring freedom of a country, zone or compartment after an outbreak of ND (with or without vaccination) should report the results of a surveillance programme in which the ND susceptible poultry population undergoes regular surveillance planned and implemented according to the general conditions and methods described in these recommendations.

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Annex XXV

CH AP TE R 11. 6. BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

EU comments

The EU could support the proposed changes, but would like the TAHSC to take its comments into account.

It is especially important, in order to highlight some points where the standards seem inappropriate for practical management, to reiterate some comments already sent in the past.

Moreover, some new data on the infectivity of the small intestine show that there is a need of adaptation of the articles on specified risk materials.

Article 11.6.1.

General provisions and safe commodities

The recommendations in this chapter are intended to manage the human and animal health risks associated with the presence of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) agent in cattle (Bos taurus and B. indicus ) only.

  • 1. 
    When authorising import or transit of the following commodities and any products made from these commodities and containing no other tissues from cattle, V eterinary A uthorities should not require any BSE related conditions, regardless of the BSE risk status of the cattle population of the exporting country , zone or co mpartme nt :
  • a. 
    milk and milk products ;
  • b. 
    semen and in vivo derived cattle embryos collected and handled in accordance with the recommendations of the International Embryo Transfer Society;
  • c. 
    hides and skins;
  • d. 
    gelatine and collagen prepared exclusively from hides and skins;
  • e. 
    tallow with maximum level of insoluble impurities of 0.15% in weight and derivatives made from this tallow;

EU comment

The EU would like to remind the Code Commission of its previous opinion on this point and to restate its position.

The Quantitative risk assessment and the subsequent updates of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) of the scientific opinions on tallow, show that in practice it is not possible to guarantee the safety of tallow if it contains specified risk material, or if it is derived from animals found dead with no inspection.

Thus, the EU proposes the following wording:

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"e tallow with maximum level of insoluble impurities of 0.15% in weight and derivatives made from this tallow, if no commodities as laid down in Article 11.6.14 are used for its production and if the animals of which the raw material has been derived, have passed ante and post mortem inspection.

  • f. 
    dicalcium phosphate (with no trace of protein or fat);
  • g. 
    deboned skeletal muscle meat (excluding mechanically separated meat) from cattle which were not subjected to a stunning process prior to slaughter , with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity or to a pithing process, and which passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections and which has been prepared in a manner to avoid contamination with tissues listed in Article 11.6.14.;
  • h. 
    blood and blood by-products, from cattle which were not subjected to a stunning process, prior to slaughter , with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity, or to a pithing process.
  • 2. 
    When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the BSE risk status of the cattle population of the ex porti ng country , z one or compartment .

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 11.6.2.

The BSE risk status of the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment

The BSE risk status of the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment should be determined on the basis of the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    the outcome of a risk assessment , based on the provisions of the Terrestrial Code , identifying all potential factors for BSE occurrence and their historic perspective. Members should review the risk assessment annually to determine whether the situation has changed.
  • a. 
    Release assessment

Release assessment consists of assessing, through consideration of the following, the likelihood that the BSE agent has either been introduced into the country, zone or compartment via commodities potentially contaminated with it, or is already present in the country, zone or compartment :

  • i. 
    the presence or absence of the BSE agent in the indigenous ruminant population of the country, zone or compartment and, if present, evidence regarding its prevalence;
  • ii. 
    production of meat-and-bone meal or greaves from the indigenous ruminant population;
  • iii. 
    imported meat-and-bone meal or greaves ;
  • iv. 
    imported cattle, sheep and goats;
  • v. 
    imported animal feed and feed ingredients;
  • vi. 
    imported products of ruminant origin for human consumption, which may have contained tissues listed in Article 11.6.14. and may have been fed to cattle;
  • vii. 
    imported products of ruminant origin intended for in vivo use in cattle.

The results of surveillance and other epidemiological investigations into the disposition of the commodities identified above should be taken into account in carrying out the assessment.

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  • b. 
    Exposure assessment

If the release assessment identifies a risk factor, an exposure assessment should be conducted, consisting of assessing the likelihood of cattle being exposed to the BSE agent, through a consideration of the following:

  • i. 
    recycling and amplification of the BSE agent through consumption by cattle of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin, or other feed or feed ingredients contaminated with these;
  • ii. 
    the use of ruminant carcasses (including from fallen stock), by-products and slaughterhouse waste, the parameters of the rendering processes and the methods of animal feed manufacture;
  • iii. 
    the feeding or not of ruminants with meat-and-bone meal and greaves derived from ruminants, including measures to prevent cross-contamination of animal feed;
  • iv. 
    the level of surveillance for BSE conducted on the cattle population up to that time and the results of that surveillance ;
  • 2. 
    on-going awareness programme for veterinarians, farmers, and workers involved in transportation, marketing and slaughter of cattle to encourage reporting of all cases showing clinical signs consistent with BSE in target sub-populations as defined in Articles 11.6.20. to 11.6.22.;
  • 3. 
    the compulsory notification and investigation of all cattle showing clinical signs consistent with BSE;
  • 4. 
    the examination carried out in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual in a laboratory of brain or other tissues collected within the framework of the aforementioned surveilla nce and monitoring system.

When the risk assessment demonstrates negligible risk, the Member should conduct Type B surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.6.20. to 11.6.22.

When the risk assessment fails to demonstrate negligible risk, the Member should conduct Type A surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.6.20. to 11.6.22.

Article 11.6.3.

Negligible BSE risk

Commodities from the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment pose a negligible risk of transmitting the BSE agent if the following conditions are met:

  • 1. 
    a risk assessment , as described in point 1 of Article 11.6.2., has been conducted in order to identify the historical and existing risk factors, and the Member has demonstrated that appropriate specific measures have been taken for the relevant period of time defined below to manage each identified risk;
  • 2. 
    the Member has demonstrated that Type B surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.6.20. to 11.6.22. is in place and the relevant points target, in accordance with Table 1, has been met;
  • 3. 
    EITHER:
  • a. 
    there has been no case of BSE or, if there has been a case , every case of BSE has been demonstrated to have been imported and has been completely destroyed, and
  • i. 
    the criteria in points 2 to 4 of Article 11.6.2. have been complied with for at least 7 years; and
  • ii. 
    it has been demonstrated through an appropriate level of control and audit that for at least 8 years neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived from ruminants has been fed to ruminants;

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EU comment

The EU would like to remind the Code Commission of its previous opinion on this point and to restate its position. Practical experience pointed out the existence of cross-contaminations when applying a simple ruminant to ruminant feed ban, which has been proven impossible to implement in practice if imposed alone. Even if the simple ruminant to ruminant feed ban is scientifically justified, the evaluation of the extent of the feed ban should include the possibility of cross contaminations.

Thus the EU proposes the following wording: "ii           it has been demonstrated through an

appropriate level of control and audit, including that of cross contamination through feed of other mammalian origin, that for at least 8 years neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived from ruminants has been fed to ruminants

This comment also applies to Article 11.6.3., point 3b) ii), Article 11.6.4, point 3a)(ii) and 3b), Article 11.6.7.,point 2), Article 11.6.8., point 3, Article 11.6.9., point 1) en 3b) and Article 11.6.10., point 3).

OR

  • b. 
    if there has been an indigenous case , every indigenous case was born more than 11 years ago; and
  • i. 
    the criteria in points 2 to 4 of Article 11.6.2. have been complied with for at least 7 years; and
  • ii. 
    it has been demonstrated through an appropriate level of control and audit that for at least 8 years neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived from ruminants has been fed to ruminants; and
  • iii. 
    all BSE cases , as well as:

§ all cattle which, during their first year of life, were reared with the BSE cases during their first year of life, and which investigation showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during that period, or

§ if the results of the investigation are inconclusive, all cattle born in the same herd as, and within 12 months of the birth of, the BSE cases ,

if alive in the country, zone or compartment , are permanently identified, and their movements controlled, and, when slaughtered or at death , are completely destroyed.

The Member or zone will be included in the list of negligible risk only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE. Retention on the list requires that the information for the previous 12 months on surveillance results and feed controls be re-submitted annually and changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be reported to the OIE according to the requirements in Chapter 1.1. To maintain negligible risk status, all imports of cattle should comply with requirements in Articles 11.6.7., 11.6.8. or 11.6.9., as relevant.

Article 11.6.4.

Controlled BSE risk

Commodities from the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment pose a controlled risk of transmitting the BSE agent if the following conditions are met:

  • 1. 
    a risk assessment , as described in point 1 of Article 11.6.2., has been conducted in order to identify the historical and existing risk factors, and the Member has demonstrated that appropriate measures are being

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taken to manage all identified risks, but these measures have not been taken for the relevant period of time;

  • 2. 
    the Member has demonstrated that Type A surveillance in accordance with Articles 11.6.20. to 11.6.22. has been carried out and the relevant points target, in accordance with Table 1, has been met; Type B surveillance may replace Type A surveillance once the relevant points target is met;
  • 3. 
    EITHER:
  • a. 
    there has been no case of BSE or, if there has been a case , every case of BSE has been demonstrated to have been imported and has been completely destroyed, the criteria in points 2 to 4 of Article 11.6.2. are complied with, and it can be demonstrated through an appropriate level of control and audit that neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived from ruminants has been fed to ruminants, but at least one of the following two conditions applies:
  • i. 
    the criteria in points 2 to 4 of Article 11.6.2. have not been complied with for 7 years;
  • ii. 
    it cannot be demonstrated that controls over the feeding of meat-and-bone meal or greaves derived from ruminants to ruminants have been in place for 8 years;

OR

  • b. 
    there has been an indigenous case of BSE, the criteria in points 2 to 4 of Article 11.6.2. are complied with, and it can be demonstrated through an appropriate level of control and audit that neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived from ruminants has been fed to ruminants;

and all BSE cases , as well as:

§ all cattle which, during their first year of life, were reared with the BSE cases during their first year of life, and which investigation showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during that period, or

§ if the results of the investigation are inconclusive, all cattle born in the same herd as, and within 12 months of the birth of, the BSE cases ,

if alive in the country, zone or compartment , are permanently identified, and their movements controlled, and, when slaughtered or at death , are completely destroyed.

The Member or zone will be included in the list of controlled risk only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE. Retention on the list requires that the information for the previous 12 months on surveillance results and feed controls be re-submitted annually and changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be reported to the OIE according to the requirements in Chapter 1.1. To maintain controlled risk status, all imports of cattle should comply with requirements in Articles 11.6.7., 11.6.8. or 11.6.9., as relevant.

Article 11.6.5.

Undetermined BSE risk

The cattle population of a country, zone or compartment poses an undetermined BSE risk if it cannot be demonstrated that it meets the requirements of another category.

Article 11.6.6.

Recommendations for the importation of bovine commodities from a country, zone or compartment posing a negligible BSE risk

for all commodities from cattle not listed in point 1 of Article 11.6.1.

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V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certificate attesting that the country, zone or compartment complies with the conditions in Article 11.6.3.

Article 11.6.7.

Recommendations for the importation of cattle from a country, zone or compartment posing a negligible BSE risk but where there has been an indigenous case

for cattle selected for export

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    are identified by a permanent identification system in such a way as to demonstrate that they are not exposed cattle as described in point 3b)iii) of Article 11.6.3.;
  • 2. 
    were born after the date from which the ban on the feeding of ruminants with meat-and-bone meal and greaves derived from ruminants had been effectively enforced.

Article 11.6.8.

Recommendations for the importation of cattle from a country, zone or compartment posing a controlled BSE risk

for cattle

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the country, zone or compartment complies with the conditions referred to in Article 11.6.4.;
  • 2. 
    cattle selected for export are identified by a permanent identification system in such a way as to demonstrate that they are not exposed cattle as described in point 3b) of Article 11.6.4.;
  • 3. 
    cattle selected for export were born after the date from which the ban on the feeding of ruminants with meat-and-bone meal and greaves derived from ruminants was effectively enforced.

Article 11.6.9.

Recommendations for the importation of cattle from a country, zone or compartment posing an undetermined BSE risk

for cattle

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the feeding of ruminants with meat-and-bone meal and greaves derived from ruminants has been banned and the ban has been effectively enforced;
  • 2. 
    all BSE cases , as well as:
  • a. 
    all cattle which, during their first year of life, were reared with the BSE cases during their first year of life, and, which investigation showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during that period, or
  • b. 
    if the results of the investigation are inconclusive, all cattle born in the same herd as, and within 12 months of the birth of, the BSE cases ,

if alive in the country, zone or compartment , are permanently identified, and their movements controlled, and, when slaughtered or at death , are completely destroyed;

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  • 3. 
    cattle selected for export:
  • a. 
    are identified by a permanent identification system in such a way as to demonstrate that they are not exposed cattle as demonstrated in point 2 above;
  • b. 
    were born at least 2 years after the date from which the ban on the feeding of ruminants with meat-and-bone meal and greaves derived from ruminants was effectively enforced.

Article 11.6.10.

Recommendations for the importation of meat and meat products from a country, zone or compartment posing a negligible BSE risk

for fresh meat and meat products from cattle (other than those listed in point 1 of Article 11.6.1.)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the country, zone or compartment complies with the conditions in Article 11.6.3.;
  • 2. 
    the cattle from which the fresh meat and meat products were derived, passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections;
  • 3. 
    in countries with negligible BSE risk where there have been indigenous cases , the cattle from which the fresh meat and meat products were derived were born after the date from which the ban on the feeding of ruminants with meat-and-bone meal and greaves derived from ruminants had been effectively enforced.

Article 11.6.11.

Recommendations for the importation of meat and meat products from a country, zone or compartment posing a controlled BSE risk

for fresh meat and meat products from cattle (other than those listed in point 1 of Article 11.6.1.)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the country, zone or compartment complies with the conditions referred to in Article 11.6.4.;
  • 2. 
    the cattle from which the fresh meat and meat products were derived passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections;
  • 3. 
    cattle from which the fresh meat and meat products destined for export were derived were not subjected to a stunning process, prior to slaughter , with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity, or to a pithing process;
  • 4. 
    the fresh meat and meat products were produced and handled in a manner which ensures that such products do not contain and are not contaminated with:
  • a. 
    the tissues listed in points 1 and 2 of Article 11.6.14.,
  • b. 
    mechanically separated meat from the skull and vertebral column from cattle over 30 months of age.

EU comment

The EU would like to remind the Code Commission of its previous opinion on this point. In practice, the harvesting of mechanically recovered meat (MRM) does not allow for a selective exclusion of the skull or vertebral column of bovine animals over 30 months of age. Thus, in

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order to be effective, this exclusion of MRM should be extended to bovine of any age as well as to all bovine bones. Point b) above should only read: "mechanically separated meat".

This comment also applies to Article 11.6.12, point 2c).

Article 11.6.12.

Recommendations for the importation of meat and meat products from a country, zone or compartment posing an undetermined BSE risk

for fresh meat and meat products from cattle (other than those listed in point 1 of Article 11.6.1.)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the cattle from which the fresh meat and meat products originate:
  • a. 
    have not been fed meat-and-bone meal or greaves derived from ruminants;
  • b. 
    passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections;
  • c. 
    were not subjected to a stunning process, prior to slaughter , with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity, or to a pithing process;
  • 2. 
    the fresh meat and meat products were produced and handled in a manner which ensures that such products do not contain and are not contaminated with:
  • a. 
    the tissues listed in points 1 and 3 of Article 11.6.14.,
  • b. 
    nervous and lymphatic tissues exposed during the deboning process,
  • c. 
    mechanically separated meat from the skull and vertebral column from cattle over 12 months of age.

Article 11.6.13. Recommendations on ruminant-derived meat-and-bone meal or greaves

  • 1. 
    Ruminant-derived meat-and-bone meal or greaves , or any commodities containing such products, which originate from a country, zone or compartment defined in Article 11.6.3., but where there has been an indigenous case of BSE, should not be traded if such products were derived from cattle born before the date from which the ban on the feeding of ruminants with meat-and-bone meal and greaves derived from ruminants had been effectively enforced.
  • 2. 
    Ruminant-derived meat-and-bone meal or greaves , or any commodities containing such products, which originate from a country, zone or compartment defined in Articles 11.6.4. and 11.6.5. should not be traded between countries.

Article 11.6.14.

Recommendations on commodities that should not be traded

  • 1. 
    From cattle of any age originating from a country, zone or compartment defined in Articles 11.6.4. and 11.6.5., the following commodities, and any commodity contaminated by them, should not be traded for the preparation of food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals including biologicals, or medical devices: tonsils and distal ileum. Protein products, food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals or medical devices prepared using these commodities (unless covered by other Articles in this chapter) should also not be traded.

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EU comment

Scientific data show that potential infectivity can be found in the mesenteric nerves and the mesenteric lymph nodes situated near the mesenteric artery in bovine animals. In addition, on 10 September 2009, the EFSA adopted a scientific opinion on BSE Risk in Bovine Intestines (http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902899454.htm), which states that new even if limited experimental scientific data demonstrate that in addition to ileum, also jejunum may harbour infectivity when a large BSE inoculum dose was used to experimentally infect cattle.

Thus the EU proposes to replace the words "and distal ileum" by the words "mesentery and small intestine".

  • 2. 
    From cattle that were at the time of slaughter over 30 months of age originating from a country, zone or compartment defined in Article 11.6.4., the following commodities, and any commodity contaminated by them, should not be traded for the preparation of food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals including biologicals, or medical devices: brains, eyes, spinal cord, skull and vertebral column. Protein products, food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals or medical devices prepared using these commodities (unless covered by other Articles in this chapter) should also not be traded.

EU comment

On 19 April 2007 the EFSA adopted an opinion which took into account the latest results of the pathogenesis studies as well as the epidemiological data available from the monitoring programme in the European Union since 2001. One of the recommendations is that the age limit for the removal of brains, eyes, spinal cord and skull as SRM stays at 12 months if the risk of the country is not negligible.

Thus, the point 2 above should read:

"From cattle that were at the time of slaughter over 30 12 months of age originating from a country, zone or compartment defined in Article 11.6.4. and 11.6.5, the following commodities, and any commodity contaminated by them, should not be traded for the preparation of food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals including biologicals, or medical devices: brains, eyes, spinal cord, and skull and vertebral column. Protein products, food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals or medical devices prepared using these commodities (unless covered by other Articles in this chapter) should also not be traded."

And the point 3 below should read:

"From cattle that were at the time of slaughter over 12 30 months of age originating from a country, zone or compartment defined in Article 11.6.4. and 11.6.5, the following commodities, and any commodity contaminated by them, should not be traded for the preparation of food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals including biologicals, or medical devices: brains, eyes, spinal cord, skull and vertebral column. Protein products, food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals or medical devices prepared using these commodities (unless covered by other Articles in this chapter) should also not be traded.

  • 3. 
    From cattle that were at the time of slaughter over 12 months of age originating from a country, zone or compartment defined in Article 11.6.5., the following commodities, and any commodity contaminated by them, should not be traded for the preparation of food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals including biologicals, or medical devices: brains, eyes, spinal cord, skull and vertebral column. Protein products, food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals or medical devices prepared using these commodities (unless

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covered by other Articles in this chapter) should also not be traded.

EU comment

In addition, the EU would like to restate its position that if a commodity is considered at specified risk, as a principle any commodity made out of this commodity should be considered the same, and the words between brackets (in the three points) should be deleted.

Article 11.6.15.

Recommendations for the importation of gelatine and collagen prepared from bones and intended for food or feed, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals including biologicals, or medical devices

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the commodities came from a country, zone or compartment posing a negligible BSE risk; OR
  • 2. 
    they originate from a country, zone or compartment posing a controlled or undetermined BSE risk and are derived from cattle which have passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections; and that
  • a. 
    vertebral columns from cattle over 30 months of age at the time of slaughter and skulls have been excluded;
  • b. 
    the bones have been subjected to a process which includes all of the following steps: i. degreasing, ii. acid demineralisation, iii. acid or alkaline treatment, iv. filtration,
  • v. 
    sterilisation at >138°C for a minimum of 4 seconds, or to an equivalent or better process in terms of infectivity reduction (such as high pressure heating).

Article 11.6.16.

Recommendations for the importation of tallow (other than as defined in Article 11.6.1.) intended for food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals including biologicals, or medical devices

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the tallow came from a country, zone or compartment posing a negligible BSE risk; or
  • 2. 
    it originates from a country, zone or compartment posing a controlled BSE risk, is derived from cattle which have passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections, and has not been prepared using the tissues listed in points 1 and 2 of Article 11.6.14.

Article 11.6.17. Recommendations for the importation of dicalcium phosphate (other than as defined in Article 11.6.1.)

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intended for food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals including biologicals, or medical devices

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the dicalcium phosphate came from a country, zone or compartment posing a negligible BSE risk; or
  • 2. 
    it originates from a country, zone or compartment posing a controlled or undetermined BSE risk and is a byproduct of bone gelatine produced according to Article 11.6.15.

Article 11.6.18.

Recommendations for the importation of tallow derivatives (other than those made from tallow as defined in Article 11.6.1.) intended for food, feed, fertilisers, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals including biologicals, or medical devices

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the tallow derivatives originate from a country, zone or compartment posing a negligible BSE risk; or
  • 2. 
    they are derived from tallow meeting the conditions referred to in Article 11.6.16.; or
  • 3. 
    they have been produced by hydrolysis, saponification or transesterification using high temperature and pressure.

Article 11.6.19.

Procedures for the reduction of BSE infectivity in meat-and-bone meal

The following procedure should be used to reduce the infectivity of any transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents which may be present during the production of meat-and-bone meal containing ruminant proteins.

  • 1. 
    The raw material should be reduced to a maximum particle size of 50 mm before heating.
  • 2. 
    The raw material should be heated under saturated steam conditions to a temperature of not less than 133°C for a minimum of 20 minutes at an absolute pressure of 3 bar.

Article 11.6.20. Surveillance: introduction

  • 1. 
    Depending on the risk category of a country, zone or compartment with regard to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), surveillance for BSE may have one or more goals:
  • a. 
    detecting BSE, to a pre-determined design prevalence, in a country, zone or compartment ;
  • b. 
    monitoring the evolution of BSE in a country, zone or compartment ;
  • c. 
    monitoring the effectiveness of a feed ban and/or other risk mitigation measures, in conjunction with auditing;
  • d. 
    supporting a claimed BSE status;
  • e. 
    gaining or regaining a higher BSE status.
  • 2. 
    When the BSE agent is present in a country or zone , the cattle population will comprise the following sectors,

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in order of decreasing size:

  • a. 
    cattle not exposed to the infective agent;
  • b. 
    cattle exposed but not infected;
  • c. 
    infected cattle, which may lie within one of three stages in the progress of BSE:
  • i. 
    the majority will die or be killed before reaching a stage at which BSE is detectable by current methods;
  • ii. 
    some will progress to a stage at which BSE is detectable by testing before clinical signs appear;
  • iii. 
    the smallest number will show clinical signs.
  • 3. 
    The BSE status of a country, zone or compartment cannot be determined only on the basis of a surveillance programme but should be determined in accordance with all the factors listed in Article 11.6.2. The surveillance programme should take into account the diagnostic limitations associated with the above sectors and the relative distributions of infected cattle among them.
  • 4. 
    With respect to the distribution and expression of the BSE agent within the sectors described above, the following four subpopulations of cattle have been identified for surveillance purposes:
  • a. 
    cattle over 30 months of age displaying behavioural or clinical signs consistent with BSE (clinical suspects);
  • b. 
    cattle over 30 months of age that are non-ambulatory, recumbent, unable to rise or to walk without assistance; cattle over 30 months of age sent for emergency slaughter or condemned at ante-mortem inspection (casualty or emergency slaughter or downer cattle);
  • c. 
    cattle over 30 months of age which are found dead or killed, on farm, during transport or at an abattoir (fallen stock);
  • d. 
    cattle over 36 months of age at routine slaughter .
  • 5. 
    A gradient is used to describe the relative value of surveillance applied to each subpopulation. Surveillance should focus on the first subpopulation, but investigation of other subpopulations will help to provide an accurate assessment of the BSE situation in the country, zone or compartment . This approach is consistent with Articles 11.6.20. to 11.6.22.
  • 6. 
    When establishing a surveillance strategy, authorities need to take into account the inherent difficulties of obtaining samples on farm, and overcome them. These difficulties include higher cost, the necessity to educate and motivate owners, and counteracting potentially negative socio-economic implications.

Article 11.6.21. Surveillance: description of cattle subpopulations

  • 1. 
    Cattle over 30 months of age displaying behavioural or clinical signs consistent with BSE (clinical suspects)

Cattle affected by illnesses that are refractory to treatment, and displaying progressive behavioural changes such as excitability, persistent kicking when milked, changes in herd hierarchical status, hesitation at doors, gates and barriers, as well as those displaying progressive neurological signs without signs of infectious illness are candidates for examination. These behavioural changes, being very subtle, are best identified by those who handle animals on a daily basis. Since BSE causes no pathognomonic clinical signs, all Members with cattle populations will observe individual animals displaying clinical signs consistent with BSE. It should be recognised that cases may display only some of these signs, which may also vary in severity, and such animals should still be investigated as potential BSE affected animals. The rate at which such suspicious cases are

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likely to occur will differ among epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably.

This subpopulation is the one exhibiting the highest prevalence. The accurate recognition, reporting and classification of such animals will depend on the ongoing owner/veterinarian awareness programme. This and the quality of the investigation and laboratory examination systems (Article 11.6.2.), implemented by the V eterinary Services , are essential for the credibility of the surveilla nce system.

  • 2. 
    Cattle over 30 months of age that are non-ambulatory, recumbent, unable to rise or to walk without assistance; cattle over 30 months of age sent for emergency slaughter or condemned at ante-mortem inspection (casualty or emergency slaughter, or downer cattle)

These cattle may have exhibited some of the clinical signs listed above which were not recognised as being consistent with BSE. Experience in Members where BSE has been identified indicates that this subpopulation is the one demonstrating the second highest prevalence. For that reason, it is the second most appropriate population to target in order to detect BSE.

  • 3. 
    Cattle over 30 months of age which are found dead or killed on farm, during transport or at an abattoir (fallen stock)

These cattle may have exhibited some of the clinical signs listed above prior to death , but were not recognised as being consistent with BSE. Experience in Members where BSE has been identified indicates that this subpopulation is the one demonstrating the third highest prevalence.

  • 4. 
    Cattle over 36 months of age at routine slaughter

Experience in Members where BSE has been identified indicates that this subpopulation is the one demonstrating the lowest prevalence. For that reason, it is the least appropriate population to target in order to detect BSE. However, sampling in this subpopulation may be an aide in monitoring the progress of the epizootic and the efficacy of control measures applied, because it offers continuous access to a cattle population of known class, age structure and geographical origin. Testing of routine slaughter cattle 36 months of age or less is of relatively very little value (Table 2).

Article 11.6.22.

Surveillance activities

In order to implement efficiently a surveillance strategy for BSE, a Member must use documented records or reliable estimates of the age distribution of the adult cattle population and the number of cattle tested for BSE stratified by age and by subpopulation within the country, z one or compa rtment .

The approach assigns ‘point values’ to each sample, based on the subpopulation from which it was collected and the likelihood of detecting infected cattle in that subpopulation. The number of points a sample is assigned is determined by the subpopulation from which the sample is collected and the age of the animal sampled. The total points accumulation is then periodically compared to the target number of points for a country, zone or co mpartme nt .

A surveillance strategy should be designed to ensure that samples are representative of the herd of the country, zone or compartment , and include consideration of demographic factors such as production type and geographic location, and the potential influence of culturally unique husbandry practices. The approach used and the assumptions made should be fully documented, and the documentation retained for 7 years.

The points targets and surveillance point values in this chapter were obtained by applying the following factors to a statistical model:

  • a. 
    the design prevalence for Type A or Type B surveillance ;
  • b. 
    a confidence level of 95%;

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  • c. 
    the pathogenesis, and pathological and clinical expression of BSE: i. sensitivity of diagnostic methods used;
  • ii. 
    relative frequency of expression by age;
  • iii. 
    relative frequency of expression within each subpopulation;
  • iv. 
    interval between pathological change and clinical expression;
  • d. 
    demographics of the cattle population, including age distribution;
  • e. 
    influence of BSE on culling or attrition of animals from the cattle population via the four subpopulations;
  • f. 
    percentage of infected animals in the cattle population which are not detected.

Although the procedure accepts very basic information about a cattle population, and can be used with estimates and less precise data, careful collection and documentation of the data significantly enhance their value. Since samples from clinical suspect animals provide many times more information than samples from healthy or dead-of-unknown-cause animals, careful attention to the input data can substantially decrease the procedure’s cost and the number of samples needed. The essential input data are:

  • g. 
    cattle population numbers stratified by age;
  • h. 
    the number of cattle tested for BSE stratified by age and by subpopulation.

This chapter utilises Tables 1 and 2 to determine a desired surveillance points target and the point values of surveillance samples collected.

Within each of the subpopulations above in a country, zone or compartment , a Member may wish to target cattle identifiable as imported from countries or zones not free from BSE and cattle which have consumed potentially contaminated feedstuffs from countries or zones not free from BSE.

All clinical suspects should be investigated, regardless of the number of points accumulated. In addition, animals from the other subpopulations should be tested.

  • 1. 
    Type A surveillance

The application of Type A surveillance will allow the detection of BSE around a design prevalence of at least one case per 100,000 in the adult cattle population in the country, zone or compartment of concern, at a confidence level of 95%.

  • 2. 
    Type B surveillance

The application of Type B surveillance will allow the detection of BSE around a design prevalence of at least one case per 50,000 in the adult cattle population in the country, zone or compartment of concern, at a confidence level of 95%.

Type B surveillance may be carried out by countries, zones or compartments of negligible BSE risk status (Article 11.6.3.) to confirm the conclusions of the risk assessment , for example by demonstrating the effectiveness of the measures mitigating any risk factors identified, through surveillance targeted to maximise the likelihood of identifying failures of such measures.

Type B surveillance may also be carried out by countries, zones or compartments of controlled BSE risk status (Article 11.6.4.), following the achievement of the relevant points target using Type A surveillance , to maintain confidence in the knowledge gained through Type A surveillance .

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  • 3. 
    Selecting the points target

The surveillance points target should be selected from Table 1, which shows target points for adult cattle populations of different sizes. The size of the adult cattle population of a country, zone or compartment may be estimated or may be set at one million because, for statistical reasons, one million is the point beyond which sample size does not further increase with population size.

4. Determining the point values of

ples collected

Table 2 can be used to determine the point values of the surveillance samples collected. The approach assigns point values to each sample according to the likelihood of detecting infection based on the subpopulation from which the sample was collected and the age of the animal sampled. This approach takes into account the general principles of surveillance described in Chapter 1.4. and the epidemiology of BSE.

Because precise aging of the animals that are sampled may not be possible, Table 2 combines point values into five age categories. The point estimates for each category were determined as an average for the age range comprising the group. The age groups were selected on their relative likelihoods of expressing BSE according to scientific knowledge of the incubation of the disease and the world BSE experience. Samples may be collected from any combination of subpopulations and ages but should reflect the demographics of the cattle herd of the country, zone or compartment . In addition, Members should sample at least three of the four subpopulations.

Table 1. Points targets for diffe rent adult c attle population sizes in a country, zone or compartment

 

Points targets for country, zone or compartment

Adult cattle population size (24 months and

Type A surveillance

Type B surveillance

> 1,000,000

300,000

150,000

800,000-1,000,000

240,000

120,000

600,000-800,000

180,000

90,000

400,000-600,000

120,000

60,000

200,000-400,000

60,000

30,000

100,000-200,000

30,000

15,000

50,000-100,000

15,000

7,500

25,000 -50,000

7,500

3,750

If a country, zone or compartment determines, based on the demographics and epidemiological characteristics of its cattle population, that precise classification of the subpopulations ‘casualty or emergency slaughter, or downer cattle’ and ‘fallen stock’ is not possible, these subpopulations may be combined. In such a case, the surveillance point values accorded to the combined subpopulation would be that of ‘fallen stock’.

The total points for samples collected may be accumulated over a period of a maximum of 7 consecutive years to achieve the target number of points determined in Table 1.

Surveillance points remain valid for 7 years (the 95th percentile of the incubation period).

Table 2. Surveillance point values for samples collected from animals in the given subpopulation and age category

Surveillance subpopulation

Routine slaughter1

Fallen stock2

2

Casualty slaughter3 Clinical suspect

Age≥1 year and <2years

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0.01

0.2

Age >2 years and <4 years (young adult)

0.1

0.2

Age >4 years and< 7 years (middle adult)

0.2

0.9

Age >7 years and <9 years (older adult)

0.1

0.4

Age >9 years (aged)

0.0

0.1

0.4

0.4

1.6.

0.7

0.2

N/A

260

750

220

45

Article 11.6.23.

BSE risk assessment: introduction

The first step in determining the BSE risk status of the cattle population of a country or zone is to conduct a risk assessment (reviewed annually), based on Section 2 of this Terrestrial Code , identifying all potential factors for BSE occurrence and their historic perspective.

  • 1. 
    Release assessment

Release assessment consists of assessing the likelihood that a BSE agent has been introduced via the importation of the following commodities potentially contaminated with a BSE agent:

a.

b.

c.

d.

meat-and-bone mea l or greaves ;

live animals;

animal feed and feed ingredients;

products of animal origin for human consumption.

  • 2. 
    Exposure assessment

Exposure assessment consists of assessing the likelihood of exposure of the BSE agent to cattle, through a consideration of the following:

  • a. 
    epidemiological situation concerning BSE agents in the country or zone ;
  • b. 
    recycling and amplification of the BSE agent through consumption by cattle of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin, or other feed or feed ingredients contaminated with these;
  • c. 
    the origin and use of ruminant carcasses (including fallen stock), by-products and slaughterhouse waste, the parameters of the rendering processes and the methods of animal feed manufacture;
  • d. 
    implementation and enforcement of feed bans, including measures to prevent cross-contamination of animal feed; the status of the birth cohort of a case should be determined when investigating the implementation of feed bans.

EU comment

The EU agrees that the assessment of the birth cohorts of the positive BSE cases should be taken into account to allow better assessment of the correct implementation of the feed ban provisions. But in addition, and this is even more important, the possibility of cases born after

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the implementation of the feed ban should also be considered to assess the exposure.

Thus the EU proposes the following wording:

"d. implementation and enforcement of feed bans, including measures to prevent cross-contamination of animal feed; the status of the birth cohort of a case should be determined when investigating the implementation of feed bans, and thorough epidemiological investigations should be conducted for any indigenous case born after the date of the implementation of feed bans."

The following recommendations are intended to assist V eterinary Services in conducting such a risk assessment . They provide guidance on the issues that need to be addressed when conducting a country-based assessment of BSE risk. They apply equally to self-assessment in preparation of dossiers for categorisation of countries. The recommendations are supported by greater detail in the questionnaire used for the submission of data for country assessment.

Article 11.6.24.

The potential for the release of the BSE agent through the importation of meat-and-bone meal or greaves

This point is irrelevant if the exposure assessment outlined below in Article 11.6.27. indicates that meat-and-bone meal or greaves has not been fed, either deliberately or accidentally, in the past 8 years. Nevertheless, documentation should be provided on the control systems (including relevant legislation) in place to ensure that meat-and-bone meal or greaves has not been fed to ruminants.

A ssumption: That meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin plays the only significant role in BSE transmission.

Question to be answered: Has meat-and-bone meal , greaves , or feedstuffs containing either been imported within the past 8 years? If so, where from and in what quantities?

Rationale: Knowledge of the origin of meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing either meat-and-bone meal or greaves , is necessary to assess the risk of release of BSE agent. Meat-and-bone meal and greaves originating in countries of high BSE risk pose a higher release risk than that from low risk countries. Meat-and-bone meal and greaves originating in countries of unknown BSE risk pose an unknown release risk.

E vi dence req ui red:

  • • 
    Documentation to support claims that meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing either meat-and-bone meal or greaves have not been imported, OR
  • • 
    Where meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing them have been imported, documentation of country of origin and, if different, the country of export.
  • • 
    Documentation on annual volume, by country of origin, of meat , greaves or feedstuffs containing them imported during the past 8 years.
  • • 
    Documentation describing the composition (on a species and class of stock basis) of the imported meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing them.
  • • 
    Documentation, from the country of production, supporting why the rendering processes used to produce meat-and-bone meal , greaves or feedstuffs containing them would have inactivated, or significantly reduced the titre of BSE agent, should it be present.
  • • 
    Documentation describing the fate of imported meat-and-bone mea l and greaves .

Article 11.6.25.

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The potential for the release of the BSE agent through the importation of live animals potentially infected with BSE

Assumptions:

  • • 
    Countries which have imported ruminants from countries infected with BSEs are more likely to experience BSE.
  • • 
    Cattle pose the only known risk although other species are under study.
  • • 
    Animals imported for breeding may pose a greater risk than animals imported for slaughter because of the hypothetical risk of maternal transmission and because they are kept to a greater age than animals imported for slaughter .
  • • 
    Risk is influenced by the date at which imports occurred, relative to the BSE status of the country of origin.
  • • 
    Risk is proportional to volume of imports (Article 2.1.3.). Question to be answered: Have live animals been imported within the past 7 years? Rationale: The release risks are dependent on:
  • • 
    country of origin and its BSE status, which will change as more data become available; this may result from the detection of clinical disease , or following active surveillance , or assessment of geographical BSE risk;
  • • 
    feeding and management of the animals in the country of origin;
  • • 
    use to which the commodity has been put as apart from representing risk of developing clinical disease , the slaughter , rendering and recycling in meat-and-bone meal of imported animals represents a potential route of exposure of indigenous livestock even if meat-and-bone meal and greaves , or feedstuffs containing them, have not been imported;
  • • 
    species;
  • • 
    dairy versus meat breeds, where there are differences in exposure in the country of origin because feeding practices result in greater exposure of one category;
  • • 
    age at slaughter . E vi dence req ui red:
  • • 
    Documentation on the country of origin of imports. This should identify the country of breeding of animals, the length of time they lived in that country and of any other country in which they have resided during their lifetime.
  • • 
    Documentation describing origins, species and volume of imports.
  • • 
    Documentation describing the fate of imported animals, including their age at slaughter .
  • • 
    Documentation demonstrating that risks are periodically reviewed in light of evolving knowledge on the BSE status of the country of origin.

Article 11.6.26.

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The potential for the release of the BSE agent through the importation of products of animal origin potentially infected with BSE

Assumptions:

  • • 
    Semen, embryos, hides and skins or milk are not considered to play a role in the transmission of BSE.
  • • 
    Countries which have imported products of animal origin from countries with BSEs are more likely to experience BSE.
  • • 
    Risk is influenced by the date at which imports occurred, relative to the BSE status of the country of origin.
  • • 
    Risk is proportional to volume of imports (Article 2.1.3.). Question to be answered: What products of animal origin have been imported within the past 7 years? Rationale: The release risks are dependent on:
  • • 
    the species of origin of the animal products and whether these products contain tissues known to contain BSE infectivity (Article 11.6.14.);
  • • 
    country of origin and its BSE status, which will change as more data become available; this may result from the detection of clinical disease , or following active surveillance , or assessment of geographical BSE risk;
  • • 
    feeding and management of the animals in the country of origin;
  • • 
    use to which the commodity has been put as apart from representing risk of developing clinical disease , the slaughter , rendering and recycling in meat-and-bone meal of imported animals represents a potential route of exposure of indigenous livestock even if meat-and-bone meal and greaves , or feedstuffs containing them, have not been imported;
  • • 
    species;
  • • 
    dairy versus meat breeds, where there are differences in exposure in the country of origin because feeding practices result in greater exposure of one category;
  • • 
    age at slaughter . E vi dence req ui red:
  • • 
    Documentation on the country of origin of imports. This should identify the country of breeding of animals, the length of time they lived in that country and of any other country in which they have resided during their lifetime.
  • • 
    Documentation describing origins, species and volume of imports.
  • • 
    Documentation describing the end use of imported animal products, and the disposal of waste.
  • • 
    Documentation demonstrating that risks are periodically reviewed in light of evolving knowledge on the BSE status of the country of origin.

Article 11.6.27.

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The potential for the exposure of cattle to the BSE agent through consumption of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin

Assumptions:

  • • 
    That the consumption by bovines of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin plays the only significant role in BSE transmission.
  • • 
    That commercially-available products of animal origin used in animal feeds may contain meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin.
  • • 
    Milk and blood are not considered to play a role in the transmission of BSE.

Question to be answered: Has meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin been fed to cattle within the past 8 years (see Articles 11.6.3. and 11.6.4.)?

Rationale: If cattle have not been fed products of animal origin (other than milk or blood) potentially containing meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin within the past 8 years, meat-and-bone meal and greaves can be dismissed as a risk.

Article 11.6.28.

The origin of animal waste, the parameters of the rendering processes and the methods of animal feed production

Assumptions:

  • • 
    BSE has a long incubation period and insidious onset of signs, so cases may escape detection.
  • • 
    Pre-clinical BSE infectivity cannot reliably be detected by any method and may enter rendering, in particular if specified risk materials are not removed.
  • • 
    Tissues most likely to contain high titres of BSE infectivity (brain, spinal cord, eyes) may not be harvested for human consumption and may be rendered.
  • • 
    BSE may manifest in sudden death , chronic disease, or recumbency, and may be presented as fallen stock or materials condemned as unfit for human consumption.
  • • 
    BSE agent survival in rendering is affected by the method of processing. Adequate rendering processes are described in Article 11.6.19.
  • • 
    BSE agent is present at much higher titres in central nervous system and reticulo-endothelial tissues (so-called ‘Specified Risk Materials’, or SRM).

Question to be answered: How has animal waste been processed over the past 8 years?

Rationale: If potentially infected animals or contaminated materials are rendered, there is a risk that the resulting meat-and-bone meal could retain BSE infectivity.

Where meat-and-bone meal is utilized in the production of any animal feeds, the risk of cross-contamination exists.

Evidence required:

  • • 
    Documentation describing the collection and disposal of fallen stock and materials condemned as unfit for human consumption.

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  • • 
    Documentation describing the definition and disposal of specified risk material, if any.
  • • 
    Documentation describing the rendering process and parameters used to produce meat-and-bone meal and greaves .
  • • 
    Documentation describing methods of animal feed production, including details of ingredients used, the extent of use of meat-and-bone meal in any livestock feed, and measures that prevent cross-contamination of cattle feed with ingredients used in monogastric feed.
  • • 
    Documentation describing monitoring and enforcement of the above.

Article 11.6.29.

Conclusions of the risk assessment

The overall risk of BSE in the cattle population of a country or zone is proportional to the level of known or potential exposure to BSE infectivity and the potential for recycling and amplification of the infectivity through livestock feeding practices. For the risk assessment to conclude that the cattle population of a country or zone is free from BSE risk, it must have demonstrated that appropriate measures have been taken to manage any risks identified.

1       See point 4) of Article 11.6.21.

2       See point 3) of Article 11.6.21.

3       See point 2) of Article 11.6.21.

4       See point 1) of Article 11.6.21.

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Annex XXVI

CH AP TE R 11.7. BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS

EU comments

The EU strongly supports the proposed changes and thanks the OIE for its excellent work in finalising these 2 Chapters concerning TB. There is still a comment in article 11.7.4 that need to be addressed in order to make the article consistent.

NB: the EU will send a letter to OIE scientific commission regarding the change in Taxonomy regarding M. caprae, as this was included as M. bovis, as well as on the role of wildlife.

Article 11.7.1. General provisions

The recommendations in this chapter are intended to manage the human and animal health risks associated with Mycobacterium bovis (M. bovis ) infection in domestic (permanently captive and owned free-range) bovines including cattle (Bos taurus , B. indicus and B. grunniens ), water buffaloes (Bubalus bubalis ) and wood bisons (Bison bison and B. bonasus ).

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 11.7.2. Country or zone free from bovine tuberculosis

To qualify as free from bovine tuberculosis, a country or zone should satisfy the following requirements:

  • 1. 
    M. bovis infection in domestic (permanently captive and owned free-range) bovines including cattle, water buffalo and wood bison is a notifiable disease in the country;
  • 2. 
    an on-going awareness programme should be in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of bovine tuberculosis;
  • 3. 
    regular and periodic testing of all cattle, water buffalo, and wood bison herds demonstrated that M. bovis infection was not present in at least 99.8% of the herds and 99.9% of the cattle, water buffalo and wood bison in the country or zone for 3 consecutive years;
  • 4. 
    a surveillance programme should be in place to detect bovine tuberculosis in the country or zone through ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection as described in Chapter 6.2.;
  • 5. 
    if the surveillance programme described in points 3 and 4 above has not detected infection with demonstrated that M. bovis infection was not present in at least 99.8% of the herds and 99.9% of the cattle, water buffalo and wood bison in the country or zone for 5 consecutive years, surveillance may be maintained through ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection as described in Chapter 6.2.;
  • 6. 
    cattle, water buffalo and wood bison introduced into a country or zone free from bovine tuberculosis should be accompanied by a certificate from an Official V eterinarian attesting that they come from a country, zone , compartment or herd free from bovine tuberculosis or comply with the relevant provisions in Article 11.7.5. or in Article 11.7.6.

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Article 11.7.3. Compartment free from bovine tuberculosis

To qualify as a compartment free from bovine tuberculosis, all cattle, water buffalo or wood bison in a compartment should be certified by the V eterinary A uthority as satisfying the following requirements:

  • 1. 
    the cattle, water buffalo and wood bison:
  • a. 
    showed no sign of bovine tuberculosis or lesions at ante-mortem or post-mortem inspection for at least 3 consecutive years;
  • b. 
    were over 6 weeks of age at the time of the first test and have shown a negative result to at least t wo tuberculin tests carried out at an interval of a minimum of 6 months, the first test being performed at least 6 months following the slaughter of the last affected animal;
  • c. 
    met one of the following conditions:
  • i. 
    showed a negative result to a biannual tuberculin test to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is more than 1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 2 years; or
  • ii. 
    showed a negative result to an annual tuberculin test to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is more than 0.2% but not more than 1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 2 years; or
  • iii. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 3 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 0.2% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 4 years; or
  • iv. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 4 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 0.1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 6 years;
  • 2. 
    cattle, water buffalo and wood bison introduced into the compartment come from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis. This condition may be waived for animals which have been isolated for at least 90 days and which, prior to entry into the compartment , were subjected to at least two tuberculin tests carried out at a 6-month interval with negative results with the second tuberculin test performed during the 30 days prior to entry into the compartment ;
  • 3. 
    cattle, water buffalo and wood bison in a compartment free from bovine tuberculosis are protected from contact with wildlife reservoirs of bovine tuberculosis and are managed under a common biosecurity plan protecting them from contamination with M. bovis , and the compartment has been approved by the V eterinary A uthority in accordance with Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.

Article 11.7.4. Herd free from bovine tuberculosis

To qualify as free from bovine tuberculosis, a herd of cattle, water buffalo, or wood bisons should satisfy the following requirements:

  • 1. 
    the herd is in a country, zone or compartment free from bovine tuberculosis and is certified free by the V eterinary A uthority ; or
  • 2. 
    cattle, water buffalo and wood bison in the herd : EU comment

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A herd to qualify free after a case according to point b) needs a minimum of 12 months; in order to be consistent, the period without any findings at the slaughterhouse should be the same. Thus, the EU proposes to reduce the time delay in point a) to 1 year.

In addition, the point b) below seems to indicate that only after a case should this testing procedure be applied, while it should be the procedure for free status acquisition even if there were no findings of TB before. Thus, the EU proposes to clarify point b as follows:

" b. were over 6 weeks of age at the time of the first test and have shown a negative result to at least two tuberculin tests carried out at an interval of a minimum of 6 months,; in case of regaining of free status after an outbreak, the first test being should be performed at least 6 months following the slaughter of the last affected animal;"

Finally, point c) does not deal with the acquisition of the free status but with its maintenance, so it should read:

"c. to maintain the free status, met one of the following conditions:"

  • a. 
    showed no signs of bovine tuberculosis or lesions at ante-mortem or post-mortem inspection for at least 3 consecutive years;
  • b. 
    were over 6 weeks of age at the time of the first test and have shown a negative result to at least t wo tuberculin tests carried out at an interval of a minimum of 6 months, the first test being performed at least 6 months following the slaughter of the last affected animal;
  • c. 
    met one of the following conditions:
  • i. 
    showed a negative result to an annual tuberculin test to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis; or
  • ii. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 2 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 2 years; or
  • iii. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 3 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 0.2% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 4 years; or
  • iv. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 4 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 0.1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 6 years;
  • 3. 
    cattle, water buffalo and wood bison introduced into the herd come from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis. This condition may be waived for animals which have been isolated for at least 90 days and which, prior to entry into the herd , were subjected to at least t wo tuberculin tests carried out at a 6-month interval with negative results.

Article 11.7.5. Recommendations for the importation of cattle, water buffalo and wood bison for breeding or rearing

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no signs of bovine tuberculosis on the day of shipment;

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  • 2. 
    originate from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis that is in a country, zone or compartment free from bovine tuberculosis; or
  • 3. 
    were subjected to the tuberculin test for bovine tuberculosis with negative results during the 30 days prior to shipment and come from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis; or
  • 4. 
    have been isolated for at least 90 days prior to entry into the herd, including protection from contact with wildlife reservoirs of bovine tuberculosis and were subjected to at least two tuberculin tests carried out at a six-month interval with negative results with the second tuberculin test performed during the 30 days prior to entry into the herd .

Article 11.7.6. Recommendations for the importation of cattle, water buffalo and wood bison for slaughter

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no signs of bovine tuberculosis on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    originated from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis or were subjected to a tuberculin test for bovine tuberculosis with negative results during the 30 days prior to shipment;
  • 3. 
    were not being eliminated as part of an eradication programme against bovine tuberculosis.

Article 11.7.7. Recommendations for the importation of semen of cattle, water buffalo and wood bison

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals showed no signs of bovine tuberculosis on the day of collection of the semen and either:
  • a. 
    were kept in an artificial insemination centre free from bovine tuberculosis in a country, zone or compartment free from bovine tuberculosis and which only accepts animals from free herds in a free country, zone or compa rtment ; or
  • b. 
    showed negative results to tuberculin tests carried out annually and were kept in a herd free from bovine tuberculosis;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 11.7.8. Recommendations for the importation of embryos/ ova of cattle, water buffalo and wood bison

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females and all other susceptible animals in the herd of origin showed no signs of bovine tuberculosis during the 24 hours prior to embryo collection; and either
  • a. 
    originated from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis in a country, zone or compartment free from bovine tuberculosis; or
  • b. 
    were kept in a herd free from bovine tuberculosis, and were subjected to a tuberculin test for bovine tuberculosis with negative results during an isolation period of 30 days in the establishment of origin prior

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to collection;

  • 2. 
    the embryos/ova were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7., 4.8. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 11.7.9.

Recommendations for the importation of fresh meat and meat products of cattle, water buffalo, and wood bison

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat comes from animals which have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections as described in Chapter 6.2.

Article 11.7.10.

Recommendations for the importation of milk and milk products of cattle, water buffalo and wood bison

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the consignment:

  • 1. 
    has been derived from animals in a herd free from bovine tuberculosis; or
  • 2. 
    was subjected to pasteurization; or
  • 3. 
    was subjected to a combination of control measures with equivalent performance as described in the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygienic Practice for Milk and Milk Products.

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Annex XXVI (contd)

CH AP TE R 11.8. BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS OF FARMED CERVIDAE

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes.

Article 11.8.1.

General provisions

The recommendations in this chapter are intended to manage the human and animal health risks associated with Mycobacterium bovis (M. bovis ) infection in domestic (permanently captive and owned free-range) farmed cervidae (red deer, wapiti, sika, samba, rusa, fallow deer, white-tailed, black-tailed and mule deer [Cervus elephus , C. canadensis , C. nippon , C. unicolor unicolor , C. timorensis , Dama dama dama , Odocoileus virginianus borealis , Odocoileus hemionus columbianus and Odocoileus hemionus hemionus ]). The chapter does not address the management of tuberculosis in wild cervid populations.

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 11.8.2.

Country or zone free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae

To qualify as free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae, a country or zone should satisfy the following requirements:

  • 1. 
    M. bovis infection in domestic bovines and in farmed cervidae as specified in Article 11.8.1. is a notifiable disease in the country;
  • 2. 
    an on-going awareness programme should be in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of tuberculosis;
  • 3. 
    regular and periodic testing of all herds of farmed cervidae has demonstrated that M. bovis infection was not present in at least 99.8% of the herds and 99.9% of the farmed cervidae in the country or zone for 3 consecutive years;
  • 4. 
    a surveillance programme should be in place to detect bovine tuberculosis in the country or zone through ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection as described in Chapter 6.2.;
  • 5. 
    if the surveillance programme described in points 3 and 4 above has not detected infection with demonstrated that M. bovis infection was not present in at least 99.8% of the herds and 99.9% of the farmed cervidae in the country or zone for 5 consecutive years, surveillance may be maintained through ante-mortem and postmortem inspection as described in Chapter 6.2.;
  • 6. 
    farmed cervidae introduced into a country or zone free from bovine tuberculosis should be accompanied by a certificate from an Official V eterinarian attesting that they come from a country, zone , compartment or herd free from bovine tuberculosis or comply with the relevant provisions in Article 11.8.5. or in Article 11.8.6.

Article 11.8.3. Compartment free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae

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To qualify as a compartment free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae, the V eterinary A uthority should be able to certify that the following requirements are satisfied:

  • 1. 
    all farmed cervidae:
  • a. 
    showed no sign of bovine tuberculosis or lesions at ante-mortem or post-mortem inspection for at least 3 consecutive years;
  • b. 
    were over 6 weeks of age at the time of the first test and have shown a negative result to at least t wo tuberculin tests carried out at an interval of a minimum of 6 months, the first test being performed at least 6 months following the slaughter of the last affected animal;
  • c. 
    met one of the following conditions:
  • i. 
    showed a negative result to a biannual tuberculin test to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is more than 1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 2 years; or
  • ii. 
    showed a negative result to an annual tuberculin test to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is more than 0.2% but not more than 1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 2 years; or
  • iii. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 3 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 0.2% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 4 years; or
  • iv. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 4 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 0.1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 6 years;
  • 2. 
    farmed cervidae introduced into the compartment come from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis. This condition may be waived for animals which have been isolated for at least 90 days and which, prior to entry into the compartment , were subjected to at least t wo tuberculin tests carried out at a 6-month interval with negative results with the second tuberculin test performed during the 30 days prior to entry into the co mpartme nt ;
  • 3. 
    farmed cervidae in a compartment free from bovine tuberculosis are protected from contact with wildlife reservoirs of bovine tuberculosis and are managed under a common biosecurity plan protecting them from contamination with M. bovis , and the compartment has been approved by the V eterinary A uthority in accordance with Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.

Article 11.8.4. Herd free from bovine tuberculosis

To qualify as free from bovine tuberculosis, a herd of farmed cervidae should satisfy the following requirements:

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Annex XXVI (contd)

  • 1. 
    the herd is in a country, a zone or a compartment free from bovine tuberculosis and is certified free by the V eterinary A uthority ; or
  • 2. 
    farmed cervidae in the herd :
  • a. 
    showed no sign of bovine tuberculosis or lesions at ante-mortem or post-mortem inspection for at least 3 consecutive years;
  • b. 
    were over 6 weeks of age at the time of the first test and have shown a negative result to at least t wo tuberculin tests carried out at an interval of a minimum of 6 months, the first test being performed at least 6 months following the slaughter of the last affected animal;
  • c. 
    met one of the following conditions:
  • i. 
    showed a negative result to an annual tuberculin test to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis; or
  • ii. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 2 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 2 years; or
  • iii. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 3 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 0.2% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 4 years; or
  • iv. 
    showed a negative result to a tuberculin test every 4 years to ensure the continuing absence of bovine tuberculosis if the annual percentage of herds confirmed as infected with tuberculosis is not more than 0.1% of all herds in the country or zone during the last 6 years;
  • 3. 
    farmed cervidae introduced into the herd come from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis. This condition may be waived for animals which have been isolated for at least 90 days and which, prior to entry into the herd , were subjected to at least two tuberculin tests carried out at a 6-month interval with negative results.

Article 11.8.5.

Recommendations for the importation of farmed cervidae for breeding or rearing

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no signs of bovine tuberculosis on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    originate from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae that is in a country, zone or compartment free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae; or
  • 3. 
    were subjected to the tuberculin test for bovine tuberculosis with negative results during the 30 days prior to shipment and come from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae; or
  • 4. 
    have been isolated for at least 90 days prior to entry into the herd, including protection from contact with wildlife reservoirs of bovine tuberculosis and were subjected to at least two tuberculin tests carried out at a six-month interval with negative results with the second tuberculin test performed during the 30 days prior to entry into the herd .

Article 11.8.6.

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Recommendations for the importation of farmed cervidae for slaughter

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no signs of bovine tuberculosis on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    originated from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae or were subjected to a tuberculin test for bovine tuberculosis with negative results during the 30 days prior to shipment;
  • 3. 
    were not being eliminated as part of an eradication programme against bovine tuberculosis.

Article 11.8.7. Recommendations for the importation of semen of farmed cervidae

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals showed no signs of bovine tuberculosis on the day of collection of the semen; and either:
  • a. 
    were kept in a herd free from bovine tuberculosis in any species, in a country, zone or compartment free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae, and which only accepts animals from free herds in a free country, zone or compartment ; or
  • b. 
    showed negative results to tuberculin tests carried out annually and were kept in a herd free from bovine tuberculosis;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 11.8.8. Recommendations for the importation of embryos/ ova of farmed cervidae

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females and all other susceptible animals in the herd of origin showed no signs of bovine tuberculosis during the 24 hours prior to embryo collection; and either
  • a. 
    originated from a herd free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae in a country, zone or compartment free from bovine tuberculosis; or
  • b. 
    were kept in a herd free from bovine tuberculosis of farmed cervidae and were subjected to a tuberculin test for bovine tuberculosis with negative results during an isolation period of 30 days in the establishment of origin prior to collection;
  • 2. 
    the embryos/ova were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7., 4.8. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 11.8.9. Recommendations for the importation of fresh meat and meat products of farmed cervidae

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat comes from animals which have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections as described in Chapter 6.2.

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Annex XXVII

CHAPTER 11.9. CONTAGIOUS BOVINE PLEUROPNEUMONIA

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed changes.

Article 11.9.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period for contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) shall be 6 months.

For the purpose of this chapter, a case of CBPP means an animal infected with Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. mycoides SC (Mmm SC), and freedom from CBPP means freedom from Mmm SC infection.

For the purpose of this chapter, susceptible animals include domestic cattle (Bos indicus and B. taurus ) and water buffalo (Bubalus bubalis ).

For the purposes of international trade , this chapter deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by MmmSC, but also with the presence of infection with Mmm SC in the absence of clinical signs.

The following defines the occurrence of Mmm SC infection:

  • 1. 
    Mmm SC has been isolated and identified as such from an animal, embryos, oocytes or semen; or
  • 2. 
    antibodies to Mmm SC antigens which are not the consequence of vaccination, or Mmm SC DNA, have been identified in one or more animals showing pathological lesions consistent with infection with Mmm SC with or without clinical signs, and epidemiological links to a confirmed outbreak of CBPP in susceptible animals.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the CBPP status of the domestic cattle and water buffalo population of the ex porting country , z one or compartment .

Article 11.9.2.

Trade in Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any CBPP related conditions, regardless of the CBPP status of the domestic cattle and water buffalo population of the ex porti ng country , z one or compartment :

  • 1. 
    milk and milk products ;
  • 2. 
    hides and skins;
  • 3. 
    meat and meat products (excluding lung).

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When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the CBPP status of the domestic cattle and water buffalo population of the ex porting countr y , z one or compartment .

Article 11.9.3. CBPP free country, zone or compartment

To qualify for inclusion in the existing list of CBPP free countries, a Member should:

  • 1. 
    have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;
  • 2. 
    send a declaration to the OIE stating that:
  • a. 
    there has been no outbreak of CBPP during the past 24 months;
  • b. 
    no evidence of CBPP infection has been found during the past 24 months;
  • c. 
    no vaccination against CBPP has been carried out during the past 24 months,

and supply documented evidence that surveillance for CBPP in accordance with this chapter is in operation and that regulatory measures for the prevention and control of CBPP have been implemented;

  • 3. 
    not have imported since the cessation of vaccination any animals vaccinated against CBPP.

The country will be included in the list only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE. Retention on the list requires that the information 2a), 2b), 2c) and 3 above be re-submitted annually and changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be reported to the OIE according to the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

Article 11.9.4.

Recovery of free status

When a CBPP outbreak occurs in a CBPP free country, zone or compartment , one of the following waiting periods is required to regain the status of CBPP free country, zone or compartment :

  • 1. 
    12 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy and serological surveillance and strict movement control are applied in accordance with this chapter;
  • 2. 
    if vaccination was used, 12 months after the slaughter of the last vaccinated animal.

Where a stamping-out policy is not practised, the above waiting periods do not apply but Article 11.9.3. applies.

Article 11.9.5.

CBPP infected country or zone

When the requirements for acceptance as a CBPP free country or zone are not fulfilled, a country or zone shall be considered as infected.

Article 11.9.6. Recommendations for importation from CBPP free countries, zones or compartments

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Annex XXVII (contd)

for domestic cattle and water buffaloes

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an interna tional veterinary certificate attesting that the animals showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of shipment.

Article 11.9.7. Recommendations for importation from CBPP infected countries or zones

for domestic cattle and water buffaloes for slaughter

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    originate from an establishment where no case of CBPP was officially reported for the past 6 months, and
  • 3. 
    are transported directly to the slaughterhouse in sealed vehicles .

Article 11.9.8. Recommendations for importation from CBPP free countries, zones or compartments

for bovine semen

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a. 
    showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the semen;
  • b. 
    were kept in a CBPP free country since birth or for at least the past 6 months;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 11.9.9. Recommendations for importation from CBPP infected countries or zones

for bovine semen

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that: 1. the donor animals:

  • a. 
    showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the semen;
  • b. 
    were subjected to the complement fixation test for CBPP with negative results, on two occasions, with an interval of not less than 21 days and not more than 30 days between each test, the second test being performed within 14 days prior to collection;

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Annex XXVII (contd)

  • c. 
    were isolated from other domestic bovidae from the day of the first complement fixation test until collection;
  • d. 
    were kept since birth, or for the past 6 months, in an establishment where no case of CBPP was reported during that period, and that the establishment was not situated in a CBPP infected zone ;
  • e. 
    AND EITHER:
  • i. 
    have not been vaccinated against CBPP;

OR

  • ii. 
    were vaccinated using a vaccine complying with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual not more than 4 months prior to collection; in this case, the condition laid down in point b) above is not required;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 11.9.10. Recommendations for importation from CBPP free countries, zones or compartments

for in vivo derived or in vitro produced embryos/oocytes of bovidae

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a. 
    showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the embryos/oocytes;
  • b. 
    were kept in a CBPP free country since birth or for at least the past 6 months;
  • 2. 
    the oocytes were fertilised with semen meeting the conditions of Article 11.9.8.;
  • 3. 
    the embryos/oocytes was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7., 4.8. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 11.9.11. Recommendations for importation from CBPP infected countries or zones

for in vivo derived or in vitro produced embryos/oocytes of bovidae

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that: 1. the donor animals:

  • a. 
    showed no clinical sign of CBPP on the day of collection of the embryos/oocytes;
  • b. 
    were subjected to the complement fixation test for CBPP with negative results, on two occasions, with an interval of not less than 21 days and not more than 30 days between each test, the second test being performed within 14 days prior to collection;

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Annex XXVII (contd)

  • c. 
    were isolated from other domestic bovidae from the day of the first complement fixation test until collection;
  • d. 
    were kept since birth, or for the past 6 months, in an establishment where no case of CBPP was reported during that period, and that the establishment was not situated in a CBPP infected zone ;
  • e. 
    AND EITHER:
  • i. 
    have not been vaccinated against CBPP;

OR

  • ii. 
    were vaccinated using a vaccine complying with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual not more than 4 months prior to collection; in this case, the condition laid down in point b) above is not required;
  • 2. 
    the oocytes were fertilised with semen meeting the conditions of Article 11.9.9.;
  • 3. 
    the embryos/oocytes was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7., 4.8. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 11.9.12.

Surveillance: introduction

Articles 11.9.12. to 11.9.17. define the principles and provides a guide for the surveillance of for CBPP in accordance with Chapter 1.4. applicable to Members seeking establishment of freedom from CBPP. Guidance is provided for Members seeking reestablishment of freedom from CBPP for the entire country or for a zone or compartment , following an outbreak and for the maintenance of CBPP free status.

The impact and epidemiology of CBPP differ widely in different regions of the world and therefore it is impossible to provide specific recommendations for all situations. Surveillance strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from CBPP at an acceptable level of confidence will need to be adapted to the local situation. It is incumbent upon the applicant Member to submit a dossier to the OIE in support of its application that not only explains the epidemiology of CBPP in the region concerned but also demonstrates how all the risk factors are managed. This should include provision of scientifically-based supporting data. There is therefore considerable latitude available to OIE Members to provide a well-reasoned argument to prove that the absence of CBPP infection is assured at an acceptable level of confidence.

Surveillance for CBPP should be in the form of a continuing programme designed to establish that the whole territory or part of it is free from CBPP infection.

Article 11.9.13.

Surveillance: general conditions and methods

  • 1. 
    A surveillance system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. should be under the responsibility of the V eterinary A uthority . A procedure should be in place for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspect cases of CBPP to a laboratory for CBPP diagnoses as described in the Terrestrial Manual .

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  • 2. 
    The CBPP surveillance programme should:
  • a. 
    include an early warning system throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspicious cases . Farmers and workers (such as community animal health workers) who have day-to-day contact with livestock, meat inspectors as well as laboratory diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of CBPP. They should be integrated directly or indirectly (e.g. through private veterinarians or veterinary para -professionals ) into the surveilla nce system. All suspect cases of CBPP should be investigated immediately. Where suspicion cannot be resolved by epidemiological and clinical investigation, samples should be taken and submitted to a laboratory . This requires that sampling kits and other equipment are available for those responsible for surveillance . Personnel responsible for surveillance should be able to call for assistance from a team with expertise in CBPP diagnosis and control;
  • b. 
    implement, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical inspection and testing of high-risk groups of animals, such as those adjacent to a CBPP infected country or infected zone (for example, areas of transhumant production systems);
  • c. 
    take into consideration additional factors such as animal movement, different production systems, geographical and socio-economic factors that may influence the risk of disease occurrence.

An effective surveillance system will periodically identify suspicious cases that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is CBPP. The rate at which such suspicious cases are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. Applications for freedom from CBPP infection should, in consequence, provide details of the occurrence of suspicious cases and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of laboratory testing and the control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation (quarantine, movement stand-still orders, etc.).

Article 11.9.14. Surveillance strategies

  • 1. 
    Introduction

The target population for surveillance aimed at identifying disease and infection should cover all the susceptible species (Bos taurus , B. indicus and Bubalus bubalis ) within the country, z one or compa rtment .

Given the limitations of the diagnostic tools available, the interpretation of surveillance results should be at the herd level rather than at the individual animal level.

Randomised surveillance may not be the preferred approach given the epidemiology of the disease (usually uneven distribution and potential for occult foci of infection in small populations) and the limited sensitivity and specificity of currently available tests. Targeted surveillance (e.g. based on the increased likelihood of infection in particular localities or species, focusing on slaughter findings, and active clinical surveillance ) may be the most appropriate strategy. The applicant Member should justify the surveillance strategy chosen as adequate to detect the presence of CBPP infection in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the epidemiological situation.

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Targeted surveillance may involve testing of the entire target subpopulation or a sample from it. In the latter case the sampling strategy will need to incorporate an epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing will need to be large enough to detect infection if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size and expected disease prevalence determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The applicant Member must justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of surveillance and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the design prevalence in particular clearly needs to be based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Irrespective of the survey design selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated.

Irrespective of the surveillance system employed, the design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There needs to be an effective procedure for following-up positives to ultimately determine with a high level of confidence, whether they are indicative of infection or not. This should involve follow-up with supplementary tests, clinical investigation and post-mortem examination in the original sampling unit as well as herds which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

  • 2. 
    Clinical surveillance

Clinical surveillance aims at detecting clinical signs of CBPP in a herd by close physical examination of susceptible animals. Clinical inspection will be an important component of CBPP surveillance contributing to reach the desired level of confidence of detection of disease if a sufficiently large number of clinically susceptible animals is examined.

Clinical surveillance and laboratory testing should always be applied in series to clarify the status of CBPP suspects detected by either of these complementary diagnostic approaches. Laboratory testing and postmortem examination may contribute to confirm clinical suspicion, while clinical surveillance may contribute to confirmation of positive serology. Any sampling unit within which suspicious animals are detected should be classified as infected until contrary evidence is produced.

  • 3. 
    Pathological surveillance

Systematic pathological surveillance for CBPP is the most effective approach and should be conducted at slaughterhouses and other slaughter facilities. Suspect pathological findings should be confirmed by agent identification. Training courses for slaughter personnel and mea t inspectors are recommended.

  • 4. 
    Serological testing

Serological surveillance is not the preferred strategy for CBPP. However, in the framework of epidemiologic investigations, serological testing may be used.

The limitations of available serological tests for CBPP will make the interpretation of results difficult and useful only at the herd level. Positive findings should be followed-up by clinical and pathological investigations and agent identification.

Clustering of seropositive reactions should be expected in CBPP infections and will be usually accompanied by clinical signs. As clustering may signal field strain infection , the investigation of all instances must be incorporated in the surveillance strategy.

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Following the identification of a CBPP infected herd , contact herds need to be tested serologically. Repeated testing may be necessary to reach an acceptable level of confidence in herd classification.

  • 5. 
    Agent surveillance

Agent surveillance using tests described in the Terrestrial Manual should be conducted to follow-up and confirm or exclude suspect cases . Isolates should be typed to confirm Mmm SC.

Article 11.9.15.

Countries or zones applying for recognition of freedom from CBPP

In addition to the general conditions described in this chapter, an OIE Member applying for recognition of CBPP freedom for the country or a zone should provide evidence for the existence of an effective surveillance programme. The strategy and design of the surveillance programme will depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances and will be planned and implemented according to general conditions and methods in this chapter, to demonstrate absence of CBPP infection, during the preceding 24 months in susceptible populations. This requires the support of a national or other laboratory able to undertake identification of CBPP infection using methods described in the T errestrial Manual .

Article 11.9.16.

Compartments seeking recognition of freedom from CBPP

The bilateral recognition of CBPP free compartments should follow the principles laid in this chapter, Chapter 4.3. and Chapter 4.4.

Article 11.9.17.

Countries or zones re-applying for recognition of freedom from CBPP following an outbreak

In addition to the general conditions described in this chapter, a Member re-applying for recognition of country or zone freedom from CBPP should show evidence of an active surveillance programme for CBPP, following the recommendations of this chapter.

T wo strategies are recognised by the OIE in a programme to eradicate CBPP infection following an outbreak :

  • 1. 
    slaughter of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals;
  • 2. 
    vaccination used without subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals.

The time periods before which an application can be made for re-instatement of freedom from CBPP depends on which of these alternatives is followed. The time periods are prescribed in Article 11.9.4.

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Annex XXVIII

C HA PT ER 11 .11. ENZOOTIC BOVINE LEUKOSIS

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes.

Article 11.11.1. General provisions

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual . For the purpose of this chapter, susceptible animals include domestic cattle (Bos indicus and Bos taurus ).

Article 11.11.2. Country or zone free from enzootic bovine leukosis

  • 1. 
    Qualification

To qualify as free from enzootic bovine leukosis (EBL), a country or zone must should satisfy the following requirements for at least 3 years:

  • a. 
    all tumours, suspected to be lymphosarcoma, are reported to the V eterinary A uthority , and are examined at a laboratory by appropriate diagnostic techniques;
  • b. 
    all animals cattle with tumours in which EBL has been confirmed or cannot be ruled out are traced back to the herds in which they have been kept since birth; all cattle over 24 months of age in these herds are subjected to an individual diagnostic test for EBL;
  • c. 
    at least 99.8% of the herds are qualified as EBL free.
  • 2. 
    Maintenance of free status

For a country or zone to maintain its EBL free status:

  • a. 
    a serological survey must should be carried out annually on a random sample of the cattle population of the country or zone sufficient to provide a 99% level of confidence of detecting EBL if it is present at a prevalence rate exceeding 0.2% of the herds ;
  • b. 
    all imported bovines (except for slaughter ) comply with the provisions of Article 11.11.4.;
  • c. 
    all imported bovine semen and embryos/ova fulfil the requirements referred to in Article 11.11.5. and in Article 11.11.6., respectively.

Article 11.11.2.bis Compartment free from enzootic bovine leukosis

1. Qualification

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To qualify as free from EBL, a compartment should satisfy the following requirements: All herds in the compartments have satisfied the requirements of Article 11.11.3.,and;

a.     all cattle introduced into the compartment come from a free herd ;

b.     all bovine semen and embryos/ova introduced into the compartment after the first test have fulfilled the conditions referred to in Article 11.11.5. and in Article 11.11.6., respectively;

c.     the compartment is managed under a common biosecurity plan complying with Article 4.3.3. and Article 4.4.3., which protects the cattle from contact with EBL virus, which might occur from introduction of infected cattle, cattle products or material and through practices such as vaccinations and other injections, collection of blood and other biological samples, dehorning, ear-tagging, pregnancy diagnosis, etc.;

d.     the compartment has been approved by the V eterinary A uthority in accordance with Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.

2.    Maintenance of free status

For a compartment to maintain its EBL free status, all herds in the compartment should remain free according to Article 11.11.3. and specific surveillance implemented according to Article 4.4.5. has not detected the agent.

EU comments:

The EU proposes to add at the end of the sentence the words "or antibodies", which should be self-explanatory.

3.    Revocation and re-approval of free status

If in an EBL free compartment any cattle react positively to a diagnostic test for EBL as described in the Terrestrial Manual, the status of the compartment shall be revoked until all herds have recovered their free status according to Article 11.11.3. and the compartment has been re-approved according to Chapters 4.3 and 4.4.

Article 11.11.3. Herd free from enzootic bovine leukosis

  • 1. 
    Qualification To qualify as free from EBL, a herd must should satisfy the following requirements:
  • a. 
    there has been no evidence of EBL either clinical, post-mortem, or as a result of a diagnostic test for EBL within the previous 2 years;
  • b. 
    all animals cattle over 24 months of age have been subjected to a diagnostic test for EBL on t wo occasions with negative results, at an interval of not less than 4 months during the preceding 12 months;
  • c. 
    animals cattle introduced into the herd after the first test have fulfilled the conditions of Article 11.11.4.;
  • d. 
    all bovine semen and embryos/ova introduced into the herd after the first test have fulfilled the conditions referred to in Article 11.11.5. and in Article 11.11.6., respectively.
  • 2. 
    Maintenance of free status

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For a herd to maintain its EBL free status, the animals cattle in the herd over 24 months of age on the day of sampling must should be subjected to a diagnostic test for EBL with negative results at intervals of no more than 36 months and the conditions referred to in points 1a), 1c) and 1d) above continue to be fulfilled.

  • 3. 
    Suspension and restoration of free status

If in an EBL free herd any animals cattle react positively to a diagnostic test for EBL as described in the Terrestrial Manual or a virological test (under study) for bovine leukosis virus, the status of the herd shall be suspended until the following measures have been taken:

  • a. 
    the animals cattle which have reacted positively, and their progeny since the last negative test, must should be removed from the herd immediately; however, any animal cattle within the progeny which has have been subjected to a PCR test with negative results (under study) may be retained in the herd ;
  • b. 
    the remaining animals cattle must should have been subjected to a diagnostic test for EBL carried out as described in point 1b) above with negative results at least 4 months after removal of the positive animals cattle and their progeny.

Article 11.11.4.

Recommendations for the importation of cattle for breeding or rearing

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals cattle:

  • 1. 
    come from a country or zone free from EBL; or
  • 2. 
    come from an EBL free herd ; or
  • 3. 
    meet the following three conditions:
  • a. 
    the animals cattle were kept in a herd in which:
  • i. 
    there has been no evidence of EBL either clinical, post-mortem, or as a result of a diagnostic test for EBL within the previous 2 years;
  • ii. 
    all animals cattle over 24 months of age have been subjected to a diagnostic test for EBL on a blood sample on two occasions with negative results during the preceding 12 months, at an interval of at least 4 months, or were tested on t wo occasions while segregated from the herd in an isolation unit approved by the V eterinary A uthority at an interval of at least 4 months;
  • b. 
    the animals cattle were subjected to a diagnostic test for EBL within 30 days prior to shipment with negative results;
  • c. 
    if less than 2 years of age, the animals cattle come from 'uterine' dams which have been subjected to a diagnostic test for EBL on a blood sample on t wo occasions at intervals of at least 4 months within the preceding 12 months, with negative results.

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Annex XXVIII (contd)

Article 11.11.5.

Recommendations for the importation of bovine semen

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor bull was resident at the time of semen collection in an EBL free herd ; and
  • 2. 
    if less than 2 years of age, the bull came from a serologically negative ‘uterine’ dam; or
  • 3. 
    the bull was subjected to diagnostic tests for EBL on blood samples on two occasions with negative results, the first test being carried out at least 30 days before and the second test at least 90 days after collection of the semen;
  • 4. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 11.11.6. Recommendations for the importation of bovine embryos/ ova

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the embryos/ova have been collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7., 4.8. and 4.9., as relevant.

text deleted

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Annex XXIX

C HA PT ER 11 .13

INFECTIOUS BOVINE RHINOTRACHEITIS/INFECTIOUS PUSTULAR

VULVOVAGINITIS

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes.

Article 11.13.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the incubation period for infectious bovine rhinotracheitis/infectious pustular vulvovaginitis (IBR/IPV) shall be 21 days.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual.

Article 11.13.2.

Country or zone free from IBR/ IPV

  • 1. 
    Qualification To qualify as free from IBR/IPV, a country or zone must satisfy the following requirements:
  • a. 
    the disease or suspicion of the disease is notifiable;
  • b. 
    no animal has been vaccinated against IBR/IPV for at least 3 years;
  • c. 
    at least 99.8% of the herds are qualified as free from IBR/IPV.
  • 2. 
    Maintenance of free status For a country or zone to maintain its status free from IBR/IPV:
  • a. 
    a serological survey should be carried out annually on a random sample of the cattle population of the country or zone sufficient to provide a 99% level of confidence of detecting IBR/IPV if it is present at a prevalence rate exceeding 0.2% of the herds ;
  • b. 
    all imported bovines comply with the provisions of Article 11.13.4.;
  • c. 
    all imported bovine semen and embryos/ova fulfil the requirements referred to in Articles 11.13.6. or 11.13.7., and in Article 11.13.8., respectively.

Article 11.13.3. Herd free from IBR/ IPV

  • 1. 
    Qualification

To qualify as free from IBR/IPV, a herd of cattle must satisfy the following requirements:

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  • a. 
    all the animals in the herd have been subjected to a diagnostic test for IBR/IPV on a blood sample on t wo occasions with negative results, at an interval of not less than 2 months and not more than 12 months; or
  • b. 
    if the herd contains only dairy cattle of which at least a quarter are lactating cows, each of the latter has been subjected to a diagnostic test on individual milk samples carried out on three occasions at intervals of 2 months with negative results;
  • c. 
    animals introduced into the herd after the first tests referred to in point a) or point b) as relevant have been:
  • i. 
    kept in an IBR/IPV free herd ; or
  • ii. 
    placed in isolation for a period of 30 days, and during this period have been subjected to a diagnostic test for IBR/IPV on a blood sample on two occasions with negative results, at an interval of not less than 21 days;
  • d. 
    all bovine semen and embryos/ova introduced into the herd after the first tests referred to in point a) or point b) as relevant have fulfilled the conditions provided in Articles 11.13.6. or 11.13.7. and in Article 11.13.8., respectively.
  • 2. 
    Maintenance of free status

For a herd to maintain its status free from IBR/IPV, it must be subjected to the following tests with negative results:

EITHER

  • a. 
    diagnostic tests for IBR/IPV on blood samples for all the animals repeated at maximum intervals of 12 months; in herds composed entirely of fattening animals, blood sampling may be limited to animals sent for slaughter ;

OR

  • b. 
    diagnostic tests on individual milk samples from all lactating cows repeated at intervals of 6 months; V eterinary A uthorities applying an IBR/IPV eradication programme may extend these intervals (under study) if more than 98% of herds have been free from the disease for at least 3 years; and
  • c. 
    diagnostic tests on blood samples for IBR/IPV of all breeding bulls repeated at maximum intervals of 12 months;

AND

  • d. 
    diagnostic tests on blood samples for IBR/IPV of all cattle having aborted after more than 3 months of gestation.

Animals introduced into the herd must satisfy the conditions provided in point 1c) above, and semen and embryos/ova used in the herd must satisfy the conditions provided in Articles 11.13.6. or 11.13.7. and in Article 11.13.8., respectively.

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Annex XXIX (contd)

Article 11.13.4.

Recommendations for the importation of cattle destined for IBR/ IPV free herds

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of IBR/IPV on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    come from an IBR/IPV free herd ; or
  • 3. 
    were kept in a quarantine station for the 30 days prior to shipment and were subjected to a diagnostic test for IBR/IPV on a blood sample on t wo occasions with negative results, at an interval of not less than 21 days.

Article 11.13.5. Recommendations for the importation of cattle intended for herds not qualified as free from IBR/ IPV

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of IBR/IPV on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were vaccinated with an inactivated virus vaccine not less than one month and not more than 6 months prior to shipment.

Article 11.13.6. Recommendations for the importation of fresh semen

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals were kept in an IBR/IPV free herd at the time of collection of the semen;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 11.13.7. Recommendations for the importation of frozen semen

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals were kept in an IBR/IPV free herd at the time of collection of the semen; or
  • 2. 
    the donor animals were held in isolation during the period of collection and for the 30 days following collection and were subjected to a diagnostic test for IBR/IPV on a blood sample taken at least 21 days after collection of the semen, with negative results; or

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Annex XXIX (contd)

  • 3. 
    if the serological status of the bull is unknown or if the bull is serologically positive, an aliquot of each semen collection was subjected to a virus isolation test or PCR, performed in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual , with negative results; and
  • 4. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 11.13.8.

Recommendations for the importation of embryos/ ova

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the embryos/ova were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7., 4.8. and 4.9., as relevant.

text deleted

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Annex XXX

CH AP TE R 12.7. EQUINE INFLUENZA

EU comments

The EU thanks the TAHSC for these changes, which it supports, but would like its other comments below be taken into account, as they are needed for better consistency, comprehension and implementation of the chapter.

Article 12.7.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , equine influenza (EI) is defined as an infection of domestic horses, donkeys and mules.

For the purposes of international trade , this chapter deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by equine influenza virus (EIV), but also with the presence of infection with EIV in the absence of clinical signs.

For the purposes of this chapter, isolation is defined as ‘the separation of horses from horses of a different equine influenza health status, utilising appropriate biosecurity measures, with the purpose of preventing the transmission of infection ’.

EU comment

EI is defined as "an infection of domestic horses, donkeys and mules". Thus, in the paragraph above, as well as in all the text of this chapter, the word "horses" should be replaced by the words "equidae" or by the words "horses, donkeys and mules".

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the infective period for equine influenza is 21 days.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the EI status of the equine population of the ex porting country , z one or compa rtment .

Article 12.7.2.

Trade in Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities , V eterinary A uthorities should not require any EIV related conditions, regardless of the EI status of the equine population of the ex porting country , zone or compartment :

  • 1. 
    semen;
  • 2. 
    in vivo derived equine embryos collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7. or Chapter 4.9. (under study).

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When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the EI status of the equine population of the ex porting countr y , z one or compa rtment .

Article 12.7.3. Determination of the EI status of a country, a zone or a compartment

The EI status of a country, a zone or a compartment can be determined on the basis of the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    the outcome of a risk assessment identifying all potential factors for EI occurrence and their historic perspective;
  • 2. 
    whether EI is notifiable in the whole country, an on-going EI awareness programme is in place, and all notified suspect occurrences of EI are subjected to field and, where applicable, laboratory investigations;
  • 3. 
    appropriate surveillance is in place to demonstrate the presence of infection in the absence of clinical signs in horses.

EU comment

EI is defined as "an infection of domestic horses, donkeys and mules". Thus, in the paragraph above, as well as in all the text of this chapter, the word "horses" should be replaced by the words "equidae" or by the words "horses, donkeys and mules".

Article 12.7.4.

Equine influenza free country, zone or compartment

A country or a zone or a compartment may be considered free from EI provided the disease is notifiable in the whole country and it shows evidence of an effective surveillance programme, planned and implemented according to the general principles in Chapter 1.4. The surveillance may need to be adapted to parts of the country, zone or compartment depending on historical or geographical factors, industry structure, population data, movements of equids into the country, zone or compartment , wild equid populations or proximity to recent outbreaks .

EU comment

The word "or" at the beginning of the first sentence should be deleted to read "A country, a zone or a compartment may be considered….".

There is a need for criteria for freedom, so the second part of the first sentence should read: "and it shows evidence, through of an effective surveillance programme, planned and implemented according to the general principles in Chapter 1.4, that no case of EI occurred in the past two years.

The movements of equidae inside the country or zone are also relevant in the design of the surveillance. Thus, in the second sentence the words "within and", should be added between "movements of equidae" and "into the country".

A country, a zone or a compartment seeking freedom from EI, in which vaccination is practised, should also demonstrate that EIV has not been circulating in the population of domestic and wild equidae during the past 12 months, through surveillance , in accordance with Chapter 1.4. In a country in which vaccination is not practised, surveillance could be conducted using serological testing. In countries where vaccination is practised, the surveillance should include methods of virus detection.

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EU comment

The word "also" in the first sentence should be replaced by "in addition".

In order to better reflect the meaning and to be consistent with other parts of the Code, the second and third sentences should be merged as follows: "While Iin a country in which vaccination is not practised, surveillance could may be conducted using serological testing, . Iin countries where vaccination is practised, the surveillance should include agent identification methods described in the Terrestrial Manual for evidence of infection of virus detection.

If an outbreak of clinical equine influenza occurs in a previously free country, zone or compartment , free status can be regained 12 months after the last clinical case , providing that surveillance for evidence of infection has been carried out during that 12-month period in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

EU comment

The words "equine influenza" in the paragraph above should be replaced by "EI".

Article 12.7.5. Recommendations for the importation of horses for immediate slaughter

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the horses showed no clinical sign of EI on the day of shipment.

EU comment

EI is defined as "an infection of domestic horses, donkeys and mules". Thus, in the article above, as well as in all the text of this chapter, the word "horses" should be replaced by the words "equidae" or by the words "horses, donkeys and mules".

Article 12.7.6. Recommendations for the importation of horses for unrestricted movement

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the horses:

EU comment

EI is defined as "an infection of domestic horses, donkeys and mules". Thus, in all this article, as well as in all the text of this chapter, the word "horses" should be replaced by the words "equidae" or by the words "horses, donkeys and mules". In point 1 below, the word "its" should then be replaced by "their".

  • 1. 
    came from an EI free country, zone or compartment in which they had been resident for at least 21 days; in the case of a vaccinated horse, information on its vaccination status should be included in the veterinary certificate;

OR

  • 2. 
    came from a country, zone or compartment not known to be free from EI, were subjected to pre-export isolation for 21 days and showed no clinical sign of EI during isolation nor on the day of shipment; and

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  • 3. 
    were immunised according to the manufacturer’s instructions with a vaccine complying with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual beween 21 and 90 days before shipment either with a primary course or a booster.

EU comment

The following words should be added at the end of point 3 above: "; information on their vaccination status should be included in the veterinary certificate".

For additional security, countries that are free of EI or undertaking an eradication programme may also request that the horses were tested negative for EIV by PCR conducted on nasopharyngeal swabs collected on two occasions at 21 7 to 14 days and 3 less than 5 days before shipment.

EU comment

The above paragraph was previously agreed, but not very much commented on. In order not to be limited to only one testing procedure, it should read:

For additional security, countries that are free of EI or undertaking an eradication programme may also request that the horses were tested negative for EIV by PCR an agent identification test for EI described in the Terrestrial Manual conducted on nasopharyngeal swabs samples collected on two occasions at 21 7 to 14 days and 3 less than 5 days before shipment.

Article 12.7.7. Recommendations for the importation of horses which will be kept in isolation (see Article 12.7.1.)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the horses:

EU comment

EI is defined as "an infection of domestic horses, donkeys and mules". Thus, in all this article, as well as in all the text of this chapter, the word "horses" should be replaced by the words "equidae" or by the words "horses, donkeys and mules". In point 1 below, the word "its" should then be replaced by "their".

  • 1. 
    came from an EI free country, zone or compartment in which they had been resident for at least 21 days; in the case of a vaccinated horse, information on its vaccination status should be included in the veterinary certificate;

OR

  • 2. 
    showed no clinical sign of EI in any premises in which the horses had been resident for the 21 days prior to shipment nor on the day of shipment; and
  • 3. 
    were immunised according to the manufacturer’s instructions with a vaccine complying with the standards described in the Terrestrial Manual .

EU comment

The following words should be added at the end of point 3 above: "; information on their vaccination status should be included in the veterinary certificate".

Article 12.7.8.

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Recommendations for the importation of fresh meat of horses, mules or donkeys

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an interna tional veterinary certificate attesting that the fresh meat came from horses, mules or donkeys which had been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections as described in Chapter 6.2.

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Annex XXX (contd)

C HA PT ER 12 .10. EQUINE VIRAL ARTERITIS

EU comments

The EU thanks the TAHSC for these changes, which it supports except for the 2 comments below which it would like taken on board.

Article 12.10.1.

General provisions

The infective period for equine viral arteritis (EVA) shall be 28 days for all categories of equine except sexually mature stallion where the infective period may be for the life of the animal. Because the infective period may be extended in the case of virus shedding in semen, the status of seropositive stallions should be checked to ensure that they do not shed virus in their semen.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 12.10.2.

Recommendations for the importation of uncastrated male equines

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals showed no clinical sign of EVA on the day of shipment and during the 28 days prior to shipment and met one of the following requirements:

  • 1. 
    were isolated for the 28 days prior to shipment and were subjected, to a test for EVA, as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual , carried out on a single blood sample collected during the 21 days prior to shipment with negative result; or
  • 2. 
    were subjected between 6 and 9 months of age to a test for EVA, as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual , carried out on two blood samples collected at least 14 days apart with stable or decreasing titre, immediately vaccinated for EVA and regularly revaccinated according to the manufacturer’s instructions; or
  • 3. 
    met the following requirements:
  • a. 
    were isolated for 28 days; and
  • b. 
    not earlier than 7 days of commencing isolation were tested, with negative results, with a test for EVA as prescribed in the T errestrial Manual ; and
  • c. 
    were then immediately vaccinated; and
  • d. 
    were kept separated from other equidae for 21 days following vaccination; and
  • e. 
    were revaccinated regularly according to the manufacturer’s instructions; or
  • 4. 
    have been subjected to a test for EVA, as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual , carried out on a blood sample with positive results and then: either

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  • a. 
    were subsequently test mated to two mares within 12 6 months prior to shipment which were subjected to two tests for EVA as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual with negative results on blood samples collected at the time of test mating and again 28 days after the mating; or
  • b. 
    were subjected to a test for equine arteritis virus as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual with negative results, carried out on semen collected during the 28 days 6 months prior to shipment; or

c.    were subjected to a test for equine arteritis virus as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual with negative results, carried out on semen collected within 6 months after the blood sample was tested, then immediately vaccinated, and revaccinated regularly.

Article 12.10.3.

Recommendations for the importation of equines other than uncastrated males

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals showed no clinical sign of EVA on the day of shipment and

EITHER

1. were kept in an establishment where no animals have shown any signs of EVA for the 28 days prior to shipment; and either

1a. were isolated for the 28 days prior to shipment and were subjected to a test for EVA, as prescribed in the T errestrial Manual , carried out either:

a.    on a single blood sample collected during the 28 days prior to shipment with negative results, or

b.    on blood samples collected on two occasions at least 14 days apart within 28 days prior to shipment, which demonstrated stable or declining antibody titres; or

b. regularly vaccinated according to the manufacturer’s

OR

  • 2. 
    were isolated for the 28 days prior to shipment and during this period the animals showed no signs of EVA and were subjected, between 6 and 9 months of age, to a diagnostic test for EVA, as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual , carried out on t wo blood samples collected at least 14 days apart, on a single blood sample with negative results or stable or declining titre, and immediately vaccinated for EVA and regularly revaccinated according to the manufacturer’s instructions.

EU comments

The EU believes that this article is not correct. The idea is either the animal comes from a free establishment and is positive or vaccinated, and then is safe, or if not it should be put into isolation. The negative test is useless in this case. This article needs to be reworded to reflect this.

The words "on a single blood sample collected during the 28 days prior to shipment with negative results, or" in point 1.a) should be deleted.

The point 2 should read: "were isolated for the 28 days prior to shipment and during this period the animals showed no signs of EVA".

Article 12.10.4. Recommendations for the importation of semen

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V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animal donors were kept for the 28 days prior to semen collection in an establishment where no equine has shown any clinical sign of EVA during that period and showed no clinical sign of EVA on the day of semen collection; and

  • 1. 
    were subjected between 6 and 9 months of age to a test for EVA as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual on t wo blood samples with stable or decreasing titre, immediately vaccinated for EVA and regularly revaccinated according to the manufacturer’s instructions; or
  • 2. 
    were isolated and not earlier than 7 days of commencing isolation were subjected to a test for EVA as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual on a blood sample with negative results, immediately vaccinated for EVA, kept for 21 days following vaccination separated from other equidae and regularly revaccinated according to the manufacturer’s instructions; or
  • 3. 
    were subjected to a test for EVA as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual on a blood sample with negative results within 14 days prior to semen collection, and had been separated from other equidae not of an equivalent EVA status for 14 days prior to blood sampling from the time of the taking of the blood sample until the end of semen collection; or
  • 4. 
    have been subjected to a test for EVA as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual carried out on a blood sample with positive results and then: either
  • a. 
    were subsequently test mated to two mares within 12 6 months prior to semen collection, which were subjected to two tests for EVA as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual with negative results on blood samples collected at the time of test mating and again 28 days 6 months after the test mating, or

EU comments

The EU does not understand why the 28 days was changed to 6 months in the sentence above, as this is far too long; it seems to be a mistake: it's only in the first line and in point b) that it should be changed. The previous 28 days should be retained there.

  • b. 
    were subjected to a test for equine arteritis virus as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual with negative results, carried out on semen collected within one year 6 months prior to collection of the semen to be exported; or

c.    were subjected to a test for equine arteritis virus as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual with negative results, carried out on semen collected within 6 months after the blood sample was tested, then immediately vaccinated, and revaccinated regularly; or

  • 5. 
    were, for frozen semen, subjected with negative results either:
  • a. 
    to a test for EVA as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual carried out on a blood sample taken not earlier than 14 days and not later than 12 months after the collection of the semen for export; or
  • b. 
    to a test for equine arteritis virus as prescribed in the Terrestrial Manual carried out on an aliquot of the semen collected immediately prior to processing or on an aliquot of semen collected within 14 to 30 days after the first collection of the semen to be exported.

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Annex XXXI

CH AP TE R 14.9 SCRAPIE

EU comments

The EU cannot support this draft Chapter in its present form.

Firstly, there is a complete inconsistency between the article 14.9.3 and the articles 14.9.14 and 15, with incoherent cross-references. The recognition of historical freedom from TSE is impossible without a proper risk assessment and surveillance. It is suggested to delete articles 14.9.14 and 15 while integrating contents of Article 14.9.15 in articles 14.9.3.

Secondly, the EU reserves its position as regards the possibility to consider semen as a safe commodity in itself, pending the final opinion of the European Food Safety Authority on the subject, which might differ from that of the TAHSC.

Finally, the EU suggests taking into consideration genetic aspects, when importing sheep for breeding, semen and embryos of sheep from countries or zones not considered free from scrapie. Breeding animals of ARR/ARR genotype (or semen/embryos coming from such animals) should be considered safe as they do not transmit the disease.

Article 14.9.1.

General provisions and safe commodities

Scrapie is a neurodegenerative disease of sheep and goats. The main mode of transmission is from mother to offspring immediately after birth and to other susceptible neonates exposed to the birth fluids and tissues of an infected animal. Transmission occurs at a much lower frequency to adults exposed to the birth fluids and tissues of an infected animal. A variation in genetic susceptibility of sheep has been recognised. The incubation period of the disease is variable; however, it is usually measured in years. The duration in incubation period can be influenced by a number of factors including host genetics and strain of agent.

EU comments

The EU reminds the OIE that the last EU comments proposed that for the sake of consistency, the first sentence of the paragraph below be deleted as the Chapter deals only with the management of animal health.

Scrapie is does not considered to pose a risk to human health. The recommendations in this chapter are intended to manage the animal health risks associated with the presence of the scrapie agent in sheep and goats. The chapter does not cover so-called ‘atypical’ scrapie which is clinically, pathologically, biochemically and epidemiologically unrelated to ‘classical’ scrapie, may not be contagious and may, in fact, be a spontaneous degenerative condition of older sheep.

  • 1. 
    When authorising import or transit of the following commodities derived from sheep or goats and any products made from these commodities and containing no other tissues from sheep or goats derived, V eterinary

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A uthorities should not require any scrapie-related conditions, regardless of the scrapie risk status of the sheep and goat populations of the ex porting country , zone or compartment :

  • a. 
    semen collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.; EU comment

The EU reserves its position as regards the possibility to consider semen as a safe commodity pending the final opinion of the European Food Safety Authority on the subject, and would like the OIE TAHSC to better justify its proposal.

This comment also applies to Articles 14.9.2 point 1a), 14.9.3 point 4, 14.9.4, 14.9.5 and 14.9.8.

b.    meat (excluding materials as referred to in Article 14.9.12.);

bc. hides and skins;

cd. gelatine;

de. collagen prepared from hides or skins;

ef. tallow (maximum level of insoluble impurities of 0.15% in weight) and derivatives made from this tallow;

EU comment

The EU would like to remind the Code Commission of its previous opinion on this point and to restate its position.

In practice in it is not possible to guarantee the safety of gelatine or tallow if it contains specified risk material, or if it is derived from animals found dead with no inspection.

Thus, the EU proposes the following wording for points d and e:

"d gelatine, if no commodities as laid down in Article 14.9.12 have been used for its production and if the animals from which the raw material has been derived, have passed ante and post mortem inspection;

"f tallow (maximum level of insoluble impurities of 0.15% in weight) and derivatives made from this tallow, if no commodities as laid down in Article 14.9.12 have been used for its production and if the animals from which the raw material has been derived, have passed ante and post mortem inspection;"

fg. dicalcium phosphate (with no trace of protein or fat);

gh. wool or fibre.

  • 2. 
    When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the scrapie risk status of the sheep and goat populations of the ex porting country , z one or compartment .

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 14.9.2.

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Determination of the scrapie status of a country, zone, compartment or establishment

The scrapie status of the sheep and goat populations of a country, zone , compartment or establishment should be determined on the basis of the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    the outcome of a risk assessment identifying all potential factors for scrapie occurrence and their historic perspective, in particular the:
  • a. 
    importation or introduction of sheep and goats or their semen or their embryos/oocytes potentially infected with scrapie;
  • b. 
    extent of knowledge of the population structure and husbandry practices of sheep and goats;
  • c. 
    feeding practices, including consumption of meat-and-bone meal or greaves derived from ruminants;
  • d. 
    importation of milk and milk products of sheep or goats origin intended for use in feeding of sheep and goats;
  • 2. 
    an on-going awareness programme for veterinarians , farmers, and workers involved in transportation, marketing and slaughter of sheep and goats to facilitate recognition and encourage reporting of all animals with clinical signs compatible with scrapie;
  • 3. 
    a surveillance and monitoring system including the following:
  • a. 
    official veterinary surveillance , reporting and regulatory control in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 1.4.;
  • b. 
    a V eterinary A uthority with current knowledge of, and authority over, all establishments which contain sheep and goats in the whole country;
  • c. 
    compulsory notification and clinical investigation of sheep and goats showing clinical signs compatible with scrapie;
  • d. 
    examination, in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual , in a laboratory of appropriate material from sheep and goats older than 18 months displaying clinical signs compatible with scrapie;
  • e. 
    maintenance of records including the number and results of all investigations for at least 7 years.

Article 14.9.3. Scrapie free country or zone

Countries or zones may be considered free from scrapie if within the said territory:

  • 1. 
    a risk assessment , as described in point 1 of Article 14.9.2., has been conducted, and it has been demonstrated that appropriate measures are currently in place and have been taken for the relevant period of time to manage any risk identified and points 2 and 3 have been complied with for the preceding 7 years;

AND

  • 2. 
    one of the following conditions should be met:
  • a. 
    the country or the zone have demonstrated historical freedom taking into account the recommendations in Articles 14.9.14. and 14.9.15. (under study); or

EU comment

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Putting here a cross reference to articles 14.9.14 and 15 is confusing, and moreover will lead to trade disputes since there are inconsistencies between the articles.

Thus, the point a above should be rewritten to include the specific provisions for a historically free country or zone:

"a. the country or the zone have demonstrated historical freedom as follows: taking into account the recommendations in Articles 14.9.14. and 14.9.15. (under study);

i) Scrapie has been notifiable for at least 25 years,

ii) a formal programme of targeted surveillance and monitoring, which includes testing of a sufficient number of clinical suspects, animals dead on farm and aged sheep and goats, can be documented as having been in place for at least 10 years, and

iii) no case of scrapie has been reported for at least 25 years;

or

  • b. 
    for at least 7 years, a sufficient number of representative mature culled sheep and goats over 18 months of age culled and/or dead on farm have been tested annually, to provide a 95% level of confidence of detecting scrapie if it is present at a prevalence rate exceeding 0.1% out of the total number of all chronic wasting conditions in the population of sheep and goats older than 18 months of age and no case of scrapie has been reported during this period; it is assumed that the occurrence rate of chronic wasting conditions within the population of sheep and goats older than 18 months of age is at least 1% (under study); or
  • c. 
    all establishments containing sheep or goats have been accredited free as described in Article 14.9.5.;

AND

  • 3. 
    the feeding to sheep and goats of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin has been banned and effectively enforced in the whole country for at least 7 years;

EU comment

The EU would like to remind the Code Commission of its previous opinion on this point and to restate its position. Practical experience pointed out the existence of cross-contaminations when applying a simple ruminant to ruminant feed ban, which has been proven impossible to implement in practice if imposed alone. Even if the simple ruminant to ruminant feed ban is scientifically justified, the evaluation of the extent of the ban should include the possibility of cross contaminations.

The EU proposes to modify point 3 above as follows: “it has been demonstrated through an appropriate level of control and audit, including that of cross contamination through feed of

other mammalian origin, that for at least 7 years neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves

AND

  • 4. 
    introductions of sheep and goats or their semen or their embryos/oocytes from countries or zones not free from scrapie are carried out in accordance with Articles 14.9.6., 14.9.7., 14.9.8. or 14.9.9., as relevant.

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Article 14.9.4. Scrapie free compartment

A compartment may be considered free from scrapie if the following conditions are fulfilled:

EU comment

The same wording should be used here as in other chapters, e.g. BV Tuberculosis.

1.     all establishments within the compartment are free from scrapie according to Article 14.9.5.;

2.     all establishments within the compartment are managed under a common biosecurity plan protecting them from introduction of scrapie, and the compartment has been approved by the V eterinary A uthority in accordance with Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.;

3.     introductions of sheep and goats are allowed only from accredited free establishments ;

4.     introductions of sheep and goat embryos are allowed either from accredited free establishments or in accordance with Article 14.9.9.;

5.     sheep and goat semen introduced into the compartment should have been collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.;

6.     sheep and goats in the compartment should have no direct or indirect contact, including shared grazing, with sheep or goats from establishments not within the compartment .

One or more establishments may be considered eligible for accreditation as a scrapie free compartment if:

1. in the country or zone where the establishments are situated, the following conditions are fulfilled:

a.    the disease is compulsorily notifiable;

b.    an awareness, surveillance and monitoring system as referred to in Article 14.9.2. is in place;

c.    affected sheep and goats are slaughtered and completely destroyed;

d.    the feeding to sheep and goats of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin has been banned and effectively enforced in the whole country;

e.    an official accreditation scheme is in operation under the supervision of the V eterinary A uthorit y , including the measures described in point 2 below;

2. in the establishments the following conditions have been complied with for at least 7 years:

a. sheep and goats are permanently identified and records maintained, to enable trace back to establishment of birth;

b. records of movements of sheep and goats in and out of the establishment

c. introductions of sheep and goats are allowed only from free establishments of an equal or higher stage in the process of accreditation; however, rams and bucks complying with the provisions in point 1 of . may also be introduced;

d. an Official V eterinarian inspects sheep and goats in the establishments and audits the records at least once a year;

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e.    no case of scrapie has been reported;

f.    sheep and goats of the establishments should have no direct or with sheep or goats from establishments of a lower status;

g.    all culled sheep and goats over 18 months of age are inspected by an Official V eterinarian , and a proportion of those exhibiting wasting signs and all those exhibiting neurological signs are tested in a laborator y for scrapie. The selection of the sheep and goats to be tested should be made by the Official V eterinarian . Sheep and goats over 18 months of age that have died or have been killed for reasons other than routine slaughter should also be tested (including ‘fallen’ stock and those sent for emergency slaughter ).

3. cattle, water buffalo and wood bison in a compartment free from bovine tuberculosis are protected from contact with wildlife reservoirs of bovine tuberculosis and are managed under a common biosecurity plan protecting them from contamination with M. bovis , and the compartment has been approved by the V eterinar y A uthority in accordance with Chapters

Article 14.9.5. Scrapie free establishment

An establishment may be considered eligible for accreditation as a scrapie free establishment if:

EU comment

The same wording should be used here as in other chapters, e.g. BV Tuberculosis: "An establishment may be considered free from scrapie if…".

  • 1. 
    in the country or zone where the establishment is situated, the following conditions are fulfilled:
  • a. 
    the disease is compulsorily notifiable;
  • b. 
    an awareness, surveillance and monitoring system as referred to in Article 14.9.2. is in place;
  • c. 
    affected sheep and goats are slaughtered and completely destroyed;

EU comment

The word "slaughtered" should be replaced by "killed" in order to be clear that it is for animal health reasons. This comment applies to other relevant articles.

  • d. 
    the feeding to sheep and goats of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin has been banned and effectively enforced in the whole country;
  • e. 
    an official accreditation scheme is in operation under the supervision of the V eterinary A uthority , including the measures described in point 2 below;
  • 2. 
    in the establishment the following conditions have been complied with for at least 7 years:
  • a. 
    sheep and goats are permanently identified and records maintained, to enable trace back to their establishment of birth;
  • b. 
    records of movements of sheep and goats in and out of the establishment are maintained;
  • c. 
    introductions of sheep and goats are allowed only from free establishments ;

d.    introduction of sheep and goat embryos should comply with Article 14.9.9.;

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e. sheep and goat semen introduced into the establishment should have been collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.;

df. an Official V eterinarian inspects sheep and goats in the establishments and audits the records at least once a year;

eg. no case of scrapie has been reported;

fh. sheep and goats of the establishments should have no direct or indirect contact, including shared grazing, with sheep or goats from establishments of a lower status;

gi. all culled sheep and goats over 18 months of age are inspected by an Official V eterinarian , and a proportion of those exhibiting wasting signs and all those exhibiting neurological signs are tested in a laboratory for scrapie. The selection of the sheep and goats to be tested should be made by the Official V eterinarian . Sheep and goats over 18 months of age that have died or have been killed for reasons other than routine slaughter should also be tested (including ‘fallen’ stock and those sent for emergency slaughter ).

Article 14.9.6. Recommendations for importation from countries or zones not considered free from scrapie

for sheep and goats for breeding or rearing

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an interna tional veterinary certificate attesting that the animals come from an establishment free from scrapie as described in Article 14.9.5.

OR

In cases where the animals do not come from an establishment free from scrapie as described in Article 14.9.5., the importing countr y may require the placing of the animals in a quarantine station located on its territory, in conformity with the conditions stipulated in its animal health legislation.

EU comment

The EU proposes that sheep of ARR/ARR genotype can be introduced as well even if they come from establishments which are not accredited free and proposes to add the following alternative condition:

"OR

In cases where the animals are sheep and do not come from an establishment free from scrapie as described in Article 14.9.5, Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals are of ARR/ARR genotype. "

This comment also applies to Article 14.9.9 point 2.

Article 14.9.7. Recommendations for importation from countries or zones not considered free from scrapie

for sheep and goats for slaughter

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    in the country or zone :

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  • a. 
    the disease is compulsorily notifiable;
  • b. 
    an awareness, surveillance and monitoring system as referred to in Article 14.9.2. is in place;
  • c. 
    affected sheep and goats are slaughtered and completely destroyed;
  • 2. 
    the sheep and goats selected for export showed no clinical sign of scrapie on the day of shipment.

Article 14.9.8. Recommendations for importation from countries or zones not considered free from scrapie

for semen of sheep and goats

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

1.    the donor animals:

a.    are permanently identified to enable trace back to their establishment of origin;

b.    have been kept since birth in establishments in which no case of scrapie had been confirmed during their residency;

c.    showed no clinical sign of scrapie at the time of semen collection;

2.    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 14.9.9. Recommendations for importation from countries or zones not considered free from scrapie

for embryos/oocytes of sheep and goats

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    in the country or zone :
  • a. 
    the disease is compulsorily notifiable;
  • b. 
    an awareness, surveillance and monitoring system as referred to in Article 14.9.2. is in place;
  • c. 
    affected sheep and goats are slaughtered and completely destroyed;
  • d. 
    the feeding to sheep and goats of meat-and-bone meal or greaves of ruminant origin has been banned and effectively enforced in the whole country;
  • 2. 
    the donor animals either have been kept since birth in a free establishment , or meet the following conditions:
  • a. 
    are permanently identified to enable trace back to their establishment of origin;
  • b. 
    have been kept since birth in establishments in which no case of scrapie had been confirmed during their residency;
  • c. 
    showed no clinical sign of scrapie at the time of embryo/oocyte collection;
  • 3. 
    the embryos/oocytes were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7.

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Article 14.9.10. Recommendations for importation from countries or zones not considered free from scrapie

for milk and milk products of sheep or goat origin intended for use in feeding of sheep and goats

EU comment

Due to the proven risk of cross-contamination between cattle feed and small ruminant feed and feeding systems, protective measures in relation to milk and milk products should be extended to all ruminant feeds.

The EU proposes the following wording:

"for milk and milk products of sheep or goat origin intended for use in feeding of ruminants"

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an interna tional veterinary certificate attesting that the milk and milk products come from scrapie free establishments .

Article 14.9.11.

Recommendations on meat-and-bone meal

Meat-and-bone meal containing any sheep or goat protein, or any feedstuffs containing that type of meat-and-bone meal , which originate from countries not considered free of scrapie should not be traded between countries for ruminant feeding.

Article 14.9.12.

Recommendations for importation from countries or zones not considered free from scrapie

for skulls including brains, ganglia and eyes, vertebral column including ganglia and spinal cord, tonsils, thymus, spleen, intestine, adrenal gland, pancreas, or liver, and protein products derived therefrom, from sheep and goats

EU comment

Even if this point has been adopted previously, the EU would like to know in detail the scientific basis for considering "adrenal gland, pancreas and liver" as unsafe commodities.

1.    these commodities should not be traded for use in ruminant feeds;

2.    for purposes other than ruminant feeding, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an i nternationa l veteri na ry certifica te attesting that:

1a. in the country or zone :

ai. the disease is compulsorily notifiable;

bii. an awareness, surveillance and monitoring system as referred to in Article 14.9.2. is in place;

ciii. affected sheep and goats are slaughtered and completely destroyed;

2b. the materials come from sheep and goats that showed no clinical sign of scrapie on the day of slaughter .

Article 14.9.13.

Recommendations for the importation of ovine and caprine materials destined for the preparation of biologicals

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V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products originate from sheep and goats born and raised in a scrapie free country, zone or establishment .

Article 14.9.14. Principles for declaring a country or zone historically free from scrapie

Articles 14.9.14. and 14.9.15. outline principles for declaring a country or zone free from scrapie.

An essential prerequisite to provide the guarantees required for the recognition of freedom from disease /infection is that the V eterinary Services of the Member comply with the provisions of Chapter 3.1. on evaluation of V eterinary Services , and, if relevant, with the provisions of Chapter 4.3. on zoning and compartmentalisation.

The provisions of the above-mentioned articles are based on the principles developed in Chapter 1.4. and the following premises:

1. the sheep population of the country or zone includes a range of genotypes known to be susceptible to scrapie;

21. the V eterinary Services have the competence, capacity and mandate to investigate, diagnose and report scrapie, if present;

32. the absence of scrapie over a long period of time can be substantiated by effective disease investigation and reporting by the V eterinary Services of an OIE Member.

EU comment

The above Article 14.9.14 is either redundant with Article 2 or merely restates other provisions of the Terrestrial Code that apply in any case. It is very confusing and thus it should be deleted.

Article 14.9.15.

Requirements to declare a country or zone historically free from scrapie

A country or zone may be recognised free from scrapie without having applied the requirements of Article 14.9.3. when:

  • a. 
    scrapie has been notifiable for at least 25 years; and
  • b. 
    a formal programme of targeted surveillance and monitoring, which includes clinical suspects, animals dead on farm and aged sheep and goats, can be documented as having been in place for at least 10 years; and

c.    the presence of a range of scrapie susceptible genotypes in this sheep population can be documented; and

dc. appropriate measures to prevent scrapie introduction can be documented as having been in place for at least 25 years; and

  • i. 
    either scrapie has never been reported; or
  • ii. 
    no case of scrapie has been reported for at least 25 years.

EU comment

The above Article 14.9.15 is inconsistent, since it implies the non implementation of Article 14.9.3 while the latter makes reference to it.

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This is very confusing and the article should be deleted while the content of points a) to c) should be included in Article 14.9.3 to provide for conditions for historical freedom.

text deleted

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Annex XXXII

CH AP TE R 15. 3. CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER

EU comments

The EU supports the proposed change, but wishes to reiterate its comment regarding the importation of meat (which is coherent with the TAHSC proposal of modification of articles 8.5.20 to 22 on FMD) in article 15.13.12.

Article 15.3.1. General provisions

For the purposes of international trade , classical swine fever (CSF) is defined as an infection of domestic pigs.

Domestic pig is defined as ‘all domesticated pigs, permanently captive or farmed free range, used for the production of meat for consumption, for the production of other commercial products or for breeding these categories of pigs.

The pig is the only natural host for classical swine fever (CSF) virus. The definition of pig includes all varieties of Sus scrofa , both domestic and wild. For the purposes of this chapter, a distinction is made between domestic pig and wild pig (including feral pigs) populations.

Pigs exposed to CSF virus prenatally may be persistently infected throughout life and may have an incubation period of several months before showing signs of disease . Pigs exposed postnatally have an incubation period of 2-14 days, and are usually infective between post-infection days 5 and 14, but up to 3 months in cases of chronic i nfections .

For the purposes of international trade , a Member should not impose trade bans in response to a notification of infection with classical swine fever virus in wild pigs according to Article 1.2.3. of the Terrestrial Code after the Member confirms that Article 15.3.2. is appropriately implemented.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 15.3.2.

Determination of the CSF status of a country, zone or compartment

The CSF status of a country, zone or compartment can only be determined after considering the following criteria in domestic and wild pigs, as applicable:

  • 1. 
    CSF should be notifiable in the whole territory, and all clinical signs suggestive of CSF should be subjected to appropriate field and/or laboratory investigations;
  • 2. 
    an on-going awareness programme should be in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of CSF;
  • 3. 
    the V eterinary A uthority should have current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic pigs in the country, zone or compartment ;
  • 4. 
    the V eterinary A uthority should have current knowledge about the population and habitat of wild pigs in the country or zone ;

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  • 5. 
    for domestic pigs, appropriate surveillance , capable of detecting the presence of infection even in the absence of clinical signs, and the risk posed by wild pigs, is in place; this may be achieved through a surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 15.3.23. to 15.3.28.
  • 6. 
    for wild pigs, if present in the country or zone , a surveillance programme is in place according to Article 15.3.28., taking into account the presence of natural and artificial boundaries, the ecology of the wild pig population, and an assessment of the risks of disease spread.
  • 7. 
    Based on the assessed risk of spread within the wild pig population, and according to Article 15.3.26., the domestic pig population should be separated from the wild pig population by appropriate biosecurity measures to prevent transmission of CSF from wild to domestic pigs.

Article 15.3.3.

CSF free country, zone or compartment

A country, zone or compartment may be considered free from CSF when surveillance in accordance with Articles 15.3.23. to 15.3.28. has been in place for at least 12 months, and when:

  • 1. 
    there has been no outbreak of CSF in domestic pigs during the past 12 months;
  • 2. 
    no evidence of CSFV infection has been found in domestic pigs during the past 12 months;
  • 3. 
    no vaccination against CSF has been carried out in domestic pigs during the past 12 months unless there are means, validated to OIE standards (Chapter 2.8.3. of the Terrestrial Manual ), of distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs;
  • 4. 
    imported domestic pigs comply with the requirements in Article 15.3.5. or Article 15.3.6.

Article 15.3.4.

Recovery of free status

Should a CSF outbreak occur in a free country, zone or compartment , the free status may be restored where surveillance in accordance with Articles 15.3.23. to 15.3.28. has been carried out with negative results either:

  • 1. 
    3 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy without vaccination is practised; OR
  • 2. 
    where a stamping-out policy with emergency vaccination is practised:
  • a. 
    3 months after the last case and the slaughter of all vaccinated animals, or
  • b. 
    3 months after the last case without the slaughter of vaccinated animals where there are means, validated to OIE standards (Chapter 2.8.3. of the Terrestrial Manual ), of distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs;

OR

  • 3. 
    where a stamping-out policy is not practised, the provisions of Article 15.3.3. should be followed.

Article 15.3.5. Recommendations for importation from countries, zones or compartments free of CSF

for domestic pigs

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V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of CSF on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were kept in a country, zone or compartment free of CSF since birth or for at least the past 3 months;
  • 3. 
    have not been vaccinated against CSF, nor are they the progeny of vaccinated sows, unless there are means, validated to OIE standards (Chapter 2.8.3. of the Terrestrial Manual ), of distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs.

Article 15.3.6. Recommendations for importation from CSF infected countries or zones

for domestic pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of CSF on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were kept since birth or for the past 3 months in a CSF free compartment ;
  • 3. 
    have not been vaccinated against CSF nor are they the progeny of vaccinated sows, unless there are means, validated to OIE standards (Chapter 2.8.3. of the Terrestrial Manual ), of distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs.

Article 15.3.7.

Recommendations for the importation of wild pigs

Regardless of the CSF status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of CSF on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were kept in a quarantine station for 40 days prior to shipment, and were subjected to a virological test and a serological test performed at least 21 days after entry into the quarantine station , with negative results;
  • 3. 
    have not been vaccinated against CSF, unless there are means, validated to OIE standards (Chapter 2.8.3. of the T errestrial Manual ), of distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs.

Article 15.3.8. Recommendations for importation from countries, zones or compartments free of CSF

for semen of domestic pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

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Annex XXXII (contd)

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a. 
    were kept in a country, zone or compartment free of CSF since birth or for at least 3 months prior to collection;
  • b. 
    showed no clinical sign of CSF on the day of collection of the semen;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 15.3.9. Recommendations for importation from CSF infected countries or zones

for semen of domestic pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a. 
    were kept in a compartment free of CSF since birth or for at least 3 months prior to collection;
  • b. 
    showed no clinical sign of CSF on the day of collection of the semen and for the following 40 days;
  • c. 
    met one of the following conditions:
  • i. 
    have not been vaccinated against CSF and were subjected to a serological test performed at least 21 days after collection, with negative results; or
  • ii. 
    have been vaccinated against CSF and were subjected to a serological test in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual performed at least 21 days after collection and it has been conclusively demonstrated that any antibody is due to the vaccine; or
  • iii. 
    have been vaccinated against CSF and were subjected to a virological test performed in accordance with the Terrestrial Manual on a sample taken on the day of collection and it has been conclusively demonstrated that the boar is negative for virus genome;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5. and Chapter 4.6.

Article 15.3.10. Recommendations for importation from countries, zones or compartments free of CSF

for in vivo derived embryos of domestic pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females showed no clinical sign of CSF on the day of collection of the embryos;
  • 2. 
    the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7. or Chapter 4.9., as relevant.

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Annex XXXII (contd)

Article 15.3.11. Recommendations for importation from CSF infected countries or zones

for in vivo derived embryos of domestic pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females:
  • a. 
    were kept in a compartment free of CSF since birth or for at least 3 months prior to collection;
  • b. 
    showed no clinical sign of CSF on the day of collection of the embryos and for the following 40 days;
  • c. 
    and either:
  • i. 
    have not been vaccinated against CSF and were subjected, with negative results, to a serological test performed at least 21 days after collection; or
  • ii. 
    have been vaccinated against CSF and were subjected to a serological test performed at least 21 days after collection and it has been conclusively demonstrated by means, validated to OIE standards (Chapter 2.8.3. of the Terrestrial Manual ), that any antibody is due to the vaccine;
  • 2. 
    the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7. or Chapter 4.9., as relevant.

Article 15.3.12. Recommendations for importation from countries, zones or compartments free of CSF

for fresh meat of domestic pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat comes from animals which:

  • 1. 
    have been kept in a country, zone or compartment free of CSF since birth or for at least the past 3 months, or which have been imported in accordance with Article 15.3.5. or Article 15.3.6.;
  • 2. 
    have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir , have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections in accordance to Chapter 6.2. and have been found free of any sign suggestive of CSF.

EU comment

The EU wishes to reiterate its comment regarding the point 1 above: as long as the country, zone or compartment is free, the meat has to be considered safe.

Thus the words "since birth or for at least the past 3 months" should be deleted.

This is coherent with the TAHSC proposal of modification of articles 8.5.20 to 22 on FMD.

Article 15.3.13. Recommendations for the importation of fresh meat of wild pigs

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Regardless of the CSF status of the country of origin, V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting the entire consignment of meat comes from animals:

  • 1. 
    which have been subjected to a post-mortem inspection in accordance with Chapter 6.2. in an approved examination centre, and have been found free of any sign suggestive of CSF;
  • 2. 
    from each of which a sample has been collected and has been subjected to a virological test and a serological test for CSF, with negative results.

Article 15.3.14.

Recommendations for the importation of meat and meat products of pigs, or for products of animal origin (from fresh meat of pigs) intended for use in animal feeding, for agricultural or industrial use, or for pharmaceutical or surgical use

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    have been prepared:
  • a. 
    exclusively from fresh meat meeting the conditions laid down in Article 15.3.12.;
  • b. 
    in a processing establishment:
  • i. 
    approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes; ii. processing only meat meeting the conditions laid down in Article 15.3.12.; OR
  • 2. 
    have been processed in an establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the CSF virus in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Article 15.3.21. and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of CSF virus

Article 15.3.15.

Recommendations for the importation of products of animal origin (from pigs, but not derived from fresh meat) intended for use in animal feeding

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    originated from domestic pigs in a CSF free country, zone or compartment and have been prepared in a processing establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes; or
  • 2. 
    have been processed in an establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the CSF virus in accordance with Article 15.3.20. and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of CSF virus.

Article 15.3.16.

Recommendations for the importation of products of animal origin (from pigs, but not derived from fresh meat) intended for agricultural or industrial use

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

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  • 1. 
    originated from domestic pigs in a CSF free country, zone or compartment and have been prepared in a processing establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes; or
  • 2. 
    have been processed in an establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the CSF virus (under study) and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of CSF virus.

Article 15.3.17. Recommendations for the importation of bristles

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    originated from domestic pigs in a CSF free country, zone or compartment and have been prepared in a processing establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes; or
  • 2. 
    have been processed in an establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the CSF virus (under study) and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of CSF virus.

Article 15.3.18. Recommendations for the importation of litter and manure

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    originated from domestic pigs in a CSF free country, zone or compartment and have been prepared in a processing establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes; or
  • 2. 
    have been processed in an establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the CSF virus (under study) and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of CSF virus.

Article 15.3.19. Recommendations for the importation of skins and trophies derived from wild pigs

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

  • 1. 
    originated from domestic pigs in a CSF free country, zone or compartment and have been prepared in a processing establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes; or
  • 2. 
    have been processed in an establishment approved by the V eterinary A uthority for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the CSF virus in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Article 15.3.22. and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of CSF virus.

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Annex XXXII (contd)

Article 15.3.20.

Procedures for the inactivation of the CSF virus in swill

For the inactivation of classical swine fever (CSF) viruses likely to be present in swill, one of the following procedures should be used:

  • 1. 
    the swill should be maintained at a temperature of at least 90°C for at least 60 minutes, with continuous stirring; or
  • 2. 
    the swill should be maintained at a temperature of at least 121°C for at least 10 minutes at an absolute pressure of 3 bar.

Article 15.3.21. Procedures for the inactivation of the CSF virus in meat

For the inactivation of viruses present in meat , one of the following procedures should be used:

  • 1. 
    Heat treatment Meat shall be subjected to one of the following treatments:
  • a. 
    heat treatment in a hermetically sealed container with a Fo value of 3.00 or more;
  • b. 
    heat treatment at a minimum temperature of 70°C, which must be reached throughout the meat .
  • 2. 
    Natural fermentation and maturation

The meat should be subjected to a treatment consisting of natural fermentation and maturation having the following characteristics:

  • a. 
    an aw value of not more than 0.93, or
  • b. 
    a pH value of not more than 6.0.

Hams should be subjected to a natural fermentation and maturation process for at least 190 days and loins for 140 days.

  • 3. 
    Dry cured pork meat
  • a. 
    Italian style hams with bone-in should be cured with salt and dried for a minimum of 313 days.
  • b. 
    Spanish style pork meat with bone-in should be cured with salt and dried for a minimum of 252 days for Iberian hams, 140 days for Iberian shoulders, 126 days for Iberian loin, and 140 days for Serrano hams.

EU comment

In view of the latest data concerning virus survival in cured pork meat, (maximum 189 days, whatever the technique), the point 3 above should be deleted or the same period should apply. Consistency should be sought with the point 2, or explanation should be given for the differences.

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Article 15.3.22.

Procedures for the inactivation of the CSF virus in trophies

For the inactivation of CSF viruses likely to be present in trophies, one of the following procedures should be used:

  • 1. 
    boiling in water for an appropriate time so as to ensure that any matter other than bone, tusks or teeth is removed;
  • 2. 
    gamma irradiation at a dose of at least 20 kiloGray at room temperature (20°C or higher);
  • 3. 
    soaking, with agitation, in a 4% (w/v) solution of washing soda (sodium carbonate - Na2CO3) maintained at pH 11.5 or above for at least 48 hours;
  • 4. 
    soaking, with agitation, in a formic acid solution (100 kg salt [NaCl] and 12 kg formic acid per 1,000 litres water) maintained at below pH 3.0 for at least 48 hours; wetting and dressing agents may be added;
  • 5. 
    in the case of raw hides, salting for at least 28 days with sea salt containing 2% washing soda (sodium carbonate - Na2CO3).

Article 15.3.23.

Surveillance: introduction

Articles 15.3.23. to 15.3.28. define the principles and provide a guide on the surveillance for CSF, complementary to Chapter 1.4., applicable to Members seeking to determine their CSF status. This may be for the entire country or a zone . Guidance for Members seeking free status following an outbreak and for the maintenance of CSF status is also provided.

The impact and epidemiology of CSF differ widely in different regions of the world, and it is, therefore, impossible to provide specific recommendations for all situations. The surveillance strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from CSF at an acceptable level of confidence will need to be adapted to the local situation. For example, the approach must be tailored in order to prove freedom from CSF for a country or zone where wild pigs provide a potential reservoir of infection , or where CSF is present in adjacent countries. The method must examine the epidemiology of CSF in the region concerned and adapt to the specific risk factors encountered. This should include provision of scientifically based supporting data. There is, therefore, latitude available to Members to provide a well-reasoned argument to prove that absence of classical swine fever virus (CSFV) infection is assured at an acceptable level of confidence.

Surveillance for CSF should be in the form of a continuing programme designed to establish that a population in a country, zone or compartment is free from CSFV infection or to detect the introduction of CSFV into a population already recognized as free. Consideration should be given to the specific characteristics of CSF epidemiology which include: the role of swill feeding and the impact of different production systems on disease spread, the role of semen in transmission of the virus, the lack of pathognomonic gross lesions and clinical signs, the frequency of clinically inapparent infections , the occurrence of persistent and chronic infections , and the genotypic, antigenic, and virulence variability exhibited by different strains of CSFV. Serological cross-reactivity with other pestiviruses has to be taken into consideration when interpreting data from serological surveys. A common route by which ruminant pestiviruses can infect pigs is the use of vaccines contaminated with bovine viral diarrhoea virus (BVDV).

For the purposes of this chapter, virus infection means presence of CSFV as demonstrated directly by virus isolation, the detection of virus antigen or virus nucleic acid, or indirectly by seroconversion which is not the result of vaccination.

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Article 15.3.24. Surveillance: general conditions and methods

  • 1. 
    A surveillance system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. should be under the responsibility of the V eterinary A uthority . A procedure should be in place for the rapid collection and transport of samples to an accredited laboratory as described in the T errestrial Manual .
  • 2. 
    The CSF surveillance programme should:
  • a. 
    include an early warning system throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspicious cases . Farmers and workers, who have day-to-day contact with livestock, as well as diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of CSF to the V eterinary A uthority . They should be supported directly or indirectly (e.g. through private veterinarians or veterinary para-professionals ) by government information programmes and the V eterinary A uthority . Since many strains of CSFV do not induce pathognomonic gross lesions or clinical signs, cases in which CSF cannot be ruled out should be immediately investigated employing clinical, pathological, and labora tory diagnosis. This requires that sampling kits and other equipment are available to those responsible for surveillance . Personnel responsible for surveillance should be able to call for assistance from a team with expertise in CSF diagnosis, epidemiological evaluation, and control;
  • b. 
    implement, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical inspections and serological testing of high-risk groups of animals (for example, where swill feeding is practised), or those adjacent to a CSF infected country or zone (for example, bordering areas where infected wild pigs are present).

An effective surveillance system will periodically identify suspicious cases that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is CSFV. The rate at which such suspicious cases are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot, therefore, be reliably predicted. Recognitions for freedom from CSFV infection should, as a consequence, provide details of the occurrence of suspicious cases and how they were investigated and dealt with. This should include the results of laboratory testing and the control measures to which the animals concerned were subjected during the investigation (quarantine, movement standstill orders, etc.).

Article 15.3.25. Surveillance strategies

  • 1. 
    Introduction

There are two basic strategies that can be employed for CSF surveillance depending on the purpose of the Member for seeking recognition of freedom from CSF. In countries free of CSF, surveillance programmes should be designed to detect the introduction of CSFV into domestic or wild swine. The optimal strategy to meet this objective is most often targeted surveillance .

The population covered by surveillance aimed at detecting disease and infection should include domestic and wild pig populations within the country or zone to be recognised as free from CSFV infection. Such surveillance may involve opportunistic testing of samples submitted for other purposes, but a more efficient and effective strategy is one which includes targeted surveilla nce .

Surveillance is targeted to the pig population which presents the highest risk of infection (for example, swill fed farms, pigs reared outdoors or farms in proximity to infected wild pigs). Each Member will need to identify its individual risk factors. These may include: temporal and spatial distribution of past outbreak s , pig movements and demographics, etc.

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For reasons of cost, the longevity of antibody levels, as well as the existence of clinically inapparent infections and difficulties associated with differential diagnosis of other diseases , serology is often the most effective and efficient surveillance methodology. In some circumstances, which will be discussed later, clinical and virological surveillance may also have value.

The Member should justify the surveillance strategy chosen as adequate to detect the presence of CSFV infection in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and the epidemiological situation. Cumulative survey results in combination with the results of passive surveillance , over time, will increase the level of confidence in the surveillance strategy. If a Member wishes to apply for recognition by other Members of a specific zone within the country as being free from CSFV infection, the design of the surveillance strategy and the basis for any sampling process would need to be aimed at the population within the zone .

For random surveys, the design of the sampling strategy will need to incorporate epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing will need to be large enough to detect infection if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size and expected disease prevalence determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The Member must justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of surveillance and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. Selection of the design prevalence in particular clearly needs to be based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Irrespective of the survey design selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated for the vaccination/infection history and production class of animals in the target population.

Irrespective of the testing system employed, the surveillance system design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. This is especially true of the serological diagnosis of CSF because of the recognized cross-reactivity with ruminant pestiviruses. There needs to be an effective procedure for following up positives to ultimately determine with a high level of confidence, whether or not they are indicative of CSFV infection. This should involve confirmatory and differential tests for pestiviruses, as well as further investigations concerning the original sampling unit as well as animals which may be epidemiologically linked.

  • 2. 
    Clinical and virological surveillance

Beyond their role in targeted surveillance , clinical and virological surveillance for CSF has t wo aims: a) to shorten the period between introduction of CSF virus into a disease free country or zone and its detection, and b) to confirm that no unnoticed outbreak s have occurred.

In the past, clinical identification of cases was the cornerstone of early detection of CSF. However, emergence of low virulence strains of CSF, as well as new diseases - such as post-weaning multisystemic wasting syndrome and porcine dermatitis and nephropathy syndrome - have made such reliance less effective, and, in countries where such diseases are common, can add significant risk of masking the presence of CSF.

The spectrum of disease signs and gross pathology seen in CSF infections, along with the plethora of other agents that can mimic CSF, renders the value of clinical examination alone somewhat inefficient as a surveillance tool. These factors, along with the compounding effects of concurrent infections and diseases caused by ruminant pestiviruses, dictate the need for laboratory testing in order to clarify the status of CSF suspects detected by clinical monitoring.

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Nevertheless, clinical presentation should not be ignored as a tool for early detection; in particular, any cases where clinical signs or lesions consistent with CSF are accompanied by high morbidity and/or mortality should be investigated without delay. In CSFV infections involving low virulence strains, high mortality may only be seen in young animals. Otherwise close physical examination of susceptible animals is useful as a selection criteria for CSF surveillance , particularly in diagnostic laboratories or slaughter establishments or when applied to high risk populations such as swill feeding operations.

The difficulties in detecting chronic disease manifested by non-specific clinical signs and delayed seroconversion and seronegativity, in persistently infected piglets, both of which may be clinically normal, makes virological investigation essential. As part of a herd investigation, such animals are likely to be in a minority and would not confound a diagnosis based on serology. Individually or as part of recently mixed batches, such animals may, however, escape detection by this method. A holistic approach to investigation, taking note of herd history, pig, personnel and vehicle movements and disease status in neighbouring zones or countries, can also assist in targeting surveillance in order to increase efficiency and enhance the likelihood of early detection.

The labour-intensive nature of clinical, pathological and virological investigations, along with the smaller ‘window of opportunity’ inherent in virus, rather than antibody detection, has, in the past, resulted in greater emphasis being placed on mass serological screening as the best method for surveillance . However, surveillance based on clinical and pathological inspection and virological testing should not be underrated. If targeted at high risk groups in particular, it provides an opportunity for early detection that can considerably reduce the subsequent spread of disease . Herds predominated by adult animals, such as nucleus herds and artificial insemination studs, are particularly useful groups to monitor, since infection by low virulence viruses in such groups may be clinically inapparent, yet the degree of spread may be high.

Clinical and virological monitoring may also provide a high level of confidence of rapid detection of disease if a sufficiently large number of clinically susceptible animals is examined. In particular, molecular detection methods are increasingly able to offer the possibility of such large-scale screening for the presence of virus, at reasonable cost.

Wild pigs and, in particular, those with a wholly free-living existence, rarely present the opportunity for clinical observation, but should form part of any surveillance scheme and should, ideally, be monitored for virus as well as antibody.

Vaccine design and diagnostic methodologies, and in particular methods of virus detection, are increasingly reliant on up-to-date knowledge of the molecular, antigenic and other biological characteristics of viruses currently circulating and causing disease . Furthermore, epidemiological understanding of the pathways of spread of CSFV can be greatly enhanced by molecular analyses of viruses in endemic areas and those involved in outbreak s in disease free areas. It is therefore essential that CSFV isolates are sent regularly to the regional OIE Reference Laboratory for genetic and antigenic characterisation.

  • 3. 
    Serological surveillance

Serological surveillance aims at detecting antibodies against CSFV. Positive CSFV antibody test results can have five possible causes:

  • a. 
    natural infection with CSFV;
  • b. 
    legal or illegal vaccination against CSF;

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  • c. 
    maternal antibodies derived from an immune sow (maternal antibodies) are usually found only up to 4.5 months of age, but, in some individuals, maternal antibodies can be detected for considerably longer periods;
  • d. 
    cross-reactions with other pestiviruses;
  • e. 
    non-specific reactors.

The infection of pigs with other pestiviruses may complicate a surveillance strategy based on serology. Antibodies to bovine viral diarrhoea virus (BVDV) and Border disease virus (BDV) can give positive results in serological tests for CSF, due to common antigens. Such samples will require differential tests to confirm their identity. Although persistently infected immunotolerant pigs are themselves seronegative, they continuously shed virus, so the prevalence of antibodies at the herd level will be high. Chronically infected pigs may have undetectable or fluctuating antibody levels.

It may be possible to use sera collected for other survey purposes for CSF surveillance . However, the principles of survey design described in this chapter and the requirement for statistical validity should not be compromised.

The discovery of clustering of seropositive reactions should be foreseen. It may reflect any of a series of events, including but not limited to the demographics of the population sampled, vaccinal exposure or the presence of infection by field strains or other pestiviruses. Because clustering may signal field strain infection , the investigation of all instances must be incorporated in the survey design. Clustering of positive animals is always epidemiologically significant and therefore should be investigated.

In countries or zones that are moving towards freedom, serosurveillance can provide valuable information on the disease status and efficacy of any control programme. Targeted serosurveillance of young stock will indicate whether newly circulating virus is present, although the presence of maternal antibody will also need to be considered. If conventional attenuated vaccine is currently being used or has been used in the recent past, serology aimed at detecting the presence of field virus will likewise need to be targeted at unvaccinated animals and after the disappearance of maternal antibody. General usage in such situations may also be used to assess levels of vaccine coverage.

Vaccines also exist which, when used in conjunction with dedicated serological tests, may allow discrimination between vaccinal antibody and that induced by field infection . Such tools, described in the Terrestrial Manual , will need to be fully validated. They do not confer the same degree of protection as that provided by conventional vaccines, particularly with respect to preventing transplacental infections . Furthermore, serosurveillance using such differentiation requires cautious interpretation on a herd basis.

The results of random or targeted serological surveys are important in providing reliable evidence that no CSFV infection is present in a country or zone . It is therefore essential that the survey be thoroughly documented.

The free status should be reviewed whenever evidence emerges to indicate that changes which may alter the underlying assumption of continuing historical freedom, has occurred. Such changes include but are not limited to:

  • a) 
    an emergence or an increase in the prevalence of CSF in countries or zones from which live pigs or products are imported;

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  • b) 
    an increase in the volume of imports or a change in their country or zone of origin;
  • c) 
    an increase in the prevalence of CSF in the domestic or wild pigs of adjacent countries or zones ;
  • d) 
    an increased entry from, or exposure to, infected wild pig populations of adjacent countries or zones .

Article 15.3.26. Countries, zones or compartments declaring freedom from CSF: additional surveillance procedures

  • 1. 
    Country or zone free of CSF

In addition to the general conditions described above, a Member seeking recognition of CSF freedom for the country or a zone , whether or not vaccination had been practised, should provide evidence for the existence of an effective surveillance programme. The strategy and design of the surveillance programme will depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances in and around the country or zone and will be planned and implemented according to the general conditions and methods described in this chapter, to demonstrate the absence of CSFV infection in domestic and wild pig populations. This requires the support of a national or other laboratory able to undertake identification of CSFV infection through virus detection and serological tests described in the Terrestrial Manual .

  • 2. 
    Compartment free of CSF

The objective of surveillance is to demonstrate the absence of CSFV infection in the compartment . The provisions of Chapter 4.3. should be followed. The effective separation of the two subpopulations should be demonstrated. To this end, a biosecurity plan that includes but is not limited to the following provisions should be implemented:

  • a. 
    proper containment of domestic pigs;
  • b. 
    control of movement of vehicles with cleaning and disinfection as appropriate;
  • c. 
    control of personnel entering into the establishments and awareness of risk of fomite spread;
  • d. 
    prohibition of introduction to the establishments of wild caught animals and their products;
  • e. 
    record of animal movements into and out of establishments ;
  • f. 
    information and training programmes for farmers, processors, veterinarians , etc.

The biosecurity plan implemented also requires internal and external monitoring by the V eterinary A uthority . This monitoring should include:

  • g. 
    periodic clinical and serological monitoring of herds in the country or zone , and adjacent wild pig populations following these recommendations;

h. herd registration;

  • i. 
    official accreditation of biosecurity plans ;
  • j. 
    periodic monitoring and review.

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Monitoring the CSF status of wild and domestic pig populations outside the compartment will be of value in assessing the degree of risk they pose to the CSF free compartment . The design of a monitoring system is dependent on several factors such as the size and distribution of the population, the organisation of the V eterinary Services and resources available. The occurrence of CSF in wild and domestic pigs may vary considerably among countries. Surveillance design should be epidemiologically based, and the Member should justify its choice of design prevalence and level of confidence based on Chapter 1.4.

The geographic distribution and approximate size of wild pig populations need to be assessed as a prerequisite for designing a monitoring system. Sources of information may include government wildlife authorities, wildlife conservation organisations, hunter associations and other available sources. The objective of a surveillance programme when the disease is already known to exist should be to determine the geographic distribution and the extent of the infection .

Article 15.3.27.

Recovery of free status: additional surveillance procedures

In addition to the general conditions described in the above-mentioned articles, a Member seeking reestablishment of country or zone freedom from CSF should show evidence of an active surveillance programme to demonstrate absence of CSFV infection.

Populations under this surveillance programme should include:

  • a. 
    establishments in the proximity of the outbreak ;
  • b. 
    establishments epidemiologically linked to the outbreak ;
  • c. 
    animals used to re-populate affected establishments and any establishments where contiguous culling is carried out;
  • d. 
    wild pig populations in the area of the outbreak .

In all circumstances, a Member seeking reestablishment of country or zone freedom from CSF with vaccination or without vaccination should report the results of an active and a passive surveillance programme in which the pig population undergoes regular clinical, pathological, virological, and/or serological examination, planned and implemented according to the general conditions and methods described in these recommendations. The surveillance should be based on a statistically representative sample of the populations at risk.

Article 15.3.28.

Surveillance for CSF in wild pigs

While the same principles apply, surveillance in wild pigs presents challenges beyond those encountered in domestic populations in each of the following areas:

  • a. 
    determination of the distribution, size and movement patterns associated with the wild pig population;
  • b. 
    assessment of the possible presence of CSF within the population;
  • c. 
    determination of the practicability of establishing a zone .

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The design of a monitoring system for wild pigs is dependent on several factors such as the organisation of the V eterinary Services and resources available. The geographic distribution and approximate size of wild pig populations need to be assessed as a prerequisite for designing a monitoring system. Sources of information may include wildlife conservation organisations, hunter associations and other available sources. The objective of a surveillance programme is to determine if a given disease is present, and if so, at what prevalence.

Estimates of wild pig populations can be made using advanced methods (e.g. radio tracking, linear transect method, capture/recapture) or traditional methods based on the number of animals that can be hunted to allow for natural restocking (hunting bags).

For implementation of the monitoring programme, it will be necessary to define the limits of the territory over which wild pigs range in order to delineate the epidemiological units within the monitoring programme. It is often difficult to define epidemiological units for wild animals. The most practical approach is based on natural and artificial barriers.

The monitoring programme should also include animals found dead, road kills, animals showing abnormal behaviour or exhibiting gross lesions during dressing.

There may be situations where a more targeted surveillance programme can provide additional assurance. The criteria to define high risk areas for targeted surveillance include:

  • a. 
    areas with past history of CSF;
  • b. 
    sub-regions with large populations of wild pigs;
  • c. 
    border regions with CSF affected countries or zones ;
  • d. 
    interface between wild and domestic pig populations;
  • e. 
    picnic and camping areas;
  • f. 
    farms with free-ranging pigs;
  • g. 
    garbage dumps;
  • h. 
    other risk areas determined by the V eterinary A uthority .

text deleted

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Annex XXXIII

CHAPTER 11.4. BOVINE CYSTICERCOSIS

Article 11.4.1. General provisions

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 11.4.2.

Recommendations for the importation of fresh meat of cattle

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat comes from animals which have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections as described in Chapter

text deleted

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CHAPTER 11.10. DERMATOPHILOSIS

Article 11.10.1. General provisions

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 11.10.2. Recommendations for importation from countries considered infected with der

for ruminants and equines

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifi ca t

1.     showed no clinical sign of dermatophilosis on the day of shipment;

2.     were treated with acaricides prior to shipment and were completely free of ticks.

text deleted

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CHAPTER 12.4. EPIZOOTIC LYMPHANGITIS

Article 12.4.1. General provisions

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 12.4.2.

Recommendations for the importation of domestic horses

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

showed no clinical sign of epizootic lymphangitis on the day of shipment;

were kept in establishments in which no case of epizootic lymphangitis was officially reported during the 2 months prior to shipment.

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CHAPTER 12.12 HORSE MANGE

Annex XXXIII (contd)

Article 12.12.1.

General provisions

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manua

Article 12.12.2.

Recommendations for the

V eterinary A uthorities of i attesting that the animals:

ng countries should

the

1. showed no

of an international veterinary certificate

2. were kept for the 3 months reported during that period.

horse mange on the day of shipment;

r to shipment in an establishment where no case of horse mange was

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CHAPTER 12.13

HORSE POX

Annex XXXIII (contd)

Recommendations for the

Article 12.13.1.

V eterinary A uthorities of i attesting that the animals:

ng countries should

the

1. showed no

of an international veterinary certificate

2. were kept for the 3 months reported during that period.

horse pox on the day of shipment;

r to shipment in an establishment where no case of horse pox was

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Annex XXXIII (contd)

CHAPTER 15.2. ATROPHIC RHINITIS OF SWINE

Article 15.2.1. General provisions

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

Article 15.2.2. of pigs for breeding or rearing

Recommendations for the

V eterinary A uthorities of i attesting that the animals:

1. showed no clinical sig

ng countries should

the

of atrophic

on the day of shipment;

of an international veterinary certificate

were kept in the

no case of atrophic

ng cou

or for the 6 months prior to shipment, in an establishment where

was officially reported during the past ye

text deleted

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CH AP TE R 15. 6.

TESCHOVIRUS ENCEPHALOMYELITIS (previously enterovirus encephalomyel Teschen disease, Talfan disease)

Article 15.6.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the

, the incubation period for

encephalomyelitis shall be 40 days.

Standards for diagnostic tests

l Manua

Article 15.6.2.

Teschovirus encephalomyelitis free country

A country may be

encephalomyelitis when it has been shown that

encephalomyelitis has not been present for at least the past 3 ye

shall be 6 months after the slaughter of the last affected

policy is practised with or without

Teschovirus encephalomyelitis

for

encephalomyelitis.

which a stamp

Article 15.6.3.

zone

A zone shall be considered as infected with Teschovirus encephalomyelitis until:

of the last case and the completion of a stampin g-out policy

1. at least 40 days have elapsed after the and disinfection procedures, or

2. 6 months have elapsed after the was not practised.

recovery or death of the last affected

a sta mpi n g-out policy

Article 15.6.4.

for

from

free

for domestic

the presentation 1. showed no

an i nterna ti ona l veterina ry certifica

the animals:

us encephalomyelitis on the day of shipment;

2. were kept in a country free from Teschovirus encephalomye

or for at least the past 40 days

Article 15.6.5.

for

from

free

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s

t

for wild pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica

1. showed no

us encephalomyelitis on the day of shipment;

2. come from a country free from Teschovirus encephalomyelitis;

if the country of encephalomyelitis:

has a common border with a country

with

3. were kept in a quarantine

the 40 days

to shipment.

Article 15.6.6.

for

from

with

encephalomyelitis

for domestic pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te 1. showed no clinical sign of Teschovirus encephalomyelitis on the day of shipment;

2. were kept

or for the past 40 days, in an establishment where no case of

encephalomyelitis was officially reported during that

situated in an Teschovirus encephalomyelitis infected z one ; or

3.     were kept in a quarantine station for the 40 days prior to shipment;

4.     have not been vaccinated against Teschovirus encephalomyelitis; or

5.     were

us

and that the establishment of origin was not

types

nated against Teschovirus encephalomyelitis, not less than 30 days and not more than one year to shipment (the nature of the vaccine used, whether inactivated or modified live virus, and the virus

l also be

tificate).

Article 15.6.7.

for

from

with

encephalomyelitis

for wild pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica

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s

Annex XXXIII (contd)

1.     showed no clinical sign of Teschovirus encephalomyelitis on the day of shipment;

2.     were kept in a quarantine station for the 40 days prior to shipment;

3.     have not been vaccinated against Teschovirus encephalomyelitis; or

4.     were vaccinated against Teschovirus encephalomyelitis, not less than 30 days and not more than one year prior to shipment (the nature of the vaccine used, whether inactivated or modified live virus, and the virus types and strains included shall also be stated in the certificate).

Article 15.6.8. Recommendations for importation from Teschovirus encephalomyelitis free countries

for semen of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the donor animals:

1.     showed no clinical sign of Teschovirus encephalomyelitis on the day of collection of the semen;

2.     were kept in a country free from Teschovirus encephalomyelitis for not less than 40 days prior to collection.

Article 15.6.9.

Recommendations for importation from countries considered infected with Teschovirus encephalomyelitis

for semen of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the donor animals:

1.     showed no clinical sign of Teschovirus encephalomyelitis on the day of collection of the semen;

2.     were kept in the exporting countr y , for the 40 days prior to collection, in an establishment or artificial insemination centre where no case of Teschovirus encephalomyelitis was officially reported during that period, and that the establishment or artificial insemination centre was not situated in an Teschovirus encephalomyelitis infected zone .

Article 15.6.10. Recommendations for importation from Teschovirus encephalomyelitis free countries

for fresh meat of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat comes from animals:

1.     which have been kept in a country free from Teschovirus encephalomyelitis since birth or for at least the past 40 days;

2.     which have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir and have been subjected to ante-mortem and postmortem inspections for Teschovirus encephalomyelitis with favourable results.

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Annex XXXIII (contd)

Article 15.6.11.

for

from

with

encephalomyelitis

for fresh meat of pig

nary A uthorities should

the

consignment of meat comes from animals:

of an interna tional veterinary certifica te

that the

1. wh

been kept i

us encephalomyelitis infected z one ;

2. which have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir not

an

zone and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem encephalomyelitis with favourable results.

s encephalomyelitis infected for Teschovirus

Article 15.6.12.

for

from

with

encephalomyelitis

for meat products of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

1. the

of meat products comes from

and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem encephalomyelitis with favourable results;

2. the meat products have been processed to ensure the destruction of the Tescho

which have been slaughtered in an approved

for

encephalomye

virus;

3. the necessary precaut Teschovirus encephalomye

were taken after virus.

to

contact of the meat with any source of

Article 15.6.13.

for

from

free

for products of

s)

use

feeding or for

l or i

l use

V eterinary A uthorities should require the products come from

of an international veterinary certificate

which have been kept in a country free from

encephalomye

with

that these

for at least the past 40 days

Article 15.6.14.

for

from

encephalomyelitis

for meal and flour from blood, meat, defatted bones, hooves and claws

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nary A uthorities should

the

products have been processed using heat treatment to ensure the virus.

of an international veterinary certificate

of

that these

us encephalomye

Article 15.6.15.

for

from

with

encephalomyelitis

for bristles

nary A uthorities should

the

products have been processed to ensure the destruction of Teschoviru controlled and approved by the V eterinary A uthorit y of the ex porting country.

of an international veterinary certificate encephalomyeliti

esting that these virus, in premises

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Annex XXXIV

CHAPTER 8.2. AUJESZKY'S DISEASE

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes but has comments.

The structure of the chapter could be amended to match that of the CSF chapter.

Article 8.2.1.

General provisions

The Aujeszky's disease (AD) free or provisionally free status of a country or zone can only be determined if the following conditions are fulfilled:

  • 1. 
    a risk assessment has been conducted identifying all potential factors for AD occurrence and their historic perspective;
  • 2. 
    AD is notifiable in the whole country, and all clinical cases suggestive of AD are subjected to field and laboratory investigations;
  • 3. 
    an on-going awareness programme is in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of AD in susceptible species;
  • 4. 
    the V eterinary A uthority has current knowledge of, and authority over, all establishments containing pigs in the whole country;
  • 5. 
    domestic pigs are properly identified when leaving their establishment of origin with an indelible mark giving the identification number of their herd of origin; a reliable tracing back procedure is in place for all pigs leaving their establishment of origin.

An AD infected establishment means an establishment in which the virus has been isolated or identified, or a positive serological result (total or gE antibodies) has been confirmed in a laboratory .

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the AD status of the ex porting country or zone .

Article 8.2.1.bis

Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities and any products made from these, V eterinar y A uthorities should not require any AD related conditions, regardless of the AD status of the exporting country or zone :

1.     fresh meat of domestic and wild pigs not containing offal (head, and thoracic and abdominal viscera);

2.     meat products of domestic and wild pigs not containing offal (head, and thoracic and abdominal viscera);

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3. products of animal origin not containing offal (head, and thoracic and abdominal viscera).

Article 8.2.2. AD free country or zone

  • 1. 
    Qualification

A country or zone may be considered free from the disease without formally applying a specific surveillance programme (historical freedom) if the disease has not been reported for at least 25 years, and if for at least the past 10 years:

  • a. 
    it has been a notifiable disease ;
  • b. 
    an early detection system has been in place;
  • c. 
    measures to prevent the introduction of the AD virus into the country or zone have been in place;
  • d. 
    no vaccination against the disease has been carried out;
  • e. 
    infection is not known to be established in wild swine, or measures have been implemented to prevent any transmission of the AD virus from wild swine to domestic pigs.

A country or zone which does not meet the conditions of the above paragraph may be considered free from AD when:

  • f. 
    animal health regulations to control the movement of commodities listed in Article 8.2.6. in order to prevent the introduction of infection into the establishments of the country or zone have been in place for at least 2 years;
  • g. 
    vaccination against AD has been banned for all domestic pigs in the country or zone for at least 2 years;
  • h. 
    if AD has never been reported in the country or zone , serological surveys, with negative results, have been conducted on a representative sample of all pig establishments in conformity with the recommendations in Chapter X.X. (under study) no more than 3 years prior to qualification; the serological surveys should be directed at the detection of antibodies to the whole virus, and based on the breeding pig population or, for establishments that contain no breeding pigs, on a comparable number of fattening pigs; or
  • i. 
    if AD has been reported in the country or zone , a surveillance and control programme has been in place to detect every infected establishment and eradicate AD from it; the surveillance programme should be carried out in conformity with the recommendations in Chapter X.X. (under study) and demonstrate that no establishments within the country or zone have had any clinical, virological or serological evidence of AD for at least 2 years.

In order for a country to reach free status, all of its zones must have reached AD free status.

In countries or zones with wild swine, measures should be implemented to prevent any transmission of the AD virus from wild swine to domestic pigs.

  • 2. 
    Maintenance of free status

In order to maintain its free status, a country or zone should comply with the following requirements:

  • a. 
    periodic serological surveys directed at the detection of antibodies to the whole AD virus should be carried out on a statistically significant number of breeding pigs, in conformity with the recommendations in Chapter X.X. (under study);

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  • b. 
    the importation of the commodities listed in Article 8.2.6. into the country or zone is carried out in conformity with the import conditions contained in the relevant Articles of the present chapter;
  • c. 
    the ban on AD vaccination remains in force;
  • d. 
    measures aimed at preventing the transmission of the AD virus from wild swine to domestic pigs remain in force.
  • 3. 
    Recovery of free status

Should an AD outbreak occur in an establishment of a free country or zone, the status of the country or zone may be restored if either:

  • a. 
    all the pigs in the outbreak have been slaughtered; and, during and after the application of this measure, an epidemiological investigation including clinical examination, and serological and/or virological testing has been carried out in all pig establishments which have been directly or indirectly in contact with the infected establishment and in all pig establishments located within a 5-kilometre radius of the outbreak , demonstrating that these establishments are not infected; or
  • b. 
    vaccination with gE - deleted vaccines has been applied and:
  • i. 
    a serological testing procedure (differential ELISA) has been implemented in the establishments where vaccination has been applied to demonstrate the absence of infection ;
  • ii. 
    the movement of pigs from these establishments has been banned, except for immediate slaughter , until the above procedure has demonstrated the absence of infection ;
  • iii. 
    all vaccinated animals have been slaughtered;
  • iv. 
    during and after the application of the measures described in points i) to iii) above, a thorough epidemiological investigation including clinical examination and serological and/or virological testing has been carried out in all pig establishments which have been directly or indirectly in contact with the infected establishment and in all pig establishments located within a 5-kilometre radius of the outbreak , demonstrating that these establishments are not infected.

EU comments:

The EU proposes to add an alternative option so as to avoid the unnecessary killing of healthy vaccinated animals as follows:

"c. vaccination with gE- deleted vaccines has been applied and

  • i) 
    all pigs on the establishment where the outbreak occurred and all pigs within at least a 5 kilometre radius of the outbreak are vaccinated immediately with deleted virus strain (DIVA vaccination) according to the manufacturer's recommendations;
  • ii) 
    a serological testing procedure (differential ELISA) is carried out twice in the establishments where vaccination has been applied in order to demonstrate the absence of infection;
  • iii) 
    a thorough epidemiological investigation including a clinical examination and a serological and/or virological tesing has been carried out in all pig establishments which have been directly or indirectly in contact with the infected establishment;

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  • iv) 
    the movements of pigs from these establishments has been prohibited except for movement directly for slaughter until the procedures in iii) above have demonstrated the absence of infection;;
  • v) 
    all infected and vaccinated pigs have been slaughtered and all uninfected and vaccinated pigs have been identified and prohibited from moving outside the 5 kilometre zone.

Article 8.2.3. AD provisionally free country or zone

  • 1. 
    Qualification

A country or zone may be considered as provisionally free from AD if the following conditions are complied with:

  • a. 
    animal health regulations to control the movement of commodities listed in Article 8.2.6. in order to prevent the introduction of infection into the establishments of the country or zone have been in place for at least 2 years;
  • b. 
    if AD has never been reported in the country or zone , a serological survey, with negative results, has been conducted on a representative sample of all pig establishments in conformity with the recommendations in Chapter X.X. (under study) (at a level of confidence not sufficient to meet requirements for freedom); the serological survey should be directed at the detection of antibodies to the whole virus, and based on the breeding pig population or, for establishments that contain no breeding pigs, on a comparable number of fattening pigs; or
  • c. 
    if AD has been reported in the country or zone , a surveillance and control programme has been in place to detect infected establishments and eradicate AD from these establishments , the herd prevalence rate in the country or zone has not exceeded 1% for at least 3 years (the sampling procedure described in point 1e) of the definition of ‘AD free establishment’ should be applied within the establishments of the country or zone ), and at least 90% of the establishments in the country or zone are qualified free;
  • d. 
    in countries or zones with wild swine, measures should be taken to prevent any transmission of the AD virus between wild swine and domestic pigs.
  • 2. 
    Maintenance of provisionally free status

In order to maintain its provisionally free status, a country or zone should comply with the following requirements:

  • a. 
    the measures described in points 1b) and 1d) above should be continued;
  • b. 
    the percentage of infected establishments remains <1%;
  • c. 
    the importation of the commodities listed in Article 8.2.6. into the country or zone is carried out in conformity with the import conditions contained in the relevant Articles of the present chapter.

EU comment

As article 8.2.6 is deleted it should read "in the present chapter".

  • 3. 
    Recovery of provisionally free status

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Should the percentage of infected establishments exceed 1% in a provisionally free country or zone, the status of the country or zone is cancelled and may be restored only once the percentage of infected establishments has remained <1% for at least 6 months, and this result is confirmed by a serological survey conducted in conformity with point 1c) above.

Article 8.2.4.

AD infected country or zone

Countries and zones which do not fulfil the conditions to be considered free or provisionally free of AD should be considered as infected.

Article 8.2.5. AD free establishment

  • 1. 
    Qualification To qualify as free from AD, an establishment should satisfy the following conditions:
  • a. 
    it is under the control of the V eterinary A uthority ;
  • b. 
    no clinical, virological or serological evidence of AD has been found for at least one year;
  • c. 
    the introduction of pigs, semen and embryos/ova into the establishment is carried out in conformity with the import conditions for these commodities contained in the relevant articles of the present chapter;
  • d. 
    vaccination against AD has not been carried out in the establishment for at least 12 months, and any previously vaccinated pigs are free from gE antibodies;
  • e. 
    a number of breeding pigs from the establishment has been subjected, with negative results, to serological tests to the whole AD virus, applying a sampling procedure set out in conformity with the recommendations in Chapter X.X. (under study); these tests must have been carried out on two occasions, at an interval of 2 months; for establishments that contain no breeding pigs, the tests should be carried out only once on a comparable number of fattening or weaning pigs;
  • f. 
    a surveillance and control programme has been in place to detect infected establishments located within a 5-kilometre radius of the establishment and no establishment is known to be infected within this zone .
  • 2. 
    Maintenance of free status

For establishments located in an infected country or infected zone , the testing procedure described in point 1e) above should be carried out every 4 months.

For establishments located in a provisionally free country or zone, the testing procedure described in point 1e) above should be carried out every year.

  • 3. 
    Recovery of free status

Should a free establishment become infected, or should an outbreak occur within a 5-kilometre radius of a free establishment , the free status of the establishment should be suspended until the following conditions are met:

  • a. 
    in the infected establishment :
  • i. 
    all the pigs in the establishment have been slaughtered, or
  • ii. 
    at least 30 days after removal of all infected animals, all breeding animals have been subjected to a serological test to the whole AD virus, with negative results, on two occasions, at an interval of

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2 months;

  • b. 
    in other establishments located in the 5-kilometre radius zone : a number of breeding pigs from each establishment has been subjected, with negative results, to serological tests to the whole AD virus (non vaccinated establishments ) or to gE antibodies (vaccinated establishments ), applying the sampling procedure described in point 1e above.

Article 8.2.6.

Trade in commodities

Commodities other than those listed below are not considered to have the potential to spread AD when they are the subject of international trade .

V eterinary A uthorities of countries shall consider whether there is a risk with regard to AD in accepting importation or transit through their territory, from other countries, of the following commodities :

1.     domestic and wild swine;

2.     semen of domestic and wild swine;

3.     embryos/ova of domestic and wild swine;

4.     offal (head, and thoracic and abdominal viscera) of swine and products containing swine offal;

5.     pathological material and biological products (see Chapter 5.8.).

Article 8.2.7. Recommendations for importation from AD free countries or zones

for domestic pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    come from an establishment located in an AD free country or zone;
  • 3. 
    have not been vaccinated against AD.

Article 8.2.8. Recommendations for importation from AD provisionally free countries or zones

for domestic pigs for breeding or rearing

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    have been kept exclusively in AD free establishments since birth;
  • 3. 
    have not been vaccinated against AD;
  • 4. 
    were subjected to a serological test to the whole AD virus, with negative results, within 15 days prior to shipment.

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Article 8.2.9. Recommendations for importation from AD infected countries or zones

for domestic pigs for breeding or rearing

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were kept exclusively in AD free establishments since birth;
  • 3. 
    have not been vaccinated against AD;
  • 4. 
    were isolated in the establishment of origin or a quarantine station , and were subjected to a serological test to the whole AD virus, with negative results, on two occasions, at an interval of not less than 30 days between each test, the second test being performed during the 15 days prior to shipment.

Article 8.2.10.

Recommendations for importation from AD provisionally free countries or zones or AD infected countries or zones

for domestic pigs for slaughter

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    a surveillance and control programme is in place in the country or zone to detect infected establishments and eradicate AD;
  • 2. 
    the animals:
  • a. 
    are not being eliminated as part of an eradication programme;
  • b. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of shipment;
  • c. 
    have been kept exclusively in AD free establishments since birth; or
  • d. 
    have been vaccinated against AD at least 15 days prior to shipment.

[Note: A ppropriate precautions should be tak en both by the exporting country and the importing country to ensure that the pigs are transported directly from the place of shipment to the abattoir for immediate slaughter.]

Article 8.2.11. Recommendations for importation from AD free countries or zones

for wild swine

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were captured in an AD free country or zone;
  • 3. 
    have not been vaccinated against the disease ;
  • 4. 
    were isolated in a quarantine station , and were subjected to a serological test to the whole AD virus, with

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negative results, on t wo occasions, at an interval of not less than 30 days between each test, the second test being performed during the 15 days prior to shipment.

Article 8.2.12. Recommendations for importation from AD free countries or zones

for semen of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of collection of the semen;
  • b. 
    were kept in an establishment or artificial insemination centre located in an AD free country or zone at the time of semen collection;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 8.2.13. Recommendations for importation from AD provisionally free countries or zones

for semen of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor animals:
  • a. 
    have been kept for at least 4 months prior to semen collection in an artificial insemination centre which has the status of AD free establishment , and where all boars are subjected to a serological test to the whole AD virus, with negative results, every 4 months;
  • b. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of collection;
  • 2. 
    the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 8.2.14. Recommendations for importation from AD infected countries or zones

for semen of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that: 1. the donor animals:

  • a. 
    were kept in an AD free establishment for at least 6 months prior to entering the artificial insemination centre ;
  • b. 
    have been kept for at least 4 months prior to semen collection in the artificial insemination centre which has the status of AD free establishment , and where all boars are subjected to a serological test to the whole AD virus, with negative results, every 4 months;
  • c. 
    were subjected to a serological test to the whole AD virus, with negative results, within 10 days prior to or 21 days after semen collection;

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  • d. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of collection; 2. the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 8.2.15. Recommendations for importation from AD free countries or zones

for in vivo derived embryos of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females:
  • a. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of collection of the embryos;
  • b. 
    were kept in an establishment located in an AD free country or zone prior to collection;
  • 2. 
    the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 8.2.16. Recommendations for importation from AD provisionally free countries or zones

for in vivo derived embryos of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females:
  • a. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of collection of the embryos;
  • b. 
    were kept in an AD free establishment for at least 3 months prior to collection;
  • 2. 
    the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 8.2.17. Recommendations for importation from AD infected countries or zones

for in vivo derived embryos of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    the donor females:
  • a. 
    showed no clinical sign of AD on the day of collection of the embryos;
  • b. 
    were kept in an AD free establishment for at least 3 months prior to collection;
  • c. 
    were subjected to a serological test to the whole AD virus, with negative results, within 10 days prior to collection;
  • 2. 
    the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 4.7. and 4.9., as relevant.

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Article 8.2.18. Recommendations for importation from AD free countries or zones

for offal (head, and thoracic and abdominal viscera) of pigs or products containing pig offal

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of offal or products containing pig offal comes from animals which come from establishments located in an AD free country or zone.

Article 8.2.19.

Recommendations for importation from AD provisionally free countries or zones or from AD infected countries or zones

for offal (head, and thoracic and abdominal viscera) of pigs

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of offal comes from animals:

  • 1. 
    which have been kept in an AD free establishment since birth;
  • 2. 
    which have not been in contact with animals from establishments not considered free from AD during their transport to the approved abattoir and therein.

Article 8.2.20.

Recommendations for importation from AD provisionally free countries or zones or from AD infected countries or zones

for products containing pig offal (head, and thoracic and abdominal viscera)

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that:

  • 1. 
    either the entire consignment of offal used to prepare the products complied with the conditions referred to in Article 8.2.19.; or
  • 2. 
    the products have been processed to ensure the destruction of the AD virus; and
  • 3. 
    the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the products with any source of AD virus.

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Annex XXXIV (contd)

CHAPTER 8.11. RIFT VALLEY FEVER

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes.

Article 8.11.1. General provisions

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code , the infective period for Rift Valley fever (RVF) shall be 30 days.

For the purposes of this chapter, ruminants include camels.

The historic distribution of RVF is the sub-Saharian African continent, Madagascar and the Arabian Peninsula.

Countries or zones within the historic distribution of RVF or adjacent to those that are historically infected should be subjected to surveillance .

Epidemics of RVF may occur in infected areas after flooding. They are separated by inter-epidemic periods that may last for several decades in arid areas and, during these periods, the prevalence of infection in humans, animals and mosquitoes can be difficult to detect.

In the absence of clinical disease , the RVF status of a country or zone within the historically infected regions of the world should be determined by a surveillance programme (carried out in accordance with Chapter 1.4.) focusing on mosquitoes and serology of susceptible mammals. The programme should concentrate on parts of the country or zone at high risk because of historical, geographic and climatic factors, ruminant and mosquito population distribution, and proximity to areas where epidemics have recently occurred.

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the Terrestrial Manual .

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the RVF status of the ruminant population of the exportin g country or z one .

Article 8.11.2.

Trade in Safe commodities

When authorising import or transit of the following commodities and any products made from them, V eterinary A uthorities should not require any RVF related conditions, regardless of the RVF status of the ruminant population of the ex porting country or zone :

  • 1. 
    hides and skins;
  • 2. 
    wool and fiber.

When authorising import or transit of other commodities listed in this chapter, V eterinary A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in this chapter relevant to the RVF status of the ruminant population of the exportin g country or z one .

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Article 8.11.3.

RVF infection free country or zone

A country or a zone may be considered free from RVF infection when the disease is notifiable in animals throughout the country and either:

  • 1. 
    the country or zone lies outside the historically infected regions, and not adjacent to historically infections; or
  • 2. 
    a surveillance programme as described in Article 8.11.1. has demonstrated no evidence of RVF infection in humans, animals or mosquitoes in the country or zone during the past 4 years following a RVF epidemic.

The provisions of the last paragraph of Article 8.11.1. may need to be complied with on a continuous basis in order to maintain freedom from infection , depending on the geographical location of the country or zone .

A RVF infection free country or zone in which surveillance and monitoring has found no evidence that RVF infection is present will not lose its free status through the importation of permanently marked seropositive animals or those destined for direct slaughter .

Article 8.11.4.

RVF infected country or zone without disease

A RVF disease free country or zone is a country or zone that is not infection free (see Article 8.11.3.) but in which disease has not occurred in humans or animals in the past 6 months provided that climatic changes predisposing to outbreak s of RVF have not occurred during this time.

Article 8.11.5.

RVF infected country or zone with disease

A RVF infected country or zone with disease is one in which clinical disease in humans or animals has occurred within the past 6 months.

Article 8.11.6. Recommendations for importation from RVF infection free countries or zones

for ruminants

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    were kept in a RVF free country or zone since birth or for at least 30 days prior to shipment; and
  • 2. 
    if the animals were exported from a free zone , either:
  • a. 
    did not transit through an infected zone during transportation to the place of shipment ; or
  • b. 
    were protected from mosquito attack at all times when transiting through an infected zone .

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Annex XXXIV (contd)

Article 8.11.7. Recommendations for importation from RVF infection free countries or zones

for meat and meat products of domestic and wild ruminants

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an interna tional veterinary certificate attesting that the products are derived from animals which remained in the RVF infection free country/free zone since birth or for the last 30 days.

Article 8.11.8. Recommendations for importation from RVF infected countries/ zones without disease

for ruminants

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no evidence of RVF on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    met one of the following conditions:
  • a. 
    were kept in a RVF infected country/zone free of disease since birth or for the last 6 months providing that climatic changes predisposing to outbreaks of RVF have not occurred during this time; or
  • b. 
    were vaccinated against RVF at least 21 days prior to shipment with a modified live virus vaccine; or
  • c. 
    were held in a mosquito-proof quarantine station for at least 30 days prior to shipment during which the animals showed no clinical signs of RVF and were protected from mosquitoes between quarantine and the place of shipment as well as at the place of shipment ;

AND

  • 3. 
    did not transit through an infected zone with disease during transportation of the place of shipment .

Article 8.11.9. Recommendations for importation from RVF infected countries or zones without disease

for meat and meat products of domestic and wild ruminants

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that: 1. the products are derived from animals which:

  • a. 
    remained in the RVF infected country or zone without disease since birth or for the last 30 days;
  • b. 
    were slaughtered in an approved abattoir and were subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections for RVF with favourable results;

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Annex XXXIV (contd)

  • 2. 
    the carcasses from which the products were derived were submitted to maturation at a temperature above +2°C for a minimum period of 24 hours following slaughter .

Article 8.11.10. Recommendations for importation from RVF infected countries or zones with disease

for ruminants

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an internationa l veterina ry certifica te attesting that the animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no evidence of RVF on the day of shipment;
  • 2. 
    were vaccinated against RVF at least 21 days prior to shipment with a modified live virus vaccine; OR
  • 3. 
    were held in a mosquito-proof quarantine station for at least 30 days prior to shipment during which the animals showed no clinical signs of RVF and were protected from mosquito attack between quarantine and the place of shipment as well as at the place of shipment .

Article 8.11.11. Recommendations for importation from RVF infected countries or zones with disease

for meat and meat products of domestic and wild ruminants

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the carcasses:

  • 1. 
    are from animals which have been slaughtered in an approved abattoir and have been subjected to ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections for RVF with favourable results; and
  • 2. 
    have been fully eviscerated and submitted to maturation at a temperature above +2°C for a minimum period of 24 hours following slaughter .

Article 8.11.12. Recommendations for importation from RVF infected countries or zones with disease

for in vivo derived embryos of ruminants

V eterinary A uthorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the donor animals:

  • 1. 
    showed no evidence of RVF within the period from 28 days prior to 28 days following collection of the embryos;
  • 2. 
    were vaccinated against RVF at least 21 days prior to collection with a modified live virus vaccine;

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Annex XXXIV (contd)

OR

  • 3. 
    were serologically tested on the day of collection and at least 14 days following collection and showed no significant rise in titre.

Article 8.11.13.

(Under study) Recommendations for importation from RVF infected countries or zones with disease or from RVF infected countries or zones without disease

for milk and milk products

V eterinary A uthorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the consignment:

  • 1. 
    was subjected to pasteurization; or
  • 2. 
    was subjected to a combination of control measures with equivalent performance as described in the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygienic Practice for Milk and Milk Products.

text deleted

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Annex XLIV

FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME FOR THE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

 

Topic

Action How to be managed Status (September 2009)

Restructuring of the Terrestrial Code Harmonisation of Terrestrial and Aquatic Codes

  • 1. 
    Work with AAHSC towards harmonisation, as appropriate, of the Codes
  • 2. 
    Reorganization of semen & embryo chapters
  • 3. 
    Chapters / references of non listed disease

TAHSC, ITD & IETS experts

  • 1. 
    Ongoing
  • 2. 
    Modified CH proposed for MC
  • 3. 
    Deletion proposed for MC

Import r

isk analysis C & AHG nthrax

 

Revise handbook TAHS

On going

A

 

Develop text on the inactivation of B. anthracis TAHS

C&SCAD& an ex crapie

pert Modified CH proposed for MC

S

 

Update CH

TAHSC&SCAD aluation of VS and OIE PVS

Modified CH proposed for MC

Ev

 
  • 1. 
    review of PVS
  • 2. 
    Address aquatic animal health services
  • 3. 
    inclusion of legislation aspect
  • 1. 
    AHG
  • 2. 
    AHG & ITD
  • 3. 
    TAHSC & ITD
  • 1. 
    Feedback session & AHG in Dec09
  • 2. 
    Ongoing
  • 3. 
    Modified CH proposed for MC

Surveillance articles on AI,ND,CSF

Modify for consistency SCAD Start working

Equine diseases

Official recognition SCAD wait until decision by Council/SCAD

Other Terrestrial Code texts in need of revision

Update CH on Brucellosis

SCAD; APFSWG

AHG in Nov09 under SCAD

Update CH on Rabies

SCAD

AHG in Jan10 under SCAD

Update CH on Bee diseases

SCAD

AHG in Jan10 under SCAD and BSC

Update CH on PPR

SCAD

AHG in Dec09 under SCAD

Update CH on ND (inactivation)

TAHSC &SCAD

Table proposed for MC

Update CH on SVD

SCAD, ITD

Revised CH TAHSC in Feb10

Update CH on ASF(inactivation + SURV)

SCAD

 

CH on Paratuberculosis

BSC (diagnostic test) & STD (guidance document)

On hold pending further development in diagnostics

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Annex XLIV (contd)

 

Animal Production Food Safety

Salmonellosis

  • 1. 
    Consolidate CH on salmonella control.
  • 2. 
    Update biosecurity procedures CH

APFSWG & AHG

Modified draft CH proposed for MC

Discussion paper on future priorities for standard setting

APFSWG & TCC

To be discussed in November

Cysticercosis

APFSWG

On hold

Campylobacterosis

APFSWG

Ongoing

Pet food CH

Expert group

Modified draft CH proposed for MC

Animal welfare

New texts:

  • 1. 
    Dog populations
  • 2. 
    Lab animals
  • 3. 
    Livestock production systems Future work programme

AWWG & AHGs TAHSC supervision

  • 1. 
    Modified draft CH proposed for MC
  • 2. 
    Ongoing
  • 3. 
    Ongoing

Alternative approaches to providing OIE advice

 

Develop alternative mechanism for providing guidance to Members on managing certain animal health and welfare issues outside the Code framework

TAHSC, AWWG, APFS WG & ITD

Ongoing

Commodity-based measures for trade

  • 1. 
    Examine scientific evidence that beef (deboned matured pH tested) may safely traded regardless of disease status of exporting country/zone
  • 2. 
    OIE/DEFRA project

TAHSC, SCAD, AHG, ITD / S&T Dept

1.Disease specific items ongoing 2.AHG review in Oct09

Definition of wildlife

Role of wildlife as disease reservoirs TAHSC with WG on Wildlife & SCAD Compartmentalisation

On going

FMD

Aujeszky’s disease

TAHSC

TAHSC

Draft CH proposed for MC

On hold

Communication

Develop new CH

TAHSC & AHG

Ongoing

Note: MC; Member comments, CH: chapter, SURV: surveillance, Scientific & Technical Department, IC: International Committee

ITC: International Trade Department, S&T Dept:

EU comments

The EU acknowledges the huge work of the OIE Code Commission.

However, in the future and for a better study of all submitted documents, it would be appreciated if a summary table of the documents was proposed, with a coherent numbering between chapters, items and annexes.

Moreover, the EU reiterates its proposal for expertise, especially in the ad hoc groups.

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ANNEX 3

Original: English September/October 2009

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE AQUATIC ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 28 September–2 October 2009

The OIE Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission (the A quatic A nimals Commission ) met at the OIE Headquarters from 28 September to 2 October 2009.

Details of participants and the adopted agenda are given at Annexes I and II.

The Aquatic Animals Commission recognised the contribution of the following Members in providing comments: Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, European Union (EU), Switzerland, Thailand and the United States of America (USA).

The Aquatic Animals Commission reviewed various OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code (the Aquatic Code) draft texts from its March 2009 report in the light of Member comments. The outcome of the Commission’s work is presented at Annexes III to XXVII in this report. Amendments made during the March 2009 meeting are shown as double underlined text, with deleted text in strikeout, while those made at this meeting (September 2009) are shown in a similar fashion but with a coloured background to distinguish the two groups of proposals.

The table below summarises the texts presented in the Annexes. Part I: Annexes III to XXIII will be proposed for adoption at the 78th OIE General Session in May 2010; Part II: Annexes XXIV to XXVII are presented for Members’ information.

The Aquatic Animals Commission strongly encourages Members to participate in the development of the OIE’s international standards by submitting comments on this report. It would be very helpful if comments were submitted as specific proposed text changes, supported by a scientific rationale. Proposed deletions should be indicated in ‘strikeout’ and proposed additions with ‘double underline’. Members should not use the automatic ‘track-change’ function provided by word processing software as such changes are lost in the process of collating Members’ submissions into the Commission’s working documents.

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Comments on this report must reach OIE Headquarters by 22 January 2010 to be considered at the 22–26 February 2010 meeting of the Aquatic Animals Commission. Comments should be sent to the International Trade Department at: trade.dept@oie.int.

Part I: Texts proposed for adoption

Glossary

Diseases listed by the OIE (Ch. 1.3.)

Annex number

Annex III

Annex IV

Example Article X.X.3.; X.X.9.; X.X.12.

Annex V

Amended text for epizootic haematopoietic necrosis (Articles 10.1.3., 10.1.9., 10.1.12.), Taura syndrome (Articles 9.4.3., 9.4.9., 9.4.11.) and for infection with Bonamia ostreae (Articles 11.2.3., 11.2.9., 11.2.11.)

Criteria to assess the safety of aquatic animal commodities (Ch 5.3.)

Annex VI

Annex VII

Measures concerning international transport of aquatic animal disease agents and pathological material (Ch 5.9.)

Annex VIII

Control of aquatic animal health hazards in aquatic animal feed (Ch 4.5.) General obligations related to certification (Ch. 5.1.)

Annex XIII

Annex XIV

Certification procedures (Ch. 5.2.)

Annex XV

Model international aquatic animal health certificates (Ch 5.10.)

Annex XVI

Slaughter of farmed fish for human consumption (Ch 7.3.)

Annex XXII

Introduction to the recommendations for controlling antimicrobial resistance (Ch 6.1.)

Annex XXIII

 

Import Risk Analysis (Ch 2.2.)

Annex IX

Quality and Evaluation of Competent Authorities (Ch 3.1.)

Annex X

Application of compartmentalisation (Ch 4.X.)

Annex XI

Zoning and compartmentalisation (Ch 4.1.)

Annex XII

Welfare of farmed fish during transport (Ch 7.2.)

Annex XVII

Article X.X.8 for all disease specific chapters

Annex XVIII

Infection with abalone herpes-like virus (Ch 11.X.)

Annex XIX

Necrotising hep atop ancreatitis (Ch 9.X.)

Annex XX

Disinfection of salmonid eggs – (Article 10.4.X., Article 10.5.X., Article 10.9.X.)

Annex XXI

Part II: Annexes for Members’ information

Annex number

Guidance on considering species as susceptible to a disease

Annex XXIV

Report of the ad hoc Group on the Safety of Commodities derived from Aquatic Animals (August 2009)

Annex XXV

Report of the ad hoc Group on Crustacean Diseases – electronic meeting (July – Sept 2009)

Annex XXVI

Aquatic Animals Commission Work Plan 2009/1010

Annex XXVII

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Meeting with Dr Vallat

Dr Bernard Vallat, Director General of the OIE, joined the Commission for a short discussion and warmly welcomed both the returning and new members of the Commission. Dr Vallat indicated that the management and reporting of diseases, particularly in regard to emerging diseases and diseases at the interface between animal and human ecosystems, are priority areas for international organisations and OIE Members, and that this would be reflected in the OIE fifth Strategic Plan (2011–2016). As aquaculture makes an important contribution to the global struggle against hunger, it would be important for the Commission to further strengthen its standard setting activities and for members of the Commission to participate with the OIE Regional Commissions and Regional Representations to ensure that OIE Members are aware of and apply the provisions of the Aquatic Code.

Turning specifically to the draft OIE fifth Strategic Plan (2011–2016), Dr Vallat mentioned the proposal to establish a new Scientific Commission for Aquatic Animal Diseases. In subsequent discussion, the President, Dr Barry Hill, and Dr Vallat agreed that there did not seem to be a strong rationale to support this proposal at the present time, as the scientific work of the Aquatic Animals Commission was proceeding well and the membership had been augmented with a sixth person by decision of OIE Delegates in May 2009. In view of the significant resource implications of creating a new Commission, there was general agreement from the Aquatic Animals Commission that this development was not warranted, the final decision being taken by the Assembly of Delegates.

Dr Vallat reminded the Commission that the expansion of its mandate to cover animal production food safety and animal welfare were important decisions of Delegates at the May 2009 General Assembly and encouraged the Commission to pursue this work actively. Dr Vallat considered that the development of recommendations on the management of resistance to antibacterial products in aquatic animals and the finalisation of the Aquatic Code text on Feed for Aquatic Animals were particular priorities. He also encouraged the Commission to liaise with the OIE Animal Production Food Safety Working Group (APFSWG), which will hold its next meeting on 3–5 November 2009, and provide input to the APFSWG’s discussion paper on future standard setting priorities in animal production food safety. In light of the great importance of aquaculture and aquatic animal health to food production, foodborne illness associated with aquatic animals during production should be addressed by the OIE.

Dr Vallat noted that the Commission is continuing to develop text for the Aquatic Code on the welfare of farmed fish and encouraged the Commission to propose text that is reasonably generic and flexible, so that all OIE Members could apply the provisions in practice.

Finally, Dr Vallat identified some important developments within the OIE disease surveillance and reporting provisions as these apply to wildlife and noted that this was entirely consistent with the longstanding approach of the Aquatic Animals Commission.

  • 1. 
    Activities and progress of ad hoc Groups

1.1. Report of the ad hoc Group on Safety of Commodities Derived from Aquatic Animals – August 2009

Dr Franck Berthe, Chair of the ad hoc Group, gave a summary of progress made at the meeting held from 24 to 26 August 2009 at the OIE Headquarters (Paris). Dr Berthe reported that the ad hoc Group considered Member comments on the ‘example articles’ to be included in all disease specific chapters, and to Article 5.9.1. entitled “Measures concerning the international transport of aquatic animal disease agents and pathological material” and made relevant amendments. Details are provided under Agenda Item 2.4. and 2.7., respectively.

The ad hoc Group undertook an assessment of commodities listed for a fish disease (epizootic haematopoietic necrosis), a crustacean disease (Taura syndrome) and a mollusc disease (infection with Bonamia ostreae). Commodities currently listed in Article X.X.3. point 1a) were assessed using criteria in Article 5.3.1., and commodities currently listed in Article X.X.3. point 1b) were assessed using criteria in Article 5.3.2. for these three diseases. Detail is provided under Agenda Item 2.6.

The ad hoc Group also developed a draft new article on trade measures for disinfected salmonid eggs for three disease chapters: viral haemorrhagic septicaemia, infectious salmon anaemia and infectious haematopoietic necrosis. Detail is provided under Agenda Item 3.3.

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Dr Hill thanked Dr Berthe and the ad hoc Group for their very comprehensive work on this complex subject. The Aquatic Animals Commission recommended that the ad hoc Group be reconvened at a suitable time to continue their work and complete a report prior to the next Commission meeting in February 2010.

The ad hoc Group report is provided for information at Annex XXV.

1.2. Report of the ad hoc Group on Crustacean Diseases – electronic meeting (July – Sept 2009)

Dr Don Lightner, Chair of the ad hoc Group, gave a summary of progress made from the electronic meeting held from July to September 2009. Dr Lightner reported that the ad hoc Group re-assessed necrotising hepatopancreatitis disease against the criteria for listing aquatic animal diseases in the Aquatic Code (Article 1.2.1.), taking into account a Member’s comment. Detail is provided under Agenda Item 2.3.

Dr Hill thanked Dr Lightner and the ad hoc Group for their work undertaken promptly in response to the request from the Aquatic Animals Commission.

The ad hoc Group report is provided for information at Annex XXVI.

  • 2. 
    OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code: amendments to existing chapters

2.1.  General comments

The Aquatic Animals Commission agreed that it is important to continue to harmonize the Aquatic and Terrestrial Codes but recognized there are inherent differences in some areas where harmonization is not feasible. To facilitate the process of review and harmonization, the Commission encouraged Members to ensure that their comments on relevant horizontal text are submitted to both the Code and Aquatic Animals Commissions.

2.2.  Glossary

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed new definitions.

Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity we would like to have our comments to the proposed definitions of feed additives, emerging disease and susceptible species taken into account by the AAC.

The Aquatic Animals Commission reviewed the Aquatic Code Glossary and made a number of amendments.

The following definitions were amongst those amended, to be consistent with the equivalent definitions in the Terrestrial Code, as part of the ongoing harmonisation of the two Codes:

Protection zone, Competent Authority, Emerging disease, Feed additives, Hazard, International aquatic animal health certificate, Pathological material and Veterinary Services.

Personnel of the Competent Authority was deleted as it is not used in the Aquatic Code and slaughtering was deleted as it is only used once in the Aquatic Code.

The revised chapter is provided at Annex III for Member comments.

2.3. Diseases listed by the OIE (Chapter 1.3.)

EU comment

The EU would agree with the definitive listing of necrotising hepatopancreatitis as an OIE disease.

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The ad hoc Group on the OIE List of Aquatic Animal Diseases (Crustacean Team) considered a Member’s proposal that necrotising hepatopancreatitis (NHP) be de-listed. The ad hoc Group disagreed with the proposal and recommended that NHP, currently listed under study, be listed as an OIE disease. Full justification is provided in the Crustacean ad hoc Group Report (Annex XXVI).

The Aquatic Animals Commission endorsed the Crustacean ad hoc Group recommendation to list necrotising hepatopancreatitis.

The revised chapter is provided at Annex IV for Member comments.

2.4. Example Article X.X.3; X.X.9; X.X.12.

EU comment

The EU would agree with these examples.

Comments for the AAC consideration have been included in Annex V of the report.

The Aquatic Animals Commission considered the recommendations of the ad hoc Group on Safety of Commodities Derived from Aquatic Animals in response to Member comments on the ‘example articles’ to be included in all disease specific chapters and made some minor amendments. This draft text is presented as clean text for ease of readability. The tracked version is available in the ad hoc Group report in Annex XXV.

The amended Articles are provided at Annex V for Member comments.

2.5. Amended text for epizootic haematopoietic necrosis (Articles 10.1.3., 10.1.9. and 10.1.12.), Taura syndrome (Articles 9.4.3., 9.4.9. and 9.4.11.) and for infection with Bonamia ostreae (Articles 11.2.3., 11.2.9. and 11.2.11.)

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed texts.

The Aquatic Animals Commission reviewed the text proposed by the ad hoc Group on Safety of Commodities Derived from Aquatic Animals for amendments of epizootic haematopoietic necrosis (Articles 10.1.3., 10.1.9. and 10.1.12.), Taura syndrome (Articles 9.4.3., 9.4.9. and 9.4.11.) and for infection with Bonamia ostreae (Articles 11.2.3., 11.2.9. and 11.2.11.). These amendments are based on proposed draft ‘Disease X’ Articles X.X.3.; X.X.9.; X.X.12. and specific assessments of commodities currently listed in Article X.X.3.

In these Articles, reference to the assessments undertaken by the ad hoc Group is provided as a footnote indicating where to find these assessments in the ad hoc Group report. The Aquatic Animals Commission welcomes Member comments on these assessments.

The revised articles are provided at Annex VI for Member comments.

2.6. Criteria to assess the safety of aquatic animal commodities (Chapter 5.3.)

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed articles.

The Aquatic Animals Commission noted that in the process of conducting the commodity assessments (see Item 2.1.2.) the ad hoc Group on Safety of Commodities Derived from Aquatic Animals made amendments to the text of Article 5.3.1. and Article 5.3.2. The Aquatic Animals Commission agreed with the proposed amendments.

The revised chapters are provided at Annex VII for Member comments.

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2.7. Measures concerning international transport of aquatic animal disease agents and pathological material (Chapter 5.9.)

In their report to the Aquatic Animals Commission (Annex XXV), the ad hoc Group on the Safety of Commodities Derived from Aquatic Animals considered Member comments on the proposed text for Article 5.9.1. in the Aquatic Code to address the issue of biological samples preserved for diagnostic applications.

The revised article is provided at Annex VIII for Member comments. 2.8. Import risk analysis (Chapter 2.2.)

The Aquatic Animals Commission considered the proposed amendments to the corresponding chapter in the Terrestrial Code and amended the text as appropriate for the chapter on import risk analysis (Chapter 2.2.), as part of the ongoing harmonisation of the two Codes.

The revised chapter is provided at Annex IX for Member comments. 2.9. Quality and evaluation of Competent Authorities (Chapter 3.1.)

The Aquatic Animals Commission considered the proposed amendments to the corresponding chapter in the Terrestrial Code and amended the text as appropriate for the Chapter on Quality and Evaluation of Competent Authorities (Chapter 3.1.), as part of the ongoing harmonisation of the two Codes.

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The revised chapter is provided at Annex X for Member comments 2.10. Zoning and compartmentalisation (Chapter 4.1.)

EU comment

With regard to which diseases should be prioritised to develop a text addressing how to restore disease- free status for a compartment, the EU would suggest:

fish diseases: VHS, IHN, ISA and KHV

-mollusc diseases: Infection with Bonamia ostreae and Infection with Martelia refringens

crustacean disease: WSD

With regard to the inclusion of a new chapter on "application of compartmentalisation", it is possible that the Terrestrial code merges in a future this chapter with the one on "zoning and compartmentalisation". If this is the case, a consistent approach would be needed.

In addition several comments have been included in Annex XI and XII.

The EU and Norway had previously commented on the absence of options for regaining freedom for previously-free compartments after the detection of the disease in all disease specific chapters.

The Aquatic Animals Commission considered preparing general text for all disease chapters but concluded that the conditions for restoring disease free status for a compartment needed to be disease specific and take into account the different characteristics/factors for the different diseases. This task will require a significant amount of time and effort and it was not possible for the Aquatic Animals Commission to undertake this work during this meeting. Given the size of the task, the Aquatic Animals Commission considered this work would need to be prioritised in order to determine which specific disease to address first.

The Aquatic Animals Commission reviewed the texts on compartmentalisation in the Aquatic and Terrestrial Codes and noted that the Terrestrial Code included a specific chapter on the application of compartmentalisation (Chapter 4.4.). The Aquatic Animals Commission agreed that similar text should be included in the Aquatic Code.

The Aquatic Animals Commission drafted a chapter on application of compartmentalisation (Chapter 4.X.).

The new draft chapter is provided in Annex XI for Member comments.

The Aquatic Animals Commission also amended Chapter 4.1. by removing provisions specific to compartmentalisation as these are now included in the draft chapter 4.X.

The revised chapter is provided in Annex XII for Member comments.

2.11. Control of aquatic animal health hazards in aquatic animal feed (Chapter 4.5.)

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed amendments.

Comments for the AAC consideration have been included in Annex XIII of the report.

The Commission noted the advice of the OIE International Trade Department that relatively few modifications were needed to Chapter 4.5., which had been adopted at the 77th General Session in May 2009, to address the expanded mandate of the Commission to include food safety. The chapter had originally been

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drafted along appropriate lines and needed only minor modification to explicitly address animal production food safety. The Commission made some small modifications to the text.

The revised chapter is provided in Annex XIII for Member comments.

2.12. General obligations related to certification (Chapter 5.1.)

EU comment

The EUwould agree with the proposed amendments.

A comment for the AAC consideration have been included in Annex XIV of the report

The Aquatic Animals Commission considered a Member comment and the proposed amendments to the corresponding chapter in the Terrestrial Code and amended the text as appropriate for the chapter on general obligations related to certification (Chapter 5.1.), as part of the ongoing harmonisation of the two Codes.

The revised chapter is provided at Annex XIV for Member comments.

2.13. Certification procedures (Chapter 5.2.)

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

A comment for the AAC consideration has been included in Annex XV of the report.

The Aquatic Animals Commission considered the proposed amendments to the corresponding chapter in the Terrestrial Code and amended the text as appropriate for the chapter on certification procedures (Chapter 5.2.), as part of the ongoing harmonisation of the two Codes.

The revised chapter is provided at Annex XV for Member comments.

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2.14. Model international aquatic animal health certificates (Chapter 5.10.)

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

The Aquatic Animals Commission considered a Member’s comment on the chapter on model international aquatic animal health certificates (Chapter 5.10.) and amended the text accordingly.

The revised chapter is provided at Annex XVI for Member comments.

2.15. Welfare of farmed fish during transport (Chapter 7.2.)

EU comments

The EU can support the proposed changes in the Chapter on Transport of Fish.

A specific EU comment is presented within the text.

The Aquatic Animals Commission reviewed the text under study in Article 7.2.3. ‘[Except for disease control purposes]’ and amended the text as follows:

The ability of the fish to cope with the stress of transport should be assessed based on health status, previous handling and recent transport history of the fish. Generally, only fish that are fit for transport should be loaded. [Except for Transport for disease control purposes. should be in accordance with Chapter X.X. on the humane killing of fish for disease control purposes (in preparation); (under study)] Only fish that are fit for transport should be loaded.

The Aquatic Animals Commission amended the title of this chapter to be consistent with the corresponding chapter in the Terrestrial Code.

The revised chapter is provided at Annex XVII for Member comments.

2.16. References to non-susceptible species in mollusc chapters

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed change.

The Aquatic Animals Commission agreed with the recommendation of the ad hoc Group on Safety of Commodities Derived from Aquatic Animals that the reference to non-susceptible species in Article X.X.3. point 1c) of the Aquatic Code chapters on Infection with Bonamia ostreae, Martellia refringens and B. exitiosa be moved to the relevant OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals chapters and requested that the OIE Scientific and Technical Department undertake this task.

2.17. Invasive alien species

EU comment

The EU would agree to limit the scope of the OIE Aquatic Code to issues under the OIE mandate. Nevertheless, it is not clear in the proposed text this limitation.

The EU would suggest an altenative wording in Annex XVIII

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Dr Sarah Kahn briefed the Commission on the preparation of a special edition of the OIE Scientific and Technical Review on Invasive Alien Species. The Commission recalled that in 2007 the OIE had adopted references to the Code of Practice on the Introduction and Transfers of Marine Organisms of the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) and that these appear in all disease specific chapters in Article X.X.8.

The ICES Code of Practice sets forth recommended procedures and practices to diminish the risks of detrimental effects from the intentional introduction and transfer of marine (including brackish water) organisms.

The Commission reviewed Article X.X.8., for all disease specific chapters, and made some modifications to clarify that the recommendation in the Aquatic Code for OIE Members to apply the provisions of the ICES Code are limited to issues under the OIE mandate and do not extend to the specific ICES provisions for the assessment of invasiveness when establishing measures for the translocation of aquatic animals.

The revised Article X.X.8. for inclusion in all disease specific chapters is provided in Annex XVIII for Member comments.

  • 3. 
    OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code: proposed new articles and chapters

3.1. Infection with abalone herpes-like virus (Chapter 11.X.)

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

The Aquatic Animals Commission considered Member comments on the draft chapter on abalone herpes-like virus and amended the text accordingly.

Several Members commented on Article X.X.1. regarding the inclusion of ‘associated manifestations’ in the definition of infection with abalone herpes-like virus. The Aquatic Animals Commission agreed that this definition reflected previous case definitions for abalone viral mortality complex (AVM) and amended the text as shown below:

‘For the purposes of the Aquatic Code, infection with abalone herpes-like virus means herpes-like virus associated manifestation in abalone. any form of the abalone viral mortality complex (AVM) caused by abalone herpes-like virus.’

The revised chapter is provided in Annex XIX for Member comments.

3.2. Necrotising hepatopancreatitis (Chapter 9.X.)

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

The Crustacean ad hoc Group had previously prepared a draft disease chapter for necrotising hepatopancreatitis (NHP) which the Aquatic Animals Commission circulated to Members for comment as part of their October 2008 Report. The Crustacean ad hoc Group considered Member comments on that draft chapter and amended the text accordingly during the meeting of the ad hoc Group held in June 2008 (see June 2008 Crustacean ad hoc Group report for details).

The Aquatic Animals Commission endorsed the draft chapter that will be proposed for adoption at the 78th General Session in May 2010 provided the World Assembly of Delegates adopts the listing of this disease.

The new draft chapter is provided at Annex XX for Member comments.

3.3. Disinfection of salmonid eggs – (new Articles: Article 10.4.X., Article 10.5.X., Article 10.9.X.)

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EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

However, several comments for consideration can be found in Annex XXI

In their report to the Aquatic Animals Commission, the ad hoc Group on the Safety of Commodities Derived from Aquatic Animals developed a draft new article on trade measures for disinfected salmonid eggs for three disease chapters: viral haemorrhagic septicaemia, infectious salmon anaemia and infectious haematopoietic necrosis (see Item 1.1.). In the case of EHNV there is lack of published information regarding vertical transmission and the ad hoc Group recommended that a formal request for further information be addressed to the OIE Reference Laboratories for EHNV. The Aquatic Animals Commission requested that OIE Headquarters seek this information from the Reference Laboratories.

The Aquatic Animals Commission reviewed the ad hoc Group’s draft text and made some minor amendments.

The new draft Articles are provided at Annex XXI for Member comments.

3.4. New chapter – slaughter of farmed fish for human consumption (Chapter 7.3.)

EU comments

The EU welcomes the work of the OIE for the development of a new chapter on Slaughter of farmed fish for human consumption and encourages the OIE to develop as soon as possible also the Draft Chapter on Humane Killing of Fish for Disease Control Purposes in consistency with the Terrestrial Code. Specific EU comments are presented within the text.

The Aquatic Animals Commission developed a draft chapter on the slaughter of farmed fish for human consumption. These recommendations apply to the slaughter of farmed fish species for human consumption and address the need to ensure the welfare of farmed fish intended for human consumption, during pre-slaughter and slaughter processes, until they are dead. The draft chapter describes general principles that should be applied to ensure the welfare of fish for slaughter and also applies to fish killed for disease control purposes and intended for human consumption. Specific measures applicable to emergency killing for disease control purposes not intended for human consumption will be addressed in Chapter 7.4. entitled “Humane killing of fish for disease control purposes (under development)”.

The Commission discussed the use of anaesthetics to sedate fish prior to killing. In Australia, New Zealand and Chile, isoeugenol (e.g. active ingredient in AQUI-S™) is authorised for stunning in combination with exsanguination for slaughter of fish. The welfare aspects of pharmaceutical methods have been recently assessed (EFSA, 2009) and stress mechanisms in relation to isoeugenol are described in Zahl et al. (2009). The Commission also considered the recent classification of isoeugenol by the U.S. National Toxicology Program as a carcinogen in male mice (Meinertz and Schreier, 2009), and uncertainty regarding the possible use of this product as an immediate-release sedative. The Commission agreed that more information on the food safety aspects of the isoeugenol method is needed before it can be included in the chapter on slaughter of farmed fish for human consumption.

The Commission also agreed that pharmaceutical methods used for humane killing of fish that are not intended for human consumption would be considered for inclusion in Chapter 7.4. entitled “Humane killing of fish for disease control purposes (under development)”.

References:

EFSA (2009). Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare on a request from the European Commission on welfare aspect of the main systems of stunning and killing of farmed Atlantic salmon. The EFSA Journal (2009) 1012, 1–77.

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Meinertz J.R. and Schreier T.M. (2009). Depletion of isoeugenol residues from the fillet tissue of AQUI-S™ exposed rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss). Aquaculture, 296:200–206.

Zahl I.H., Kiessling A.K., Samuelsen O.B. and Olsen R.E. (2009). Anaesthesia induces stress in Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and Atlantic halibut (Hippoglossus hippoglossus). Fish Physiology and Biochemistry. On line: http://www.springerlink.com/content/22785776gkk51778/

The new draft chapter is provided in Annex XXII for Member comments.

  • 4. 
    OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code: other items

4.1.  Guidance on considering species as susceptible to a disease

At its March 2009 meeting, the Aquatic Animals Commission had discussed Member requests for clarification about the basis for deciding whether single or multiple species or entire families should be considered as susceptible to diseases. The Commission further discussed this issue and agreed that a conservative approach should be taken to this question. Where there was evidence supporting the susceptibility of multiple species, and little/no evidence suggesting that species in the same genus, family or order were resistant to infection, the Commission would assume that all species in the genus, family or order were susceptible, pending scientific findings to the contrary.

Related to this matter, the Commission agreed on the need to develop guidance for experts to decide which species should be listed as susceptible in Article X.X.2. for all disease specific chapters in the Aquatic Code as well as the disease specific chapters in the Aquatic Manual.

The Commission developed a short paper for guidance of experts. The Commission noted that application of this guidance could result in some changes to the species currently identified as susceptible in the disease specific chapters in the Aquatic Code and Aquatic Manual. Therefore, the Commission invited OIE Members to provide comments on the guidance paper, even though the text is not intended for inclusion in the Aquatic Code.

This guidance document is provided at Annex XXIV for Member information.

4.2.  Resistance to antimicrobials

 

EU comment

   

The EUwould

agree with the proposed text.

 

A comment for the AAC consideration has been included in Annex XXIII of the

report.

Dr Kahn briefed the Commission on the work underway to address the issue of antimicrobial resistance as this relates to aquatic animals, including arrangements to convene an ad hoc group to review relevant information, including the current Terrestrial Code chapters, with the objective of developing text for inclusion in the Aquatic Code. The Commission reviewed the introductory text (Chapter 6.7. of the Terrestrial Code) and discussed the need for the ad hoc Group to also consider the issue of antibiotic treatment of wild caught ornamental fish that are transported from developing countries (mostly) to developed countries for sale. The current Terrestrial Code text refers to ‘animal husbandry’ and would exclude consideration of this practice. Nonetheless, the Commission felt that the introductory text was generally relevant to aquatic animals.

Accordingly, the Commission made some modifications to the Terrestrial Code text (including removing the word ‘husbandry’) for consistency with other chapters in the Aquatic Code.

The new draft chapter giving an introduction to the recommendations for controlling antimicrobial resistance (Chapter 6.1.) is provided in Annex XXIII for Member comments.

4.3. OIE Evaluation of Performance of Veterinary Services and other Competent Authorities

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Dr Kahn updated the Aquatic Animals Commission on developments with PVS, including the organisation of a workshop on experience in the use of the OIE PVS Tool (9–10 December 2009), to be followed by a meeting of the ad hoc Group on the Evaluation of Veterinary Services (11 December 2009), at which necessary revisions to the PVS Tool, including any modifications needed to make it more relevant to Aquatic Animal Health Services, would be discussed. The Commission was pleased to note that a pilot evaluation of Aquatic Animal Health Services of an OIE Member was planned to take place in November 2009. The findings from this mission will be considered by the ad hoc Group in preparing the 2009 edition of the OIE PVS Tool. The Commission will continue to monitor developments on this issue.

  • 5. 
    Joint meeting with the President of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission

The Aquatic Animals Commission was joined by Dr Alejandro Thiermann, President of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (the Code Commission), for a brief meeting. Dr Thiermann updated the Aquatic Animals Commission on the Code Commission’s work on communication. He noted that in response to Member comments the Code Commission had agreed to associate the proposed definitions related to communication with the outline of the draft chapter on communication developed by the ad hoc Group. The Code Commission had circulated the outline and proposed definitions to Members and invited Members to provide comments, which would be forwarded to the ad hoc Group to be taken into account in the further development of the chapter. The Aquatic Animals Commission appreciated the development of recommendations on communication and agreed to adopt a parallel approach in the Aquatic Code.

Dr Thiermann provided an update on the Code Commission’s work on compartmentalisation and the recently adopted definition for protection zone in the Terrestrial Code which incorporates the concepts that were previously included in the buffer zone and surveillance zone. The idea is to broaden the application of measures to protect susceptible sub-populations beyond a strict reference to physical separation and to incorporate other protection measures. The Aquatic Animals Commission agreed to propose adoption of the definition for protection zone in the Aquatic Code.

The Aquatic Animals Commission and Dr Thiermann agreed to continue to work together to ensure ongoing harmonisation of the two Codes.

  • 6. 
    Upcoming OIE Conferences and Meetings

– 10th Conference of the OIE Regional Commission for the Middle East (25–29 October 2009, Doha, Qatar). Dr Karim Ben Jebara to attend.

– 26th Conference of the OIE Regional Commission for Asia, the Far East and Oceania (16–21 November 2009, Shanghai, People's Republic of China. Dr Huang Jie to attend.

– Second International Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centres (21–23 June 2010, Paris, France).

The Aquatic Animals Commission noted the upcoming conference and referred to the position paper on ‘Pathogen strain differentiation’ it had presented at the first international conference held in Florianopolis (Brazil, 2006). The Aquatic Animals Commission agreed that this subject should be a matter for further discussion and suggest it be a specific theme at the second conference and agreed to provide suggestions for other topics and possible speakers to the conference organizers’.

– FAO/OIE Aquatic Biosecurity Framework for Southern Africa: A Scoping Meeting of Regional Fisheries and Veterinary Authorities (13–14 October 2009, Namibia). Dr Mara Gonzalez to attend.

– FAO's global programme for fisheries and aquaculture focusing on country-level assistance (27–30 October 2009, Rome, Italy). Dr Gillian Mylrea to attend.

– OIE regional aquatic animal focal points training workshops.

Dr Kahn updated the Aquatic Animals Commission on the OIE programme to provide OIE training workshops for aquatic animal focal points in all OIE regions over the next 12 to 18 months. The members of the Commission indicated they were happy to participate in these important workshops.

  • 7. 
    OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals – Seventh edition 2012

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Ms Sara Linnane, Scientific Editor, from the Scientific and Technical Department, joined the meeting for agenda items 7 and 8.

7.1.  Review of the sixth edition and discussion on improvements

The sixth edition of the Aquatic Manual had been published in August and distributed to the Delegates and the OIE experts. The Commission noted that the disease chapter template was quite complex and that some of the information requested was not necessary to the scope and purpose of the Aquatic Manual. It was agreed that the ad hoc Group on Aquatic Animal Health Surveillance would be asked to review and simplify the template when it next meets in February 2010.

7.2.  Commission chapters for new listed diseases

7.2.1.  Diseases of amphibians

In May 2008, the World Assembly of Delegates adopted two diseases of amphibians for inclusion in Chapter 1.3. of the Aquatic Code: Infection with Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis and Infection with ranavirus. Two applications for OIE Reference Laboratories for these two diseases had also been adopted by the World Assembly of Delegates of the OIE in May 2009. The experts will be asked to draft Aquatic Manual chapters on the two diseases and an introductory chapter on diseases of amphibians, which could be proposed for adoption in May 2010 and, if adopted, included in the web version of the Aquatic Manual.

7.2.2.  Infection with abalone herpes-like virus

In May 2009, the World Assembly of Delegates adopted Infection with abalone herpes-like virus in Chapter 1.3. of the Aquatic Code. It was agreed that Dr Berthe would collaborate with experts on this disease to urgently update the disease card (by the end of November 2009) and then draft an Aquatic Manual chapter, which could be reviewed by the Commission at its meeting in February 2010 before being circulated to Members and presented for adoption in May 2010 and, if adopted, included in the web version of the Aquatic Manual.

  • 8. 
    OIE Reference Laboratories

8.1.  New applications for Reference Laboratory and Collaborating Centre status

An application had been received from the Atlantic Veterinary College (AVC), Centre for Aquatic Health Science, University of Prince Edward Island, Canada for a Collaborating Centre for Aquatic Epidemiology and Evidence-Based Health Management, and a second application had been received from the National Veterinary Institute, Department for Epidemiology, Sentrum, Norway for a Collaborating Centre for Risk Assessment, Spatial Modelling and Control of Diseases in Farmed Fish.

The Commission advised that the following aspects of these two applications should be clarified: details of the exact services that each Centre would provide to OIE Members, evidence of the benefits of such services to OIE Members, and a description of how these benefits will be provided. Although it is the intention that the two Centres to cooperate and complement each other as their field of specialisation does not completely overlap, a joint designation may be more appropriate. The Commission will formulate its final opinion at its next meeting taking into account additional information submitted.

The Commission noted that Dr Stephen Feist would replace Dr Hill as he is the new contact point for the OIE Collaborating Centre for Information on Aquatic Animal Diseases at the Centre for Environment, Fisheries & Aquaculture Science (Cefas) Weymouth in United Kingdom.

8.2.  Infection with abalone herpes-like virus

Following the listing of Infection with abalone herpes-like virus in May 2009, there is now a need for an OIE Reference Laboratory for this disease. The Aquatic Animals Commission encouraged interested Members with expertise to submit applications for OIE Reference Laboratory status through their OIE Delegate.

8.3.  Twinning proposal between laboratories in Canada and Chile

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The Commission reviewed an application for a twinning project between laboratories for infectious salmon anaemia in Canada and Chile. The Commission supported the application in principle but considered that the scope of the proposed project went beyond that of a twinning project and requested the application be amended to focus more on the normal twinning aspects as provided in the ‘Guide to OIE certified Laboratory Twinning Projects’.

  • 9. 
    Any other business

9.1. Second Global Conference on Aquatic Animal Health: ‘Contribution of Aquatic Animal Health to Global Food Security’, provisionally July 2011 in the Asian region

All members of the Aquatic Animals Commission indicated that they would be happy to participate in the scientific committee and look forward to receive further information on this conference.

9.2. Review of the Aquatic Animals Commission’s work plan for 2009/10

The Aquatic Animals Commission reviewed and updated their work plan, which is provided at Annex XXVII for Members’ information.

  • 10. 
    Date of the next meeting

22–26 February 2010.

.../Annexes

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Annex I

MEETING OF THE OIE

AQUATIC ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 28 September–2 October 2009

Adopted agenda

Welcome from the Director General

  • 1. 
    Activities and progress of ad hoc Groups

1.1.    Report of the ad hoc Group on Safety of Commodities Derived from Aquatic Animals – August 2009

1.2.    Report of the ad hoc Group on Crustacean Diseases – electronic meeting – 2009

  • 2. 
    OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code – amendments to existing chapters

2.1.    General comments

2.2.    Glossary

2.3.    Diseases listed by the OIE (Chapter 1.3.)

2.4.    Example Articles X.X.3., X.X.9. and X.X.12.

2.5.    Criteria to assess the safety of aquatic animal commodities (Chapter 5.3.)

2.6.    Amended text for epizootic haematopoietic necrosis (Articles 10.1.3., 10.1.9. and 10.1.12.), Taura syndrome (Articles 9.4.3., 9.4.9. and 9.4.11.) and infection with B. ostreae (Articles 11.2.3., 11.2.9. and 11.2.11.)

2.7.    Measures concerning international transport of aquatic animal disease agents and pathological material (Chapter 5.9.)

2.8.    Import risk analysis (Chapter 2.2.).

2.9.    Quality and evaluation of Competent Authorities (Chapter 3.1.)

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Annex I (contd)

2.10.    Zoning and compartmentalisation

2.11.    Control of aquatic animal health hazards in aquatic animal feed (Chapter 4.5.)

2.12.    General obligations related to certification (Chapter 5.1.)

2.13.    Certification procedures (Chapter 5.2.)

2.14.    Model international aquatic animal health certificates (Chapter 5.10.)

2.15.    Welfare of farmed fish during transport (Chapter 7.2.)

2.16.    References to non-susceptible species in mollusc chapters 2.1.7.   Invasive alien species

  • 3. 
    OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code – proposed new articles and chapters

3.1.      Infection with abalone herpes-like virus (Chapter 11.X.)

3.2.      Necrotising hepatopancreatitis

3.3.      Disinfection of salmonid eggs – (Article 10.4.X., Article 10.5.X. and Article 10.9.X.)

3.4.      New welfare chapters

  • 4. 
    OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code – other items

4.1.      Guidance on considering species as susceptible to diseases

4.2.      Resistance to antimicrobials

4.3.      OIE Evaluation of Performance of Veterinary Services and other Competent Authorities

  • 5. 
    Joint meeting with the President of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission
  • 6. 
    OIE Conferences and Meetings

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Annex I (contd)

  • 7. 
    OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals – Seventh edition 2011

7.1.    Review of the sixth edition and discussion on improvements

7.2.    Commission chapters for new listed diseases

7.2.1.   Diseases of amphibians

7.2.2.   Infection with abalone herpes-like virus

  • 8. 
    OIE Reference Laboratories

8.1.    New applications for Reference Laboratory and Collaborating Centre status

8.2.    Infection with abalone herpes-like virus

8.3.    Twinning proposal between laboratories in Canada and Chile

  • 9. 
    Any other business

9.1.    Second Global Conference on Aquatic Animal Health: ‘Contribution of Aquatic Animal Health to Global Food Security’

9.2. Review of the Aquatic Animals Commission’s work plan for 2009/10 12. Date of the next meeting

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Annex II

MEETING OF THE OIE

AQUATIC ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Paris, 28 September–2 October 2009

List of participants

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

Dr Barry Hill

President

CEFAS Weymouth Laboratory

Barrack Road, The Nothe

Weymouth, Dorset DT4 8UB

UNITED KINGDOM

Tel.: (44-1305) 20.66.25

Fax: (44-1305) 20.66.01

E-mail: b.j.hill@cefas.co.uk

Dr Ricardo Enriquez

Vicepresident

Patología Animal / Lab. Biotecnología

  • Patología Acuatica

Universidad Austral de Chile

Casilla 567 - Valdivia

CHILE

Tel.: (56-63) 22.11.20

Fax: (56-63) 21.89.18

E-mail: renrique@uach.cl

Dr Franck Berthe

Secretary General

Senior Scientific Officer

European Food Safety Authority

  • EFSA

Animal Health and Animal

Welfare unit

Largo N. Palli 5/A, 43100 Parma

ITALY

Tel.: + 39 0521 036 870

Fax: + 39 0521 036 0870

Email:

Franck.Berthe@efsa.europa.eu

Dr Olga Haenen

Central Veterinary Institute (CVI) of Wageningen UR

Cluster General Bacteriology and Fish

Diseases

Fish and Shellfish Diseases

Laboratory,

P.O. Box 65

8200 AB Lelystad

NETHERLANDS

Tel.: +31 320 238352

Fax: +31 320 238153

Email: Olga.Haenen@wur.nl

Dr Huang Jie

Virologist

Senior Researcher, Head of

Maricultural Organism Diseases

Control & Molecular Pathology

Laboratory,

Yellow Sea Fisheries Research

Institute,

Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences

106 Nanjing Road

Qingdao, SD 266071

PR CHINA

Tel.: +86-532-5823062

Mobile: +86-138-05421513

Fax: +86-532-5811514

Email: huangjie@ysfri.ac.cn

aqudis@public.gd.sd.cn

Dr Victor Manuel Vidal

Centro de Investigación y de

Estudios Avanzados del Instituto

Politécnico Nacional

Carretera Antigua a Progreso

Km. 6

Apartado Postal 73 Cordemex

Mérida,

Yucatán C.P. 97310

MÉXICO

Tel.: +52 99 99 46 94 02

Fax: +52 99 81 29 17

Email: vvidal@mda.cinvestav.mx

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Annex II (contd)

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Prof. Donald V. Lightner

(Crustacean disease expert)

Aquaculture Pathology Section,

Department of Veterinary Science &

Microbiology,

University of Arizona, Building 90,

Room 202,

Tucson, AZ 85721

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel.: (1.520) 621.84.14

Fax: (1-520) 621.48.99

E-mail: dvl@u.arizona.edu

Dr Rohana P. Subasinghe

Senior Fishery Resources Officer

(Aquaculture)

Fisheries Department

Food and Agriculture Organization of

the UN

Viale delle Terme di Caracalla

00100 Rome

ITALY

Tel.: 39 06 570 56473

Fax: 39 06 570 53020

E-mail: Rohana.Subasinghe@fao.org

Prof. Eli Katunguka-Rwakishaya

Director

School of Graduate Studies

Makerere University,

P.O. Box 7062,

Kampala

UGANDA

Tel.: (256.41) 53.0983

Mobile: 256 772 754 685

Fax: (256-41) 533809

email:

erkatunguka@vetmed.mak.ac.ug

mupgs@muspgs.mak.ac.ug

OIE HEADQUARTERS

Dr Bernard Vallat

Director General

OIE

12, rue de Prony

75017 Paris

FRANCE

Tel.: 33 - (0)1 44 15 18 88

Fax: 33 - (0)1 42 67 09 87

E-mail: oie@oie.int

Dr Sarah Kahn

Head

International Trade Department

OIE

E-mail: s.kahn@oie.int

Ms Sara Linnane

Scientific editor

Scientific and Technical

Department

OIE

E-mail: s.linnane@oie.int

Dr Gillian Mylrea

Chargée de mission

International Trade Department

OIE

E-mail: g.mylrea@oie.int

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Annex III

GLOSSARY

EU comment

  • 1) 
    Definition of feed additives

The proposed definition is

"Feed additives: means any intentionally added ingredient not normally consumed as feed by

itself, whether or not it has nutritional value or other effect on the animal, which affects the

characteristics of feed of the animal products. Microorganisms, enzymes, pH regulators, trace

elements, vitamins and other products fall within the scope of this definition depending on the

purpose of use and method of administration. This excludes veterinary drugs".

However, it seems that in the third line after "feed" there is an "or" missing. Additionally we

would propose to start the second sentence with "In particular, …" because this is not an

exhaustive list of substances. Therefore the prosed new definition would read:

"Feed additives: means any intentionally added ingredient not normally consumed as feed by itself, whether or not it has nutritional value or other effect on the animal, which affects the characteristics of feed or of the animal products. In particular, microorganisms, enzymes, pH regulators, trace elements, vitamins and other products fall within the scope of this definition depending on the purpose of use and method of administration. This excludes veterinary drugs".

  • 2) 
    Definition of susceptible species: For the sake of clarity, the Code would benefit from one single list of susceptible species in Article X.X.2 of the disease specific chapters instead of having two different lists in the Manual and the Code. A practical problem that may arise as well, is that because of the different timing for new editions of the Manual and Code, both list may have subtantials differences causing problems of interpretation.
  • 3) 
    Definition of emerging disease

The proposed definition would benefit of a reference to the possibility of detecting a known pathogen in a new host. We propose the following amendment highligthed):

means a newly recognised infection resulting from the evolution or change of an existing pathogenic, or of a host, a known infection spreading to a new geographic area or population, or a previously unrecognised pathogenic agent or disease diagnosed for the first time and which has a significant impact on aquatic animal or public health.

Buffe r zone

means a zone established to protect the health status of aquatic animals in a free country or free zone , from those in a country or zone of a different aquatic animal health status , using measures based on the epidemiology of the disease under consideration to prevent spread of the disease a gent into a free country or free zone .

Protection zon e

means a zone established to protect the health status of aquatic animals in a free country or free zone , from those in a country or zone of a different aquatic animal health status , using measures based on the epidemiology of the disease under consideration to prevent spread of the causative pathogenic agent into a free country or free zone . These measures may include, but are not limited to, vaccination, movement control and an intensified degree of surveillance .

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Central Bure auHeadquarte rs

means the Permanent Secretariat of the World Organisation for Animal Health which headquarters are located at:

12, rue de Prony, 75017 Paris, France Telephone: 33-(0)1 44 15 18 88 Fax: 33-(0)1 42 67 09 87 Electronic mail: oie@ oie.int WWW: http://www.oie.int

Competent Au thority

means the V eterinary Services , or other Authority of a Member, having the responsibility and competence for ensuring or supervising the implementation of the aquatic animal health measures or other standards in the A quatic Code .

means the V eterinary A uthorit y or other Governmental Authority of an OIE Member having the responsibility and competence for ensuring or supervising the implementation of aquatic animal health and welfare measures, international health certification and other standards and recommendations in the Aquatic Code in the whole territory.

E arly detection syste m

means an efficient system for ensuring the rapid recognition of signs that are suspicious of a listed disease , or an emerging disease situation, or unexplained mortality, in aquatic animals in an aquaculture establishment or in the wild, and the rapid communication of the event to the Competent A uthority , with the aim of activating diagnostic investigation with minimal delay.

Such a system will include the following characteristics:

  • a) 
    broad awareness, e.g. among the personnel employed at aquaculture establishments or involved in processing, of the characteristic signs of the listed diseases and emerging diseases ;
  • b) 
    veterinarians or aquatic animal health specialists professionals trained in recognising and reporting suspicionus of disease occurrence;
  • c) 
    ability of the Competent A uthority to undertake rapid and effective disease investigation based on a national chain of command;

Annex III (contd)

  • d) 
    access by the Competent A uthority to laboratories with the facilities for diagnosing and differentiating listed di sea ses and emergi ng di sea ses .;

e)     the legal obligation of private veterinarians or aquatic animal health professionals to report suspicions of disease occurrence to the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority .

Emerg ing dise ase

means a newly recognised serious disease , the cause of which may or may not yet be established, that has the potential to be spread within and between populations, for example by way of trade in aquatic animals and/or aquatic animal products .

means a newly recognised infection resulting from the evolution or change of an existing pathogenic agent, a known infection spreading to a new geographic area or population, or a previously unrecognised pathogenic agent or disease diagnosed for the first time and which has a significant impact on aquatic animal or public health.

Feed additive s

means any ingredient intentionally added in micro-amounts not normally consumed as feed by itself, whether or not it has nutritional value or other effect on the animal, which affects the characteristics of feed or of the animal products. Micro-organisms, enzymes, acidity regulators, trace elements, vitamins, substances used to attract aquatic animals to feed and promote feed intake, pigments, synthetic binders,

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synthetic amino acids, antioxidants and other products fall within the scope of this definition, depending on the purpose of use and method of administration. This excludes veterinary drugs.

means any intentionally added ingredient not normally consumed as feed by itself, whether or not it has nutritional value or other effect on the animal , which affects the characteristics of feed of the animal products. Microorganisms, enzymes, pH regulators, trace elements, vitamins and other products fall within the scope of this definition depending on the purpose of use and method of administration. This excludes veterinary drugs.

H azard

means any pathogen that could produce adverse consequences on the importation of a commodit y .

means a biological, chemical or physical agent in, or a condition of, an aquatic animal or aquatic animal product with the potential to cause an adverse effect on aquatic animal health or public health.

Infected zone

means a zone in which a disease has been diagnosed. The infected zone must be clearly defined by the Competent A uthority(ies) concerned and may be separated from the rest of the country by a buffer protection zone .

Inte rnational aquatic anim al health certific ate

means a certificate issued by a member of the personnel of the Competent A uthority of the exporting countr y , certifying the state of health of the aquatic animals , and a declaration that the aquatic anima

source subjected to official health surveillance according to the procedures described in the Aquatic Manual .

means a certificate, issued in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 5.10., describing the aquatic animal health and/or public health requirements which are fulfilled by the exported commodities .

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Annex III (contd)

Pathologic al m ate rial

means tissues,

laboratory

as an

uids, etc., from aquatic animals , or

or

of

to be sent to an aquatic animal

us

(which could be

laboratory or to a reference

by the OIE, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agr

ure

the United Nations (

the European

means

sitic

from live or dead aquatic animals , containing or suspected of containing infectious or

, to be sent to a laboratory.

Pe rsonnel of the Competent Authority

means any competent personnel working within the body of, or

signated by, the Competent A uthorit y .

means the killing and bleeding of fish.

Susceptible specie s

means a species of aquatic animal in which infection has been demonstrated by natural cases or by experimental exposures to the disease a gent that mimics the natural pathways for infection . Each disease chapter in the Aquatic Code and Aquatic Manual contains a list of currently known susceptible species .

Vete rinary Se rvices

means the Veterinary Administration, all the licensed by the veterinary statutory bod y .

means the go

ernment

l and non-governmental

nary A uthorities , and all persons

nisatio

that implement

l health and welfare measures and

ther standards and recommendations in the OIE

in the territory. The

nary Services are under the overall

ontrol

direction of the

na ry A uthority . Priv

or organisatio

veteri na rians , veterinary paraprofessionals

or aquatic

delegated functions.

professionals are no

credited or approved by the

nary A uthority to deliver the

text deleted

Annex IV

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l

n

r

CH AP TE R 1.3. DISEASES LISTED BY THE OIE

EU comment

The EU would agree with the definitive listing of necrotising hepatopancreatitis as an OIE disease.

Preamble: The following diseases are listed by the OIE according to the criteria for listing an aquatic animal disease (see Article 1.2.1.) or criteria for listing an emerging aquatic animal disease (see Article 1.2.2.).

Article 1.3.1.

The following diseases of fish are listed by the OIE:

  • Epizootic haematopoietic necrosis
  • Infectious haematopoietic necrosis
  • Spring viraemia of carp
  • Viral haemorrhagic septicaemia
  • Infectious salmon anaemia
  • Epizootic ulcerative syndrome
  • Gyrodactylosis (Gyrodactylus salaris )
  • Red sea bream iridoviral disease
  • Koi herpesvirus disease.

Article 1.3.2. The following diseases of molluscs are listed by the OIE:

  • Infection with Bonamia ostreae
  • Infection with Bonamia exitiosa
  • Infection with Marteilia refringens
  • Infection with Perk insus marinus
  • Infection with Perk insus olseni
  • Infection with X enohaliotis californiensis
  • Infection with abalone herpes-like virus.

Article 1.3.3. The following diseases of crustaceans are listed by the OIE:

  • Taura syndrome
  • White spot disease
  • Yellow head disease
  • Infectious hypodermal and haematopoietic necrosis
  • Crayfish plague (A phanomyces astaci )
  • Necrotising hepatopancreatitis 1
  • Infectious myonecrosis
  • White tail disease

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  • Milky haemolymph disease of spiny lobsters (Panulirus spp.) 1.

Article 1.3.4. The following diseases of amphibians are listed by the OIE:

  • Infection with Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis
  • Infection with ranavirus.

text deleted

  • 1. 
    Listing of this disease is under study.

Annex V

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RE VI SE D ART ICL ES X. X.3 . A ND X .X .9.

AN D X. X. 12.

AN EXAMPLE (DISEASE X)

TO BE APPLIED ACROSS ALL DISEASE CHAPTERS

(SECTIONS 8, 9, 10 AND 11)

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed example provided the following comment is taken into consideration:

Article X.X.3

  • 1) 
    The title of this article is "Importation or transit of aquatic animal products for any purpose regardless of the Disease X status of the exporting country, zone or compartment" meaning that it only addreses the imports of products. However points 2 and 3 of the article deal with commodities including live animals. Therefore, we suggest this new title:

"Importation or transit of live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products for any purpose regardless of the Disease X status of the exporting country, zone or compartment"

  • 2) 
    Point 2 and 3 refers to the fact that Competent Authorities may require conditions relevant to the Disease X. This is not in line with the title of the Article which refers to importation regardless of the Disease X status.

We would suggest splitting his article in two articles: one containing point 1 and the other containing points 2 and 3.

  • 3) 
    Point 3 reads as follows:

When considering the importation or transit of a commodity from an ex porting country , z one or compartment not declared free of Disease X from a species not covered in Article X.X.2. but which could reasonably be expected to pose a risk of transmission for Disease X, Competent A uthorities should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with the recommendations in the Aquatic Code . The ex porting country should be informed of the outcome of this assessment.

We propose the following rewording (highlighted):

When considering the importation or transit of a commodity from an ex porting country , z one or compartment not declared free of Disease X of a species not covered in Article X.X.2. but which could reasonably be expected to pose a risk of transmission for Disease X, Competent A uthorities should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with the recommendations in the Aquatic Code . The ex porting country should be informed of the outcome of this assessment.

Article X.X.9

In point 2 of this Article there is a reference to the treatment of effluents in a way that ensure inactivation of pathogens. The text would benefit of a reference to the Code Chapter 4.2 on "General Recommendations on disinfection"

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Article X.X.3.

Importation or transit of aquatic animal products for any purpose regardless of the Disease X status of the exporting country, zone or compartment

  • 1. 
    Competent Authorities should not require any Disease X related conditions, regardless of the Disease X status of the exporting country, zone or compartment when authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities from the species referred to in Article X.X.2. intended for any purpose and complying with Article 5.3.1.:

[i) aquatic animal product(s). As currently listed in the Aquatic Code for each disease specific chapter. This list is considered under study until specific assessments have been completed and adopted* ] (under study)

  • 2. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of commodities of a species referred to in Article X.X.2., other than those referred to in point 1 of Article X.X.3., Competent Authorities should require the conditions prescribed in Articles X.X.7. to X.X.12. relevant to the Disease X status of the exporting country, zone or compartment.
  • 3. 
    When considering the importation or transit of a commodity fro m an exporting country, zone or compartment not declared free of Disease X from a species not covered in Article X.X.2. but which could reasonably be expected to pose a risk of transmission for Disease X, Competent Authorities should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with the recommendations in the Aquatic Code. The exporting country should be informed of the outcome of this assessment.

Article X.X.9.

Importation of live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products for processing for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from Disease X

When importing for processing for human consumption, live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products of the species referred to in Article X.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from Disease X, the Competent Authority of the importing country should assess the risk and if justified require that:

  • 1. 
    the consignment is delivered directly to and held in quarantine or containment facilities for processing to one of the products referred to in point 1 of Article X.X.3., or products described in point 1 of Article X.X.12., or other products authorised by the Competent Authority; and
  • 2. 
    all effluent and waste material from the processing are treated in a manner that ensures inactivation of Disease agent X or is disposed in a manner that prevents contact of waste with susceptible species.

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ANNEX 3                                  DG B I                                        EN

Annex V (contd)

For these commodities Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.

[…] Article X.X.12. (fish chapters) /Article X.X.11. (mollusc and crustacean chapters)

Importation of live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products for retail trade for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from Disease X

  • 1. 
    Competent A uthorities should not require any Disease X related conditions, regardless of the Disease X status of the exporting country , zone or compartment when authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities which have been prepared and packaged for retail trade and complying with Article 5.3.2.:

[i) commodity (s). As currently listed in the A quatic Code for each disease specific chapter. This list is considered under study until specific assessments have been completed and adopted.*] (under study)

For these commodities Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.

  • 2. 
    When importing live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products , other than those referred to in point 1 above, of the species referred to in Article X.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from Disease X, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and apply appropriate risk mitigation measures.

* the highlighted text is an explanatory note only.

Annex VI

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C HA PT ER 10 .1

EPIZOOTIC HAEMATOPOIETIC NECROSIS

EUcomment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

[…]

Article 10.1.3.

Commodities Importation or transit of aquatic animal products for any purpose regardless of the EHN status of the exporting country, zone or compartment

  • 1. 
    When authorising the i

or

of the following commodities , the Competent A uthorities should not

require any EHN related conditions, regardless of the EHN status of the ex porting country , zone or compartment when authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities from the species referred to in Article 10.1.2. intended for any purpose and complying with Article 5.3.1.:

a) From the species referred to in Article 10.1.2. intended for any purpose:

  • i) 
    commo

fish skin,;

treated in a manner that

the

t e.g. fish skin leather7 made from

ii) pasteurised products8 and some ready-to-eat

  • iii) 
    fish oil9; and
  • iv) 
    fish meal10 intended for use in feed ;.

s; and

ii) biological samples preserved for diagnostic applications di sea se a gent .

such a manner as to

the

b) The following commo which have be

de

for human consumption from the

prepared and packaged for

referred to

i) eviscerated fish (chilled or frozen); ii) fillets or cutlets (chilled or frozen iii) dried eviscerated fish (including air

, flame dried and sun dried).

referred to

OIE Members may wish to

der

For the commo

measures to address the risk s associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human

consumption.

Annex VI (contd)

Refer to page 20 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group. Refer to page 21 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group. Refer to page 22 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group. 0 Refer to page 22 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

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  • 2. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of commodities of a species referred to in Article 10.1.2., other than those referred to in point 1 of Article 10.1.3., the Competent A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in Articles 10.1.7. to 10.1.12. relevant to the EHN status of the exporting country , zone or co mpartment .
  • 3. 
    When considering the importation/ or transit of a commodit y from an ex porting country , zone or compartment not declared free of EHN of a live commodi y from a species not covered in Article 10.1.2. but which could reasonably be expected to pose a risk of transmission be a potential mechanical vector for EHN, the Competent A uthorities should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with the recommendations in the A quatic Code . The ex porting country should be informed of the outcome of this assessment.

[…]

Article 10.1.9.

Importation of live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products for processing for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from epizootic haematopoietic necrosis

When importing, for processing for human consumption, live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products of the species referred to in Article 10.1.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from EHN, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and, if justified, require that:

  • 1. 
    the consignment be is delivered directly to and held in quarantine or containment facilities for slaughter and processing to one of the products referred to in point 1 of Article 10.1.3., or products described in point 1 of Article 10.1.12., or other products authorised by the Competent A uthority ; and
  • 2. 
    all effluent and waste material from the processing are treated in a manner that ensures inactivation of EHNV or is disposed in a manner that prevents contact of waste with susceptible species.

For these commodities OIE Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the commodit y prevent such commodities being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.

This Article does not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of Artic

[…]

Article 10.1.12.

Importation of live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products for retail trade for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from epizootic haematopoietic necrosis

  • 1. 
    Competent A uthorities should not require any EHV related conditions, regardless of the EHV status of the ex porting country , zone or compartment when authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities which have been prepared and packaged for retail trade and complying with Article 5.3.2.:

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Annex VI (contd)

i) eviscerated fish (chilled or frozen); 11

ii) fillets or steaks cutlets (chilled or frozen)12; and

iii) artificially dried eviscerated fish 13 (including air dried, flame dried and sun dried).

For these commodities Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.

  • 2. 
    When importing live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products , other than those referred to in point 1 above, of the species referred to in Article 10.1.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from EHV, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and apply appropriate risk mitigation measures.

In the case of dead fish, whether eviscerated or uneviscerated, such risk mitigation measures may include:

1. the direct delivery into and holding of the consignment in facilities for processing to one of the products referred to in point 1 of Article 10.1.3. or other products authorised by the Competent A uthorit y ;

2. the treatment of all effluent and waste material in a manner that ensures inactivation of EHNV. This Article does not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of Artic

text deleted

11 Refer to page 23 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

12 Refer to page 24 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

13 Refer to page 24 and 25 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

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Annex VI (contd)

CH AP TE R 9.4. TAURA SYNDROME

EUcomment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

[…]

Article 9.4.3.

Commodities Importation or transit of aquatic animal products for any purpose regardless of the Taura Syndrome status of the exporting country, zone or compartment

  • 1. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of the following commodties , the Competent A uthorities should not require any TS related conditions, regardless of the TS status of the ex porting country , zone or compartment when authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities f rom the species referred to in Article 9.2.2. intended for any purpose and complying with Article 5.3.1.:

a)     For the species referred to in Article 9.4.2. intended for any purpose:

i)     commodities treated in a manner that inactivates the disease a gent e.g. boiled cooked products14

ii)    canned products; 15 or pasteurised products 16 and some ready-to-eat meals; and

iii)    crustacean oil17; and

  • iv) 
    crustacean meal18 intended for use in feed ;

iiv)   chemically extracted chitin19.

iii) crustacean products made non-infectious through processing as dry feed (e.g. pelleted or extruded feed ); 20

iv) biological samples preserved for diagnostic applications in such a manner as to inactivate the di sea se a gent .

b)     [The following products destined for human consumption from species referred to in Arti which have been prepared and packaged for direct retail trade:

14 Refer to page 33 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

15 Refer to page 32 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

16 Refer to page 31 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

17 Refer to page 29 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

18 Refer to page 28 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

19 Refer to page 30 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

20 Refer to page 28 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

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Annex VI (contd)

For the commodities listed in point 1b), OIE Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption. (under study)]

  • 2. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of the commodities of a species referred to in Article 9.4.2., other than those listed in point 1 of Article 9.4.3., the Competent A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in Articles 9.4.7. to 9.4.11. relevant to the TS status of the ex porting country , zone or compartment .
  • 3. 
    When considering the importation/ or transit of a commodity from an exporting country , zone or compartment not declared free of TS of a commodit y of from a species not covered in Article 9.4.2. but which could reasonably be expected to pose a risk of transmission be a potential mechanical vector for TSV, the Competent A uthorities should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with the recommendations in the A quatic Code . The ex porting country should be informed of the outcome of this assessment.

[…]

Article 9.4.9.

Importation of live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products for processing for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from Taura syndrome

When importing, for processing for human consumption, live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products of the species referred to in Article 9.4.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from TS, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and, if justified, require that:

  • 1. 
    the consignment be is delivered directly to and held in quarantine or containment facilities isolation until for processing and/or consumption; to one of the products referred to in point 1 of Article 9.4.3., or products described in point 1 of Article 9.4.11., or other products authorised by the Competent A uthority ; and
  • 2. 
    all effluent, dead aquatic animals and waste materials from the processing be are treated in a manner that ensures inactivation of TSV or is disposed in a manner that prevents contact of waste with susceptible species.

For these commodities OIE Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the prevent such commoditiesy being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.

oes not apply to commodities listed in point 1 of Art

[…]

Article 9.4.11.

Importation of live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products for retail trade for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from Taura syndrome

  • 1. 
    Competent A uthorities should not require any TS related conditions, regardless of the TS status of the exportin g country , zone or compartment when authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities which have been prepared and packaged for retail trade and complying with Article 5.3.2.:

[i) frozen, peeled shrimp (shell off, head off)] (under study)21.

21

Refer to page 35 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

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Annex VI (contd)

For these commodities Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.

2. When importing live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products, other than those referred to in point 1 above, of the species referred to in Article 9.4.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from TS, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and apply appropriate risk mitigation measures.

This Article does not apply to commodities listed in point 1 of Art

text deleted

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Annex VI (contd)

C HA PT ER 11 .2. INFECTION WITH BONAMIA OSTREAE

EU comment

The EUwould agree with the proposed text.

Please correct the following crosss-reference in Article 11.2.3. point 2 (highlighted)

  • 2. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of commodities of a species referred to in Article 11.2 2., other

than those referred to in point 1 of Article 11.2.3., the Competent A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in Articles 11.2.7. to 11.2.11. relevant to the B. ostreae status of the ex porting country , zone or compartment .

[…] Article 11.2.3.

Commodities Importation or transit of aquatic animal products for any purpose regardless of the B . ostre ae status of the exporting country, zone or compartment

  • 1. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities , the Competent A uthorities should not require any B. ostreae related conditions, regardless of the B. ostreae status of the exporting country , zone or compartment when authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities from the species referred to in Article 11.2.2. intended for any purpose and complying with Article 5.3.1.:

a) From the species referred to in Article 11.2.2. intended for any purpose:

  • i) 
    commodities treated in a manner that inactivates the disease a gent e.g.canned 22 or

ii) pasteurised products23

ii) biological samples preserved for diagnostic applications in such a manner as to inactivate the di sea se a gent .

b) The following commodities destined for human consumption from the species referred to in

. which have been prepared and packaged for direct retail trade:

i) off the shell (chilled or frozen); 24

ii) half-shell (chilled). 25

c) All commodities from Crasso streagigas , C. virginica , Rudit apesdecussa tus , R. philippin arum , Mytilusgallo provincialis and M. edulis , including the live aqua tic anima l .

Annex VI (contd)

22 Refer to page 39 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

23 Refer to page 39 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

24 Refer to page 40 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

25 Refer to page 40 of Annex XXV for the assessment of this product undertaken by the ad hoc Group.

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For the commodities referred to in point 1b), OIE Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.

  • 2. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of commodities of a species referred to in Article 11.1.2., other than those referred to in point 1 of Article 11.2.3., the Competent A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in Articles 11.2.7. to 11.2.11. relevant to the B. ostreae status of the exporting country , zone or co mpartment .
  • 3. 
    When considering the importation/ or transit of a commodit y from an ex porting country , zone or compartment not declared free of infection with B. ostreae of a commodit y from bivalve a species not covered in Article 11.2.2. or in point 1c) of Article 11.2.3. but which could reasonably be expected to pose a risk of transmission be a potential mechanical vector for B. ostreae , the Competent A uthorities should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with the recommendations in the Aquatic Code . The ex porting country should be informed of the outcome of this assessment.

[…]

Article 11.2.9.

Importation of live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products for processing for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from B. ostre ae

When importing, for processing for human consumption, live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products of the species referred to in Article 11.2.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from B. ostreae , the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and, if justified, require that:

  • 1. 
    the consignment be is delivered directly to and held in quarantine or containment facilities until for processing and/or consumption to one of the products referred to in point 1 of Article 11.2.3., or products described in point 1 of Article 11.2.11., or other products authorised by the Competent A uthority ; and
  • 2. 
    all effluent and waste material from the processing are treated in a manner that ensures inactivation of B. ostreae or is disposed in a manner that prevents contact of waste with susceptible species.

For these commodities Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.

not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of

[…]

Article 11.2.11.

Importation of live aquatic animals and aquatic animal products for retail trade for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from B. ostre ae

  • 1. 
    Competent A uthorities should not require any B. ostreae related conditions, regardless of the B. ostreae status of the exporting country , zone or compartment when authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities which have been prepared and packaged for retail trade and complying with Article 5.3.2.:

i) off the shell oyster meat (chilled or frozen);

ii) half-shell (chilled or frozen).

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For these commodities Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.Annex VI (contd)

  • 2. 
    When importing live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products, other than those referred to in point 1 above, of the species referred to in Article 11.2.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from B. ostreae , the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and apply appropriate risk mitigation measures.

This Article does not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of Artic

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Annex VII

Highlighted text shows changes required to align Articles with the proposed changes to Articles X.X.3, X.X.9, X.X.12.

CH AP TE R 5.3.

CRITERIA TO ASSESS THE SAFETY OF AQUATIC ANIMAL COMMODITIES

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

In the context of this chapter the word safety is applied only to animal health considerations for OIE disea ses .

Article 5.3.1.

Criteria to assess the safety of aquatic animal products commodities irrespective regardless of country disease status

In all disease chapters, point 1a) of Article X.X.3. lists commodities aquatic animal products that can be traded irrespective regardless of country disease status. The criteria for inclusion of commodities aquatic animal products in point 1a) of Article X.X.3. are based on the absence of the disease agent in the traded commodity aquatic animal product or inactivation of the disease agent by treatment or processing.

The assessment of the safety of the commodity aquatic animal product using the criteria relating to treatment or processing can only be undertaken where treatments or processing are well defined. It may not be necessary to provide details of the entire treatment or process undertaken. However, the steps considered critical in the inactivation of the disease agent of concern should be detailed.

It is assumed that treatment or processing (i) uses standardised protocols, which include the steps considered critical in the inactivation of the disease agent of concern; (ii) is conducted according to Good Manufacturing Practices; and (iii) that any other steps in the treatment, processing and subsequent handling of the commodity aquatic animal product do not jeopardise the safety of the traded commodity aqua tic anima l product .

For an commodity aquatic animal product to be considered safe for international trade under the provisions of point 1a) of Article X.X.3., it should comply with the following criteria:

  • 1. 
    Absence of disease agent in the traded commodity aquatic animal product :
  • a) 
    There is strong evidence that the disease agent is not present in the tissues from which the commodity aquatic animal product is derived.

AND

  • b) 
    The water (including ice) used to process or transport the commodity aquatic animal product is not contaminated with the disease agent and the processing prevents cross contamination of the commodity aquatic animal product to be traded.OR

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  • 2. 
    Even if the disease agent is present in, or contaminates the tissues from which the commodity aquatic animal product is derived, the treatment or processing to produce the commodity aquatic animal product to be traded inactivates the disease a gent :
  • a) 
    physical (e.g. temperature, drying, smoking); AND/OR
  • b) 
    chemical (e.g. iodine, pH, salt, smoke); AND/OR
  • c) 
    biological (e.g. fermentation).

Article 5.3.2.

Criteria to assess the safety of live aquatic animals or of aquatic animal products destined for retail trade for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free of a irrespective of country disease status

In all disease chapters, point 1b) of Article X.X.123. (fish disease chapters) and; Article X.X.X.11. (mollusc and crustacean disease chapters) lists live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products for retail trade destined for human consumption. The criteria for inclusion of live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products in point 1b) of Article X.X.123. include consideration of the form and presentation of the product, the expected volume of waste tissues generated by the consumer and the likely quantity of viable disease a gent in the waste.

For the purpose of this criterion retail means the selling or provision of live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products directly to the consumer with the intended purpose of human consumption. The retail pathway may also include wholesale distribution of the products provided they are not further processed by the wholesale distributor or the retailer, i.e. are not subjected to actions such as gutting, cleaning, filleting, freezing, thawing, cooking, unpacking, packing or repackaging.

It is assumed that:

(i) the live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products is are used for human consumption only;

(ii) waste may not always be handled in an appropriate manner that mitigates the introduction of the disease agent . The level of risk is related to the waste disposal practices in each Member’s country or territory;

(iii) treatment or processing prior to importation (i) uses standardised protocols, which include the steps considered critical in the inactivation of the disease agent of concern; and (ii) is conducted according to Good Manufacturing Practices; and (iii)

(iv) that any other steps in the treatment, processing and subsequent handling of the live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products prior to importation do not jeopardise the safety of the traded live aquatic animals or aquatic a ni ma l products .

For live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products to be considered safe for international trade under the provisions of point 1 b) of Article X.X.123. (fish disease chapters); Article X.X.X.11. (mollusc and crustacean disease chapters), it should comply with the following criteria:

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Annex VII (contd)

  • 1. 
    the live aquatic animals or aquatic animal product is prepared and packaged for retail trade for human consumption; AND

EITHER

  • 2. 
    it includes only a small amount of waste tissues; OR
  • 3. 
    viable disease agent is unlikely to be present in the waste tissues, because:

a)     the disease agent is not normally found in the waste tissues;. OR

b)     the disease agent may be present in the waste tissues but the processing prior to importation involves processes known to inactivate and/or reduce the load of disease a gent :

i) physical (e.g. temperature,

OR ii) chemical (e.g. pH, salt, smoke);

OR iii) biological (e.g. fermentation).

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Annex VIII

CH AP TE R5 .9.

MEASURES CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT

OF AQUATIC ANIMAL DISEASE AGENTS AND

PATHOLOGICAL MATERIAL

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

Article 5.9.1.

Introduction

There is the risk that disease may occur as a result of the accidental release of aquatic anmal pathogens during international transport of packaged materials. Such pathogens may already occur in the country or they may have been imported deliberately or inadvertently. It is therefore necessary to have in place measures to prevent their accidental release. These measures may be applied at national borders by prohibiting or controlling the importation of specified aquatic animal pathogens or pathologcal material, which may contain them

Competent Authorities should not require sanitary measures for biological samples preserved for diagnostic applications that are treated in such a manner as to inactivate the disease agent and will not cause aquatic animal disease.

Article 5.9.2. [■■■]

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Annex IX

CH AP TE R 2.2. IMPORT RISK ANALYSIS

[…]

Article 2.2.3.

Principles of risk assessment

  • 1. 
    Risk assessment should be flexible to deal with the complexity of real life situations. No single method is applicable in all cases. Risk assessment must be able to accommodate the variety of animal commodities , the multiple hazards that may be identified with an importation and the specificity of each disease , detection and surveillance systems, exposure scenarios and types and amounts of data and information.
  • 2. 
    Both qualitative risk assessment and quantitative risk assessment methods are valid. Although quantitative assessment is recognised as being able to provide deeper insights into a particular problem, qualitative methods may be more relevant when available data are limited.

[…]

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Annex X

CH AP TE R 3.1. QUALITY OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed amendments

  • 1) 
    With regard to Article 3.1.2, point 6 we would propose the deletion of the reference to "animal identification system, as this may be applicable to terrestrial animals but not to aquatic animals.
  • 2) 
    With regard to article Article 3.1.5, it would be helpful if AAC explains the procedure to select the experts

Article 3.1.1.

The quality of Competent A uthorities depends on multiple factors that include fundamental principles of an ethical, organisational, legislative and technical nature. Competent A uthorities should conform to these fundamental principles, regardless of the political, economic or social situation of their country.

Compliance with these fundamental principles by the Competent A uthority of an OIE Member Country or Territory (Member) is important to the establishment and maintenance of confidence in its international aquatic animal health certificates by Competent A uthorities of other Members.

These fundamental principles are presented in Article 3.1.2. Other factors affecting the quality of Competent A uthorities are described in the A quatic Code (notification , principles of certification, etc.).

The quality of Competent A uthorities , including aquatic animal health legislation, can be measured through an evaluation, the general principles of which are described in Article 3.1.3. and in Article 3.1.4.

A procedure for evaluating Competent A uthorities by OIE experts, on a voluntary basis, is described in Article 3.1.5.

Article 3.1.2.

Fundamental principles of quality

Competent A uthorities should comply with the following principles to ensure the quality of their activities:

  • 1. 
    Professional judgement

The personnel of Competent A uthorities should have the relevant qualifications, scientific expertise and experience to give them the competence to make sound professional judgements.

  • 2. 
    Independence

Care should be taken to ensure that the Competent A uthority personnel are free from any commercial, financial, hierarchical, political or other pressures which might affect their judgement or decisions.

  • 3. 
    Impartiality

Competent A uthorities should be impartial. In particular, all the parties affected by their activities have a right to expect their services to be delivered under reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions.

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  • 4. 
    Integrity

Competent A uthorities should guarantee that the work of each of their personnel is of a consistently high level of integrity. Any fraud, corruption or falsification should be identified, documented and corrected.

  • 5. 
    Objectivity C ompetent A uthorities should at all times act in an objective, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

6.    Aquatic animal health legislation

Aquatic animal health legislation is a fundamental element of quality as it supports good governance and provides the legal framework for all key activities of the Competent A uthority .

Legislation should be suitably flexible to allow for judgements of equivalence and efficient responses to changing situations. In particular, it should define and document the responsibilities and structure of the organisations in charge of the animal identification system, control of aquatic animal movements, aquati c animal disease control and reporting systems, epidemiological surveillance and communication of epidemiological information.

A similar demonstration should be made by Competent A uthorities when they are in charge of veterinary public health activities.

67. General organisation

Competent A uthorities must be able to demonstrate by means of an appropriate legislation regulatory framework, sufficient financial resources and effective organisation that they are in a position to have control of the establishment and application of aquatic animal health measures, and of international aquatic animal health certification activities. The regulatory framework should be suitably flexible to allow for judgements of equivalence and efficient responses to changing situations. In particular, such frameworks should define and document the responsibilities and structure of the organisations in charge of the control of aquatic animal movements, aquatic animal disease control and reporting systems, epidemiological surveillance and communication of epidemiological information.

A similar demonstration should be made by Competent A uthorities when they are in charge of veterinary public health activities.

Competent A uthorities should have at their disposal effective systems for aquatic animal disease surveillance , diagnosis and notification of disease problems that may occur in the national territory , in accordance with the provisions of the A quatic Code . They should at all times endeavour to improve their performance in terms of aquatic animal health information systems and aquatic a nima l disea se control.

Competent A uthorities should define and document the responsibilities and structure of the organisation (in particular the chain of command) in charge of issuing interna tional aqua tic anima l health certifica tes .

Each position within the Competent A uthority that has an impact on their quality should be described.

These job descriptions should include the requirements for education, training, technical knowledge and experience.

78. Quality policy

Competent A uthorities should define and document their policy and objectives for, and commitment to, quality, and should ensure that this policy is understood, implemented and maintained at all levels in the organisation. Where conditions allow, they may implement a quality system corresponding to their areas of activity and appropriate for the type, range and volume of work that they have to perform. The

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recommendations provided in this chapter describe a suitable reference system, which should be used if a Member chooses to adopt a quality system.Annex X (contd)

89. Procedures and standards

Competent A uthorities should develop and document appropriate procedures and standards for all providers of relevant activities and associated facilities. These procedures and standards may for example relate to:

Where there are standards in the A quatic Code or in the A quatic Manual , Competent A uthorities should comply with these standards when applying aquatic animal health measures and when issuing international aquatic a ni ma l health certifica tes .

910. Information, complaints and appeals

Competent A uthorities should undertake to reply to requests from Competent A uthorities of other Members or any other authority, in particular ensuring that any requests for information, complaints or appeals that are presented are dealt with in a timely manner.

A record should be maintained of all complaints and appeals and of the relevant action taken by Competent A uthori ti es .

1011. Documentation

Competent A uthorities should have at their disposal a reliable and up-to-date documentation system suited to their activities.

1112. Self-evaluation

Competent A uthorities should undertake periodical self-evaluation especially by documenting achievements against goals, and demonstrating the effectiveness of their organisational components and resource adequacy.

A procedure for evaluating Competent A uthorities by OIE experts, on a voluntary basis, is described in Article 3.1.5.

Annex X (contd)

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1213. Communication

Competent A uthorities should have effective internal and external systems of communication covering administrative and technical staff and parties affected by their activities.

1314. Human and financial resources

Responsible authorities should ensure that adequate resources are made available to implement effectively the above activities.

Article 3.1.3.

For the purposes of the A quatic Code , every Member should recognise the right of another Member to undertake, or request it to undertake, an evaluation of its Competent A uthority where the initiating Member is an actual or a prospective importer of aquatic animal commodities and/or where the evaluation is to be a component of a risk analysis process that is to be used to determine or review sanitary measures which apply to such trade.

A Member has the right to expect that the evaluation of its Competent A uthority will be conducted in an objective and transparent manner. A Member undertaking an evaluation should be able to justify any measure taken as a consequence of its evaluation.

Article 3.1.4.

A Member which intends to conduct an evaluation of another Member's Competent A uthority should provide notice in writing, and allow sufficient time for the other Member to comply with the request. This notice should define the purpose of the evaluation and details of the information required.

On receipt of a formal request for information to enable an evaluation of its Competent A uthority by another Member, and following bilateral agreement of the evaluation process and criteria, a Member should expeditiously provide the Member requesting the evaluation with meaningful and accurate information of the type requested.

The evaluation process should take into account the fundamental principles and other factors of quality laid down in Article 3.1.1. and in Article 3.1.2. It should also take into consideration the specific circumstances regarding quality, as described in Article 3.1.1., prevailing in the countries concerned.

The outcome of an evaluation conducted by a Member should be provided in writing as soon as possible, and in any case within 4 months of receipt of the relevant information, to the Member which has undergone the evaluation. The evaluation report should detail any findings that affect trade prospects. The Member which conducts the evaluation should clarify in detail any points of the evaluation on request.

In the event of a dispute between two Members over the conduct or the conclusions of the evaluation of Competent A uthorities , the matter should be dealt with having regard to the procedures set out in Article 3.1.3.

Annex X (contd)

Article 3.1.5.

Evaluation facilitated by OIE experts under the auspices of the OIE

The OIE has established procedures for the evaluation of Competent A uthorities of Members. Members can make a request to the OIE for an evaluation of their Competent A uthority .

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The World Assembly of OIE Delegates may endorse a list of approved experts to facilitate the evaluation process.

Under these procedures, the Director General of the OIE recommends an expert(s) from that list.

The expert(s) facilitate(s) the evaluation of the Competent A uthority of the Member using the OIE Tool for the E valuation of Performance of V eterinary Services (OIE PV S Tool ), applied as appropriate to the context of the evaluation.

The expert(s) produce(s) a report in consultation with the Competent A uthority of the Member.

The report is submitted to the Director General of the OIE and, with the consent of the Member, published by the OIE.

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Annex XI

C HA PT ER 4. X. APPLICATION OF COMPARTMENTALISATION

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed amendments

  • 1) 
    In Article 4.X.3, point 2i), the term "carcasses" should be replaced by dead animals to better reflect the mollusc farming aspects.
  • 2) 
    In Article Article 4.X.5., there is a reference to Veterinary Authority that should be replaced by competent authority.

Article 4.X.1.

Introduction and objectives

The recommendations in this Chapter provide a structured framework for the application and recognition of compartments within countries or zones , based on the provisions of Chapter 4.1. with the objective to facilitate trade in aquatic animals and products of aquatic animal origin and as a tool for disease management.

Establishing and maintaining a disease free-status throughout the country should be the final goal for OIE Members. However, establishing and maintaining a disease -free status for an entire country may be difficult, especially in the case of diseases that can easily cross international boundaries. For many diseases , OIE Members have traditionally applied the concept of zoning to establish and maintain an animal subpopulation with a different animal health status within national boundaries.

The essential difference between zoning and compartmentalisation is that the recognition of zones is based on geographical boundaries whereas the recognition of compartments is based of management practices and biosecurity. However, spatial considerations and good management practices play a role in the application of both concepts.

The fundamental requirement for compartmentalisation is the implementation and documentation of management and biosecurity measures to create a functional separation of subpopulations .

For example, an aquaculture establishment in an infected country or zone might have biosecurity measures and management practices that result in negligible risk from diseases or agents. The concept of a compartment extends the application of a ‘risk boundary’ beyond that of a geographical interface and considers all epidemiological factors that can help to create an effective disease -specific separation between subpopulations .

In disease -free countries or zones , compartments preferably should be defined prior to the occurrence of a disease outbreak . In the event of an outbreak or in infected countries or zones , compartmentalisation may be used to facilitate trade.

For the purpose of international trade , compartments must be under the responsibility of the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority in the country. For the purposes of this Chapter, compliance by the Members with Chapters 1.1. and 3.1. is an essential prerequisite.

Article 4.X.2. Principles for defining a compartment

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A compartment may be established with respect of a specific disease or diseases . A compartment must be clearly defined, indicating the location of all its components including establishments, as well as related functional units (such as brood stock facilities, hatcheries, nurseries, grow-out facilities, slaughterhouses, processing plants etc.), their interrelationships and their contribution to an epidemiological separation between the aquatic animals in a compartment and subpopulations with a different health status. The definition of compartment may revolve around disease specific epidemiological factors, production systems, biosecurity practices infrastructural factors and surveillance .Annex XI (contd)

Article 4.X.3. Separation of a compartment from potential sources of infection

The management of a compartment must provide to the Competent A uthority documented evidence on the following:

  • 1. 
    Physical or spatial factors that affect the status of biosecurity in a compartment

While a compartment is primarily based on management and biosecurity measures, a review of geographical factors is needed to ensure that the functional boundary provides adequate separation of a compartment from adjacent animal populations with a different health status. The following factors should be taken into consideration in conjunction with biosecurity measures and, in some instances, may alter the degree of confidence achieved by general biosecurity and surveillance measures:

  • a) 
    disease status in adjacent areas and in areas epidemiologically linked to the compartment ;
  • b) 
    location, disease status and biosecurity of the nearest epidemiological units or other epidemiologically relevant premises. Consideration should be given to the distance and physical separation from:
  • i) 
    aquatic animal populations with a different health status in close proximity to the compartment , including wildlife and their migratory routes;
  • ii) 
    slaughterhouses or processing plants;
  • iii) 
    exhibitions, ‘put and take’ fisheries, fish markets, restaurants with live fish and other points of aquatic animal concentration.
  • 2. 
    Infrastructural factors

Structural aspects of the establishments within a compartment contribute to the effectiveness of its biosecurity. Consideration should be given to:

  • a) 
    water supply;
  • b) 
    effective means of physical separation;
  • c) 
    facilities for people entry including access control;
  • d) 
    vehicle and vessel access including washing and disinfection procedures;
  • e) 
    unloading and loading facilities;
  • f) 
    isolation facilities for introduced aquatic animals ;
  • g) 
    facilities for the introduction of material and equipment;
  • h) 
    infrastructure to store feed and veterinary products; i) disposal of carcasses;
  • j) 
    measures to prevent exposure to living mechanical or biological vectors;

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  • k) 
    feed supply/source.

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Annex XI (contd)

  • 3. 
    Biosecurity plan

The integrity of the compartment relies on effective biosecurity. The management of the compartment should develop, implement and monitor a comprehensive biosecurity plan .

The biosecurity plan should describe in detail:

  • a) 
    potential pathways for introduction and spread into the compartment of the agents for which the compartment was defined, including aquatic animal movements, wild aquatic animals, potential vectors, vehicles , people, biological products, equipment, fomites, feed, waterways, drainage or other means. Consideration should also be given to the survivability of the agent in the environment;
  • b) 
    the critical control points for each pathway;
  • c) 
    measures to mitigate exposure for each critical control point;
  • d) 
    standard operating procedures including:
  • i) 
    implementation, maintenance, monitoring of the measures, ii) application of corrective actions, iii) verification of the process, iv) record keeping;
  • e) 
    contingency plan in the event of a change in the level of exposure;
  • f) 
    reporting procedures to the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority ;
  • g) 
    the programme for educating and training workers to ensure that all persons involved are knowledgeable and informed on biosecurity principles and practices;
  • h) 
    the surveillance programme in place.

In any case, sufficient evidence should be submitted to assess the efficacy of the biosecurity plan in accordance with the level of risk for each identified pathway. This evidence should be structured in line with the principles of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP). The biosecurity risk of all operations of the compartment should be regularly re-assessed and documented at least on a yearly basis. Based on the outcome of the assessment, concrete and documented mitigation steps should be taken to reduce the likelihood of introduction of the disease agent into the compartment .

  • 4. 
    Traceability system

A prerequisite for assessing the integrity of a compartment is the existence of a valid traceability system. Although individual identification of aquatic animals may not be feasible, the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority should provide sufficient assurance of traceability in such a way that their history and movements can be documented and audited.

All aquatic animal movements into and out of the compartment should be recorded at the compartment level, and when needed, based on a risk assessment , certified by the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority . Movements within the compartment need not be certified but should be recorded at the compartment level.

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Annex XI (contd)

Article 4.X.4.

Documentation

Documentation must provide clear evidence that the biosecurity, surveillance , tra ceability and management practices defined for a compartment are effectively and consistently applied. In addition to animal movement information, the necessary documentation should include production unit records (e.g. cage, pond), feed sources, laboratory tests, death records, the visitor logbook, morbidity history, medication and vaccination records, biosecurity plans , training documentation and any other criteria necessary for the evaluation of disease exclusion.

The historical status of a compartment for the disease(s) for which it was defined should be documented and demonstrate compliance with the requirements for freedom in the relevant Aquatic Code Chapter.

In addition, a compartment seeking recognition should submit to the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority a baseline aquatic animal health report indicating the presence or absence of OIE listed diseases . This report should be regularly updated to reflect the current aquatic animal health status of the compartment .

Vaccination records including the type of vaccine and frequency of administration must be available to enable interpretation of surveillance data.

The time period for which all records should be kept may vary according to the species and disease(s) for which the compa rtment was defined.

All relevant information must be recorded in a transparent manner and be easily accessible so as to be auditable by the V eterinary A uthority or other C ompetent A uthority .

Article 4.X.5.

Surveillance for the disease agent or disease

The surveillance system should comply with Chapter 1.4. on Surveillance and the specific recommendations for surveillance for the disease(s) for which the compartment was defined, if available.

If there is an increased risk of exposure to the agent for which the compartment has been defined, the detection level of the internal and external surveillance should be reviewed and, where necessary, raised. At the same time, biosecurity measures in place should be reassessed and increased if necessary.

  • 1. 
    Internal surveillance

Surveillance should involve the collection and analysis of disease /infection data so that the V eterina ry A uthority can certify that the animal subpopulation contained in all the establishments comply with the defined status of that compartment . A surveillance system that is able to ensure early detection in the event that the agent enters a subpopulation is essential. Depending on the disease(s) for which the compartment was defined, different surveillance strategies may be applied to achieve the desired confidence in disease freedom.

  • 2. 
    External surveillance

The biosecurity measures applied in a compartment must be appropriate to the level of exposure of the compartment . External surveillance will help identify a significant change in the level of exposure for the identified pathways for disease introduction into the compartment .

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Annex XI (contd)

An appropriate combination of active and passive surveillance is necessary to achieve the goals described above. Based on the recommendations of Chapter 1.4., targeted surveillance based on an assessment of risk factors may be the most efficient surveillance approach. Targeted surveillance should in particular include epidemiological units in close proximity to the compartment or those that have a potential epidemiological link with it.

Article 4.X.6.

Diagnostic capabilities and procedures

Officially-designated laboratory facilities should be available for sample testing. All laboratory tests and procedures should comply with the recommendations of the laboratory for the specific disease . Each laboratory that conducts testing should have systematic procedures in place for rapid reporting of disease results to the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority . Where appropriate, results should be confirmed by an OIE Reference Laboratory.

Article 4.X.7. Emergency response and notification

Early detection, diagnosis and notification of disease are critical to minimise the consequences of outbreak s .

In the event of suspicion of occurrence of the disease for which the compartment was defined, the free status of the compartment should be immediately suspended. If confirmed, the status of the compartment should be immediately revoked and importing countries should be notified following the provisions of Chapter 1.1.

In case of an occurrence of any infectious disease not present according to the baseline animal health report of the compartment referred to in Article 4.2.4., the management of the compartment should notify the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority , and initiate a review to determine whether there has been a breach in the biosecurity measures. If a significant breach in biosecurity, even in the absence of outbreak , is detected, export certification as a free compartment should be suspended. Disease free status of the compartment may only be reinstated after the compartment has adopted the necessary measures to re-establish the original biosecurity level and the V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority re-approves the status of the compa rtment .

In the event of a compartment being at risk from a change, in the surrounding area, in the disease situation for which the compartment was defined, the V eterinary A uthority should re-evaluate without delay the status of the compartment and any additional biosecurity measures needed to ensure that the integrity of the compartment is maintained.

Article 4.X.8.

Supervision and control of a compartment

The authority, organisation, and infrastructure of the V eterinary Services , including laboratories, must be clearly documented in accordance with the Chapter on the Evaluation of V eterinary Services of the A quatic Code , to provide confidence in the integrity of the compartment .

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Annex XI (contd)

The V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority has the final authority in granting, suspending and revoking the status of a compartment . The V eterinary A uthority or other Competent A uthority should continuously supervise compliance with all the requirements critical to the maintenance of the compartment status described in this Chapter and ensure that all the information is readily accessible to the importing countries . Any significant change should be notified to the importing country .

text deleted

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Annex XII

CH AP TE R 4.1. ZONING AND COMPARTMENTALISATION

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed amendments

  • 1) 
    With regard to Article 4.1.2, it is said that

" importing country may adopt a higher level of protection where it is scientifically justified and the obligations referred to in Article 2.1.2. are met. Article 4.1.4. is also relevant."

To ensure transparency in this process we propose the following addition to this sentence.

"the importing country should publish through official channels the scientific justification that justify this higher level of protection"

  • 2) 
    With regard to Article 4.1.3. a new point 2 is proposed. In that point several measures are described. Those measures are to be implemented in protection zones to preserve the health status of the free zones. We woud suggest the AAC to:
  • delete the references to "special identification" as this is very difficult to apply to aquatic animals;

-clarify what is meant by "intensified movement control". Movement controls are already described in articles X.X.7 to X.X.12 in the disease specific chapters. Therefore, the Code would benefit from a link between the chapter and the disease specific ones.

Article 4.1.1.

Introduction

Given the difficulty of establishing and maintaining freedom from a particular disease for an entire country especially for diseases whose entry is difficult to control, there may be benefits to one or more Members in establishing and maintaining a subpopulation with a distinct aquatic animal health status. Subpopulations may be separated by natural or artificial geographical barriers or, in certain situations, by the application of appropriate management practices.

Zoning and compartmentalisation are procedures implemented by a country under the provisions of this chapter to define subpopulations of distinct aquatic animal health status for the purpose of disease control or international trade . Compartmentalisation applies to a subpopulation when management practices related to biosecurity are the defining factors, while zoning applies when a subpopulation is defined on a geographical basis. In practice, spatial considerations and good management play important roles in the application of both concepts.

This chapter is to assist OIE Members wishing to establish and maintain different subpopulations , using the principles of compartmentalisation and zoning. These principles should be applied in accordance with the measures recommended in the relevant disease chapter(s). This chapter also outlines a process through which trading partners may recognise such subpopulations . This process is best implemented by trading partners through establishing parameters and gaining agreement on the necessary measures prior to outbreak s of disease .

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Before trade in aquatic animals or aquatic animal products may occur, an importing country needs to be satisfied that its aquatic animal health status will be appropriately protected. In most cases, the import regulations developed will rely in part on judgements made about the effectiveness of sanitary procedures undertaken by the ex porting country , both at its borders and within its territory .

In addition to contributing to the safety of international trade , zoning and compartmentalisation may assist disease control or eradication within Members. Zoning may encourage the more efficient use of resources, and compartmentalisation may allow the functional separation of a subpopulation from other domestic or wild aquatic animals through biosecurity measures, which a zone (through geographical separation) would not achieve. Following an outbreak of disease , compartmentalisation may allow a Member be able to take advantage of epidemiological links among subpopulations or common practices relating to biosecurity, despite diverse geographical locations, to facilitate disease control and/or the resumption of trade.

Zoning and compartmentalisation may not be applicable to all diseases , but separate requirements will be developed for each disease for which the application of zoning or compartmentalisation is considered appropriate.

To regain the status of a free zone or free compartment following an outbreak of disease , Members should follow the recommendations in the relevant disease chapter in the A quatic Code .

Annex XII (contd)

Article 4.1.2.

General considerations

The Competent A uthority of an exporting country that is establishing a zone or compartment for international trade purposes should clearly define the subpopulation in accordance with the recommendations in the relevant chapters in the A quatic Code , including those on surveillance , and the identification and traceability of aquatic animals . The Competent A uthority of an ex porting country should be able to explain to the Competent A uthority of an i mporting country the basis for its claim of a distinct aquatic animal health status for the zone or compartment in such terms.

The procedures used to establish and maintain the distinct aquatic animal health status of a zone or compartment should be appropriate to the particular circumstances and will depend on the epidemiology of the disease , environmental factors, risk of introduction and establishment of disease , and applicable biosecurity measures. The ex porting country should be able to demonstrate, through detailed documentation supplied to the importing country , published through official channels, that it has implemented the recommendations in the A quatic Code for establishing and maintaining such a z one or compartment .

An importing country should recognise the existence of this zone or compartment when the appropriate measures recommended in the Aquatic Code are applied, and the Competent A uthority of the ex porting country certifies that this is the case. Note that an importing country may adopt a higher level of protection where it is scientifically justified and the obligations referred to in Article 2.1.2. are met. Article 4.1.4. is also relevant.

Where countries share a zone or compartment , the Competent A uthority of each country should collaborate to define and fulfil their respective responsibilities.

The exporting country should conduct an assessment of the resources needed and available to establish and maintain a zone or compartment for international trade purposes. These include the human and financial resources and the technical capability of the Competent A uthority (and of the relevant industry, in the case of a compartment ) including on di sea se surveillance and diagnosi s .

Article 4.1.3.

Principles for defining a zone or compartment, including protection zones

In conjunction with the above considerations and the definitions of zone and compartment , the following principles should apply when Members define a z one or compa rtment :

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  • 1. 
    The extent of a zone should be established by the Competent A uthority on the basis of the definition of zone and made public through official channels.

2.    A protection zone may be established to preserve the health status of aquatic animals in a free country or zone , from adjacent countries or zones of different aquatic animal health status. Measures should be implemented based on the epidemiology of the disease under consideration to prevent introduction of the pathogenic agent. These measures should include intensified movement control and surveillance and may also include vaccination, special identification, raised awareness or other measures.The application of these measures can be in the entire free zone or in a defined area within and/or outside the free zone .

23. The factors defining a compartment should be established by the Competent A uthority on the basis of relevant criteria such as management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity, and made public through official channels.

34. Aquatic animals belonging to such subpopulations need to be recognizable as such through a clear epidemiological separation from other aquatic animals and all things presenting a disease risk .

45. For a zone or compartment , the Competent A uthority should document in detail the measures taken to ensure the identification of the subpopulation , for example by means of registration of all the aquaculture establishments located in such a zone or compartment and the establishment and maintenance of its aquatic animal health status through a biosecurity plan . The measures used to establish and maintain the distinct aquatic animal health status of a zone or compartment should be appropriate to the particular circumstances and will depend on the epidemiology of the disease , environmental factors, the aquatic animal health status in adjacent areas, applicable biosecurity measures (including movement controls, use of natural and artificial boundaries, the spatial separation of aquatic animals , and commercial management and husbandry practices), and surveillance .

56. For a compartment , the biosecurity plan should describe the partnership between the relevant enterprise/industry and the Competent A uthority , and their respective responsibilities, including the procedures for oversight of the operation of the compartment by the Competent A uthority .

67. For a compartment , the biosecurity plan should also describe the routine operating procedures to provide clear evidence that the surveillance conducted and the management practices are adequate to meet the definition of the compartment . In addition to information on aquatic animal movements, the biosecurity plan should include production and stock records, feed sources, traceability, surveillance results, visitor logbook, morbidity and mortality history, medications, vaccinations, documentation of training and any other criteria necessary for evaluation of risk mitigation. The information required may vary according to the aquatic animal species and disease(s) under consideration. The biosecurity plan should also describe how the measures will be audited to ensure that the risk s are regularly re-assessed and the measures adjusted accordingly.

78. Thus defined, the zones and compartments constitute the relevant subpopulations for the application of the recommendations in Section 8. to Section 11. of the A quatic Code .

Article 4.1.4.

Sequence of steps to be taken in establishing a zone or a compartment and having it recognised for international trade purposes

There is no single sequence of steps which should be followed in establishing a zone or a compartment . The steps that the Competent A uthority of the importing country and the ex porting country choose and implement will generally depend on the circumstances existing within the countries and at their borders, and their trading history. The recommended steps are:

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Annex XII (contd)

Refer to Chapter 4.X.

a)     Based on discussions with the relevant enterprise/industry, the ex porting country identifies a compartment of one or more aquaculture establishments or other premises that operate under common management practices related to biosecurity, and which contains an identifiable aquatic animal subpopulation with a distinct aquatic animal health status with respect to a specific disease /specific diseases ; the ex porting country describes how this status is maintained through a partnership between the relevant enterprise/industry and the Competent A uthority of the ex porting country .

b)     The ex porting country examines the compartment ’s biosecurity plan and confirms through an audit that:

i) the compartment is epidemiologically closed throughout its routine operating procedures as a result of effective implementation of its biosecurity plan ; and

ii) the surveillance programme in place is appropriate to verify the status of such aquaculture establishment(s) with respect to such disease(s) .

c)     The ex porting country describes the compartment , in accordance with the recommendations in the A quatic Code .

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d) The exporting country provides the above such an enterprise can be treated as an

to the importing country , with an explanation of why separated compartment for i nterna tional trade

purposes. e) The

ng cou

whether it accepts such an

i) an

of aquatic animals and aquatic anima l products , luation of the ex porting country 's Competent A uthority ;

ii) the result of research;

assessment based on the

iii) its own aquatic animal health situation with respect to iv) ther relevant OIE standards.

f) The

ng country

the

ng country of the result of

within a reasonable period of time, being either:

i) recognition of the compartment ; ii) request for further information; or

of such

as a comp

iii)

g) An attempt should be made to resolve any differences over the

as a compartment for the

ng country and its own

; and

and the underlying

the

or finally, by using an agreed

gnition of the compartment , e to reach consensus (such as the OIE

settlement mechanism).

h) The importing country and the co mpartme nt .

ng country should enter into a formal agreement

the

text deleted

Annex XIII

CHAPTER 4.5.

CONTROL OF HAZARDS OF AQUATIC ANIMAL HEALTH

HAZARDS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPORTANCE IN

AQUATIC ANIMAL FEEDS

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed amendments. Nevertheless, the proposed chapter would benefit of the following amendments:

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DG B I

680

EN

  • 1) 
    With regard to Article 4.5.4., point 4 on "Good practices", the following rewording is proposed for the first sentence (highlighted):

Where national guidelines exist, good aquaculture practices and good manufacturing practices (including good hygienic practices) should be followed. Countries without such guidelines are encouraged to develop them or to take already available or existing guidelines on board.

  • 2) 
    With regard to Article 4.5.4. point 5 on "relationship between prions and aquatic animal species", it must be highlighted that in a recent publication by Salta et al. (2009) it was reported that Gilthead Sea Bream developed TSE-like pathologies after having been force fed with BSE agent and Scrapie agent respectively. The PrPTSE found in Sea Bream was Sea Bream PrP and not residual PrPBSE or PrPSc.

Therefore, there is now evidence showing that TSEs can be potentially transmitted from cattle or sheep to fish.

The TSE like pathology was induced after force feeding high quantities of BSE and Scrapie agent. It is yet unknown, whether transmission would occur if more realistic doses of exposure were used. In other words, the “height” of the so called “species barrier” for transmission of PrPTSE from mammals to fish is unknown.

However, given the new findings, we suggest that the relevant paragraph is amended to say that there may be a potential risk if terrestrial animal by-products were used as ingredients in aquatic animal feed with respect to prion diseases.

  • 3) 
    With regard to Article 4.5.4., point 11 on "Design and management of inspection programmes" we propose the following wording for the second sentence (highlighted):

Operators in the feed and feed ingredients business and other relevant industries should implement procedures to ensure compliance with regulatory standards for harvest, handling, storage, processing, distribution and use of feed and feed ingredients . Operators have the primary responsibility for implementing systems for process quality control. Where such systems are applied, the Competent A uthority should verify that they meet all regulatory requirements.

Article 4.5.1.

Introduction

One of the key objectives of the A quatic Code is to help OIE Members trade safely in aquatic animals and aquatic animal products by developing relevant aquatic animal health measures. These recommendations address aquatic animal health hazards in aquatic animal feed . A key objective is to prevent the spread, via aquatic animal feed , of diseases from an infected country, zone or compartment to a free country , a free zone or a free compartment .

These recommendations do not address food safety issues in detail as this is not within the mandate of the Aquatic C ode .

These recommendations should be read in conjunction with relevant recommendations of the OIE Terrestrial A nimal Health Code (under study). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has published recommendations relevant to terrestrial and aquatic animal feed (Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries – Aquaculture Development: 1. Good aquaculture feed manufacturing practice. FAO 2001; Draft Good Practices for the Animal Feed Industry – Implementing the Codex Alimentarius’ Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding, IFIF/FAO [In preparation]) and there is a Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) standard (Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding [CAC/RCP 54-2004]). OIE Members are encouraged to consult these publications.

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Key considerations relevant to aquatic animal feed are as follows:

  • 1. 
    Concentration of aquaculture establishments heightens the risk of disease transmission, whether the pathogen enters the culture system via feed or other means.
  • 2. 
    For many aquatic animal species, predation (including cannibalism) is their natural way of feeding in their natural habitat.
  • 3. 
    Historically, animal proteins used in feed were mainly sourced from the marine environment, due to the nutritional needs of aquatic animals and for reasons of economy. This practice increases the risk of disease transmission, especially when aquatic animals are fed live or whole aquatic animals of the same or related species. There are many examples of this type of practice, e.g. early stage crustaceans fed on Artemia species and aquaculture tuna fed on whole wild caught fish.
  • 4. 
    The usage of feed in moist form (moisture content equal to or greater than 70%), semi-moist form (moisture content between 15 and 70%), and dry form (a moisture content equal to or less than 15%) implies different levels of risk due to the processing applied to the feed .
  • 5. 
    With the increasing number of species being farmed (especially marine finfish), the use of live feed and moist feed has increased. It is likely that these industries will in future use formulated feed as appropriate technologies are developed.

Annex XIII (contd)

  • 6. 
    Hazards may be transmitted from feed to aquatic animals via direct or indirect means. Direct transmission occurs when the cultured species consumes feed containing a pathogenic agent (e.g. shrimp larvae consuming rotifer infected contaminated with white spot syndrome virus) while indirect transmission refers to pathogens in feed entering the aquatic environment or infecting non target species, and thereby establishing a mechanism for indirect infection of the species of commercial interest. Pathogens that are less host-specific (e.g. white spot syndrome virus, V ibrio species) present a greater risk of indirect transmission as they can establish reservoirs of infection in multiple species.
  • 7. 
    As new species become the subject of aquaculture , new pathogens emerge in association with these hosts. The expression of disease may be facilitated by culturing species under intensive and novel conditions. Also, it is necessary to conduct research and develop new feed (and feed ingredients ) that are appropriate to the species and its culture system. As more and more aquatic animal species are being cultured, it is difficult to make recommendations for all disease agent /host species combinations.

Article 4.5.2.

Scope

These recommendations document risk mitigation measures, including traceability and certification, to deal with aquatic animal health risk s associated with trade in aquatic animal feed and feed ingredients . They recommend the control of hazards through adherence to recommended practices during the production (harvest, handling, storage, processing and distribution) and use of both commercial and on-farm produced feed (and feed ingredients ) for aquatic animals . Hazards include pathogens that cause OIE-listed diseases and other agents that cause an adverse effect on animal and/or public health. While aquatic animals grown for food are the main focus, the same principles apply to feed for aquatic animals used for other purposes.

Article 4.5.3. Definitions Hazard

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means a biological, chemical or physical agent in a feed or a feed ingredient with the potential to cause an adverse effect on animal or public health.

Article 4.5.4. General principles

  • 1. 
    Roles and responsibilities

The Competent A uthority has the legal power to set and enforce regulatory requirements related to animal feed , and has final responsibility for verifying that these requirements are met. The Competent A uthority may establish regulatory requirements for relevant parties, including requirements to provide information and assistance. Refer to Chapter 3.1. of the Aquatic Code .

It is a particular responsibility of the Competent A uthority to set and enforce the regulatory requirements pertaining to the use of veterinary drugs, aquatic animal disease control and the food safety aspects that relate to the management of live aquatic animals on farm.

Those involved in the production and use of animal feed and feed ingredients have the responsibility to ensure that these products meet regulatory requirements. All personnel involved in the harvest, manufacture, storage and handling of feed and feed ingredients should be adequately trained and aware of their role and responsibility in preventing the spread of hazards. Appropriate contingency plans should be developed in case of a feed -borne outbreak of disease . Equipment for producing, storing and transporting feed should be kept clean and maintained in good working order.

Private veterinarians and others (e.g. laboratories) providing specialist services to producers and to the feed industry may be required to meet specific regulatory requirements pertaining to the services they provide (e.g. disease reporting, quality standards, transparency).

  • 2. 
    Regulatory standards for feed safety

All feed and feed ingredients should meet regulatory standards for feed safety. In defining limits and tolerances for hazards, scientific evidence, including the sensitivity of analytical methods, and on the characterisation of risk s , should be taken into account.

  • 3. 
    Risk analysis

Internationally accepted principles and practices for risk analysis (see Section 2. of the A quatic Code and relevant Codex texts) should be used in developing and applying the regulatory framework.

A generic risk analysis framework should be applied to provide a systematic and consistent process for managing hazards.

  • 4. 
    Good practices

Where national guidelines exist, good aquaculture practices and good manufacturing practices (including good hygienic practices) should be followed. Countries without such guidelines are encouraged to develop them.

Where appropriate, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP; as defined in the Annex to the Recommended International Code of Practice on General Principles of Food Hygiene [CAC/RCP 1-1969]) principles should be followed to control hazards that may occur in feed .

  • 5. 
    Relationship between prions and aquatic animal species

Scientific knowledge is lacking on the relationship between prions and aquatic animal species. There is no evidence to suggest that the use of terrestrial animal by-products as ingredients in aquatic animal feed gives

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rise to risk s in respect of prion diseases. More scientific information is desirable to enable aquaculture industries to utilise more terrestrial animal by-products as a means of reducing dependency on aquatic protein and lipid sources.

  • 6. 
    Bioaccumulation

Heavy metals, dioxins and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) persist in fatty tissues and therefore tend to accumulate through the food chain.

Annex XIII (contd)

  • 7. 
    Geographic and environmental considerations

Aquatic and terrestrial harvest areas for feed should not be located in proximity to sources of animal health or food safety hazards. Where this cannot be avoided, preventive measures should be applied to control risk . The same recommendations apply for the processing of feed and the location of aquaculture establishments .

A quatic animal health considerations include factors such as disease status, location of quarantined premises, existence of processing plants without proper biosecurity measures and the existence of zones /compartments of specified health status.

Public health considerations include factors such as industrial operations and waste treatment plants that generate pollutants and other hazardous products. The potential accumulation of pollutants in the food chain through feed needs to be considered.

  • 8. 
    Zoning and compartmentalisation

F eed is an important components of biosecurity and needs to be considered when defining a compartment or zone in accordance with Chapter 4.1. of the A quatic Code .

  • 9. 
    Sampling and analysis

Sampling and analytical protocols for feed should be based on scientific principles and procedures, and OIE standards where applicable.

  • 10. 
    Labelling

Labelling should be clear and informative on how the feed and feed ingredients should be handled, stored and used and should comply with regulatory requirements. Labelling should provide for trace-back.

See Section 4.2. of the Codex Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding (CAC/RCP 54-2004).

  • 11. 
    Design and management of inspection programmes

In meeting animal and public health objectives prescribed in national legislation or required by importing countries , Competent A uthorities contribute through the direct performance of some tasks or through the auditing of animal and public health activities conducted by other agencies or the private sector.

Operators in the feed and feed ingredients business and other relevant industries should implement procedures to ensure compliance with regulatory standards for harvest, handling, storage, processing, distribution and use of feed and feed ingredients . Operators have the primary responsibility for implementing systems for process control. Where such systems are applied, the Competent A uthority should verify that they meet all regulatory requirements.

  • 12. 
    Assurance and certification

Competent A uthorities are responsible for providing assurances domestically and to trading partners that regulatory requirements have been met.

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  • 13. 
    Hazards associated with aquatic animal feed
  • a) 
    Biological hazards

Biological hazards that may occur in feed and feed ingredients include agents such as bacteria, viruses, fungi and parasites. The scope of these recommendations covers OIE-listed diseases and other agents that cause an adverse effect on animal and/or public health.

  • b) 
    Chemical hazards

Chemical hazards that may occur in feed and feed ingredients include naturally occurring chemicals (such as mycotoxins, gossypol and free radicals), industrial and environmental contaminants (such as heavy metals, dioxins and PCBs), residues of veterinary drugs and pesticides and radionuclides.

  • c) 
    Physical hazards

Physical hazards that may occur in feed and feed ingredients include foreign objects (such as pieces of glass, metal, plastic or wood).

  • 14. 
    Cross-contamination

It is important to avoid cross-contamination during the transport) and the use of feed and feed ingredients . Appropriate provisions should be included in the regulatory framework. Scientific evidence, including the sensitivity of analytical methods and on the characterisation of risk s , should be drawn upon in developing this framework.

It is necessary that the prevention of contamination during the manufacture, storage, distribution (including transport) and the use of feed and feed ingredients and relevant provisions should be included in current regulations and standards. Scientific evidence, including the sensitivity of analytical methods and on the characterisation of risks, should be drawn upon in developing this framework.

Procedures, such as flushing, sequencing and physical clean-out, should be used to reduce the likelihood of contamination between batches of feed or feed ingredients.

Procedures such as flushing, sequencing and physical clean-out should be used to avoid cross-contamination between batches of feed or feed ingredients . National regulations should be followed in order to avoid the use of unauthorised feed ingredients with a risk of cross-contamination.

  • 15. 
    Antimicrobial resistance

Concerning the use of antimicrobials in animal feed refer to Section X.X.X. of the A quatic Code (under study).

  • 16. 
    Management of information

The Competent A uthority should establish requirements for the provision of information by the private sector in accordance with the regulatory framework.

Annex XIII (contd)

The private sector should maintain records, in a readily accessible form, on the production, distribution, importation and use of feed and feed ingredients . These records are required to facilitate the prompt trace-back of feed and feed ingredients to the immediate previous source, and trace-forward to the next/subsequent recipients, to address aquatic animal health and/or public health concerns. The private sector should provide information to the C ompetent A uthority in accordance with the regulatory framework.

Animal identification (in the case of aquatic animals this will normally be on a group basis) and traceability are tools for addressing animal health and food safety risk s arising from animal feed (see Section 3.5. Chapters 4.1. and 4.2. of the OIE Terrestrial A nimal Health Code ; Section 4.3 of CAC/RCP 54-2004).

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Article 4.5.5.

Pathogens in feed

1. Pathogens can be introduced into feed in the following ways: a) via the harvest of infected aquatic animals ;

b) during

of

and

batches of feed remaining in

due to poor hyg

actices, the presence of sing lines, containers or transport vehicles .

or

2. A quatic animals can be exposed to pathogens in feed in the following ways:

a) Direct exposure

The use of unprocessed feed derived from aquatic animals to feed aquatic animals presents

route of

when feeding whole aquatic animals and unprocessed products of aquatic animals to of the same species. For example feeding salmonid offal to salmonids or feeding rotifers or

to crustaceans presents a heightened risk of

b) Indirect exposure

Pathogens in feed may be

contamination of the

mitted to aquatic animals in aquaculture and wild aquatic animals or infection of non-target species.

Article 4.5.6.

Chemical agents in feed

[under study]

Physical agents in feed

[under study]

Article 4.5.7.

Article 4.5.8. Recommended approaches to risk mitigation

  • 1. 
    Commodities
  • a) 
    Safe commodities

The following commodities undergo extensive processing such as heat treatment, acidification, extrusion and extraction. There is a negligible risk that pathogens will survive in such products if they have been produced in accordance with normal commercial practice:

  • i) 
    fish oil;
  • ii) 
    crustacean oil;

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  • iii) 
    fish solubles (a by-product of the fish oil production system, comprising the product remaining when water is drawn off [evaporated] from the residual aqueous phase);
  • iv) 
    fish meal ;
  • v) 
    crustacean meal ;
  • vi) 
    squid meal and squid liver-meal ;
  • vii) 
    bivalve meal ;
  • viii) 
    finished feed (e.g. flake, pelleted and extruded feed ).

For these commodities , Competent A uthorities should not require conditions in relation to aquatic animal diseases , regardless of the aquatic animal health status of the ex porting country , z one or compartment .

  • b) 
    Other commodities

C ompetent A uthorities should consider the following risk mitigation measures:

In addition, risk s associated with the disposal of effluents and waste material from feed processing plants and aquaculture establishments should be considered.

  • c) 
    Whole fish (fresh or frozen)

The practice of trading fresh or frozen whole marine fish for use as aquatic animal feed presents a risk of introducing diseases into populations. Risk mitigation measures include sourcing fish only from stocks where there is no evidence of infection with any of the OIE-listed diseases or treatments that inactivate aquatic animal pathogens.

  • 2. 
    Feed production

To prevent contamination by pathogens during production, storage and transport of feed and feed ingredients :

  • a) 
    flushing, sequencing or physical clean-out of manufacturing lines and storage facilities should be performed between batches as appropriate;
  • b) 
    buildings and equipment for processing and transporting feed and feed ingredients should be constructed in a manner that facilitates hygienic operation, maintenance and cleaning and prevents contamination;
  • c) 
    in particular, feed manufacturing plants should be designed and operated to avoid cross-contamination between batches;
  • d) 
    processed feed and feed ingredients should be stored separately from unprocessed feed ingredients , under appropriate storage conditions;
  • e) 
    feed and feed ingredients , manufacturing equipment, storage facilities and their immediate surroundings should be kept clean and pest control programmes should be implemented;

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  • f) 
    measures to inactivate pathogens, such as heat treatment or the addition of authorised chemicals, should be used where appropriate. Where such measures are used, the efficacy of treatments should be monitored at appropriate stages in the manufacturing process;
  • g) 
    labelling should provide for the identification of feed and feed ingredients as to the batch/lot and place and date of production. To assist in tracing feed and feed ingredients as may be required to deal with animal disease incidents, labelling should provide for identification by batch/lot and place and date of production.
  • 3. 
    Importing countries

C ompetent A uthorities should consider the following measures:

Article 4.5.9.

Certification procedures for feeds and feed ingredients of aquatic animal origin

When importing feed and feed ingredients of aquatic animal origin other than those mentioned in point 1a of Article 4.5.8., the Competent A uthority of the importing country should require that the consignment be accompanied by an international aquatic ani mal health certificate issued by the C ompetent A uthority of the ex porting country (or a certifying official approved by the importing country ).

This certificate should certify:

Specific provisions for OIE-listed diseases may be found in relevant disease chapters of the A quatic Code .

Article 4.5.10.

Risk pathways for chart of pathogen transmission and contamination through harvest, manufacture and use of aquatic animal feed

1. Pathogens can be introduced into feed in the following ways:

a) via the harvest of infected aquatic animals ;

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b) during storage, processing and transport, due to poor hygienic practices, the presence of pests, or residues of previous batches of feed remaining in processing lines, containers or transport vehicles .

2. A quatic animals can be exposed to pathogens in feed in the following ways:

a)     Direct exposure

The use of unprocessed feed derived from aquatic animals to feed aquatic animals presents a potential direct route of exposure. For example feeding salmonid offal to salmonids presents a heightened risk of disease transmission because tissue from a susceptible species is being fed to a susceptible species .

b)     Indirect exposure

Pathogens in feed may be transmitted to aquatic animals in aquaculture and wild aquatic animals via contamination of the environment or infection of non-target species.

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Annex XIII (contd)

Figure 1 illustrates the possible pathways for transmission of pathogens within the feed production and utilisation process.

F eed ingredients of aquatic origin used in aquaculture can be a source of pathogens (viruses, bacteria and parasites) to cultured aquatic animal species. In aquaculture establishments pathogens in feed can infect the animals directly (via consumption of feed ) or indirectly via environmental sources. L ive feed and moist feed are more likely to contain pathogens because their ingredients are either in a raw state or subject to minimal treatment.

F eed and feed ingredients harvested from infected countries, zones or compartments may have a high pathogen load. F eed and feed ingredients from these sources should be processed (e.g. using heat or chemical treatments) to reduce, or eliminate, the pathogen load. After processing care should be taken to avoid post processing contamination during storage and transportation of these commodities . For example, when t wo or more batches of ingredients of different sanitary status are handled, stored and/or transported together without appropriate biosecurity measures, there is a risk of cross-contamination of the feed .

An aquaculture facility can also be a source of pathogens in aquatic animal feed . For example, feed can be contaminated with pathogens through poor hygiene practices at an infected aquaculture establishment . If the feed is redistributed from the aquaculture facility to the manufacturing facility for recycling, or distributed to another farm, pathogens can be transferred to other aquaculture establishments .

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Annex XIII (contd)

Figure 1: Risk chart of pathogen transm ission and c ontam ination throug h harve st, m anufac ture an d u se

of aquatic animal feed

 

LF Live feed

——>

Possibility for risk reduction

MF Moist feed

SF Semi-moist feed

DF Dry feed

+++ High risk of pathogen presence

…………

Redistribution or recycling of finished feed

++ Moderate risk of pathogen presence

+ Low risk of pathogen presence

text deleted

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Annex XIV

CH AP TE R 5.1.

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO CERTIFICATION

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed amendments

  • 1) 
    In Article 5.1.2. the following sentence is included

The international aquatic animal health certificate should not include measures against disease a gents or disea ses that are not OIE listed, unless the importing country has demonstrated through an import risk analysis , carried out in accordance with Section 2., that the disease agent or disease poses a significant risk to the importing country .

To ensure transparency in this process, the following sentence should be added:

"In that case, the importing country should publish through official channels the results of the import risk analisis".

  • 2) 
    In Article 5.1.3. , point 1.a) there is a reference to the pathways to achieve disease-free status. In this reference only two pathways are mentioned: absence of susceptible species and trough targeted surveillance. It woud be helpful to make a reference as well to the pathway based on historical absence of the disease.

Article 5.1.1.

A combination of factors should be taken into account to facilitate international trade in aquatic animals and aquatic animal products , without incurring unacceptable risk s to human and aquatic a nimal health.

Because of differences between countries in their aquatic animal health situations, various options are offered by the Aquatic Code . The aquatic animal health situation in the ex porting country , in the transit country or countries and in the importing country should be considered before determining the requirements for trade. To maximise harmonisation of the aquatic animal health aspects of international trade , Competent A uthorities of OIE Members should base their import requirements on the OIE standards.

These requirements should be included in the certificates drawn up in accordance with the model international aquatic animal health certificates provided for in Chapter 5.10. of the A quatic Code .

Certification should be exact and concise, and should clearly address the requirements of the importing country . For this purpose, prior consultation between Competent A uthorities of importing and ex porting countries may be necessary.

The certification requirements should not include conditions for diseases that are not transmitted by the commodity concerned. There should only be one signing certifying official for one certificate.

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When officials of a Competent A uthority wish to visit another country for matters of professional interest to the Competent A uthority of the other country, the latter should be informed prior to any such visit. This visit should be mutually agreed upon between C ompetent A uthorities .

Article 5.1.2. Responsibilities of the importing country

Annex XIV (contd)

The transmission of this information is the responsibility of Competent A uthorities of the exporting country . However, it can be issued by private sector veterinarians at the place of origin of the commodities when this practice is the subject of appropriate approval and authentication by C ompetent A uthorities .

  • 5. 
    Situations may arise that result in changes to the consignee, identification of the means of transportation, or frontier post after a certificate is issued. If it is determined that these do not change the aquatic animal health or public health status of the consignment, then they should not prevent the acceptance of the certificate.

Article 5.1.3.

Responsibilities of the exporting country

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Article 5.1.4.

Responsibilities in case of an incident related to importationAnnex XIV (contd)

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Annex XV

CH AP TE R 5.2. CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

  • 1) 
    However, the following proposed sentence in Article 5.2.1. does not make sense.

It is essential not to include in the any requirements additional specific matters that cannot only those specific statements that can be accurately and honestly signed by a certifying official

The EU suggests the following sentence:

It is essential to include in the certificate only those specific statements that can be accurately and honestly signed by a certifying official .

  • 2) 
    In article 5.2.3. point 6 there is a reference to certifying veterinarian: please, replace it by certifying official

Article 5.2.1.

Protection of the professional integrity of the certifying official

Certification should be based on the highest possible ethical standards, the most important of which is that the professional integrity of the certifying official must be respected and safeguarded.

It is essential not to include in the any requirements additional specific matters that cannot only those specific statements that can be accurately and honestly signed by a certifying official . For example, these requirements should not include certification of an area as being free from diseases that are not notifiable in that country, or the occurrence of which the signing certifying official is not necessarily informed about. Equally, It is unacceptable to ask for certification for events that will take place after the document is signed is unacceptable when these events are not under the direct control and supervision of the signing certifying official .

Article 5.2.2.

Certifying officials

Certifying officials should:

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  • 3. 
    sign only at the appropriate time certificates that have been completed fully and correctly; where a certificate is signed on the basis of supporting documentation, the certifying official should have verified or be in possession of that documentation before signing;
  • 4. 
    have no conflict of interest in the commercial aspects of the aquatic animals or aquatic animal products being certified and be independent from the commercial parties.

Article 5.2.3. Preparation of international aquatic animal health certificates

Certificates should be drawn up in accordance with the following principles:

  • 1. 
    Certificates should be designed so as to minimise the potential for fraud including use of a unique identification number, or other appropriate means to ensure security. Paper certificates should bear the signature of the certifying official and the official identifier (stamp) of the issuing Competent A uthority . Each page of a multiple page certificate should bear the unique certificate number and a number indicating the number of the page out of the total number of pages. Electronic certification procedures should include equivalent safeguards.
  • 2. 
    Certificates They should be written in using terms that are as simple, unambiguous and as easy to understand as possible, without losing their legal meaning.
  • 3. 
    If so required, certificates they should be written in the language of the importing country . In such circumstances, they should also be written in a language understood by the certifying official .
  • 4. 
    Certificates They should require appropriate identification of aquatic animals and aquatic animal products except where this is impractical (e.g. eyed eggs).
  • 5. 
    Certificates They should not require a certifying official to certify matters that are outside his/her knowledge or that he/she cannot ascertain and verify.
  • 6. 
    Where appropriate, when presented to the certifying veterinarian, certificates they should be accompanied, when presented to the certifying official , by notes of guidance indicating the extent of enquiries, tests or examinations expected to be carried out before the certificate is signed.
  • 7. 
    Their text of a certificate should not be amended except by deletions that must be signed and stamped by the certifyi ng official .
  • 8. 
    The signature and stamp must be in a colour different to that of the printing of the certificate. The stamp may be embossed instead of being a different colour.
  • 9. 
    Only original certificates should be accepted by the importing country .
  • 10. 
    Replacement certificates may be issued by a Competent A uthority to replace original certificates that have been, for example, lost, damaged, contain errors, or where the original information is no longer correct. These replacements should be provided by the issuing authority and be clearly marked to indicate that they are replacing the original certificate. A replacement certificate should reference the number and the issue date of the certificate that it supersedes. The superseded certificate should be cancelled and where possible, returned to the issuing authority.

Article 5.2.4. E lectronic certification

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  • 1. 
    Certification may be provided by electronic documentation sent directly from the Competent A uthority of the ex porting country to the Competent A uthority of the importing country . Normally, such systems also provide an interface with the commercial organisation marketing the commodity for provision of information to the certifying authority. The certifying official must have access to all information such as laboratory results and aquatic animal identification data.
  • 2. 
    Electronic certificates should carry the same information as conventional certificates.
  • 3. 
    The Competent A uthority must have in place systems for the security of electronic certificates against access by unauthorised persons or organisations.
  • 4. 
    The certifying official must be officially responsible for the secure use of his/her electronic signature.

text deleted

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Annex XVI

C HA PT ER 5. 10.

MODEL HEALTH CERTIFICATES

FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN

LIVE AQUATIC ANIMALS AND

PRODUCTS OF AQUATIC ANIMAL ORIGIN

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

Article 5.10.1.

Notes for guidance on the health certificates for international trade in live aquatic animals and products of aquatic animal origin

  • 1. 
    General

Please complete the certificate on paper in capital letters. To confirm an option, mark the box with a cross (X). Ensure that no portion of certificate is left blank in a manner that would allow it to be amended. Non-applicable fields may be crossed out.

  • 2. 
    Part I. Details of dispatched consignment
 

Country:

Name of the country that issues the certificate.

Box I.1.

Name and full address of the natural or legal entity dispatching the consignment. Information on telephone and fax numbers or e-mail address is recommended.

Box I.2.

The certificate reference number is the number used by the Competent Authority of the country to identify the certificate.

Box I.3.

Name of the Competent Authority.

Box I.4.

Name and full address of the natural or legal entity to whom the consignment is destined at the time the certificate is issued.

Box I.5.

Name of the country from which the live aquatic animals or gametes are being exported. For aquatic animal products, name the country(ies) where the finished products were produced, manufactured or packed.

Box I.6.

Box I.7.

Box I.8.

Box I.9.

“ISO code” refers to the international standard two-letter code (ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 Code) for a country produced by the International Organization for Standardization.

Name of the zone or compartment of origin, if relevant, in part II of the certificate.

Name               of               the               country               of                destination.

“ISO code” refers to the international standard two-letter code (ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 Code) for a country produced by the International Organization for Standardization.

Name of the zone or compartment certificate.

of destination, if relevant, in part II of the

Name and full address of the place(s) from which the live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products are being exported; and official approval or registration number when required.

For live aquatic animals and gametes: the establishment(s) or place of capture.

For products of aquatic animal origin: the premises from which the products are to be dispatched.

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Annex XVI (contd)

Box I.10.

Name of the place from which the live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products are being shipped (this will be a land, sea or airport).

Box I.11.

Date of departure. For live aquatic animals include the expected time of departure.

Box I.12.

Details of the means of transport.

Identification of the means of transport at the time the certificate is issued: for air transport, the flight number; for maritime transport, the name of the vessel; for rail transport, the number of the train and the wagon and for road transport, the registration number of the road vehicle and the number of the trailer where used.

Box I.13.

Name of expected border post and, if available, Nations Code for Trade and Transport Locations).

its UN/LOCODE (refer to the Unite

Box I.14.

CITES permit number(s) if the commodity concerns species listed in the Convention International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.

on

Box I.15.

Describe the commodity or use the titles as they appear in the Harmonised System of the World Customs Organization.

Box I.16.

Heading or HS Code of the Harmonized System set up by the World Customs Organization.

Box I.17.

Total quantity or weight of the commodity.

For live aquatic animals and gametes give the total count or weight.

For aquatic animals products give the gross weight and the net weight in kg of the whol consignment.

Box I.18.

Temperature of products for transport and storage.

Box I.19.

For live aquatic animals or gametes give the total number of containers in which they are being transported. For aquatic animal products give the total number of packages.

Box I.20.

Identify the containers/seal numbers where required.

Box I.21.

Identify the type of packaging of aquatic animal products as defined in Recommendation No. 21 – Code of Passengers, Type of Cargo, Package and Packaging Materials of UN/CEFACT (United Nation Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business).

Box I.22.

Intended use of the imported live aquatic animals or aquatic animal products.

Breeding: applies to gametes and broodstock. Grow out: applies to live aquatic animals, a

eggs and

larvae requiring time

culture.

Slaughter: applies to live aquatic animals for slaughter.

Restocking: applies to live aquatic animals for the purpose of rebuilding stocks.

Ornamental: applies to live aquatic animals kept for companionship or enjoyment.

Competition/Display: applies to live aquatic animals used for display or competition purposes.

Human consumption: applies to live aquatic animals (without further aquaculture involved) or aquatic animals products intended for human consumption.

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Annex XVI (contd)

Box I.22.

Box I.23.

Box I.24.

Box I.24.

Aquatic animal feed: means any product of animal origin (single or multiple), whether processed, semi-processed or raw, that is intended to be fed to aquatic animals.

Further processing: applies to products of aquatic animal origin that have to be further processed before being suitable for end use.

Other technical use: applies to aquatic animal products not intended for human or aquatic animal consumption. These include aquatic animal products that are intended for use in the pharmaceutical, medical, cosmetic and other industries. Such products may be subjected to extensive further processing.

Technical use in live aquatic animals: applies to aquatic animal products used in live aquatic animals, e.g. to stimulate ovulation.

Mark, if appropriate.

Details on the nature of the commodity sufficient to identify it.

For live aquatic animals and gametes: Category (i.e. amphibian, crustacean, fish or mollusc); Wild stocks or Cultured stocks; Species (scientific name); Quantity or Weight, and if required, Identification system; Batch number or other identification details; Age; Sex.

For products of aquatic animal origin: Category (i.e. amphibian, crustacean, fish or mollusc); Wild stocks or Cultured stocks; Species (Scientific name); Approval number of establishment(s) (e.g. processing plant; cold store); Lot identification/date code; Number of packages.

3.

Part II. Zoosanitary information

Box II.

Complete this part in accordance with the requirements agreed between the Competent Authorities of the importing and exporting countries in accordance with the recommendations in the A quati Code .

Box II.a.

Certifying Official

Reference number: see box I.2.

Name, address, official position, date of signature and official stamp of the Competent Authority.

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Annex XVI (contd)

Article 5.10.2. Model Health Certificate for International Trade in Live Aquatic Animals and Gametes COUNTRY :

 
 

I.1. Consignor: Name:

I.2. Certificate reference number:

Address:

I.3. Competent Authority:

I.4. Consignee: Name:

Address:

I.5. Country of origin: ISO code*

I.6. Zone or compartment of origin**:

I.7. Country of destination: ISO code*

I.8. Zone or compartment of destination**:

I.9. Place of origin: Name:

Address:

I.10. Place of shipment:

I.11. Date of departure:

 

I.12. Means of transport:

Aeroplane □ Ship □ Railway Road vehicle □ Other □ wagon □

I.13. Expected border post:

 

I.14. CITES permit No(s).**:

Identification:

 

I.15. Description of commodity:

I.16. Commodity code (ISO code):

I.17. Total quantity/weight:

I.18.

I.19. Total number of containers:

I.20. Identification of container/seal number:

I.21. Type of packaging:

I.22. Commodities intended for use as:

Breeding □ Grow out □ Slaughter □ Restocking □ Ornamental □ Competition/Exhibition □ Other □ If other, specify………

I.23. For import or admission:

Definitive import □ Re-entry □ Temporary admission □

I.24. Identification of commodities:

Amphibian□ Crustacean □ Fish □ Mollusc □

Wild stock □ Cultured stock □

Species (Scientific name) Age * Identification system* Batch number* Sex *

Optional and ** If referenced in Part II.

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Annex XVI (contd)

COUNTRY :

II.a. Certificate reference number:

II. The undersigned Certifying Official certifies that the aquatic animal(s) and gametes described above satisfy(ies) the following requirements:

Certifying Official:

Name and address (in capital letters):

Date:

Stamp:

Official position: Signature:

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Annex XVI (contd)

Article 5.10.3. Model Health Certificate for International Trade in Products of Aquatic Animal Origin COUNTRY :

 
 

I.1. Consignor: Name:

I.2. Certificate reference number:

Address:

I.3. Competent Authority:

I.4. Consignee: Name:

Address:

I.5. Country of origin: ISO code*

I.6. Zone or compartment of origin**:

I.7. Country of destination: ISO code*

I.8. Zone or compartment of destination**:

I.9. Place of origin: Name:

Address:

I.10. Place of shipment:

I.11. Date of departure:

 

I.12. Means of transport:

Aeroplane □ Ship □ Railway wagon □ Road vehicle □ Other □

Identification:

I.13. Expected border post:

 

I.14. CITES permit No(s).**:

 

I.15. Description of commodity:

I.16. Commodity code (ISO code):

   

I.17. Total quantity/weight:

 

I.18. Temperature of product:

Ambient □ Chilled □ Frozen □

I.19. Total number of packages:

 

I.20. Identification of container/seal number:

I.21. Type of packaging:

 

I.22. Commodities intended for use as:

 

Human consumption □

Further processing □

Other □

If other, specify

………

Aquatic animal feed □ Other technical use □ Technical use in live aquatic animals □ If Technical use, specify

………

I.23.

I.24. Identification of commodities:

Amphibian□

Crustacean □

Fish □

Mollusc □

Wild stock □

Cultured stock □

Species (Scientific name)

Approval number of establishments

Lot ID/date code

Optional and ** If referenced in Part II.

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Annex XVI (contd)

COUNTRY :

II.a. Certificate reference number

II. The undersigned Certifying Official certifies that the product(s) of aquatic animal origin described above satisfy(ies) the following requirements:

Certifying Official:

Name and address (in capital letters):

Date:

Stamp:

Official position: Signature:

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Annex XVII

CH AP TE R 7.2.

TRANSPORT WELFARE OF FARMED FISH DURING

TRANSPORT

EU comment

The EU can support the proposed changes in the Chapter on Transport of Fish.

Preamble: Transport is stressful to fish. This Chapter provides information to minimise the effect of transport on the welfare of farmed fish (hereafter referred to as fish). It applies to their transport by air, by sea or on land within a country and between countries, and only considers the issues related to their welfare. Recommendations for measures to control the aquatic animal health risk s related to the transport of fish are included in Chapter 5.4. on Recommendations for safe transport of aquatic animals and aquatic animal products .

Article 7.2.1.

Responsibilities

All personnel handling fish throughout the transportation process are responsible for ensuring that consideration is given to the potential impact on the welfare of the fish.

The roles of each of the various personnel are defined below:

  • 1. 
    The responsibilities of the Competent A uthority for the exporting and importing jurisdiction include:
  • a) 
    establishing minimum standards for fish welfare during transport, including examination before, during and after their transport, appropriate certification and record keeping;
  • b) 
    ensuring awareness and training of personnel involved in transport;
  • c) 
    ensuring implementation of the standards, including possible accreditation of transport companies.
  • 2. 
    Owners and managers of fish at the start and at the end of the journey are responsible for:
  • a) 
    the general health of the fish and their fitness for transport at the start of the journey and to ensure the overall welfare of the fish during the transport regardless of whether these duties are subcontracted to other parties;
  • b) 
    ensuring competent personnel supervise operations at their facilities for fish to be loaded and unloaded in a manner that causes minimum stress and injury;
  • c) 
    having a contingency plan available to enable humane killing of the fish at the start and at the end of the journey, as well as during the journey, if required;
  • d) 
    ensuring the fish have a suitable environment to enter at their destination that ensures their welfare is maintained.
  • 3. 
    Transport companies, in cooperation with the farm owner/manager, are responsible for planning the transport to ensure that the transport can be carried out according to fish health and welfare standards including:

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Annex XVII (contd)

  • a) 
    using a well maintained vehicle that is appropriate to the species to be transported;
  • b) 
    ensuring that competent staff are available for loading and unloading; and to ensure swift, humane killing of the fish, if required;
  • c) 
    having contingency plans to address emergencies and minimise stress during transport;
  • d) 
    selecting suitable equipment for loading and unloading of the vehicle .
  • 4. 
    The person in charge of supervising the transport is responsible for all documentation relevant to the transport, and practical implementation of recommendations for welfare of fish during transport.

Article 7.2.2.

Competence

All parties supervising transport activities, including loading and unloading, should have an appropriate knowledge and understanding to ensure that the welfare of the fish is maintained throughout the process. Competence may be gained through formal training and/or practical experience.

  • 1. 
    All persons handling live fish, or who are otherwise responsible for live fish during transport, should be competent according to their responsibilities listed in Article 7.2.1.
  • 2. 
    Competent A uthority , farm owners/managers, and transport companies have a responsibility in providing training to their staff and personnel.
  • 3. 
    Any necessary training should address species-specific knowledge and may include practical experience on:
  • a) 
    fish behaviour, physiology, general signs of disease and poor welfare;
  • b) 
    operation and maintenance of equipment relevant to fish health and welfare;
  • c) 
    water quality and suitable procedures for water exchange;
  • d) 
    methods of live fish handling during transport, loading and unloading (species-specific aspects when relevant);
  • e) 
    methods for inspection of the fish, management of situations frequently encountered during transport such as changes in water quality parameters, adverse weather conditions, and emergencies;
  • f) 
    methods for the humane killing of fish in accordance with Chapter X.X. on the Humane killing of fish for disease control purposes (in preparation);
  • g) 
    logbooks and record keeping.

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Annex XVII (contd)

Article 7.2.3. Planning the transport

  • 1. 
    General considerations

Adequate planning is a key factor affecting the welfare of fish during transportation. The pre-transport preparation, the duration and route of a transport should be determined by the purpose of the transport e.g. biosecurity issues, transport of fish for stocking farms or resource enhancement, for slaughter/killing for disease control purposes. Before the transport starts, plans should be made in relation to:

  • a) 
    type of vehicle and transport equipment required;
  • b) 
    route – such as distance, expected weather and/or sea conditions;
  • c) 
    nature and duration of the transport;
  • d) 
    need for care of the fish during the transport;
  • e) 
    emergency response procedures related to fish welfare;
  • f) 
    assessment of the necessary biosecurity level (e.g. washing and disinfection practices, safe places for changing water, treatment of transport water (refer to Chapter 5.4.).
  • 2. 
    Vehicle design and maintenance
  • a) 
    V ehicles and containers used for transport of fish should be appropriate to the species, size, weight and number of fish to be transported.
  • b) 
    V ehicles and containers should be maintained in good mechanical and structural condition to prevent predictable and avoidable damage of the vehicle that may directly or indirectly affect the welfare of transported fish.
  • c) 
    V ehicles (if relevant) and containers should have adequate circulation of water and equipment for oxygenation as required to meet variations in the conditions during the journey and the needs of the animals being transported, including the closing of valves in well boats for biosecurity reasons.
  • d) 
    The fish should be accessible to inspection en route, if necessary, to ensure that fish welfare standards can be assessed.
  • e) 
    Documentation that focuses on fish welfare and thus carried with the vehicle should include a transport logbook of stocks received, contact information, mortalities and disposal/storage logs.
  • 3. 
    Water
  • a) 
    Water quality (e.g. oxygen, CO2 and NH3 level, pH, temperature, salinity) should be appropriate for the species being transported and method of transportation.
  • b) 
    Equipment to monitor and maintain water quality may be required depending on the length of the transport.

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Annex XVII (contd)

  • 4. 
    Preparation of fish for the transport
  • a) 
    Prior to transport, feed should be withheld from the fish, taking into consideration the fish species and life stage to be transported.
  • b) 
    The ability of the fish to cope with the stress of transport should be assessed based on health status, previous handling and recent transport history of the fish. Generally, only fish that are fit for transport should be loaded. [Except for Transport for disease control purposes. should be in accordance with Chapter X.X. on the humane killing of fish for disease control purposes (in preparation); (under study)] Only fish that are fit for transport should be loaded.
  • c) 
    Reasons for considering of unfitness of fish for transport includes:
  • i) 
    displaying clinical signs of disease ;
  • ii) 
    significant physical injuries or abnormal behaviour, such as rapid ventilation or abnormal swimming;
  • iii) 
    recent exposure to stressors that adversely affect behaviour or physiological state (for example extreme temperatures, chemical agents).
  • 5. 
    Species-specific recommendations

Transport procedures should take account of variations in the behaviour and specific needs of the transported fish species. Handling procedures that are successful with one species may be ineffective or dangerous for another species.

Some species or life stages may need to be physiologically prepared prior to entering a new environment, such as by feed deprivation or osmotic acclimatisation.

  • 6. 
    Contingency plans

There should be a contingency plan that identifies the important adverse fish welfare events that may be encountered during the transport, the procedures for managing each event and the action to be taken in such an event. For each event, the plan should document the actions to be undertaken and the responsibilities of all parties involved, including communications and record keeping.

Article 7.2.4. Documentation

  • 1. 
    Fish should not be loaded until the required documentation is complete.
  • 2. 
    The documentation accompanying the consignment (the transport log) should include:
  • a) 
    description of the consignment (e.g. date, time, and place of loading, species, biomass load);
  • b) 
    description of the transport plan (e.g. including route, water exchanges, expected time, date and place of arrival and unloading and receiver contact information).
  • 3. 
    The transport log should be made available to the dispatcher and the receiver of the consignment as well as to the Competent A uthority upon request. Transport logs from previous journeys should be kept after completion of the transport for a period of time as specified by the Competent A uthority .

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Annex XVII (contd)

Article 7.2.5. Loading the fish

  • 1. 
    The issues which should be addressed to avoid unnecessary stress and injury to the fish include:
  • a) 
    crowding procedure in farm pond, tank, net or cage prior to loading;
  • b) 
    equipment (such as nets, pumps, pipes and fittings) both improperly constructed, for example with sharp bends or protrusions or improperly operated by overloading the system with fish of incorrect size or number of fish per time unit according to the equipments capacity;
  • c) 
    water quality - some species of fish should be acclimatised if there is a likelihood of the fish being transported in water of a significantly different temperature or other water parameters.
  • 2. 
    The density of fish in a vehicle and/or container should be in accordance with scientific data where available and not exceed what is generally accepted for a given species and a given situation.
  • 3. 
    Loading should be carried out, or supervised, by operators with knowledge and experience of the behaviour and other characteristics of the fish species being loaded to ensure that the welfare of the fish is maintained.

Article 7.2.6. Transporting the fish

EU comment

Point 1.c) of Art 7.2.6 should be reworded as to clarify whether the objective of this sentence is to minimise stress and injuries to fish or, for example, the movements of water in well boats.

  • 1. 
    General considerations
  • a) 
    Periodic inspections should take place during the transport to verify that acceptable welfare is being maintained.
  • b) 
    Ensure that water quality is monitored and the necessary adjustments made to avoid extreme conditions.
  • c) 
    Travel in a manner that minimises uncontrolled movements of the fish.
  • 2. 
    Sick or injured fish
  • a) 
    In the event of a fish health emergency during transport, the vehicle operator should initiate the procedure to implement the contingency plan (see point 6 of Article 7.2.3.).
  • b) 
    If the killing of fish is necessary during the transport, the person in charge should ensure that the killing is carried out humanely in accordance with Chapter X.X. on the Humane killing of fish for disease control purposes (in preparation), and in compliance with relevant legislation.

Article 7.2.7. Unloading the fish

  • 1. 
    The principles of good fish handling during loading apply equally during unloading.

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  • 2. 
    Fish should be unloaded as soon as possible after arrival at the destination, allowing sufficient time to ensure that the unloading procedure does not cause harm to the fish. Some species of fish should be acclimatised if there is a likelihood of the fish being unloaded into water of a significantly different quality (such as temperature, salinity, pH).
  • 3. 
    Moribund or seriously injured fish should be removed and humanely killed in accordance with Chapter X.X. on the Humane killing of fish for disease control purposes (in preparation).

Article 7.2.8.

Post-transport activities

  • 1. 
    The person in charge of receiving the fish should closely observe them during the post-transport period, and keep appropriate records.
  • 2. 
    Fish showing abnormal clinical signs should be humanely killed in accordance with Chapter X.X. on the Humane killing of fish for disease control purposes (in preparation) or isolated and examined by a veterinarian or other qualified personnel, who may recommend treatment.
  • 3. 
    Significant problems associated with transport should be evaluated to prevent recurrence of such problems.

text deleted

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Annex XVIII

R EV IS ED AR TICL E X. X. 8.

AN EXAMPLE (DISEASE X)

TO BE APPLIED ACROSS ALL DISEASE CHAPTERS

(SECTIONS 8, 9, 10 AND 11)

EU comment

The EU would agree to limit the scope of the OIE Aquatic Code to issues under the OIE mandate. Nevertheless, it is not clear in the proposed text this limitation.

  • 1) 
    The EU would suggest this alternative wording for the first sentence of point 3 of Article X.X.8:
  • 3. 
    For the purposes of the A quatic Code , aspects of the ICES Code relevant for the prevention of disease X

(full version see: http://www.ices.dk/indexfla.asp) may be summarised to the following points:

  • 2) 
    The link to the ICES Code provided in this article does not work: please replace it by http://www.ices.dk/pubs/Miscellaneous/ICESCodeofPractice.pdf.
  • 3) 
    We would suggest a recommendation for point 4 of Article X.X.8. to help competent authorities to solve the problem when the conditions in the quarantine are not conducive to the clinical expression of the disease. The approach would be to introduce susceptible aquatic animal species (SPF individues) among imported aquatic animals in quarantine. These SPF aquatic animals can then be moved to conditions suitable for multiplication and development of the disease. Therefore we propose the following wording:

With respect to point 3e), quarantine conditions should be conducive to multiplication of the pathogen and eventually to clinical expression. If quarantine conditions are not suitable for pathogen multiplication and development, competent authorities may decide to introduce susceptible aquatic animal species (SPF individues) among imported aquatic animals in quarantine. These SPF aquatic animals can then be moved to conditions

suitable for multiplication and development of the disease.the recommended diagnostic approach might not be sensitive enough to detect low infection level.

[…] Article X.X.8.

Importation of live aquatic animals for aquaculture from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from ‘Disease X’

[…]

  • 2. 
    If the intention of the introduction is the establishment of a new stock, the Code of Practice on the Introductions and Transfers of Marine Organisms of the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) should be considered followed.

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  • 3. 
    For the purposes of the Aquatic Code , relevant aspects of the ICES Code (full version see: http://www.ices.dk/indexfla.asp) may be summarised to the following main points:
  • a) 
    identify stock of interest (cultured or wild) in its current location;
  • b) 
    evaluate stock health/disease history;
  • c) 
    take and test samples for abalone herpes-like virus, pests and general health/disease status;
  • d) 
    import and quarantine in a secure facility a founder (F-0) population;
  • e) 
    produce F-1 generation from the F-0 stock in quarantine ;
  • f) 
    culture F-1 stock and at critical times in its development (life cycle) sample and test for abalone herpeslike virus and perform general examinations for pests and general health/disease status;
  • g) 
    if ‘Disease X’ is not detected, pests are not present, and the general health/disease status of the stock is considered to meet the basic biosecurity conditions of the importing country , zone or compartment , the F-1 stock may be defined as free of infection with ‘Disease X’ or specific pathogen free (SPF) for ‘Disease X’;
  • h) 
    release SPF F-1 stock from quarantine for aquaculture or stocking purposes in the country, zone or co mpartme nt .

4.     With respect to point 3e), quarantine conditions should be conducive to multiplication of the pathogen and eventually to clinical expression. If quarantine conditions are not suitable for pathogen multiplication and development, the recommended diagnostic approach might not be sensitive enough to detect low infection level.

Annex XVIII (contd)

This Article does not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of Article X.X.3.

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Annex XIX

CH AP TE R 112 .2. X. INFECTION WITH ABALONE HERPES-LIKE VIRUS

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

Article 112.2.X.1.

For the purposes of the A quatic Code , infection with abalone herpes-like virus means herpes-like virus associated manifestation in abalone. any form of the abalone viral mortality complex (AVM) caused by abalone herpes-like virus.

Methods for conducting surveillance , diagnosis and confirmatory identification of infection with abalone herpeslike virus Information on methods for diagnosis are provided in the Aquatic Manual (under development).

Article 112.2.X.2.

Scope

The recommendations in this Chapter apply to: Haliotis diversicolor (subspecies aquatilis and supertexta ) and in Haliotis laevegata, H. rubra and hybrids of H. laevegata x H. rubra . These recommendations also apply to any other susceptible species referred to in the Aquatic Manual when traded internationally.

Article 112.2.X.3. Commodities

  • 1. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities , the Competent A uthorities should not require any abalone herpes-like virus related conditions, regardless of the abalone herpes-like virus status of the ex porting country , z one or compa rtment :
  • a) 
    For the species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. intended for any purpose:
  • i) 
    commodities treated in a manner that inactivates the disease a gent e.g. canned or pasteurized products;

ii) biological samples preserved for diagnostic applications in such a manner as to inactivate the di sea se a gent .

  • b) 
    [The following commodities destined for human consumption from the species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. which have been prepared and packaged for direct retail trade:
  • i) 
    off the shell (chilled or frozen).

For the commodities referred to listed in point 1b), OIE Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risk s associated with prevent the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption. (under study)]

  • 2. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of commodities of a species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2., other than commodities referred to in point 1 of Article 112.2.X.3., the Competent A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in Articles 112.2.X.7. to 112.2.X.11. relevant to the abalone herpes-like virus status of the ex porting country , z one or compa rtment .

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Annex XIX (contd)

  • 3. 
    When considering the importation/transit from an ex porting country , zone or compartment not declared free of infection with abalone herpes-like virus of a commodity from mollusc species not covered in Article 112.2.X.2. or in point 1b) of Article 112.2.X.3. but which could reasonably be expected to be a potential mechanical vector for abalone herpes-like virus, the Competent A uthorities should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with the recommendations in the Aquatic Code . The ex porting country should be informed of the outcome of this assessment.

Article 112.2.X.4.

Abalone herpes-like virus free country

A country may make a self-declaration of freedom from abalone herpes-like virus if it meets the conditions in points 1, 2, 3 or 4 below.

If a country shares a zone with one or more other countries, it can only make a self-declaration of freedom from abalone herpes-like virus if all the areas covered by the shared water are declared abalone herpes-like virus free zones (see Article 112.2.X.5.).

  • 1. 
    A country where none of the susceptible species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. is present may make a self-declaration of freedom from abalone herpes-like virus when basic biosecurity conditions have been continuously met in the country for at least the past 2 years.

OR

  • 2. 
    A country where any susceptible species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. are present but there has been no observed occurrence of the disease for at least the past 10 years despite conditions – in all areas where the species are present – that are conducive to its clinical expression, as described in the corresponding cChapter 2.2.9. of the A quatic Manual , may make a self-declaration of freedom from abalone herpes-like virus when basic biosecurity conditions have been continuously met in the country for at least the past 2 years and infection with abalone herpes-like virus is not known to be established in wild populations.

OR

  • 3. 
    A country where the last known clinical occurrence was within the past 10 years or where the infection status prior to targeted surveillance was unknown (e.g. because of the absence of conditions conducive to clinical expression as described in the corresponding cChapter 2.2.9. of the A quatic Manual ) may make a self-declaration of freedom from abalone herpes-like virus when:
  • a) 
    basic biosecurity conditions have been continuously met for at least the past 2 years; and
  • b) 
    targeted surveillance , as described in Chapters 1.4.3.3.1. of the A quatic Code and 2.2.9. of the A quatic Manual , has been in place for at least the past 2 years without detection of abalone herpes-like virus.

OR

  • 4. 
    A country that has previously made a self-declaration of freedom from abalone herpes-like virus but in which the disease is subsequently detected may make a self-declara tion of freedom from abalone herpes-like virus again when the following conditions have been met:
  • a) 
    on detection of the disease , the affected area was declared an infected zone and a buffer protection zone was established; and

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Annex XIX (contd)

  • b) 
    infected populations have been destroyed or removed from the infected zone by means that minimise the risk of further spread of the disease , and the appropriate disinfection procedures (see A quatic Manual ) have been completed; and
  • c) 
    targeted surveillance , as described in Chapters 1.4.3.3.1. of the A quatic Code and 2.2.9. of the A quati c Manual , has been in place for at least the past 2 years without detection of abalone herpes-like virus; and
  • d) 
    previously existing basic biosecurity conditions have been reviewed and modified as necessary and have continuously been in place for at least the past 2 years.

In the meantime, part of the non-affected area may be declared a free zone provided that such part meets the conditions in point 3 of Article 112.2.X.5.

Article 112.2.X.5.

Abalone herpes-like virus free zone or free compartment

A zone or compartment free from abalone herpes-like virus may be established within the territory of one or more countries of infected or unknown status for infection with abalone herpes-like virus and declared free by the Competent A uthority(ies) of the country(ies) concerned if the zone or compartment meets the conditions referred to in points 1, 2, 3 or 4 below.

If a zone or compartment extends over more than one country, it can only be declared a abalone herpes-like virus free zone or compartment if the conditions outlined below apply to all areas of the zone or compartment .

  • 1. 
    In a country of unknown status for abalone herpes-like virus, a zone or compartment where none of the susceptible species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. is present may be declared free from abalone herpes-like virus when basic biosecurity conditions have been continuously met in the zone or compartment for at least the past 2 years.

OR

  • 2. 
    In a country of unknown status for abalone herpes-like virus, a zone or compartment where any susceptible species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. are present but there has been no observed occurrence of the disease for at least the past 10 years despite conditions – in all areas where the species are present – that are conducive to its clinical expression, as described in the corresponding cChapter 2.2.9. of the A quatic Manual , may be declared free from abalone herpes-like virus when basic biosecurity conditions have been continuously met in the zone or compartment for at least the past 2 years and infection with abalone herpes-like virus is not known to be established in wild populations.

OR

  • 3. 
    A zone or compartment where the last known clinical occurrence was within the past 10 years or where the infection status prior to targeted surveillance was unknown (e.g. because of the absence of conditions conducive to clinical expression as described in the corresponding cChapter 2.2.9. of the A quatic Manual ) may be declared free from abalone herpes-like virus when:
  • a) 
    basic biosecurity conditions have been continuously met for at least the past 2 years; and
  • b) 
    targeted surveillance , in Chapters 1.4.3.3.1. of the A quatic Code and 2.2.9. of the A quatic Manual , has been in place for at least the past 2 years without detection of abalone herpes-like virus.

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Annex XIX (contd)

OR

  • 4. 
    A zone previously declared free from abalone herpes-like virus but in which the disease is detected may again be declared free from M. mack ini abalone herpes-like virus again when the following conditions have been met:
  • a) 
    on detection of the disease , the affected area was declared an infected zone and a buffer protection zone was established; and
  • b) 
    infected populations have been destroyed or removed from the infected zone by means that minimise the risk of further spread of the disease , and the appropriate disinfection procedures (see A quatic Manual ) have been completed; and
  • c) 
    targeted surveillance , as described in Chapters 1.4.3.3.1. of the A quatic Code and 2.2.9. of the A quati c Manual , has been in place for at least the past 2 years without detection of abalone herpes-like virus; and
  • d) 
    previously existing basic biosecurity conditions have been reviewed and modified as necessary and have continuously been in place for at least the past 2 years.

Article 112.2.X.6.

Maintenance of free status

A country, zone or compartment that is declared free from abalone herpes-like virus following the provisions of points 1 or 2 of Articles 112.2.X.4. or 112.2.X.5. (as relevant) may maintain its status as abalone herpes-like virus free provided that basic biosecurity conditions are continuously maintained.

A country, zone or compartment that is declared free from abalone herpes-like virus following the provisions of point 3 of Articles 112.2.X.4. or 112.2.X.5. (as relevant) may discontinue targeted surveillance and maintain its status as abalone herpes-like virus free provided that conditions that are conducive to clinical expression of infection with abalone herpes-like virus, as described in Chapter 2.2.9. in the corresponding chapter of the A quatic Manual , exist and basic biosecurity conditions are continuously maintained.

However, for declared free zones or compartments in infected countries and in all cases where conditions are not conducive to clinical expression of infection with abalone herpes-like virus, targeted surveillance needs to be continued at a level determined by the Competent A uthority on the basis of the likelihood of infection .

Article 112.2.X.7.

Importation of live aquatic animals from a country, zone or compartment declared free from abalone herpes-like virus

When importing live aquatic animals of species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment declared free from abalone herpes-like virus, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should require an international aquatic animal health certificate issued by the Competent A uthority of the ex porting country or a certifying official approved by the i mporti ng country .

This certificate must certify, on the basis of the procedures described in Articles 112.2.X.4. or 112.2.X.5. (as applicable), whether the place of production of the aquatic animal is a country, zone or compartment declared free from abalone herpes-like virus.

The certificate should be in accordance with the Model Certificate in Chapter 5.10.Appendix 4.1.2.

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Annex XIX (contd)

This Article does not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of Article 112.2.X.3.

Article 112.2.X.8.

Importation of live aquatic animals for aquaculture from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from abalone herpes-like virus

  • 1. 
    When importing, for aquaculture , live aquatic animals of species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from abalone herpes-like virus, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and, if justified, apply the following risk mitigation measures:
  • a) 
    the direct delivery to and lifelong holding of the consignment in biosecure facilities for continuous isolation from the local environment; and
  • b) 
    the treatment of all effluent and waste material in a manner that ensures inactivation of abalone herpes-like virus.
  • 2. 
    If the intention of the introduction is the establishment of a new stock, the Code of Practice on the Introductions and Transfers of Marine Organisms of the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) should be considered followed.
  • 3. 
    For the purposes of the Aquatic Code , relevant aspects of the ICES Code (full version see: http://www.ices.dk/indexfla.asp) may be summarised to the following main points:
  • a) 
    identify stock of interest (cultured or wild) in its current location;
  • b) 
    evaluate stock health/disease history;
  • c) 
    take and test samples for abalone herpes-like virus, pests and general health/disease status;
  • d) 
    import and quarantine in a secure facility a founder (F-0) population;
  • e) 
    produce F-1 generation from the F-0 stock in quarantine ;
  • f) 
    culture F-1 stock and at critical times in its development (life cycle) sample and test for abalone herpeslike virus and perform general examinations for pests and general health/disease status;
  • g) 
    if abalone herpes-like virus is not detected, pests are not present, and the general health/disease status of the stock is considered to meet the basic biosecurity conditions of the importing country , z one or compartment , the F-1 stock may be defined as free of infection with abalone herpes-like virus M. mack ini or specific pathogen free (SPF) for abalone herpes-like virus;
  • h) 
    release SPF F-1 stock from quarantine for aquaculture or stocking purposes in the country, zone or co mpartme nt .

4.     With respect to point 3e), quarantine conditions should be conducive to multiplication of the pathogen and eventually to clinical expression. If quarantine conditions are not suitable for pathogen multiplication and development, the recommended diagnostic approach might not be sensitive enough to detect low infection level.

This Article does not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of Article 112.2.X.3.

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Annex XIX (contd)

Article 112.2.X.9.

Importation of live aquatic animals for processing for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from abalone herpes-like virus

When importing, for processing for human consumption, live aquatic animals of species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from abalone herpes-like virus, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and, if justified, require that:

  • 1. 
    the consignment be delivered directly to and held in quarantine facilities until processing and/or consumption; and
  • 2. 
    all effluent and waste material from the processing be treated in a manner that ensures inactivation of abalone herpes-like virus.

This Article does not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of Article 112.2.X.3.

Article 112.2.X.10.

Importation of aquatic animal products from a country, zone or compartment declared free from abalone herpes-like virus

When importing aquatic animal products of species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment declared free from abalone herpes-like virus, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should require that the consignment be accompanied by an international aquatic animal health certificate issued by the Competent A uthority of the ex porting country or a certifying official approved by the importing country .

This certificate must certify, on the basis of the procedures described in Articles 112.2.X.4. or 112.2.X.5. (as applicable), whether or not the place of production of the consignment is a country, zone or compartment declared free from abalone herpes-like virus.

The certificate should be in accordance with the Model Certificate in Chapter 5.10.Appendix X.X.X. (under study).

This Article does not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of Article 112.2.X.3.

Article 112.2.X.11.

Importation of aquatic animal products from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from abalone herpes-like virus

When importing aquatic animal products of species referred to in Article 112.2.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from abalone herpes-like virus, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and apply appropriate risk mitigation measures.

This Article does not apply to commodities referred to in point 1 of Article 112.2.X.3.

text deleted

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Annex XX

CH AP TE R 9.X

NECROTISING HEPATOPANCREATITIS

EU comment

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

Article 9.X.1.

For the purposes of the A quatic Code , necrotising hepatopancreatitis (NHP) means infection with necrotising hepatopancreatitis bacteria (NHP-B). This obligate intracellular bacterium is a member of the order α-Proteobacteria.

Information on methods for diagnosis are provided in the A quatic Manual (under development).

Article 9.X.2.

Scope

The recommendations in this Chapter apply to: Pacific white shrimp (Penaeus vannamei ), blue shrimp (P. stylirostris ), northern white shrimp (P. setiferus ) and northern brown shrimp (P. aztecus ). These recommendations also apply to any other susceptible species referred to in the Aquatic Manual when traded internationally.

For the purposes of this Chapter, the terms shrimp and prawn are used interchangeably.

Article 9.X.3.

Commodities

  • 1. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of the following commodities , the Competent A uthorities should not require any NHP related conditions, regardless of the NHP status of the ex porting country , zone or compartment .
  • a) 
    For the species referred to in Article 9.X.2. intended for any purpose: [i) cooked products;
  • ii) 
    canned products;
  • iii) 
    crustacean oil;
  • iv) 
    crustacean meal ; and
  • v) 
    chemically extracted chitin.] under study
  • b) 
    [The following products destined for human consumption from species referred to in Article 9.X.2. which have been prepared and packaged for direct retail trade:

Annex XX (contd)

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For the commodities listed in point 1b), OIE Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to address the risks associated with the commodity being used for any purpose other than for human consumption] under study.

  • 2. 
    When authorising the importation or transit of the commodities of a species referred to in Article 9.X.2., other than those listed in point 1 of Article 9.X.3., the Competent A uthorities should require the conditions prescribed in Articles 9.X.7. to 9.X.11. relevant to the NHP status of the ex porting country , zone or compartment .
  • 3. 
    When considering the importation/ transit from an ex porting country , zone or compartment not declared free of NHP of a commodity of a species not covered in Article 9.X.2. but which could reasonably be expected to be a potential mechanical vector for NHP-B, the Competent A uthorities should conduct a risk analysis in accordance with the recommendations in the A quatic Code . The ex porting country should be informed of the outcome of this assessment.

Article 9.X.4.

Necrotising hepatopancreatitis free country

A country may make a self-declaration of freedom from NHP if it meets the conditions in points 1, 2, 3 or 4 below.

If a country shares a zone with one or more other countries, it can only make a self-declaration of freedom from NHP if all the areas covered by the shared water are declared NHP free countries or zones (see Article 9.X.5.).

  • 1. 
    A country where none of the susceptible species referred to in Article 9.X.2. is present may make a self-declaration of freedom from NHP when basic biosecurity conditions have been met continuously in the country for at least the past 2 years.

OR

  • 2. 
    A country where the susceptible species referred to in Article 9.X.2. are present but there has been no observed occurrence of the disease for at least the past 10 years despite conditions that are conducive to its clinical expression, as described in the corresponding chapter of the A quatic Manual , may make a self-declaration of freedom from NHP when basic biosecurity conditions have been continuously met in the country for at least the past 2 years.

OR

  • 3. 
    A country where the last observed occurrence of the disease was within the past 10 years or where the infection status prior to targeted surveillance was unknown (e.g. because of the absence of conditions conducive to its clinical expression as described in the corresponding chapter of the A quatic Manual) , may make a self-declaration of freedom from NHP when:
  • a) 
    basic biosecurity conditions have been met continuously for at least the past 2 years; and
  • b) 
    targeted surveillance , as described in Chapters 1.4. of the A quatic Code , has been in place for at least the last 2 years without detection of NHP-B.

OR

  • 4. 
    A country that has previously made a self-declaration of freedom from NHP but in which the disease is subsequently detected may make a self-declaration of freedom from NHP again when the following conditions have been met:

Annex XX (contd)

  • a) 
    on detection of the disease, the affected area was declared an infected zone and a protection zone was established; and

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  • b) 
    infected populations have been destroyed or removed from the infected zone by means that minimise the risk of further spread of the disease , and the appropriate disinfection procedures (see Aquatic Manual ) have been completed; and
  • c) 
    targeted surveillance , as described in Chapter 1.4. of the A quatic Code , has been in place for at least the past 2 years without detection of NHP-B and;
  • d) 
    previously existing basic biosecurity conditions have been reviewed and modified as necessary and have continuously been in place for at least the past 2 years.

In the meantime, part of the non-affected area may be declared a free zone provided that such part meets the conditions in point 3 of Article 9.X.5.

Article 9.X.5.

Necrotising hepatopancreatitis free zone or free compartment

A zone or compartment within the territory of one or more countries not declared free from NHP may be declared free by the Competent A uthority(ies) of the country(ies) concerned if the zone or compartment meets the conditions referred to in points 1, 2, 3 or 4 below.

If a zone or compartment extends over more than one country, it can only be declared a NHP free zone or compartment if all the relevant Competent A uthorit(ies) confirm that the conditions have been met.

  • 1. 
    A zone or compartment where none of the susceptible species referred to in Article 9.X.2. is present may be declared free from NHP when basic biosecurity conditions have been met continuously in the zone or compartment for at least the past 2 years.

OR

  • 2. 
    A zone or compartment where the susceptible species referred to in Article 9.X.2. are present but in which there has not been any observed occurrence of the disease for at least the past 10 years despite conditions that are conducive to its clinical expression, as described in the corresponding chapter of the Aquatic Manual , may be declared free from NHP when basic biosecurity conditions have been continuously met in the zone or compartment for at least the past 2 years.

OR

  • 3. 
    A zone or compartment where the last observed occurrence of the disease was within the past 10 years or where the infection status prior to targeted surveillance was unknown (e.g. because of the absence of conditions conducive to clinical expression, as described in the corresponding chapter of the A quatic Manual) , may be declared free from NHP when:
  • a) 
    basic biosecurity conditions have been met continuously for at least the past 2 years; and
  • b) 
    targeted surveillance , as described in Chapter 1.4. of the A quatic Code , has been in place, through the zone or compartment , for at least the past 2 years without detection of NHP-B.

OR

  • 4. 
    A zone previously declared free from NHP but in which the disease is detected may be again declared free from NHP when the following conditions have been met:

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Annex XX (contd)

  • a) 
    on detection of the disease , the affected area was declared an infected zone and a protection zone was established; and
  • b) 
    infected populations have been destroyed or removed from the infected zone by means that minimise the risk of further spread of the disease , and the appropriate disinfection procedures (see A quatic Manual ) have been completed; and
  • c) 
    targeted surveillance , as described in Chapter 1.4. of the A quatic Code , has been in place for at least the past 2 years without detection of NHP-B and;
  • d) 
    previously existing basic biosecurity conditions have been reviewed and modified as necessary and have continuously been in place for at least the past 2 years.

Article 9.X.6.

Maintenance of free status

A country, zone or compartment that is declared free from NHP following the provisions of points 1 or 2 of Articles 9.X.4. or 9.X.5. (as relevant) may maintain its status as NHP free provided that basic biosecurity conditions are continuously maintained.

A country, zone or compartment that is declared free from NHP following the provisions of point 3 of Articles 9.X.4. or 9.X.5. (as relevant) may discontinue targeted surveillance and maintain its status as NHP free provided that conditions that are conducive to clinical expression of NHP, as described in the corresponding chapter of the Aquatic Manual , exist, and basic biosecurity conditions are continuously maintained.

However, for declared free zones or compartments in infected countries and in all cases where conditions are not conducive to clinical expression of NHP, targeted surveillance needs to be continued at a level determined by the Competent A uthority on the basis of the likelihood of infection .

Article 9.X.7.

Importation of live aquatic animals from a country, zone or compartment declared free from necrotising hepatopancreatitis

When importing live aquatic animals of the species referred to in Article 9.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment declared free from NHP, the C ompetent A uthority of the importing country should require an interna tional aquatic animal health certificate issued by the C ompetent A uthority of the ex porting country or a certifying official approved by the importing country attesting that, on the basis of the procedures described in Articles 9.X.4. or 9.X.5. (as applicable), the place of production of the aquatic animal is a country, zone or compartment declared free from NHP.

The certificate should be in accordance with the Model Certificate in Chapter 5.10.

This Article does not apply to commodities listed in point 1 of Article 9.X.3.

Article 9.X.8.

Importation of live aquatic animals for aquaculture from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from necrotising hepatopancreatitis

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Annex XX (contd)

  • 1. 
    When importing, for aquaculture , live aquatic animals of species referred to in Article 9.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from NHP, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and, if justified, apply the following risk mitigation measures:
  • a) 
    the direct delivery to and lifelong holding of the consignment in biosecure facilities for continuous isolation from the local environment; and
  • b) 
    the treatment of all effluent and waste materials in a manner that ensures inactivation of NHP-B.
  • 2. 
    If the intention of the introduction is the establishment of a new stock, the Code of Practice on the Introductions and Transfers of Marine Organisms of the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) should be considered.
  • 3. 
    For the purposes of the Aquatic Code , relevant aspects of the ICES Code (full version see: http://www.ices.dk/indexfla.asp) may be summarised to the following points:
  • a) 
    identify stock of interest (cultured or wild) in its current location;
  • b) 
    evaluate stock health/disease history;
  • c) 
    take and test samples for NHP-B, pests and general health/disease status;
  • d) 
    import and quarantine in a secure facility a founder (F-0) population;
  • e) 
    produce F-1 generation from the F-0 stock in quarantine ;
  • f) 
    culture F-1 stock and at critical times in its development (life cycle) sample and test for NHP-B and perform general examinations for pests and general health/disea se status;
  • g) 
    if NHP-B is not detected, pests are not present, and the general health/disease status of the stock is considered to meet basic biosecurity conditions of the importing country , zone , or compartment , the F-1 stock may be defined as NHP free or specific pathogen free (SPF) for NHP-B;
  • h) 
    release SPF F-1 stock from quarantine for aquaculture or stocking purposes in the country, zone or co mpartme nt .
  • 4. 
    With respect to point 3e), quarantine conditions should be conducive to multiplication of the pathogen and eventually to clinical expression. If quarantine conditions are not suitable for pathogen multiplication and development, the recommended diagnostic approach might not be sensitive enough to detect low infection level.

This Article does not apply to commodities listed in point 1 of Article 9.X.3.

Article 9.X.9.

Importation of live aquatic animals for human consumption from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from necrotising hepatopancreatitis

When importing, for human consumption, live aquatic animals of the species referred to in Article 9.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from NHP, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and, if justified, require that:

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Annex XX (contd)

  • 1. 
    the consignment be delivered directly to and held in isolation until processing and/or consumption; and
  • 2. 
    all effluent, dead aquatic animals and waste materials from the processing be treated in a manner that ensures inactivation of NHP-B.

Members may wish to consider introducing internal measures to prevent such commodities being used for any purpose other than for human consumption.

This Article does not apply to commodities listed in point 1 of Article 9.X.3.

Article 9.X.10.

Importation of aquatic animal products from a country, zone or compartment declared free from necrotising hepatopancreatitis

When importing aquatic animal products of the species referred to in Article 9.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment declared free from NHP, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should require an international aquatic animal health certificate issued by the Competent A uthority of the ex porting country or a certifying official approved by the importing country attesting that, on the basis of the procedures described in Articles 9.X.4. or 9.X.5. (as applicable), the place of production of the consignment is a country, zone or compartment declared free from NHP.

The certificate should be in accordance with the Model Certificate in Chapter 5.10.

This Article does not apply to commodities listed in point 1 of Article 9.X.3.

Article 9.X.11.

Importation of aquatic animal products from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from necrotising hepatopancreatitis

When importing aquatic animal products of the species referred to in Article 9.X.2. from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from NHP, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk and apply appropriate risk mitigation measures.

This Article does not apply to commodities listed in point 1 of Article 9.X.3.

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Annex XXI

DISINFECTED EGGS – NEW ARTICLES

EU comments

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

  • 1) 
    Nevertheless, clarification is needed with regard to point 1.b). What is meant by the level of infection? We think that disinfected eggs should not be imported if the parents have tested positive for a pathogen.
  • 2) 
    With regard to point 2.b), it is not clear why the word "must" is used whereas the normal terminology is "should". Moreover, even if eggs have been properly disinfected and between disinfection and the import, eggs have been kept in specific pathogen free water, they may be infected if transported in non-sterile containers. Therefore, we propose the following alternative text for this point:“between disinfection and import, eggs should not come into contact with anything which may effect their health status”.
  • 3) 
    With regard to IHN, there is an inconsistency between what is said in point 4.1.5. on "Efficacy limits"of Chapter 1.1.3. on "Methods for disinfection of aquaculture establishments"of the Aquatic Manual and the proposed article. In that chapter of the Manual it is said that

"Disinfection of eggs with iodophor may not always be effective in preventing vertical transmission of infectious pancreatic necrosis virus, Renibacterium salmoninarum and infectious haematopoietic necrosis virus, for which this

method was developed initially. The ineffectiveness of iodophor disinfection in some instances has been proven by epidemiological studies and laboratory tests."

We encourage the AAC to ensure consistency between both provisions.

  • 4) 
    With regard to ISA, could you please provide the background information that has led the ad-hoc working group to assume that ISA is not transmmited vertically?
  • 5) 
    We encourage the ACC to draft articles on egg disinfection for all listed diseases.

Article 10.4.X.

Importation of disinfected eggs for aquaculture from a country, zon e or c ompartment not declared free from infectious haematopoietic necrosis

1. When importing disinfected eggs of the species referred to in Article 10.4.2 for aquaculture , from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from IHN, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should conduct a risk assessment based on information provided by the Competent A uthority of the ex porting country , including at least:

a)     the IHN virus status of the water to be used during the disinfection of the eggs ;

b)     the level of infection with IHN virus in broodstock (ovarian fluid and milt); and

c)     the temperature and pH of the water to be used for disinfection .

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2.     If the Competent A uthority of the importing country concludes that the importation is acceptable, it should apply the following risk mitigation measures including:

a)     the eggs should be disinfected prior to importing, according to the methods described in Chapter 1.1.3. of the A quatic Manual or those specified by the Competent A uthority of the importing country; and

b)     between disinfection and the import, eggs must be kept in specific pathogen free water.

3.     When importing disinfected eggs of the species referred to in Article 10.4.2. for aquaculture , from a country, z one or compartment not declared free from IHN, the C ompetent A uthority of the importing country should require an international aquatic animal health certificate issued by the C ompetent A uthority of the ex porting country or a certified official approved by the importing country attesting that the procedures described in point 2 of Article 10.4.X. have been fulfilled.

Article 10.5.X.

Importation of disinfected eggs for aquaculture from a country, zon e or c ompartment not declared free from infectious salmon anaemia

1.     When importing disinfected eggs of the species referred to in Article 10.5.2 for aquaculture , from a country , zone or compartment not declared free from ISA, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk associated with at least:

a)     the ISA virus status of the water used during the disinfection of the eggs ;

b)     the level of infection with ISA virus in broodstock (ovarian fluid and milt); and

c)     the temperature and pH of the water used for disinfection .

2.     If the Competent A uthority of the importing country concludes that the importation is acceptable, it should apply the following risk mitigation measures including:

a)     the eggs should be disinfected prior to importing, according to the methods described in Chapter 1.1.3. of the A quatic Manual or those specified by the Competent A uthority of the importing country ; and

b)     between disinfection and the import, eggs must be kept in specific pathogen free water.

3.     When importing disinfected eggs of the species referred to in Article 10.5.2. for aquaculture , from a country, zone or compartment not declared free from ISA, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should require an international aquatic animal health certificate issued by the C ompetent A uthority of the ex porting country or a certified official approved by the importing country attesting that the procedures described Article 10.5.X. point 2 have been fulfilled.

Article 10.9.X.

Importation of disinfected eggs for aquaculture from a country, zon e or c ompartment not declared free from viral haemorrhagic septicaemia

1. When importing disinfected eggs of the species referred to in Article 10.9.2 for aquaculture , from a country , zone or compartment not declared free from VHS, the Competent A uthority of the importing country should assess the risk associated with at least:

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a) the VHS virus status of the water used during the disinfection of the

b)     the level of infection with VHS virus in broodstock (ovarian fluid and milt); and

c)     the temperature and pH of the water used for disinfection .

2.     If the Competent A uthority of the importing country concludes that the importation is acceptable, it should apply the following risk mitigation measures including:

a)     the eggs should be disinfected prior to importing, according to the methods described in Chapter .1.3. of the A quatic Manual or those specified by the Competent A uthority of the importing country ; and

b)     between disinfection and the import, eggs must be kept in specific pathogen free water.

3.     When importing disinfected eggs of the species referred to in Article 10.9.2 for aquaculture , from a country, z one or compartment not declared free from VHS, the C ompetent A uthority of the importing country should require an international aquatic animal health certificate issued by the C ompetent A uthority of the ex porting country or a certified official approved by the importing country attesting that the procedures described Article 10.9.X. point 2 have been fulfilled.

text deleted

Annex XXII

CH AP TE R 7.3.

SLAUGHTER OF FARMED FISH FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION

Article 7.3.1.

EU comments

The EU welcomes the work carried out on the Draft chapter on the Slaughter of Farmed Fish for Human Consumption and encourages OIE to continue its work. The Community wishes to encourage OIE to develop as soon as possible also the Draft Chapter on Humane Killing of Fish for Disease Control Purposes in consistency with the Terrestrial Code.

In finalising this draft chapter, the EU encourages OIE to take into consideration the recently adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing and in particular Article 3 which is relevant to the killing of fish. OIE might also want to take into consideration the definitions provided for stunning and killing in this regulation.

Specific EU comments are provided within the text. Scope

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These recommendations apply to the slaughter of farmed fish species for human consumption.

These recommendations address the need to ensure the welfare of farmed fish, intended for human consumption, during pre-slaughter and slaughter processes, until they are dead.

EU comment

In the above paragraph of Art 7.3.1, for clarity of purposes the terms "pre-slaughter" and "slaughter processes" need to be defined.

This chapter describes general principles that should be applied to ensure the welfare of fish for slaughter and also applies to fish killed for disease control purposes and intended for human consumption. Specific measures applicable to emergency killing for disease control purposes not intended for human consumption are addressed in Chapter 7.4. Humane Killing for disease control purposes (under development).

As a general principle, fish should be stunned before killing, and the stunning method should ensure immediate and irreversible loss of consciousness. If the stunning is not irreversible, fish should be killed before consciousness is recovered.

Article 7.3.2.

Personnel

Persons engaged in the handling, stunning and slaughter of fish play an important role in their welfare. Personnel handling fish for slaughter should be experienced and competent in the handling of fish, and understand their behaviour patterns as well as the underlying principles necessary to carry out their tasks. Some stunning and killing methods may pose a risk to the personnel, therefore training should cover occupational health and safety implications of any methods used.

EU comments

In the second sentence of the above paragraph of Art 7.3.2, the words "stunning and killing"

should be added after "the handling".

Justification

It is important to ensure that these specific points are part of the training of the personnel.

Article 7.3.3.

Transport of fish for slaughter

If fish are to be transported for slaughter, this should be done in accordance with the OIE recommendations on the welfare of farmed fish during transport (see Chapter 7.2.).

Article 7.3.4. Design of facilities for holding fish prior to slaughter

  • 1. 
    The holding facilities should be designed and specifically constructed to hold a certain fish species or group of fish species.
  • 2. 
    The holding facilities should be of a size that allows holding a certain number of fish for processing in a given timeframe without compromising the welfare of the fish.
  • 3. 
    Operations should be conducted with minimal injury and stress to the fish. Annex XXII (contd)

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  • 4. 
    The following recommendations may help to achieve this:
  • a) 
    Nets and tanks should be suitably designed to minimise physical injuries;
  • b) 
    Water quality should be suitable for the fish species and stocking density;
  • c) 
    Equipment for transferring fish, including pumps and pipes, should be appropriate to minimise injury.

Article 7.3.5.

Unloading, transferring and loading fish prior to slaughter

  • 1. 
    Fish should be unloaded, transferred and loaded for slaughter under conditions that minimise injury and stress to the fish.
  • 2. 
    The following points should be considered:
  • a) 
    Water quality should be assessed on arrival of fish prior to their unloading for slaughter, and corrective action taken as appropriate;

EU comment

Point 2. a) of Art 7.3.5 should be replaced by "temperature and water quality (including oxygen, CO2 level, pH and salinity) in the holding facilities should be assessed taking into account the density of fish prior to their unloading in the holding facilities".

Furthermore, in the same sentence it is unclear if the water being reffered to is that which the fish have been transported in, or that which fish are transported into.

Justification

Water quality can only be assessed taking into account temperature and density of the fish. Moreover oxygen, CO2 level, pH and salinity are important elements of water quality.

  • b) 
    Where possible any injured or moribund fish should be separated and killed humanely;
  • c) 
    The crowding periods of fish prior to slaughter should be as short and infrequent as possible;
  • d) 
    The handling of fish during transfers should be minimised;
  • e) 
    Where feasible, and when applicable, fish should be allowed to swim directly into a stunning device without handling to avoid handling stress.

EU comment

Point 2. e) of Art 7.3.5 should be replaced by the following text "fish should be allowed to

swim directly into a stunning device with minimum periods out of water and with minimum

handling".

Justification

Being out of the water is stressful for fish.

  • f) 
    Equipment used to handle fish, for example nets and dip nets, pumping devices and brailing devices, should be designed, constructed and operated to minimise physical injuries.

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  • g) 
    There should be a contingency plan to address emergencies and minimise stress during unloading, transferring and loading fish prior to slaughter.

Article 7.3.6.

Stunning and killing methods

  • 1. 
    General considerations
  • a) 
    The Competent A uthority should approve the stunning and killing methods for the slaughter of fish. The choice of slaughter method should take account of species-specific information where available.
  • b) 
    Equipment should be maintained and operated appropriately; it should be tested on a regular basis to ensure that performance is adequate.

Community comment

In point 1.b) of Art 7.3.6, for clarity the words "stunning and killing" should be added before the word "equipment".

  • c) 
    Effective stunning should be verified by the absence of consciousness.
  • d) 
    A backup stunning system is necessary. If mis-stunned, the fish should be re-stunned as soon as possible.

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Annex XXII (contd)

  • e) 
    Stunning should not take place if killing is likely to be delayed such that the fish will recover or partially recover consciousness.
  • f) 
    While unconsciousness may be difficult to recognise, signs of correct stunning include i) loss of respiratory movement (loss in opercular activity); ii) loss of visual evoked response (VER); iii) loss of vestibulo-ocular reflex (VOR, eye rolling).
  • 2. 
    Mechanical stunning and killing methods
  • a) 
    Percussive stunning is achieved by a blow of sufficient strength to the head applied above or immediately adjacent to the brain in order to damage the brain. Mechanical stunning may be achieved either manually or using specially developed equipment.
  • b) 
    Spiking or coring are irreversible stunning and killing methods of fish based on physical damage to the brain by inserting a spike or core into the brain.
  • c) 
    Shooting using a free bullet may be used for killing large fish (such as tuna). The fish may either be crowded in a net and shot in the head from the surface, or individual fish may be killed by shooting in the head from under the water (commonly called lupara).
  • d) 
    Mechanical stunning is generally irreversible if correctly applied.
  • 3. 
    Electrical stunning and killing methods
  • a) 
    Electrical stunning involves the application of an electrical current of sufficient strength, frequency and duration to cause immediate unconsciousness and insensibility of the fish. In fresh water, the water conductivity is essential to establish parameters of the electrical current suitable to ensure appropriate stunning.

EU comments

In point 3.a) of Art 7.3.6, the last sentence of the paragraph above should be replaced as follow:

“The conductivity of fresh water varies between sites and over time, so it is essential to establish the parameters of the electrical current to ensure proper stunning”

Justification

Clarity

  • b) 
    The electrical stunning device should be constructed and used for the specific fish species and their environment.
  • c) 
    Electrical stunning may be reversible. In such a case fish should be killed before consciousness is recovered.
  • d) 
    Fish should be confined beneath the surface of the water, and there should be a uniform distribution of electrical current in the stunning tank or chamber.
  • f) 
    In semi-dry electrical stunning systems, fish should enter the device head first to ensure rapid, painless and efficient stunning.
  • 4. 
    Other stunning and killing methods

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The following other methods are known to be used: carbon dioxide (CO2) in holding water; chilling with ice and CO2 in holding water; salt or ammonia baths; asphyxiation by removal from water; exsanguination without stunning. However, they have been shown to result in poor fish welfare. It is preferable to use the methods described in points 2., 3. and 4. of this Article, as appropriate to the fish species.

EU comment

Point 4 of Art 7.3.6 should be either deleted or it should be more clearly indicated that the

stunning and killing methods listed here should not be recommended from an animal welfare

point of view.

Justification

The stunning and killing methods listed in point 4 have been shown to result in poor fish

welfare and therefore should not be used.

Article 7.3.7. Application of some stunning methods for fish groups

The following stunning methods enable humane killing for the following fish groups: Annex XXII (contd)

  • a) 
    Percussive stunning: carp, catfish, salmonids, halibut;

EU comment

The EU would wish OIE to provide the scientific basis for percussive stunning for catfish and halibut.

  • b) 
    Spiking or coring: salmonids, tuna;
  • c) 
    Free bullet: tuna;
  • d) 
    Electrical stunning: carp, catfish, eel, salmonids, tilapia.

EU comment

The EU would wish OIE to provide the scientific basis for electrical stunning for catfish, eel and tilapia.

Article 7.3.8.

Summary of some stunning methods for fish and their respective welfare issues

EU comment

In the table of Art 7.3.8:

It should be defined what is meant by “small”, “medium” and “large” fish sizes. Furthermore, the words “well adapted” should be replaced by “suitable”.

The following text should be included at the end of the paragraph on the disadvatages of percussive stunning method:

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A combination of methods described in the table below may be used.

 

Stunning/ kill ing method

Specific method

Key fish welfare concerns/ requirements

Advantages

Disadvantages

Percussive stunning

Mechanical

Spiking coring

Free bullet

Electrical

E lectrical stunning

Semi-dry electrical stunning

The blow should be of sufficient force and delivered above or adjacent to the brain in order to render immediate unconsciousness. Fish should be quickly removed from the water, restrained and given a quick blow to the head, delivered either manually by a club or by automated percussive stunning. The effectiveness of stunning should be checked, and fish be re-stunned if necessary. It can be a stun / killing method.

The spike should be aimed on the skull in a position to penetrate the brain of the fish and the impact of the spike should produce immediate unconsciousness. Fish should be quickly removed from the water, restrained and the spike immediately inserted into the brain. It is a stun / killing method.

The shot should be carefully aimed at the brain. The fish should be positioned correctly and the shooting range should be as short as practicable. It is a stun / killing method.

Involves the application of an electrical current of sufficient strength, frequency and duration to cause immediately unconsciousness. It can be a stun / killing method. Equipment should be designed and maintained correctly.

The head of the fish should enter the system first so electricity is applied to the brain first. Involves the application of an electrical current of sufficient strength, frequency and duration to cause immediately unconsciousness. Equipment should be designed and maintained correctly.

Immediate         loss         of

consciousness. Well adapted to medium to large sized fish.

Immediate         loss         of

consciousness. Well adapted to medium to large sized fish. For small tuna, spiking under the water avoids exposure of fish to air. The pineal window of tuna facilitates spiking for this species.

Immediate         loss         of

consciousness. Well adapted to large sized fish (e.g. large tuna).

Immediate         loss         of

consciousness. Well adapted to small to medium sized fish. Suitable for large numbers of fish, and the fish do not have to be removed from the water.

Good visual control of stunning and the ability for re-stunning of individual fish.

Hand operated equipment may be hampered by uncontrolled movement of the fish. Mis-stunning may result from a too weak blow. Injuries may occur. Manual percussive stunning is only practicable for the killing of a limited number of fish.

Inaccurate application may cause injuries. Difficult to apply if fish agitated. It is only practicable for the killing of a limited number of fish.

Shooting distance; calibre need to be adapted. Excessive crowding and noise of guns may cause stress reaction. Contamination of the working area due to release of body fluids may present a biosecurity risk. May be hazardous to operators.

Difficult to standardise for all species. Optimal control parameters are unknown for some species. May be hazardous to operators.

Misplacement of the fish may result in improper stunning. Optimal control parameters are unknown for some species. Not suitable for mixed sizes of fish.

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Annex XXIII

CH AP TE R 6.1.

INTRODUCTION TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTROLLING ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

EU comments

The EU would agree with the proposed text.

Nevertheless, in the second paragraph, the words "a priority", with no precision over what, could lead to misinterpretation and should be replaced by "important".

In the third paragraph, taking into account that the OIE web page states that "The OIE member countries have decided to provide a better guarantee of the safety of food of animal origin by creating greater synergy between the activities of the OIE and those of the Codex Alimentarius Commission" the EU suggests that the last sentence of this paragraph reads (new text highlighted in yellow):

Arising from its mandate for the protection of animal health and food safety, and in synergy with the activities of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the OIE developed these chapters to provide guidance to Members in regard to risks in the animal sector.

Article 6.1.

Objective

The purpose of chapters (6.2., 6.3., 6.4. under study) is to provide methodologies for OIE Members to appropriately address the emergence or spread of resistant bacteria from the use of antimicrobial agents in aquatic animals and to contain antimicrobial resistance through controlling the use of antimicrobial agents.

Antimicrobial agents are essential drugs for human and animal health and welfare. The OIE recognises the need for access to antimicrobial agents in veterinary medicine: antimicrobial agents are essential for treating, controlling and preventing infectious diseases in aquatic animals . The OIE therefore considers that ensuring continued access to effective antimicrobial agents is a priority.

The OIE recognises that antimicrobial resistance is a global public and aquatic animal health concern that is influenced by the usage of antimicrobial agents in humans, aquatic animals and elsewhere. Those working in the human, animal and plant sectors have a shared responsibility to prevent or minimise pressures for the selection of antimicrobial resistance factors in humans and aquatic animals . Arising from its mandate for the protection of animal health and food safety, the OIE developed these chapters to provide guidance to Members in regard to risks in the animal sector.

The application of risk assessment measures should be based on international standards on microbiological risk analysis and supported by sound data and information when available. The methodologies provided in these chapters should be consulted as part of the standard approach to prevent and reduce antimicrobial resistance.

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Annex XXIV

GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING SPECIES AS SUSCEPTIBLE TO A DISEASE

Susceptible species as defined in the A quatic Code means a species of aquatic animal in which infection has been demonstrated by natural cases or by experimental exposures to the disease agent that mimics the natural pathways for infection . Each disease chapter in the A quatic Code and A quatic Manual contains a list of currently known susceptible species . The scope of this Guideline is to provide criteria to determine which species should be listed.

Susceptibility should be assessed with consideration to:

  • 1. 
    Identification of the causative agent

Identification of the causative agent in accordance with methods described in the A quatic Manual , is a prerequisite.

AND

  • 2. 
    Natural pathways

Evidence should be classified as natural occurrence, non-invasive experimental procedure, and invasive experimental procedure.

Natural occurrence, data from non-invasive experimental procedures and data from invasive experimental procedures that mimic the natural route of infection (for example, scarification of skin for transmission of EUS) should be considered as evidence of susceptibility.

AND

  • 3. 
    Criteria for infection

A combination of these criteria should be used to assess infection of a host species:

  • i) 
    presence of an infectious or a viable organism, in or on, the live aquatic animal;
  • ii) 
    evidence of multiplication or other development of the organism;
  • iii) 
    clinicopathological changes associated with the infection;
  • iv) 
    specific location of the pathogen.

The type of scientific data supporting the criteria will depend on the causative agent under consideration.

Examples of the occurrence of causative agents in non susceptible species may include PCR positive test results for a causative agent in a atypical species, e.g. KHV in skin of sturgeon; or in filter feeders, e.g. WSSV in rotifers, Artemia, or bivalves; or ISA virus in mussels.

The outcomes of this assessment could be definite, possible and unlikely. The decision to list a species as susceptible will be based on a finding that the evidence is definite.

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Annex XXIV (contd)

References

Scientific Opinion of the Panel on AHAW on a request from the European Commission on aquatic animal species susceptible to diseases listed in the Council Directive 2006/88/EC. The EFSA Journal (2008) 808, 1-145.

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2.

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afbeelding document
 
 

3.

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